

A
GRAMMAR
OF THE
English Tongue,
With NOTES,
Giving the Grounds and Reason of
Grammar in General.

To which are now added,
The Arts of *Poetry, Rhetoric, Logic, &c.*
Making a Compleat System of an
English Education.

For the Use of the
SCHOOLS
OF
GREAT BRITAIN and IRELAND.

The Second Edition, with Improvements.

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T O T H E
Q U E E N S

Most Excellent Majesty.

M A D A M,

IT is the truly Royal Assertion of a very great Monarch, That it is one of the most glorious Signs of the Happiness of a State, to have *Arts* and *Sciences* flourish, and that *Letters* should be in as great Honour as *Arms*, because those are the principal Instruments of Virtue. Your Majesties *Arms* have struck a Terroure into your Enemies, where-ever they came; but the great WITS of our Nation, for want of public Encouragement, have all been rough Diamonds, and want the polishing of Art, which adds all the Lustre, if not Value, to the Jewel.

The Politer A R T S have here been confin'd to Languages unknown, and so the brisker Spirits, averse to the Formalities of the SCHOOLS, have chosen rather to despise what they cou'd not attain, than seem to allow they wanted any Meritorious Qualification.

The Dedication.

The Book now presented to Your Majesty endeavours to open the Doors to all *Englishmen*, to learn the ARTS in their own Mother-Tongue; as the *Greeks*, and the *Romans* did of old, and the *French* Nation does at present. The Language of YOUR KINGDOM, Madam, is more capable of Perfection than that of any of those about us: And there is no manner of reason to doubt, but the *Royal Smiles* of Your Majesty would have as good an Effect here, as those of the *French King* in *France*; in Hopes of which, this Volume is most humbly laid at Your Majesties Feet, by

M A D A M,

Your Majesties most Dutiful

and most Loyal Subject,

JOHN BRIGHTLAND.

The

A GRAMMAR OF THE English Tongue.

Part I.

CHAP. I.

[1] **G**RAMMAR do's all the Art and Knowledge teach,
According to the Use of every Speech,
How we our Thoughts most justly may express
In Words, together join'd, in Sentences.

[2] *Intro*

NOTES.

[1] The modern, as well as old Grammarians, have given us various Definitions of this very useful Art. That of a certain Author seems defective, when he says, *Grammar is the Art of Speaking*; since 'tis plain a Mastery of it, is of more Consequence in Writing; the Solecisms of Vulgar Discourse passing unheeded, tho' they would be monstrous in Writing. Of this Opinion we find the great Mr. Lock.

I cannot omit the Learned and Judicious Mr. Johnson's Definition; *Grammar is the Art of expressing the Relations of Things in Construction, with due Accent in Speaking, and Orthography in Writing, according to the Custom of those, whose Language we learn.* If he had said of Words, not Things, and Quantity for Accent, which is a Thing or Art, which no body alive understands, since it relates to the rising and falling

- [2] Into four Parts the Learn'd this Art divide:
 The First 10 Letters is precisely ty'd;
 The Second does to Syllables extend;
 The Third the various Rules of Words commend;
 The Fourth it self on Sentences does spend.

For in English, as well as other Languages, this Art consists of **LETTERS, SYLLABLES, WORDS** and **SENTENCES**. The *Second* is produc'd by the various Conjunctions of the *First*; the different Union of the *Second* begets the *Third*; and the various joinings of the *Third* compose the *Fourth*.

In the perfect Knowledge of these four Heads consists the Whole Art of **GRAMMAR**.

Letters being evidently the Foundation of the Whole, ought, in the first place, to be thoroughly consider'd, and all those Rules, which Industry and Observation have been able to furnish, laid down in such a manner, that the Understanding of the Learner being in some measure inform'd of the Reasons of Things, may not pass through this Book to so little purpose, as to learn only a few Words by rote.

[3] A

ting of the Voice, not the Quantity.)

We think it the most extensive Definition we have met with; but, indeed, every thing is extraordinary in this Author's Book. And we are pleas'd to find, that ours (which was made before we had the Happiness of seeing his Book) contains the Sense of it. But to Speak, is to Explain our Thoughts by those Signs, which Men have invented to that End. We find the most convenient Signs, are *Sounds*, and the *Voice*; but because these Sounds are transient, and pass away, Men have invented *Other Signs*, to render them more durable and permanent, as well as visible, or Objects of the Eye; which are the Characters in Writing, call'd by the Greeks *ὑπομνηματα*, whence our Term of Grammar is deriv'd. Two Things we may consider in these Signs: The *first*, what they are by their Nature, that is as *Sounds*, and *Characters*. The *second*, their *Signification*; that is, the

Manner in which Men make use of them to express their Thoughts.

[2] Others divide Grammar in the following manner; as *Orthography*, or the Art of true *Spelling*; *Orthoepy*, or exact *Pronunciation*, as to quantity and Accent; *Etymology*, or the Derivation of Words, to discover the Nature and Propriety of single Words; and *Syntax*, to join Words agreeably in Sentences. *Orthography*, or Spelling, has relation to Letters, both to the Knowledge of their Figures, and the Sounds express'd by them, and the putting them together to form Syllables and Words. *Orthoepy* directs the Pronunciation of Syllables, as to their Length or Shortness: *Etymology*, or *Derivation*, regards Words; And *Syntax*, Sentences.

Mr. Johnson, in his Grammatical Commentaries, much better: "From hence there arise four Parts of Grammar. *Analogy*, which treats of the several Parts of Speech, their

" De-

The English Grammar, with Notes.

[3] A Letter, therefore, is a Character, or Mark, either Print or Writing, which denotes the various Motions, or Positions of the [4] Instruments of Speech, either in producing, or ending of Sounds. Or you may term them Marks and Signs, expressing the several Sounds us'd in conveying our Thoughts to each other in Speech.

*A Letter is an uncompoundd Sound,
Of which there no Division can be found :
These Sounds to certain Characters we fix,
Which, in the English Tongue, are Twenty-six.*

Of these Signs, Marks, or Characters, the English Language makes use of Twenty-six, as will appear from the following Alphabet.

Definitions, Accidents and Formations. *Syntax*, which contains the Use of those Things in Construction, according to their Relations. *Orthography* of Spelling, and *Prosody* of Accenting in Pronunciation. Our Division is easily reduc'd to this for *Orthography*, whose natural Place is first, as the foundation of the whole contains *Letters* and *Syllables*. *Analogy* Words, *Syntax* Sentences. As for *Prosody*, we presume it falls more justly (especially in *English*) under the Art of *Poetry*, as we have plac'd it, but as much as relates to the Pronunciation of *Prose* is taken in by *Letters*, where their true Sound is taught ; and our Terms being more plain and easy, and needing no Explanation, we have chose to keep still to them.

[3] There are other Definitions of Letters, as the following : *A Letter may be said to be, a simple uncompoundd Sound of, or in the Voice, which cannot be subdivided into any more simple, and is generally mark'd with a particular Character.* This Definition we take to be in two Particulars ; first, tho' every Sound ought to be mark'd with proper and peculiar Character, yet by the Corruption, or Primitive Ignorance of the first Writers of our

Modern Tongue, the same Sounds are often express'd by different Characters ; and different Sounds are mark'd by one and the same Character : In the next place, *Letters* are the Signs of Sounds, not the Sounds themselves : For the *Greeks* *ϕ* *eduplas* is from Writing, and the *Latins* *Litera*, from *linendo*, (as *linen* it self) or *linendo* ; so that both Words signifie that which is mark'd on the Paper. But if there be any Character, Sign and Mark, that does not express a Sound entirely simple, but a Sound compos'd and compoundd into as many, it is not so properly a *Letter*, as an *Abbreviature* of several *Letters*, or a Contraction of them into one *Note* or *Mark*, containing in it self so many Letters, as its Power contains simple Sounds. This is plain in the *Latin* *æ*, *x*, the *Greek* *ξ*, *ζ*, *ς*, and many others sufficiently known ; for they are compos'd of (*et*), (*es*), (*xi*), (*us*), (*et*), &c. On the contrary, a simple Sound, tho' it be express'd perhaps by different Characters, yet it is to be esteem'd but one Letter : For (*th*), (*ph*), no less than *q*, *g*, and *f*, are but simple Letters.

[4] The chief Instruments of Speech, Discourse or Letters, are the Lungs,

Lungs, the Wind-pipe, Throat, Tongue, Nostrils, Lips, and several Parts of the Mouth. The Breath, or that Air that is inspir'd or breath'd into us, is blown from the Lungs through the Wind-pipe, which furnishes the Matter of the Voice or Discourse. For from the various Collision of this Air or Breath, arises the Variety both of Tones and Articulation: And this Variety comes not from the Lungs, but from other Causes, as will anon be evident. For all the Variation which Sounds receive from the Lungs, is only from the different Force, with which they send out the Breath, by which the Voice becomes more or less sonorous or loud; for the Lungs perform in Speech the Office of the Bellows in the Organ.

I know, Anatomists have observ'd, that we cannot so much as talk without the Concurrence of twelve or thirteen several Parts, as the *Nose, Lips, Teeth, Palate, Jaw, Tongue, Wcason, Lungs, Muscles of the Chest, Diaphragma, and Muscles of the Belly*; but I have nothing to do with any Part, but what is immediately concern'd in the formation of Sounds, the Observation of the Manner of which, leads the Observer to certain useful Conclusions in the Subject we treat of. Farther Enquiries into other Parts concern'd more remotely in Speech, have little but Amusements here, tho' of Consequence in the Contemplation of the admirable Order of Nature.

The Variety of Tones (that is, as far as they relate to Gravity or Acuteness, flat or sharp) arises from the Wind-pipe. For as a Flute, the longer and smaller it is, the more acute or sharp, or small the Tone; and the larger and shorter, the more grave and big the Tone is, that it gives. The same holds good in the Wind-pipe (whence, at least, in some Measure, arises the Variety of Tones in the Voices of several Men; or even of the same Men in the different Parts of their Ages) but chiefly from the

Larynx, or Knot of the Throat: For the Tone of the Voice is more or less grave or acute, as the small Cleft of the Throat opens more or less; and this is the Seat of all Musical Modulations.

From the same Seat must we seek the Reason of the Difference betwixt a gentle Whisper, and loud Talk. For if, when we speak, we make a tremulous Concussion of the Throat and Wind-pipe (that is, by reason of their Extension) it produces loud speaking; but when the Throat and the Wind-pipe are less stretch'd, and more lax, it is Whispering. But all Letters are not capable of this Diversity, or Variation; but only those, which we call Vowels, half Vowels, half Mutes (and such as derive themselves from half Mutes:) For *b, t, c,* or *k*, are simply Mutes, and their Aspirates never admit of that Concussion: nor is their Sound in loud Speech different from what it is in a Whisper.

To this Head we may refer the Hoarseness, often the Companion of Catarrhs, which hinders that Concussion of the Throat, and the Wind-pipe.

The Articulation of Words, or the Formation of the several Letters, begins when the Breath has pass'd the Throat; and is almost wholly perform'd by the Nostrils, Mouth, Tongue and Lips. Tho' these Remarks seem out of the Way to the Common Reader, yet a Judicious Master will find it worth his while to study this Point thoroughly. For by knowing what Letters are formed by the Mouth, Tongue, Throat, Lips, &c. the Master may give a great Light to the Learner in the Art of Spelling, and perhaps the most certain Rule of doing it justly, because in these Notes we shall shew how every Vowel and Consonant is form'd.

[5] Tho' it wou'd be too much from the present Design for me to enter into the Enquiry, who was the Inventer of Letters, and what Nation

Of the LETTERS. [5]

	Old English.		Roman.		Italian.		Sounded.		
1	A	a	A	a	A	a	a	a	
2	B	b	B	b	B	b	be	eb	
3	C	c	C	c	C	c	ſae	ec	ke
4	D	d	D	d	D	d	dee	ed	
5	E	e	E	e	E	e	e		
6	F	f	F	f	F	f	eff	fe	
7	G	g	G	g	G	g	ghee	eg	ga
8	H	h	H	h	H	h	atch	ha	each
9	I	i	I	i	I	i	i		
10	J	j	J	j	J	j	jay	ge	
11	K	k	K	k	K	k	ka		
12	L	l	L	l	L	l	el	le	
13	M	m	M	m	M	m	em	me	
14	N	n	N	n	N	n	en	ne	
15	O	o	O	o	O	o	o		
16	P	p	P	p	P	p	pee	ep	
17	Q	q	Q	q	Q	q	cue	kwe	que
18	R	r	R	r	R	r	ar		
19	S	s	S	s	S	s	efs	ſe	
20	T	t	T	t	T	t	tee	et	
21	U	u	U	u	U	u	u		
22	V	v	V	v	V	v	va	ev	
23	W	w	W	w	W	w	double u	we	
24	X	x	X	x	X	x	ex		
25	Y	y	Y	y	Y	y	wy	ye	
26	Z	z	Z	z	Z	z	zed	ze, orez	

tion had the Honour of first enjoying this Benefit, yet that I may not wholly disappoint some, who may expect this, I shall in a very few Words let him know, That the *Chineſe* are allow'd the Palm in this Particular; for their first King *Fohi*, who liv'd 1400 Years before *Moses*, 500 before *Menes* the first King of *Egypt*, and 2950 before *Christ*, was the Author of this Invention, and writ in their Language a Book call'd *Texim*, which is the oldest in the World.

But this was in Parts too remote, and which had so little Communication with the World, that is, all that World which was then known, that we may reasonably make another Enquiry after the Original of Letters in the higher Parts of *Asia, Egypt* and *Europe*.

'Tis more probable from the *Mummies* and *Obelisks*, that *Hieroglyphics* were in these Parts the first Manner of Writing, and even prior to *Moses*; the *Pyramids* and *Obelisks* being made, at least in great measure, while yet the *Israelites* were in Slavery to the *Egyptians*, and by Consequence not very well qualify'd for Inventions so curious and judicious.

Whether *Cadmus* and the *Phœnicians* learn'd **LETTERS** from the *Egyptians*, or their Neighbours of *Judah* and *Samaria*, may be a Question: since the Bible wrote in **LET-**

ters is more likely to have inform'd them, than the *Hieroglyphics* of *Egypt*. But when or whereſoever the *Phœnicians* learnt this Art, I think it is generally agreed, that *Cadmus* the Son of *Agenor*, firſt brought Letters into *Greece*, whence in ſubſequent Ages they ſpread over all *Europe*.

Thus much I have thought fit to say on this Head: What remains is That as the difference of the Articulate Sounds was to express the different Ideas and Thoughts of the Mind so it is certain, that one Letter was intended to *signifie* only one Sound, and not, as at present, now to *express* one Sound, and then another; which has brought in that Confusion, that has render'd the Learning of our modern Tongues extremely difficult, whereas if the various Sounds were constantly express'd by the same numerical *Letter*, more than half the Difficulty wou'd be remov'd.

But since we are not here to reform, or indeed make a new Alphabet, as some have vainly, again the Stream or full Tide of Custom attempted; but to explain and deliver Rules about that which we have, and according to those Errors and Mistakes which Use, the inviolable Rule and Right of Speaking and Writing, has consecrated, such an Endeavour wou'd be as useless, singular.

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Sample letters

X	X
B	X
C	X
D	X
E	X
F	X
G	X
H	X
I	X
K	X
L	X
M	X
N	X
O	X
P	X
Q	X
R	X
S	X
T	X
U	X
V	X
W	X
X	X
Y	X
Z	X

A	E
b	p
c	d
d	o
e	f
f	l
g	p
h	b
i	k
k	l
l	m
m	n
n	o
o	p
p	q
q	r
r	s
s	t
t	u
u	v
v	w
w	x
x	y
y	

Saxon set Chancery

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z

Old MS. Cap. 11

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z

Chancery Gothic

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z

Running Court

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z

Court hand

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z

Exchequer

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z

Pipe office

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z

CHAP. II.

OF VOWELS. [6]

*Under two Heads these Letters still are plac't,
The first holds Vowels, Consonants the last.*

These Twenty-six Letters are naturally divided into two sorts, which are call'd *Vowels* and *Consonants*. *Vowels*, or perfect Sounds, being by Nature of greater Excellence than *Consonants*, as Sounding by themselves, and giving the later their Sounds, justly demand our first Consideration.

A *Vowel*, therefore, is a Letter denoting a full Sound made in the Throat, and can be pronounc'd without the help and joining of any other Letter to it.

A Vowel by it self compleat is found,

Made in the Throat, one full and perfect Sound.

Five Letters we can only Vowels call,

For A, E, I, O, U contain them all.

[7] In *English* we have but these five Marks, or Characters of these perfect Sounds call'd *Vowels*, *a, e, i, o, u*, and *y* at the end of a Syllable for *i*, which is only a different Figure, but entirely of the same Sound. When these *Vowels* end a Syllable, they are usually long, but generally short in all other positions.

[6] It is of use to observe, that the several sorts of Sounds us'd in speaking, which we call *Letters*, are form'd in a very natural manner. For first, the Mouth is the organ that forms them, and we see, that some are so simple, and unmixt, that there is nothing requir'd, but the opening of the Mouth to make them understood, and to form different Sounds. Whence they have the names of *Vowels*, or *Voices*, or *Vocal Sounds*. On the other side we find, that there are others, whose pronounciation depends on the particular Application, and Use of every part of the Mouth, as the Teeth, the

Lips, the Tongue, the Palate; which yet cannot make any one perfect Sound but by the same opening of the Mouth; that is to say, they can only sound by their Union with those first and only perfect Sounds; and these are call'd *Consonants*, or Letters sounding with other Letters.

[7] If we judge by the Characters or Marks, we find that there is not the same Number of *Vowels* in all Languages, and yet all Nations almost agree, that there are more different Sounds of *Vowels*, than they have common Characters to express them.

*To each of these, two different Sounds belong ;
One that is short, another that is long ;
Five double Vowels add, to fill the Vocal Throng.*

Each of these five has two distinct Sounds, that is, a long and a short Sound ; the short Sound is always made long by adding (e) at the end, as *Lad, Lade ; Met, Mete ; Pipe, Pipe ; Rob, Robe ; Tun, Tune* : To these we must add five double Vowels, compounded each of two of these. To attain to the perfect Knowledge of this, the Learner must first be taught the true Sounds of these five Vowels, as they lie single, and each by it self ; for that is the Guide to arrive safely at all their Variations.

*Besides the long and short, to (A) does fall
A Sound that's broad, as in all, shall and call ;
And in all Words, that end in double (L),
As Wall, and Stall ; in (ld), as bald will tell :
Betwixt a double (U) plac'd and (R),
As Warden, Ward, Warren, Warm, and Warmer*

(A) in these Words seems to have gain'd this broad Sound from the Ancient Spelling ; which, ev'n in the Days of Queen Elizabeth, added a (u) after it, as in *talk*, it being then Written *taulk*, as in *Ascham* and several other Writers before 1560, &c.

(A) besides its short and long Sound, has before (l) or rather double (l) generally a broad open or full Sound, as it has in Words ending in (ld), &c. but when the double (l) is parted in the middle of a Word it is pronounc'd short, as *Shallow, Tallow* ; 'tis likewise broad when plac'd betwixt (w) and (r), and likewise in *Wash, Watch, Water, Wrath, &c.*

*(A) is short when single Consonants conclude,
Or two of the same into the middle intrude,
Or seem in Sound to obtain the middle Part ;
But yet the final (e) do's length to these impart.*

[8] When

For this Reason I am of Opinion (says our learned Dr. Wallis) that they ought to be distinguish'd into these three Classes ; Guttural, or Throat-Sounds ; Palatine, or Sounds of the Palate ; and Labial, or Sounds of the Lips, as they are form'd either by the Throat, the Palate, or the Lips.

If therefore we make this Division of the Vowels according to that Number of vocal Sounds, as we find them in our Time, (as we ought) then will their number be Nine, viz. Three in the Throat, three in the Palate, and three in the Lips, according to the three several Degrees

[8] When a single Consonant ends a Syllable, as *Bat, can, far,* is short; and when two of the same Consonants meet in middle of a Word, as in *batter, cannot, Farrier, &c.* and when a single Consonant in the middle Sounds double, as in *Wh, Dragon, Habit, &c.* and when it precedes two Consonants that end a Word, as *blast, past, &c.* But silent (e) ev'r these two Consonants, lengthens the (a), as *paste, &c.*

(A) *still we long most justly do suppose
In Words which but one Syllable compose,
Whenever silent (e) is in the close.
And when in th' end of Syllables, 'tis known
In words that have more Syllables than one.*

(A) sounds long, small, and slender, iſt, in Words of one Syllable with (e) at the end, as *make, fate, late, &c.* but this is the natural Effect of silent (e), which always gives length to the foregoing Vowel, and ought never to be written when the Vowel is short, 'tis likewise long in the ends of Syllables in Words of many Syllables, as *Cradle, Ladle, &c.*

*No common Word in (a) can e'er expire,
And yet its Genuine Sound retain entire.*

(A) is obscure, or not plainly pronounc'd, in the Word *usand.* None but proper Names end in this Vowel, except these in (ea), which yet sound (e), as *Lea, Plea, Flea, Pea, Sea, &c.* yea; the last Word is out of use.

Of the Vowel (E.)

[9] (E) is of different Sound, and various Use,
Silent it self, all Vowels does produce;
But least it self, yet sometimes it is found
To lengthen ev'n its own preceding Sound;
As we in Scene and Glebe, and others find,
But (e) is mostly of the shorter kind.
But then its Sound is always clear exprest,
As in Whet, let, Well, met, and Rest.

The

manners of opening the Mouth; is, by a *larger, middle, and less* way of opening it in those three Cases or Seats.

[1] We generally pronounce (a) a more small and slender Sound, than most other Nations; as

the French generally do their (e) when follow'd by (n) in the Word *Entendment*; tho' something sharper and clearer; or perhaps its most usual Sound in our Tongue comes nearest to the French Neuter, or open (e); as in the Words *Etre, Tete, &c.*

or

The Sound of this Vowel is differently express'd, and various and great Use in the Pronunciation of other Vowels for, when silent it self, it lengthens them all, but is seldom long it self, or lengthen'd by it self in Words of one, or more than one Syllable.

*Its Sound is always short, howe'er express'd,
As fret, help, left, Beard, dreamt, and blest;
Unless made long by silent final (e),
Or double (e) in Form or Sound it be.*

A single Consonant at the end after (e) makes it short, as *Bed, fret, Den*, &c. two or three Consonants at the end after it does the same; (f) as *left*, (ld) as *held*, (lm) as *Helm*, (lp) as *help*, (lt) as *melt*, (mp) as *Hemp*, (nt) as *dent, bent*, (pt) as *left*, (rb) as *Herb*, (rd) as *Herd*, (rk) as *jerk*, (rm) as *Term*, (rn) as *Hern*, (rt) as *pert*, (sb) as *Flesh*, (sk) as *Desk*, (st) as *Rest*, &c. *blest*. The Sound of (e) express'd by (ea) in the middle of several Words is short; as *already, Beard, Bearn*, (a Child), *Weather, Treasure, cleanse, Dearth, dreamt, Earnest, Earib*, (and all deriv'd from it) *Feather, Head*, (and all deriv'd from it) *Jealous, Leachery, Lead, Meadow, Measure, Pearl, Peasant, Pleasure, ready, Seamstress, spread*, and many more.

It being thus naturally short, it lengthens it self in Words of one Syllable but in these sixteen Examples,

- | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. <i>Bede</i> , | } Proper Names. | 9. <i>Mede</i> , a Country. |
| 2. <i>Pede</i> , | | 10. <i>Mere</i> , a Lake or Fenn. |
| 3. <i>Vere</i> , | | 11. <i>Mete</i> , Measure. |
| 4. <i>Crete</i> , an Island. | | 12. <i>Rere</i> , hindermost. |
| 5. <i>Ere</i> , before that. | | 13. <i>Scene</i> , in a Play. |
| 6. <i>Glebe</i> , Land. | | 14. <i>Scheme</i> , a Draught. |
| 7. <i>Glede</i> , a Kite. | | 15. <i>Sphere</i> , a Globe. |
| 8. <i>Here</i> , in this Place. | | 16. <i>These</i> . |

To these, in my Opinion, we may add *there, were*, &c. *where*, tho' by a different, yet wrong, Pronunciation, for the sound the first (e) in these Words like (a) long.

or as the *Italians* do their (a). But yet not like the fat or gross (a) of the *Germans*, which if long, we express by (au) or (aw); or if short, by short (o).

[9] This Vowel is pronounc'd

with a clear and acute Sound, like the *French* (e) *Masculine*: but scarce ever has the obscure Sound the *French* (e) *Feminine*; unless when short (e) goes before (r), as in *Vertue*, and *Stranger*.

Words of more than one Syllable, the (e) at the end
lengthens these Words, as,

Adhere.	14. Interfere.
Apozeme.	15. Intervene.
Austere.	16. Nicene, Creed.
Blasphe ^m e.	17. Obscene.
Cohere.	18. Portreve.
Complete.	19. Precede.
Concede.	20. Recede.
Concrete.	21. Replete.
Convene.	22. Revere.
Extreme.	23. Severe.
Greve, Lord.	24. Sincere.
Impede, to hinder.	25. Supersede.
Intercede, mediate.	26. Supreme.

ote, That complete, replete, extreme, supreme, are often
compleat, repleat, extream, supream; but since they are
both ways, I wou'd not omit them, tho' they, when in
belong properly to the following Rule.

When long, acute and clear (e) sounds we see,

As in ev'n, evil, be, me, we and he.

Ea, ie and double (e) are found,

Still to express of (e) the longer Sound.

from lengthens the Sound of (e) by the improper double
(ea) in all Words where it does not sound (a) short, or (e)
as will be seen when we come to that improper double

the Sound of (e) is lengthen'd by (ei) in these Words only,

Conceit.	5. Either.	9. Receive.
Conceive.	6. Neither.	10. Seize.
Deceit.	7. Inveigle.	11. Weild.
Deceive.	8. Receipt.	

) lengthens the Sound of (e), or gives it that of double
these,

Atchievement.	9. Cieling.	17. Grievous.
Believe.	10. Field.	18. Lief.
Belief.	11. Fiend.	19. Liege.
Besiege.	12. Friend.	20. Multier.
Bier.	13. Frontier.	21. Piece.
Brief.	14. Grief.	22. Piedmont.
Cashier.	15. Grievance.	23. Pierce.
Chief.	16. Grieve.	24. Priest.

12 *The English Grammar, with Notes.*

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|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| 25. <i>Relief.</i> | 30. <i>Shriek.</i> | 35. <i>Thieve.</i> |
| 26. <i>Relieve.</i> | 31. <i>Sieve.</i> | 36. <i>Thievery.</i> |
| 27. <i>Reprieve.</i> | 32. <i>Shield.</i> | 37. <i>Thievish.</i> |
| 28. <i>Siege.</i> | 33. <i>Thieves.</i> | 38. <i>Tield.</i> |
| 29. <i>Shrieve.</i> | 34. <i>Thief.</i> | |

In all other Words the Sound of (*e*) long is express'd the double Vowel (*ee*), as in *Bleed, Creed, &c.* [10] The Sound of (*e*) in *Stranger* is obscure.

*When (e) ends Words it has no Sound at all,
Except in Words which we do proper call;
Except it doubled be in Form or Sound,
The is to this the Sole Exception found.*

(*e*) it self, at the end of a Word, has now no proper Sound of its own, as in *make, have, love, &c.* except in *the*, which is writ with a single (*e*), to distinguish it from *thee*; and for Proper Names, as *Phæbe, Penelope, Pasphe, Gethsemane, &c.* for (*e*) simple is seldom else pronounc'd at the end of a Word, for *be, me, she, we, he, and ye*, sound wou'd better be written by (*ee*).

*Whene'er the Sound of (e) is in the End,
Some of these Letters will express't you'll find.
Y, or, ie, happy; ey, as in Key,
Double (e) agree; ea, as in Tea.*

But the Sound of (*e*) is at the end of many Words, tho' differently express'd; *first*, and most commonly, by (*y*); as *holy, mercy*; these words may be writ with (*ie*) or (*y*), as the Writer pleases.

2dly, By (*ey*), in *Anglesey, Balconey, Honey, Cockney, Hephrey, Key, Ramsay*, and many more; tho' Custom now begins to prevail in the omission of the (*e*).

3dly, The Sound of (*e*) at the end is express'd by (*ee*), in *Pharisee, Sadducee, agree, Chaldee, Bee, Knee*, and many more.

The Sound of (*e*) at the end is likewise express'd by (*ea*), in *Sea, Flea, Pea, Tea, yea*.

[10] The Use of this (*e*) is the lengthning the Sound of the foregoing Consonant; and a very learned Man is of Opinion, that it had this Original, That it was pronounc'd but in obscure manner, like the (*e*) Feminine of the French; so that the Words *take, one, Wine, &c.* were are now Words of one Syllable, formerly Dis-syllables, or Words of two Syllables, *ta-ke, o-ne, Wi-ne*, so that the first Vowel terminating the first Syllable, was therefore lost, and that obscure Sound of the

Where e'er the silent (e) a Place obtains,
The Voice foregoing Length and Softness gains.
And after (c) and (g) this softning-Power remains.

The silent (e), which is put at the end of Words and Syllables, does not only produce, or lengthen the foregoing Vowel, but often renders its Sound more soft; as in *Face* and *Lace*; in *Rag*, *Rage*, *Stag*, *Stage*, *bug*, *buge*.

In Compound Words its Silence (e) retains,
Which in the Simple, in the end it gains.

It does the same Office in the middle Syllables, when it follows (g) or (c), as in *Advancement*, *Encouragement*; since (c) and (g) are always sounded hard, unless (e) or (i) soften them; as *sing*, *singe*, *swing*, *swinge*, &c.

I, O and U, at th' end of Words require
The silent (e), the same do's (va) desire.

The silent (e) is added to (i), (o) and (u), at the end of Words, because the Genius of the Language requires it; and likewise to (v) Consonant or (va), except when an (i) follows in the same Word; as in *living*, *thriving*, &c. to avoid the concurrence of too many Vowels, it's preserv'd in *blameable*, *changeable*, &c. to mark the distinct Syllables. For (ie) we often now put (y), as *Mercy* for *Mercie*, and *dy* for *die*, &c.

In Compound Words, tho' of obscurer sound,
Or ev'n silent, (e) must still be found.

Tho'

(e) by little and little vanish'd so far, that in the end it was totally neglected, as the (e) *Feminine* of the *French* often is, the Quantity of the foregoing Vowel being preserv'd, and all the other Letters keeping their Sounds, as if the (e) were likewise to be pronounc'd. And a stronger Argument of this is, that we see this mute (e) in the old Orthography or Spelling perpetually annex'd to many Words, in which it is now constantly omitted, as *Darke*, *Marke*, *Selfe*, *Leafe*, *Waite*, and innumerable more, to which Words there is no Reason to imagin, that it shou'd have been join'd, if it had not been pronounc'd. *Dar-ke*, *Mar-ke*, *Sel-fe*, *Lea-fe*, *Wai-te*, &c. For 'tis plain,

it could not be join'd to those Words to make the foregoing Syllable long, which is now its principal Use, because the precedent Syllables are either not long, or made so by their *Diphthongs*, or *double Vowels*. Another Proof of this is, that we find in the old Poets this (e) makes either another Syllable or not, as the Occasion of the Verse requires; which happens to the *French* (e) *Feminine*, both in Verse and Prose.

But tho' this mute (e) is not sounded in our Time, yet is it far from being of no use and superfluous, for besides its demonstrating, that those Words were formerly of more Syllables, than they are at present, it yet serves to these three Uses:

C

First,

Tho' (e) be not sounded, or at least very obscurely, yet must it not be left out in Writing in the middle of Compound Words, as *namely, finely, closely, handsomely, whereof, wherein, whereon, &c.* nor after (l) at the end of a Word, another Consonant preceeding it, tho' obscurely sounded, as *Bridle, Right Bugle, &c.* for its Virtue still reaches the foregoing Vowel as to its Length and Softness, unless where three Consonants intervene, as in *Fiddle, Ruffle, &c.* which are call'd a Syllable and half, tho' in reality they are two distinct Syllables, as is plain from our Verses.

When (n) concludes a Word, the (e)'s obscure, Or does perhaps no Sound at all endure.

The Sound of (e) before (n) at the end of a Word is very obscure, or rather silent, as *eleven, seven, even, Heaven, bounden, beaten, &c.* and this is so plain, that in Verse they are not always us'd for Words of but one Syllable. But proper Names of Persons and Places are an Exception to this Rule as *Eden, Eben, &c.*

When (re) concludes a Word the Sound removes Before the (r) and (u), it mostly proves.

The Sound of (e) after (r) is silent, or passes into a precurrent (u) obscure; as *Fire, sounds Fi-ur; Desire, Des-ur; more, mo-ur; Mare, Ma-ur; Rere, Re-ur, &c.* The same holds in *Acre, Massacre, Meagre, Maugre, &c.*

When (s) at the end of Plural Words is found, As to the silent (e) affords no Sound.

First, To preserve the Quantity of the foregoing Vowel, which is long before, remains To, tho' that final or mute (e) be pronounc'd. 2ly, To soften the sound of (c) (g) and (th), as *huge, since, breathe, wreath, feast*, which that being away, would be pronounc'd *hug, sink, breath, wreath, feast, &c.* 3ly, To distinguish (v) Consonant from (u) Vowel, as in *have, crave, save, &c.* which would else be *bau, crau, sau, &c.* but (v) Consonant having now a peculiar and proper Character, it may perhaps hereafter happen that this mute (e) may be left out after it.

Whenever there is neither of the Considerations, it is redundant, except when it follows (l), preceeded by some other Consonant, as in *Handle, Candle, &c.* here indeed the U is not so apparent as in the following Instances, yet it has even here an obscure Sound, and the ending Consonants could not be pronounc'd without it; nay, in Verse they always make two Syllables: So that Dr. Wallis, who makes it here redundant, is certainly mistaken; tho' he is perfectly in the right in *Trifle, Title, Table, Noble, &c.* since as he observes here, the mute, rather the obscure (e) produces it.

(E) is silent when (s) is added to ends of Words in Names, which signifie more than one; as in *Blades, Trades, Glades, Tribes*, &c. but the Reason of this is, because the Word had (e) silent to soften and lengthen the Sound before, and the (s) is only added to shew, that it signifies more than one. Thus in *bites, takes, likes, strikes*, &c. which you will find anon to be call'd, by way of Excellence, Words that affirm something of some Name, or Person. And tho' the Affirmation and Name are often written with the same Letters, as *Trades* signifying many Trades, and *trades, he trades*; yet, besides the Sense, the writing the Name with a Capital or great Letter, and the Word of Affirmation with a small, (for so they ought to be written) may sufficiently distinguish them. Nor must (e) final be omitted, tho' the Syllable, that goes before consist of a double Vowel, as *House, Cleanse, Disease, Insease*, &c. and in *Horse, Nurse, Purse*.

But (e) between two (s's) at the end,
Do's to the Ear a certain Sound commend;
Or else between c, g, ch, z and s,
It still another Syllable must express.

But here it is to be noted, that Words that have the Sound (s), or (s) mingled in their Sound, (es) then makes another distinct Syllable; as after (e) in *Traces, Places, Slices*, &c. after (ch) in *Breaches, Reaches, Leeches, Riches*, &c. after (g) in *Images, Sieges, obliges*, &c. after (s) in *Horses, Muscs, Closes, Roses*, &c. after (z) in *razes, amazes, surprizes*, &c.

[11] Of the Vowel (I).

When (I) precedes ght, and nd,
Gh, mb, gn, ld still long will be;
Else it is always short, as you will see.

As for its being long when (e) silent concludes the Syllable, in *tide, abide*, &c. that is according to the general Rule (e) silent after any other Vowel; the same will hold of (e) after (r) in *Fire, Desire*, &c. Examples of the foregoing Rule, are

<p>This mute (e) in the middle of words is seldom us'd, unless it was the primitive Words a final (e), in <i>Advancement, Changeable</i>, &c. was final in <i>Advance, Change</i>, &c. at this (e) which is mute in words the singular Number, is sounded</p>	<p>in the plural, <i>House, Houses</i>, &c. [11] When (i) is short, it sounds most commonly like that of the (i) of the French, and other Nations, with the small Sound; but when 'tis long, it is pronounc'd like the Greek (η).</p>
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are *Delight, Fight, Mind, rind, kind, high, nigh, sigh*; *climb, design, mild, Child*, except *build, guild*. Short, as *bid, did, will, still, win, quilt, Mint, fit, &c.*

(I) before (r) the Sound of (u) does sute,
Except in *ir* for *in*, as in *irresolute*.

Irreverent, irrevocable, irretrievable, irreligious, &c.

(I) before (er) and (on) still sounds as (ye),
And after (ft) the Sound the same will be.

Examples are *Bullion, Onion, Communion, Hollier, Collin, Fannier, &c. Celestial, Christian, Combustion, Question, &c.* and so it sounds in *Poiniard*. 'Tis obscure in *Gossip*.

To Sound like double (e), (i) does incline,
As in *Machine, and Shire, and Magazine*;
Like (a) in *Sirrah*; but writ (oi) in *join*.

And also in *appoint, boil, broil, joint, &c.*

No English Word can end in naked (i),
It must add (e) or in their Room place (y).

The (e) is added to (i) in the Conclusion of Words, and (i) often put in their Room, yet (ie) is better after (f) and (s) as in *crucifie, dignifie, crasie, busie, Gipsie, &c.* Tho' *Incuriousness*, often in these Words, puts (y).

[12] Of the Vowel (O).

(O) does express three several sorts of Sound,
As (o) in *go*, the Mouth still opening round:
Of (au) in *Folly*, (u) in *come and some*,
And before (l) and single (m), except in *Home*.

This Vowel expresses (o) round in *Rose*, (a) long in *folly*, (u) obscure in *come and some, &c.*

(O) in these places Sounds (u) because these Words were Originally spelt with a (u) and not an (o).

(O) still is short, unless when it is found
In one of all these ways to lengthen Sound;
When (o) a Word or Syllable does close,
Unless when double Sounds of Consonants oppose.

[12] Short (o) is pronounc'd like the German (a) or open or fat (o), only it is short; as in *fond, mollifie,*

&c. long (o) is pronounc'd like the Greek (ω) and the French (au).

It closes in *go, ho, lo, so, wo, no, who, do, undo, whose, &c.* when it ends Syllables, as in *glo-rious, Sto-ry, &c.* exceptions, as *Body, codicile, notable, &c.* when the Sound of the following Syllable is doubled.

*When (o) before double (l) its place does hold,
Or else before (ld), as Scroll, bold, Gold
Before (lt) as molten, Bolt; before
(Lft), as Bolster, and several more*

Examples. When double (l) ends a Word, as *Toll, Poll, Roll, controll, &c.* but those were Originally written with (ou), and retain the long Sound of the double Vowel. (ld) as *old, bold, hold, &c.* before (lt) and (lft) as *Bolt, holt, Colt, Uphol-ler, &c.*

*Before (rd), (rge), as Cord and Forge,
Ford, Sword and gord, and likewise George & gorge.
Before (rm), (rn), (rt), as Storm,
Forlorn, exhort, and others may inform.*

But softer and more obscure in *Fort, Comfort, Effort*, which has two ways of Pronunciation, the last Syllable being long, and the first short some Times, and at other Times the contrary; tho' the first way is the most just and true Quantity, *Import, Transport, &c.*

*Before (ft) and (ught); as Post,
(But with a sharper Tone in Frost, lost, Cost)
Nought, bought, Thought, and after it when we view
The Syllable close up with double (u),
As we in blow, show and know find true.*

If it be long by the Syllables ending with (w), it will be no less by adding (e) silent, whose Quality is to lengthen the foregoing Vowel, and which ought to be added in *Bowe, blowe, growe, glowe, &c.* to distinguish them from Words which have the Sound of the proper double Vowel (ow); as *How, now, low, &c.*

*In Words of many Syllables (O)'l be
Obscure in Sound, when plac'd before a (P).*

As for Example, in *Bishop, Bishoprick*; but in Words of one Syllable it sounds open, as in *stop, hop, stop, &c.* It is likewise very obscure before (n) at the end of a Word, as in *Hutton, Hutton, Button, Parson, Capon, Falcon, &c.* But these are rather silent (o)'s than obscure (u)'s, the second Syllable being

so much suppress'd, that it seems no more than the second *Heaven, even, &c.* which Use has now made but one.

*When single (l) or (m), or (r) pursue
(O), when its plac'd 'twixt (r) and double (u)
When follow'd by (va) and silent (e) we prove,
(O) then sounds (u), except in Rove, Grove, frove.*

This is plain from these Examples: *Colour, Columbine, Colony, &c. Comfort, come, Kingdom, Besom, Fathom, random, &c.* but commonly, &c. is excepted. *World, Work, Worship, &c.* before (th), as *Brother, Mother, smother, &c.* except *Brother Cloth, Froth, Troth, Wroth*; but most of these have been, and are still frequently written with (oa). (O) after (r), in *Apron, Citron, environ, Iron, Saffron*, is obscure like (u), and in *Rome (the City)* 'tis pronounc'd like (oo) in *Room*.

*The Sound of (o) in th' end you still must know
Is ne'r express'd thus nakedly by (o),
Except in do, unto, go, lo, so, and no.* }

(O) never ends an *English Word*, except before excepted and *undo, whofo*, (an antiquated Word) *to, too, two, who, mo*, (for *more* is a Word quite out of use) the Sound of (o) being there express'd by (ow), except in *Foe, Toe, Doe, Roe*.

[13] Of the Vowel (U).

*Two Sounds in (u) we certainly shall find
Rub's of the shorter, Muse the longer kind.*

The long Sound is what it bears in the single Vowel, the short is more obscure and Lingual. The short Sounds are *Dub, rub, rut, Gun, Drum, burst, must, Rust*.

*Long, when in Words of many Syllables
It ends a Syllable, as in Durables.*

This Vowel, when it ends a Syllable in Words of many Syllables, is long; as in *Curious, Union, Importunity, Furious, Priority, Security, &c.* But this long Quality of (u) in this place seems to come from (e) final, understood, tho' left out to avoid the clashing of two Vowels, for it might be *Durable, Impunity, &c.* tho' a following Vowel of any kind will, after a single Consonant, naturally lengthen the foregoing; except when the Sound of the following Consonant is doubled, as in *Bury*

[13] The (u) long is pronounc'd like the French (u), small or slender

[14]

ed, Study, &c. where the (u) is shorten'd and falls into the end of (o) short or obscure.

No English Word in (u) can fairly end,
If Sound express'd by (ew) or (ue) we find,
Except you, thou and lieu, and this one Word adieu.
Few Words begin with, or i'ib' middle have (eu).

Instead of (u) in the end, we put (ew), or (ue), as Nephew, Sinew, Yew, &c. and accrue, Ague, Avenue, &c. Nor is the Sound of (u) in the beginning and middle of Words, in any Words, except such as are deriv'd from the Greek; as Charist, Eunuch, Euphrates, Eulogy, Eutychus, Euphony, Deuce, Exeteronomy, Europe, Euroclydon, Eusebius, Eustace, Euterpe, Eutyphor, Feud, Grandeur, Pleurisie, Pleuritick, Rheumatick, Rheumatism, &c.

Where e'er the (u) is long besides, 'tis found
That its own Character denotes its Sound.
Ar, ir, or, with ure, and er,
T'express the Sound of (u) we oft prefer.
When at the end of Words, that do consist
Of many Syllables, they are plac'd.

The Sound of (u) in all other places, but what are mention'd where it is long, is express'd by the Vowel it self; but when it is obscure and short in the end of Words of many Syllables, and some of one) it is sometimes express'd by (ar), by the Corptness of our Pronunciation; as in Altar, angular, calendar, jocular, medlar, pedlar, pillar, solar, &c. or by (ir), as Birch, shirt, sir, surname; to spirt, or squirt Water, stir, third, thirty, the Words deriv'd from it, &c. or by (or), as in Actors, actors, administrator, ambassador, anchor, assessor, corrector, cancellor, oppressor, &c. or by (ure), as in Adventure, architecture, conjecture, conjure, creature, feature, figure, fracture, furniture, gesture, imposture, inclosure, indenture, injure, jointure, lecture, leisure, manufacture, mixture, nature, nurture, pasture, peradventure, picture, pleasure, posture, pressure, rupture, scripture, sculpture, stature, structure, superstructure, tincture, torture, treasure, venture, vesture, verdure. These we have insert'd because the (u) is short and obscure, tho' it have (e) final at the end, and serves therefore for an Exception to that Rule, as well as an Example of this. Or by (er), as Adder, Adulterer, Auger a Tool, Ballisters, manner, Fodder, Crofier, Crupper, Daughter, slaughter, &c. [14]

[14] We shall here, at the end of the *Vowels*, say a few Words of their Formation, which well study'd, will (as we have observ'd) be a great Help to the Art of Spelling. To proceed therefore according to the Division made in our Notes on Number [6]. The *Gutturals*, or *Throat-Letters*, or *Vowels*, are form'd in the top or upper part of the Throat, or the lower part of the *Palate* or *Tongue*, by a moderate Compression of the Breath. When the Breath goes out with a full gust, or larger opening of the Mouth, the German (*a*), or the open (*o*) is form'd. But the *French*, and other Nations, as well as the *Germans*, most commonly pronounce their (*a*) in that manner: The *English* expresses that Sound, when it is short, by short (*o*); but when it is long, by (*au*) or (*aw*), but seldom by (*a*). For in the Words *fall*, *Folly*, *Call*, *Collar*, *Laws*, *Loss*, *Cause*, *Cost*, and *odd*, *sawd*, *sod*; and in many other Words like these, there is the same sound of the *Vowels* in both Syllables, only in the first it is long, and in the last short. And this perhaps might bring our former Division of Sounds into doubt, since that supposes the Difference to arise from their Length or Brevity; whereas here we make the Sounds the same. But this must be here understood of the Formation of the Sounds; that is, the short and the long Sounds are produc'd in the same Seats or Places of Formation; but in the former Rule the Hearing only is the Judge of the Sounds, as they are emitted, not as to the Place of their Formation.

In this same Place, but with a more moderate Opening of the Mouth, is form'd the *French* (*e*) Feminine, with an obscure Sound: Nor is there any Difference in the Formation of this Letter, from the Formation of the foregoing open (*a*), but that the Mouth or Lips are more contracted in this, than in the former. This is a Sound, that the *English* scarce any where allow, or

know, except when the short (*e*) immediately precedes the Letter (*i*) as *liberal*, *Virtue*, *Liberty*, &c.

The same Place is the Seat of the Formation of (*o*) and (*u*) obscure, but still with a less opening of the Mouth; and it differs from the *French* (*e*) Feminine only in this, that the Mouth being less open'd, the Lips come nearer together. This same Sound the *French* have in the last Syllable of the Words *serviteur*, *sacificateur*, &c. The *English* expresses this Sound by short (*u*), as in *turn*, *burn*, *dull*, *cut*, &c. and sometimes by a Negligence of Pronunciation, they express the same Sound by (*o*) and (*ou*), as in *come*, *some*, *done*, *company*, *country*, *couple*, *cover*, *love*, &c. and some others, which they ought more justly to give another Sound to. The Welsh generally expresses this Sound by (*y*), only that Letter at the end of Words with them sounds (*i*).

The Palatine Vowels are form'd in the *Palate*, that is, by a moderate Compression of the Breath between the middle of the *Palate* and the *Tongue*; that is, when the hollow of the *Palate* is made less by the raising of the middle of the *Tongue*, than in the Pronunciation of the Throat, or *Guttural Sounds*. These Sounds are of three sorts, according to the lessening or enlarging of the said Hollow; which difference may be produc'd two several ways, either by contracting the Mouth or Lips, the *Tongue* remaining in the same position; or by elevating the middle of the *Tongue* higher to the fore-parts of the *Palate*, the Lips or Mouth remaining in the same state. This is done either way, and it is the same thing if it were done both ways.

The *English* slender (*a*) is form'd by a greater Opening of the Mouth, as in *Bar*, *bate*, *Sam*, *same*, *dame*, *Dame*, *Bar*, *bare*, *ban*, *bane*, &c. This Sound differs from the fat or open (*a*) of the *Germans*, by raising the middle of the *Tongue*, as the *English*

lish do, and so compressing the
th in the Palate; but the Ger-
s, on the contrary, depress their
gue, and so depress the Breath
the Throat. The French ex-
s this Sound when (e) goes be-
(m) or (n) in the same Syllable,
ntendement, &c. The Welsh
the Italians pronounce their (a)
h this Sound.

In this same Seat the French form
(e) Masculine, by a less, or the
dle opening of the Mouth, with
acute Sound, as the Italians,
lish, Spaniards, and others, pro-
nce this Letter; for it is a mid-
Sound betwixt the foregoing
vel, and that which follows:
the English express this Sound
only by (e), but when it is long,
(ea), and sometimes by (ei); as
these, sell, Seal, tell, Teal, steal,
Seat, best, Beast, red, read, re-
ve, deceive, &c. But those Words
ich are written with (ea) would
lly be more rightly pronounc'd,
p the Sound of (e) long, the Sound
the English (a) justly pronounc'd,
re added; as in all probability
y were of old pronounc'd, and as
y are still in the Northern Parts.
d thus those written with (ei)
d be more justly spoken, if the
nd of each Letter were mix'd in
Pronunciation.

In the same place, but yet with a
er opening of the Mouth, (i) slen-
is form'd, which is a Sound very
iliar with the French, Italians,
miards, and most other Nations.
is Sound, when it is short, is ex-
s'd by the English by (i) short;
when it is long, it is generally
ten with (ee), not seldom with
s, and sometimes by (ea), as fit,
t, fit, feet, fill, feel, field, still,
l, ill, eel, fin, seen, near, dear,
r, &c. Some of those Words
ich with this Sound are written
th (ea), are often and more justly
pess'd by (ee), and others spelt
th (e) Masculine, adding to it the
nd of (a) slender, very swiftly
nounc'd. The Welsh express this

Sound not only by (i), and in the last
Syllable by (y), but also by (u), which
Letter they always pronounce in
that manner, and sound the Diph-
thongs or double Vowels au, eu, like
ai and ei.

The Labial, or Lip-Vowels, are
form'd in the Lips, being put into a
round form, the Breath being there
moderately compress'd. There are
three Sorts or Classes of these, as well
as of the former.

The round (o) is form'd by the
larger Aperture or Opening of the
Lips, which Sound most People give
the Greek ω; the French with the
same pronounce their (au), and the
English almost always pronounce
their long (o) and also (oa), the (a)
as it were quite vanishing in the ur-
terance; of which the same may be
said as was before on (ea), as one,
none, whole, Hole, Coal, Boat, those,
chose, &c. The short (o) is express'd
by the open one, as I have said be-
fore, but more rarely by the round
one.

The German fat (a) is form'd in
the Lips, by a more moderate or
middle degree of opening 'em. The
same Sound is us'd by the Italians,
Spaniards, and not a few others.
The French express this Sound by
ou, the Welsh by w; the English ge-
nerally by ao, more rarely by u or
ou, as Foot, shoot, full, Fool, Pool,
good, stood, Wood, Mood, Sourer,
could, would, should, &c. But do,
move, and the like, are better ex-
press'd by round (o) than fat (u).

Slender (u), so much in use with
both French and English, is form'd
in the same place, but with a lesser
opening of the Lips. This Sound is
every-where express'd by the En-
GLISH with their long (u), sometimes
by (e) and (ew), which yet are bet-
ter pronounc'd by retaining the
Sound of the (e) Masculine, as Muse,
Tune, Lute, dure, mute, mew, brew,
knew, &c. Foreigners wou'd obtain
the Pronunciation of this Letter, if
they wou'd endeavour to pronounce
the Diphthong (iu), by putting the
slender

slender (*i*) before the Letter (*u*) or (*w*), as the Spaniard in *Ciudad*, a City; but this is not absolutely the same Sound, tho' it comes very near it; for (*iu*) is a compound Sound, but the French and English (*u*) is a simple. The Welsh generally express this Sound by *iw*, *yw*, *uw*, as in *lliu*, Colour; *llw*, a Rudder; *Duw*, God.

We allow these nine Sounds to be Vowels; that is, distinct, unmixt Sounds, nor do we know any more; for the English broad (*i*) does not seem to be a simple Sound, yet we do not deny, but that there may now be in some Part of the World, or Posterity may discover more vocal Sounds in these Seats of Voice, than those Nine which we have mention'd, and so 'tis possible there may be some intermediate Sounds, such as perhaps is the French (*e*) Neuter, betwixt the Palatine Vowel (*a*) slender and (*e*) Masculine; for the Aperture or Opening of the Mouth is like the continu'd Quantity, divisible in *infinitum*: For as in the numbring the Winds, first there were four Names,

then twelve, and at last thirty; thus whereas the *Arabians*, and perhaps the ancient *Hebrews*, had three Vowels, or one in each Sex now in our Times we plainly discover at least three in every Sex; perhaps our Posterity may interpret some betwixt each of these.

But all these Vowels are capable of being made long or short, which arises the difference of Quantity long and short Syllables, tho' few of 'em are very rarely long, as *secure* (*u*) and (*e*) Feminine: Others are more rarely short, as round and slender (*u*), at least in a Tongue. But some of the Consonants are capable of contraction, and being lengthned, (especially such as *m*, the nearest approaches to the nature of Vowels) except *p*, *t*, *k*, or *h*, which are absolute Mutes, nor in any manner of proper Sound, only modify the Sound either of preceding or succeeding Vowel.

Here we think it proper to bring all these Vowels into one Ventrang'd in their proper Classes.

		Opening.		
		Greater.	Middle.	Less.
<div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 5px;">Guttural or Throat</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 5px;">Palatine or Palate</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;">Labial or Lip</div> </div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle; font-size: 2em;">}</div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;">Vowels.</div>		<i>a</i> open	<i>e</i> Feminine	<i>o</i> obscure
		<i>e</i> slender	<i>e</i> Masculine	<i>i</i> slender
		<i>o</i> round	<i>oo</i> fat <i>u</i>	<i>u</i> slender

CHAP. III.

DOUBLE VOWELS, proper and improper. (15.)

*When of two Vowels the compounded Sound
Fully in one Syllable is found
Of both partaking, yet distinct from all,
This we a Double Vowel still do call.*

WHat we call *Double Vowels*, is, when the Sound of two Vowels is mixt perfectly in one Syllable, and indeed, is a distinct Sound from either and all the other Vowels, would merit peculiar Characters, if we were to form an Alphabet, and not follow that, which is already in Use; by which we express these distinct Sounds by the two Vowels, whose Sound composes them; (*ai*) in *fair*, (*au*) in *laud* or *ap-
peal*, (*ee*) in *bleed*, *seed*, &c. (*oi*) in *void*, (*oo*) in *food*, and (*ou*) in *house*.

*But if the Sound of one is heard alone,
'Tis then improperly so call'd, we own,
Tho' of the Proper it before be one.*

When two Vowels come together in one Syllable, and produce no other Sound, but what one of the two gives alone, it is that not properly, but improperly call'd a *Double Vowel*; as (*ea*) is every where pronounc'd (*e*) long, the Sound of (*a*) not mingling at all with it, is entirely suppress'd; as in *pleasure*, *treasure*, &c. (*ie*) soundeth like (*ee*) in *seen*, as *friend*; and (*ei*) sounds only (*e*) long, as in *receive*, and (*ey*) as *they*, or like (*ai*), and so make no proper *Double Vowel*. (*Eau*), as *beau*, (*ew*), sound only (*u*) long, as in *beauty*, *eunuch*, *few*.

Hence it follows, that a true and proper *Double Vowel* must consist of two distinct Vowels in one Syllable, yet making but one Sound compounded of those two Letters, and different from the other single Vowels; they must be in one Syllable, because two Vowels often come together, but make two distinct Syllables, as in *aereal*, *annual*, *aguish*, *aloes*, &c.

of

[15] These Double Vowels are commonly call'd *Diphthongs*, or *compounded Sounds*; as sharing in (or blending) the Sound of Two Vowels in One.

[16] (re)

Of the proper Double Vowel (ai), or (ay).

Six proper Double Vowels we allow,
Ai, au, and ee, and oi, and oo, and ou,

At th' end of Words write ay, aw, oy, and ow.

The proper *Double Vowels* are therefore only these mention'd in the Rule. First (ai), or (ay); for (ai) ends no English Word, according to the former general Rule, that (i) ends no Word in our Tongue, and (ay) begins none, except a Word of one Syllable; as *ay* in *Ay me!* an Exclamation. The *Double Vowel* is therefore written (ai) in the beginning and middle of Words, but (ay) at the end.

In the beginning, as *Air, aim, ail, aid*, but *eight* in number and those Words that are deriv'd from it, have the Sound (ai), but are spelt (ei): In the middle of Words, as *brave, frail, affair, repair*, but some few are spelt here likewise by (ai), as *conceit, receipt, deceit, heir, reign, vein, weight*; (ay) is put at the end, as *dray, slay, fray, play, day*; and of other Words that sound (ai), except *convey, grey*, (colour of a badger) *greyhound*; *obey, prey, purvey, survey, they, trey* or *point, Whey*.

Tho' sometimes the Letters of this *Double Vowel* (ai) deviate from their proper Sound, into that of (i), or (e) short, yet the Spelling preserv'd in (ai), as *again, Villain, Foun- tain, Wainscot, &c.*

The final Pronunciation in some Part of this Town of *London* has almost confounded the Sound of (ai) and (a). Master and Scholar must therefore take a peculiar Care to avoid this Error, by remembering that (a) ends no English Word, unless before excepted; and however you pronounce, write always *day*, not *da*; and so of the rest.

When (a) and (i) come together in proper Names, especially those of Scripture, as *Ja-ir, Mo-sa-ic, Re-pha-im*, they are parted, and make two Syllables.

Of the Double Vowel (au) or (aw).

The *Double Vowel* (au) is express'd at the beginning and middle of Words by (au), at the end by (aw), except in *awful, awl, amkerd* or *awkward, &c.* where (aw) begins Words; and *Bawble, bawl, brawl, crawl, dawn, dawning, Flawn*, a sort of Custard; *Hawk*, and Words or Names deriv'd from it; *Hawser, Lawn, Prawn, Spawl, Spawn, sprawl, Strawberry, tawney*, tho' in the middle are writ with (aw), all other Words are in the middle as well as beginning (au), except

h as by the Apposition of (*ll*) to (*a*) sound (*au*) ; as *Ball*, *Hall*, &c. Tho' the Sound of this double Vowel be the same with (*a*) in *all*, *small*, &c. yet 'tis different from the common and more general Sound of that Letter.

Au begins a Word, as *Audience*, *Authority*, *austere*, *augment*, &c. *Au* is us'd in the middle of Words, as *assault*, *besse*, *Cauldron*, *Cause*, *Causey*, *daunt*, *debauch*, *fraud*, *gaudy*, *vaunt*, *Jaundice*, *Laurel*, *Maud*, *Maudlin*, *pause*, *Sauce*, *alt*, &c.

But *aw* must always conclude a Word, because our Language abhors a bare naked *u* at the end of a Word ; as *Claw*, *aw*, *raw*, *saw*, *Law*, &c.

These two Letters are often parted in Proper Names, and make two Syllables ; as in *Archela-us*, *Hermola-us*, &c. yet in *ul*, *Saul*, &c. it remains a double Vowel.

Of the Double Vowel (*ee*). [16]

The (*ee*) that was excluded heretofore
From Proper Double Vowels, we restore:

Tho' (*ee*) has been excluded by an ingenious Gentleman, from the number of Proper Double Vowels, because (*ee*) sounds like (*i*) in *Magazine*, *Shire*, and *Machine*, yet the Reason holding against (*au*) much stronger, because it sounds the same as (*a*) in *all*, *call*, *fall*, &c. we have thought it just to restore (*ee*) to its Right, since it is a very distinct sound from both the long and short Sound of (*e*), which are five : That in *Shire*, &c. is borrow'd from this Double Vowel, as that of *all*, *call*, *shall*, &c. is from (*au*) ; these in (*a*) sound much more numerous, than those in (*i*).

The single (*e*) in Words of one Syllable mostly sounds (*ee*), as *me*, *he*, *she*, *we*, *ye*, *be*, *here*, &c.

Of the Double Vowel (*oi*) or (*oy*).

The proper Double Vowel (*oi*) at the beginning, is written by (*oi*) ; as *Oister*, *Oil*, &c. It is in the same manner express'd in the middle ; as *Poise*, *noise*, *Voice*, *rejoice*, &c. This Double Vowel, in many Words, has the Sound of (*i*) long ; as in *point*, *anoint*, *Joint*, &c. (*Oy*) is written at the end of Words ; as *Boy*, *coy*, *Fey*, *destroy*, *employ*, &c.

of

[16] (*ee*) or *ze*, is sounded like *to fin*, *vin*, as we should do to *feen*, French long *z*, (that is, slender *i*) *veen* ; or perhaps *fen*, *vin*, as we the French give the same Sound do in *Fiend*.

Of the proper Double Vowel (oo).

*Two Vowels of a sort no Word begin;
So (oo), in th' middle only, is let in.*

[17] As no *English* Word begins with two of the same Letters, except *Aaron, Aaronite*, so cannot (oo) be put at the beginning of a Word, nor at the end, but of *too* in *too much*, and when it signifies *also*; and in *Cuckoo*, as spelt by some. The Use therefore of (oo) is chiefly, if not only, in the middle of Words; as in *Loom, aloof, boon, Reproof, Broom, Room, Food, Fool, Tool, cool, Goose*, and where the true and proper Sound of this Vowel is express'd, as it is in many other Words. This Double Vowel sounds (u) in these Words; they were anciently written with a (u) or (ou), in which the (u) only was sounded.

But it sounds like short (u) in *Flood* and *Blood*, and like (o) long in *Door, Floor, Moor, &c.*

*As other Letters the Office do of oo,
So that of others by oo's performed too.*

And as the Figures of this double Vowel often express the Sounds of other Letters, so by the same original Error of Pronunciation other Letters express the Sound proper to this double Vowel; as (ou) in *could, should, would, &c.* and single (o) in *Wolf, Wolves, Rome, Tomb, Womb, approve, bebove, move, reprove, &c.*

Of the proper Double Vowel (ou) or (ow).

*When (ou) retains its just compounded Sound,
A proper Double Vowel it is found:
But when the Sound of either is suppress'd,
It sinks i' improper, as do all the rest.*

This proper Double Vowel (ou) or (ow) has two Sounds: one proper to it as a Double Vowel, or as compos'd of both (o) and (u); as in *House, Mouse, Louse, Owl, Fowl, Town; bow, Fowl, Bough, our, out, &c.* and another, which is improper to its nature, the Sound of the (u) being entirely sunk, as in *Soul, Snow, know, &c.* Thus, in Words ending in (ow) obscure, (o) only is sounded; as in *shallow, sorrow, Arrow, Bill*.

[17] oo is sounded like the fat u | French; as in the Words good of the Germans, and the oo of the | Hood, Root, Foot, Loose, &c.

illow; where the (w) seems only put for Ornament-sake, merely to cover the nakedness of single (o). This holds in most Words of more than one Syllable. (Ou) is also sounded like (u) short in *couple, Trouble, scourge, &c.* in which the sound of the (o) is entirely sunk, and leaves it no longer a proper Double Vowel. Thus in *you, your, and Youth*, the (u) is sounded long.

In *could, would, should*, and a few others, it sounds (oo). But in the modern way of spelling and sounding, the (l) is left out, and *cou'd, wou'd, shou'd*, sound *cood, wood, shood, &c.*

(Ou) the Beginning, and the Middle takes;
And still the End of Words for (ow) forsakes.

(Ou) begins a Word, as *Ounce, our, out*, and its Compounds; *husel*, except *Owl*: And in the middle of most Words; as, *Hour, Flour, Mountain, Fountain, bounce, flounce, &c.* except *Trown, Clown, Down, drown, frown, Gown, Town, Bower, Dowager, Dower, Dowry, bowse, dowse, fowse, Fowl, Howlet, Towel, Trowel, Vowel, blowse, drowsy, Carrowse, Cowardice, Endowment, lowre, Power, Tower, Howard, Allowance, Advowson, Bowl, rowel, rowing, Shower, &c.*

This Sound is always at the end of a Word express'd by (ow), as *now, bow, enow, &c.* In short, this is a general Rule, That whenever a proper Double Vowel loses its native Sound, and varies to any other simple Sound, it ceases to be a proper, and becomes an improper Double Vowel, as having only the simple and uncompounded Sound of some one single Vowel. There is but one Exception to this Rule, and that is, when it wanders to the Sound of another Double Vowel, which is only done by (ou), when it sounds (oo) in *could, would, should, &c.* [18]

of

[18] All other Sounds, besides those enumerated in the foregoing Discourse of simple Sounds, are plainly compounded, tho' some of them are commonly thought to be simple.

The Diphthongs, or double Vowels *ai, ei, oi, au, eu, ou, or ay, ey, oy, aw, ew, ow*, when they are truly pronounc'd, are compounded of the foregoing or prepositive Vowels, and the Consonants *y* and *w*, which yet are commonly taken for subsequent

Vowels: For in *ai, au* or *ay, aw*, the (a) slender is set first; in *ei, ey*, the (e) Feminine; in *eu, ew*, the (e) Masculine; in *oi, ou, oy, ow*, the open (o) is sometimes set first, as in the English Words *Boy, Toy, Soul, Bowl, a Cup*; sometimes obscure (o), as in the English Words *boil, rail, Oil, Bowl, Fowl, &c.* We grant by the Pronunciation of some Men, open (o) is us'd in these Words.

Of the Improper Double Vowels. [19]

Th' improper *Double Vowels* we declare
Nine, as (aa), (ea), (eo), and (eu) are
(ie), (oa), (oe), (ue), and (ui):

But all their several Sounds here let us try.

The Juncture of these several *Vowels* can never be properly call'd *Double Vowels*, since they every one produce but the Sound of one Letter; (*tial*) is always sounded (*shal*), as in *impartial, credential*, &c. where the (*ti*) is turn'd into (*sh*), the two *Vowels* are divided after (*st*) or any other Consonant but (*r*) and (*c*), and so make two Syllables, as *bestial*. The (*io*) following (*t*) and before (*n*), sounds (*shun*), as *Constitution, Discretion*, &c. (*io*) retains the same Sound, when it follows single or double (*s*), as in *Allusion, Aspersions, Compulsion, Suffusion*.

* But, whereas some will needs have it, that the Consonants (*y*) and (*w*) do not at all differ from (*i*) and (*u*), or (as we write them) (*ee*) and (*oo*), very swiftly pronounc'd; it may easily be found to be a manifest Error, if we nicely attend the Formation of the Words *yee* and *woo*, especially if we often repeat them; for he will observe, that he cannot pass from the Sound of the Consonant, to the Sound of the following Vowel, without a manifest Motion of the Organs, and by that means of new Position, which does not happen in the repeating of the Sounds (*ee*) and (*oo*).

We are sensible, that these which we call Diphthongs, or double Vowels, in different Tongues, have different Sounds, of which we have no Business now to treat; yet these may all be found and discover'd among those Sounds, which we have

discours'd of; and may be so refer'd to their proper Places. The long *o* of the *English* is plainly compounded of the Feminine (*e*) and (*y*), (*i*), and has the same Sound entire with the *Greek* (*ei*).

The *Latin* *a*, *æ*, the *English* *ea*, *ee*, *oo*, and sometimes *ei*, *ie*, *au*, (the like being to be found among other Nations) altho' they are writen with two Characters, are yet (at least as we pronounce them now) but simple Sounds.

[19] They are justly call'd improper, because they are most improperly compounded in Sound, tho' writen with two Vowels. 'Tis probable when this Spelling prevail'd, each Letter had a share in the Sound, but Negligence and Corruption of Pronunciation has wholly silenc'd one. This is remarkable, that in most of them the first Vowel prevails, and gives the Sound.

* This is Dr. Wallis's Observation, which we do not think conclusive for what he brings it, because in the Instance he gives, the (*y*) and the (*w*) are plac'd before the Vowels, and then they are Consonants confess'd; but when they come after Vowels, they have the very same Effect on the Organs, as (*i*) and (*u*) have: For no Body contends that they are never Consonants, or that when Consonants, they are form'd in the same manner, as when Vowels.

Version, &c. Admission, Compassion, Expression, &c. But when (*io*) follows (*ff*), they are parted into two Syllables, as in *effusion, Combustion*; and the same is to be observ'd after other Consonant. (*Ua*) are always separated, except after (*g*) in (*gua*), and (*q*) in *qua*; as *Language, Lingual, &c. qualify, Quality, &c.* except likewise when it follows (*f*), and when it sounds (*fua*), as in *persuade, dissuade*, and their Derivatives *persuasive, dissuasive, &c.* and *suavity*, an obsolete word.

Next (*uo*) must always be parted, except after (*q*), which can't be sounded without (*u*), as in *quick, Quality, Qualm, note, &c.*

The improper Double Vowels are counted Nine in number, as (*aa*), (*ea*), (*eo*), (*eu*), (*ie*), (*ea*), (*oe*), (*ue*), and (*ie*).

(*Aa*) sounds (*a*), but it is seldom found;

(*Ea*) four several ways declares its Sound;

(*E*) long, (*a*) short, (*e*) short, and double (*ee*);

As in *swear, Heart, Head, and in Fear you see.*

(*Aa*) is seldom in any Word but Proper Names, and there only sounds (*a*), and is generally divided.

(*Ea*) is sounded four several ways, 1st, like (*a*) long, as *ear, swear, tear, wear*; 2^{ly}, like (*a*) short, as *hearken, Heart*, and Words deriv'd from it, as *heartly, heartless, &c.* also its compounds, as *Heart-burning, Hearts-ease, faint-hearted, &c.* 3rd, (*e*) short, as *already, ready, Beard, Breast, Head, &c.* 4th, It sometimes sounds (*ee*), or (*e*) long; as in *appear, Arrear, Fear, near, &c. Bead, conceal, Deal, Veal, glean, clean, &c.* and generally the long Sound of (*e*) is writ (*ea*), as *Feast, least, &c.* and the short Sound of (*e*), as *best, Guest, &c.*

(*EO*) (*e*) short, and double (*e*) we find,

As well as (*eu*), to sound long (*u*)'s inclin'd.

(*EO*) sounds (*e*) short in *Feoffee, Jeopardy, Leopard, Troman*, and long in *People, Feodary*, and (*o*) short in *George*.

(*Eu*), or (*ew*), sound (*u*) long; as *Deuce, Deuteronomy, Neurisie, &c.*

(*Ie*) sounds (*y*) in ending Words; and (*e*)

Short, and long, or double (*e*) 'twill be.

(*Ie*) is sounded (*e*) long in *Cieling, Cashier, Field, Fiend, Frontier, &c.* but (*e*) short in *pierce, fierce, &c.* It is us'd likewise for (*y*) at the end of Words.

(Ei) sounds (ai) a long in feign and eight.
It sounds (e) long in perceive, Deceit.

(Ei) sounds like (ai), or (a) long, in *Reign, feign, eight, mighty, &c.* It sounds (e) long in *deceive, perceive, Deceit.*

This Rule is general, That the Letter which gives or predominates in the Sound, is always plac'd first in these improper Double Vowels.

*The (a) to (o) in (oa) we apply,
To make (o) long, and silent (e) supply.*

In (oa) the (a) seems added only to make the (o) sound long, supplying the (e) silent, it giving the same Sound; as in *Cloak and Cloke, approach, broach, Coast, doat, float, Goat, hoary, Load, Moat, Oak, poach, roam, Soal, a Fish, Toad, Woad*: (oa) has a peculiar broad Sound in *broad, abroad, Groat*; and that of (ai) in *Goal*.

*The (o) and (e) alternately prevails;
In (oe) when this sounds, then that still fails.*

In (oe) sometimes the (e) prevails, and the (o) is silent; as in *OEconomy, OEdipus, OEcumenical, OEconomical*; but in *Croe* (of Iron) *Doe, Foe, Sloe, Toe, Woe*, the (e) is silent, and the (o) produc'd; these latter being Words of English Origin, as well as Use, the former of the Greek. *Shoe*, and *Woe*, to make Love, some write with (oo), leaving (o) bare, contrary to the Genius of the English Language; whereas the Distinction wou'd be preserv'd, and the Sound justly express'd, by adding (e) to the (oo).

*(Ue) one Syllable we seldom sound;
(U) after (g) to harden (g) is bound.*

Few Words have (ue) sounded as one Syllable, as *Guelderland, Guerkins*; *guest* for *gues*, is wrong spelt, tho' too much us'd of late by the Ignorance or Negligence of Authors, or Printers; for its true Spelling is *ghefs*: in all which the (u) is only added to harden the Sound of the (g), the (e) only being sounded; tho' (gue) in *Guerdon* sounds (gue), as do the Terminations, or Endings of several Words, as *Apologue, Catalogue, colleague, colloque, Decalogue, Dialogue, Epilogue, Fatigue, Intrigue, League, Plague, Prologue, prorogue, Rogue, Synagogue, Theologue, Tongue, Vogue*. At the end of the following Words (e) is added to (u), not only to cover its nakedness, according to the Genius of the Tongue, but sometimes to produce the (u); as in *accrue, Avenue, cue, due, ensue, Fescue, Glue*,

ue, hue, perdue, pursue, residue, Retinue, Rue, spue or spew,
But (*ue*) in all other Words are parted, nor make any
anner of Double Vowel, as in *Affluence, Cruelty, Gruel, &c.*

(*Ui*) *three several sorts of Sound express,*
As Guile, rebuild, Bruise and Recruit confess.

The improper Double Vowel (*ui*) has three several sorts of
nd, 1. as (*i*) long, in *beguile, Guide, disguise, quite, &c.*
(*i*) short, in *Guildford, build, rebuild, &c.* 3. (*u*) long, as
Bruise, Recruit, Fruit, &c.

CHAP. IV.

Of the CONSONANTS. [20]

A Consonant no proper Sound obtains,
But from its sounding with, its Name it gains ;
And yet it varys every Vowel's Sound,
Whether before, or after it, 'tis found.

Ho' a Consonant be a Letter that cannot be sounded.
without adding some Single or Double Vowel before
fter it, and therefore derives its Name from *confounding*,
ounding with, yet may justly be defin'd, A Letter shew-
ing

[p] As the Vowels were divi-
nto three Classes, so we divide
Consonants into the same Num-
the *Labial*, or *Lip* ; the *Pala-*
or *Palate* ; the *Guttural*, or
at Consonants, as they are form'd
e *Tbroat, Palate, or Lips* ; that
hile the Breath sent from the
s into these Seats, is either *in-*
pted, or at least more forcibly
yess'd.

it is besides to be remark'd,
we may observe a *triple Dire-*
of the *Breath*. For first, it is
irected wholly to the Mouth ;
s, seeking its Way or Outlet
the Lips ; or second, it is al-
wholly directed to the *Nostrils*,
to find Passage out ; or third, it
it were equally divided betwixt

the *Nostrils* and the *Mouth* : But we
believe this Diversity of the Directi-
on of the Breath wholly proceeds
from the various Position of the
Uvula.

Since therefore the Breath sent out
in this threefold manner may be per-
fectly *intercepted* thrice in each of
these Seats, there are nine different
Consonants, which derive their Ori-
gin from them, and which, for that
Reason, we call *primitive*, or clos'd
Consonants : But if the Breath be not
wholly intercepted in these Seats, but
only more hardly compress'd, find,
tho' with Difficulty, some Way of
exit ; various other Consonants are
form'd, according to the various
manner of the Compression ; which
Consonants we shall call *deriv'd*, or
open

ing the severat Motions and Configurations of the Parts of the Mouth, by which the Sound of the Vowels is variously determin'd, are first divided into *single* and *double*; the double are *x* and *z*, the rest are all single; and these are again divided into *Mutes* and *Liquids*; eleven Mutes, and four proper Liquids: *b*, *s*, and *w*, are *Neuters*, as not strictly adhering to either.

*The Consonants we justly may divide
Into Mutes, Liquids, Neuters; and beside
We must for Double Consonants provide. }
Eleven Mutes GRAMMARIANS do declare,
And but four Liquids, l, m, n, and r.
Behind the Mutes the Liquids gently flow
Inverted, from the Tongue they will not go.*

Consonants are divided into *Mutes* and *Liquids*, call'd also *Half-Vowels*; the *Mutes* are, *b*, *c*, *d*, *f*, *v*, *g*, *j*, *k*, *p*, *q*, *t*, and are so call'd because a *Liquid* cannot be sounded in the same Syllable, when a *Vowel* follows it, as (*rpo*).

The *Liquids*, or *Half-Vowels*, as they have some sort of obscure Sound of a *Vowel* attending their Pronunciation which is likewise imitated in their Names, as *el*, *em*, *en*, &c. so the Name of *Liquid* imports the easie motion, by which they nimbly glide away after a *Mute* in the same Syllable without any stand, and a *Mute* before it can be pronounc'd in the same Syllable, as *pro* in *probable*.

(C) the hard Sound of (*k*) will ever keep
Before (*a*), (*o*), (*u*), (*l*), and (*r*); as *creep*,
Clear, *Cup*, *Cost*, *Cat*: Before (*e*), (*i*), and (*y*),
Or ev'n the Comma that do's (*e*) imply,
It mostly takes the softer Sound of (*s*);
As *City*, *Cell*, and *Cypress* must confess.
When final (*c*) without an (*e*) is found,
'Tis hard; but silent (*e*) gives softer Sound.

[21] The genuine and natural Sound of (*c*) is hard like (*k*), as when it precedes (*a*), (*o*), (*u*), (*l*), or (*r*); as

open Consonants. As to the particular Formation of them, see the Notes, at the end of the Chapter.

[21] The French express the soft (*c*) by this Figure (ç) for Distinction, which Character wou'd be of use if it were introduc'd among us; tho' it must be confess'd, that there is so

much the less need of a new Character, as the Rule is so general and admit of no Exception. Some attempt to imitate the French Way of Spelling here, and write *Publiqu* for *Publick*, not considering that they use (*qu*) because they have no (*k*).

Cost, Cup, clear, creep. But before (*e*), (*i*), and (*y*), and when there is an Apostrophe or Comma above the Word, denoting the absence of (*e*), it has generally the Sound of (*s*), *sell, City, Cypress.* If in any Word the harder Sound precedes (*e*), (*i*) or (*y*), (*k*) is either added or put in its place, *kill, Skin, publick*: And tho' the additional (*k*) in the foregoing Word be an old way of Spelling, yet it is now justly left off, as being a superfluous Letter; for (*c*) at the end is always hard, without (*y*) or the silent (*e*) to soften as in *Chace, Clemency, &c.*

Most Words ending in the Sound of *ace, ece, ice, oice, use,* must be written with (*ce*), not (*se*), except *abase, abstruse, case, cease, amuse, concise, debase, decrease, Geese, imbase, lease, mortise, Paradise, profuse, promise, recluse, Treavise, use, disuse, excuse, House, Louse, Mouse, refuse, use, close,*

Most Words ending in *ance, ence, ince, once, and unce,* must be written with (*c*) between the (*n*) and (*e*), except *se, condense, dispense, immense, incense, tense, intense, promise, suspense, sense.*

(*c*) before (*b*), has a peculiar Sound, as in *chance, Cherry, arch, Chalk, Chip*; but in *Chart* 'tis like (*k*), and in *Chord* in *lick.*

*The genuine Sound of (s) is still acute
And hissing; but the Close that does not sute,
There 'tis obscure, and soft pronounc'd like zed,
And sometimes 'twixt two Vowels when 'tis sped.*

(*s*) being so near a-kin to the soft Sound of (*c*), we thought naturally follow'd that Letter in our Consideration, tho' it is in the Alphabet. When (*s*) therefore keeps its genuine Sound, it is pronounc'd with an acute or hissing Sound, but when it closes a Word, it almost always has a more obscure soft Sound like (*z*), and not seldom when it comes between two Vowels, or double Vowels, when it has this soft Sound, Propriety and Distinction require, that it be written with the shorter Character of that Letter, as, *his, advise, &c.* with the larger in all other places, as *hiss, devise*, if written with an (*s*) and not with a (*c*), as it too often is. There are but four Words of one Syllable, which end with hard (*s*), *this, thus, us.*

*That (s) with (c) you may not still confound
To learn, and mind the following Rules you're bound.*

By Vowels follow'd, (fi), (ti), and (ci) alike
 With the same Sound do still the Hearing strike.
 In Words deriv'd they keep a certain Law,
 Impos'd by those from whence their Sound they draw.
 If those in (de), (f) or (se) do end,
 To their Derivatives they (fi) commend;
 If with (ck) or (ce) their close they make,
 Then the deriv'd (ci) will surely take;
 But if with (t) or (te) that do conclude,
 Then with (ti) Derivative's endu'd.

[22] Si, ti, and ci sound alike, as in *Persuasion*, *Musick*, *Section*, *Imitation*, &c. These words are all deriv'd from others and therefore when the Original Words end in (de), (f), (se), then (fi) is us'd; as *persuade*, *Persuasion*, *confess*, *Confession*, *confuse*, *Confusion*, &c. If with (ck), or (rk), or hard k, then (ci) is us'd; as *Grace*, *Gracious*, *Musick*, *Musician*, &c. But if with (t), or (te), then (ti) is us'd, as *Self*, *Section*, *Rate*, *Imitation*, &c. except *Submit*, *Submission*, *Permission*.

Tho' this Letter seems very regular in its Sound of (s) at the beginning, and (es) at the end of Words, yet it is too often mistaken for (c), especially in the beginning: Yet the following Rules and Exceptions, the Mistake may be observ'd to be remov'd.

Most Words beginning with the Sound of (s) before (i) must be written with (s), except these with (c) before (e).

Cease, *Cedar*, *Celandine*, *Celery*, *Celebrate*, *Celebration*, *Crucifixion*, *Ceremony*, *Celibacy*, *Celibate*, *Cell*, *Cellar*, *Cellarage*, *Censor*, *Cense*, *Censorious*, *Censure*, *cent*, *Centaur*, *Centre*, *Century*, *Century*, *cephalic*, *Cere-cloth*, *ceremonious*, *Ceremonious*, *Ceremony*, *certain*, *certainly*, *Certificate*, *cerulean*, *Ceruss*, *Cess*, *Cessation*, *Cession*, *Cetrach*, *Finger*, &c. and these Proper Names, *Cecrops*, *Celsus*, *Cenebrea*, *Cerberus*, *Cerintus*, *Ceres*, *Cesar*.

[23] The Reason, to those who know *Latin*, is much easier; for if they are deriv'd from a *Latin* Supine ending in (tum), then (ti) is us'd, as *Natum*, *Nation*; but if the Supine end in (sum), then (si) is us'd; as *Visum*, *Vision*, *Confessum*, *Confession*. If the Word be deriv'd from

a *Latin* Substantive of the first declension ending in (ca) or (ia) of the second Declension ending in (tium) or (cium), then (ci) is us'd, as *Logica*, *Logician*, *Gratia*, *Gratification*, *Vitium*, *Viciou*, *Beneficium*, *Beneficent*, &c.

And these of (c) before (i).

catrice, Cicely, sweet and wild Herbs; *Cieling, Cichory*,
re, Drapery or Foliage wrought on the Heads of Pil-
g Cinders, Cinnabar, Cinquefoil, Cinnamon, Cinque-ports,
rus, a sweet Root; *Cion*, or *Scion*, *Cipber, Circle, Circlet,*
lar, Circuit, circulate, circulation, circumcise, and all
 pounds of *circum*—; *Cistern, Citarion, Citizen, citrine,*
trean, Citron, Citrul, a sort of Cucumber; *Citadel, City,*
s, a sort of small Leeks; *Civet, Civilian, civility, civilize*;
 these Proper Names, *Cicero, Cicilia, Cilicia, Cimbrians,*
merians, Circe, Cirencester, Cisbury, Cissa, Cisterian,
aks, Citherides.

And these likewise are excepted of (c) before (y).

ybels, Cyclades, Cycle, Cyclometry, Cyclops, Cygnets, Cylin-
al, Cymbal, cynical, Cinics, Cynthia, Cyprian, Cypress,
ne, Cyril.

The Sound of (s) in the middle of Words is usually writ-
 with (s), except *Acerbity, Acetosity, adjacent, Ancestors,*
cedent, Artificer, cancel, Cancer, beneficence, Chancel, Chan-
er, Chancellorship, Chancery, conceal, concede, conceit, con-
dness, conceive, Concent, Agreement or Harmony in Mu-
; concenter, concentric, concern, Chalcedony, concernment,
rt, concertation, an affected Word, *Concession*; *Decease,*
de, an affected Word; *Deceit, deceive, December, Decency,*
nnial, decent, Deception, deceptive, Decertation, an af-
 ed Word for striving; *Decession*, as bad a Word for de-
 ing; *exceed, excel, Excellency, except, Exception, Excess,*
er, Grocery, immarcessible, a pedantique Word for incor-
 tible; *imperceptible, Incendiary, Incense, incarterate, incen-*
incessant, incessantly, incestuous, Innocence, innocent, inter-
Intercessor, Intercession, intercept, mercenary, macerate,
ncer, Mercery, Magnificence, magnificent, Munificence, mu-
cent, necessary, Necessaries, necessitate, Necessity, necessitous,
romancer, Larceny, Ocean, Parcel, Parcels, precede, preceden-
Precedence, Precedent, preceptive, Precepts, Predecessors,
re, Sincerity, Saucer, Sorcerer, Sorceress, Sorcery, Macedon,
cedonia. Before (i) in the middle, as *Acid, Acidity, Ac-*
nt, Ancient, Anglicism, Gallicism, &c. in cism; *anticipate,*
fficial, associate, audacious, Audacity, beneficial, calcine, cal-
te, Council, capacious, capacitate, Capacity, concise, cruciate,
tible, crucify, Crucifix, decide, decimal, decimate, Decima-
decipher, Decision, decisive, Desioiency, delicious, docible,
ibility, efficacious, efficient, especially, Exception, Exercise,

Ex.

Excise, Excise-man, Excision, excite, excruciate, explicit, feasible for feasible, gracious, implicitly, implicit, incapacity, incapacity, inauspicious, incident, incidentally, incircle, Incision, Incisure, incite, invincible, judicial, judicious, Liquidity, medicinal, Multiplicity, municipal, Nuncio, officious, officious, pacify, pacific, Parsimony, Parricide, participate, Pencil, perspicacious, Perspicacity, perwacious, pertinacious, Precinct, precious, Precipice, precipitate, Precipitation, precise, precisely, prejudicial, proficient, Pronunciation, provincial, rapacious, Ratiocination, reciprocal, recital, recite, reconcile, reconcileable, Rouncivals, sagacious, Sagacity, Sicily, Simplicity, sociable, Sociableness, Society, Socinians, Solecism, solicit, Solicitation, Solicitor, solicitous, Solicitude, solstitial, spacious, special, Specialty, specific, Species, specific, Specimen, specious, Sufficiency, sufficient, supercilious, superficial, Superficies, suspicious, tacit, Taciturnity, Turcism, Veracity, Vivacity.

Most Words ending with the Sound of (*si*) or (*se*), must be written with (*cy*), except *Apostasy, busy, Controversy, Courtesy, Daisy, Ecstasy, easy, Epilepsy, Fancy, spell likewise, tho' wrong, Fancy, Frensy, or Frenzy, Gipsy, greasy, Heresy, Hypocrisy, Jealousy, Leprosy, Palsy, Pansy, a Flower, Pleasantry, Posy, Nolegay, and Motto of a Ring, Poessie, Poetry, pursey, queasy, Cansy, to Prophecy, Causey, clumsy, Kersy, Linsy-woolsey, Malmsey, Tolsy, Whimsy.*

In most Words (*s*) between two Vowels has the Sound of (*z*), except those enumerated in the Rule about *ace, ece, &c.* under (*c*).

Most Words ending in the sound of *arce, erce, orce, &c.* must be written with (*s*) between the (*r*) and (*e*), except *amerce, Divorce, Farce, fierce, Force, pierce, scarce, Scarcity, Source.*

After (*ou*), (*s*) soft, and not (*c*), must be written; as *house, to house; mouse, to mouse; rouse, to rouse; unless it interposes, and then it must be with (c), as Bounce, flounce, Ounce, &c.*

All Words of one Syllable, that end with, and bear hard upon the Sound of (*s*), must be written with (*ss*), except *this, thus, us, and yes*; but if they are Words of many Syllables, or more than one, and end with the like Sound in (*us*), the (*s*) is not double, but (*o*) inserted before; as *ambiguous, barbarous, &c.*

(T) before (i), & another Vowel join'd,
To sound like th' Acute, and hissing (s) we find :
But when an (x) or (s) do's (i) precede,
For its own sound it strenuously do's plead.

(T); when (t) comes before (i), follow'd by another Vowel, it sounds like the acute or hissing (s), as in *Nation*, *poison*, *expatiate*, &c. but when it follows (f) or (x), it keeps its own Sound, as in *Bestial*, *Question*, *Fustian*, &c.

(T) with an (b) after it, has two Sounds, as in *skin*, the tongue touching lightly the Extrems of the upper Teeth; and then, where the Tongue reaches the Palate, and the Root of the Teeth, making some mixture of (d).

(H), tho' deny'd a Letter heretofore,
We justly to the Alphabet restore.

(H), tho' excluded the Number of Letters by *Priscian* and some of our Moderns on his Authority, yet in the *Hebrew* Alphabet has three Characters; and beside some obscure Sound of its own, it mightily enforces that of the Vowels, and is manifestly a Consonant; after (w) it is pronounc'd before it, as *when*, *white*, Sounds *hwen*, *hwite*; (k) before (n) throws its Sound, as *knave*, *knight*, *bnave*, *hnight*. 'Tis indeed sometimes near silent, as in *honour*, *hour*, &c. but so many other Consonants in particular Positions.

(X), and (Z) are double Consonants;
The first the Pow'r of (c), or (ks), vaunts,
The second that of (ds) does boast,
The Force of (d) is now entirely lost,
Or rather to a strenuous hissing toft.

}

(X) and (Z) are double Consonants, containing two Powers under one Character; the former (cs), or (ks), the latter (ds), tho' the Sound of the (d) be not now heard, and only strong sibilation or hissing be discover'd. The former expressing (ks) or (cs), cannot begin a Word, except some proper Names, *Xanthé*, *Xanthus*, *Xantippe*, *Xantippus*, *Xenarchus*, *Xeneades*, *Xenius*, *Xenocrates*, *Xenophanes*, *Xenophilus*, *Xenophon*, *Xerolibia*, *Xerxenina*, *Xerxes*, *Xystus*, *Xiphiline*, and the few Terms not vary'd from the *Greek* (this Rule meaning only Words purely Native and not relating to Art) and is only some not all of that Sound; which is express'd six several Ways: (1st.) At the end of short Syllables by (cks), *Backs*, *Necks*, *Sticks*, *Rocks*, *Ducks*, *Bricks*, *mocks*, &c.
E (2^{dly}.)

(2dly,) At the end of Syllables made long by a double Vowel, it is express'd by (ks), as *Books, looks, breaks, speaks, &c.*
 (3dly,) By double (cc) in the middle of Words where (e) or (i) follows; as *Accelerate, Accent, accept, Acceptation, Access, accessible, Accession, accessory, or necessary, Accidence, Accident, accidental, inaccessible, Occident, occidental, succeed, Success, Succession, succedaneous, successful, succinct, Succinctness.*
 (4thly,) By (ct), in Words ending in *action, edion, iction, oction, uction, and unction*; as *Extraction, Perfection, Prediction, Concoction, Destruction, compunction*; only except *Complexion, Reflexion*, a bending back, but more properly *Reflection*, when it relates to thought; *Connexion, Crucifixion, Defluxion.* (5thly,) By (ct) at the end of some Words, as *Abstracts, Acts, collects, contracts, Defects, Effects, Insects, Objects, Projects, Subjects*; he *affects, corrects, instructs*, for *affecteth, &c.* the (th) being now entirely chang'd into (t).
 (6thly,) lastly, The Sound of (k) must be written with (x), in the beginning, middle and end of all other Words, except *ecstasy*. After (ex) never write (s), and seldom (c), but in *except, exceed, excess, excise, excite, &c.* and (c) after (ex) comes before (co), (cu), (cl) and (ch), having a full Sound, as *excommunicate, excuse, exclaim, exchange.*

(K) before (i), (e) when hard, is seen;
 And before (n), as *know, kill, keen.*

(K) begins all Words of a hard Sound before (e), (i) and (n), as *keep, kill, know, knock, &c.* nor is it ever put before any Consonant but (n), and then with so much constraint, that it almost loses its Sound for that of (h).

*Before all other Consonants (c)'s plac't,
 Altho' the harder Sound is there express't.*

And if the Sound of (k) comes before any other Consonant, it is express'd by (c), as in *Character, clear, cringe.*

The Sound of (k) at the beginning of any Word or Syllable before (a), (o) or (u), is always express'd by (c), as *Cat, con, cup*; or when a silent (e) follows (k), as *spake, spoke*; or (ea) in the middle, as *speak, bleak, &c.* and then (k) is written singly without (e) final.

*To (y) a double Nature does belong,
 As Consonant, and Vowel in our Tongue.
 The first begins all Words, yet none can end,
 The last, it for the Close does still contend.*

[23] (Y) is both a Vowel and Consonant; as a Vowel, it has appear'd to an ingenious Author to be superfluous; yet it is of great use in our Language, which abhors the ending of Words in (i); and when the Sound of (i) comes double, tho' in two distinct Syllables; as in *dying, frying, &c.* When it follows a Consonant it is a Vowel, and when it precedes a Vowel it is a Consonant, and ought to be call'd (*ye*), and not (*my*); and tho' it ends so many Words as a Vowel, it can end none as a Consonant.

At the end of all Words of one Syllable (y) has a sharp and clear Sound, as *by, dy, dry, sly, why, shy, thy, &c.* But at the end of Words of more Syllables it generally sounds obscure, like (e), as *eternally, gloriously, godly, &c.* except at the end of Words of Affirmation, as *apply, deny, edify, &c.* (y) only precedes Vowels, and chiefly (a), (e), (o); and these it also follows and incorporates with them into double Vowels, for *ay, (ey), (oy)*, have the same Sound with *(ai), (ei), (oi)*; but the former are more us'd at the end of Words. In the middle of Words it is not so frequently us'd for a Vowel, except in Words of the Greek Origin.

*And the same Right the double (u) demands;
Begins as Consonant, as Vowel ends.*

[24] (W). This Letter in its most general use is a Consonant, going before all the Vowels, except (u); it likewise precedes (r), and follows (s) and (th), as *Want, went, Winter, wrath, write, thwart.* It follows as a Vowel (a), (e), (o), and unites with them into the double Vowels (*aw*), (*ew*), (*ow*), as well as (u); as *Sow, sowe, saw, few*: But in (oo) it generally is obscure, especially in Words of many Syllables, as in *Shadow, Widow, &c.*

It likewise, as has been observ'd under (h), goes before (h), tho' it be sound'd after it, as in *when, what, &c.*

*(Va) to the (f) in Nature is ally'd,
And to it final, has (e) always ty'd.*

[25] (Va),

[23] This Consonant is sound'd like the German (j) Consonant, that is with a Sound most nearly approaching an extream rapid Pronunciation of the Vowel (i). The Arabians express (y) by their *ye*, or our (w) by their *waw*.

[24] The (w) is sound'd in Eng-

lish as (u) in the Latin Words *quando, lingua, suadeo*, and others after *q, g, j*. We generally make this Letter a Consonant, yet its Sound is not very different (tho' it does something differ) from the German Vowel, the *fat* or *gross* (u) very rapidly pronounc'd.

[25] (*Va*) or (*V*) Consonant, as 'tis call'd, is near a-kind (*f*): It never ends a Word without silent (*e*) after it, nor is it ever doubled, however strong the Accent may be upon it; in *English* it only goes before *Vowels*, it likewise follows (*l*) and (*r*), as *Calves*, *Carve*, &c.

(*G*) varies with the *Vowel* still its Sound,
Soft before (*i*), (*e*); before the rest hard's found:
By (*h*) and (*u*) 'tis harden'd, as in *Ghes*
And *Guilt*, and as some other Words express.

(*G*) changes its Sound according to the *Vowel* it precedes, for before (*a*), (*o*), (*u*), it has a hard Guttural Sound, as *Game*, *Gold*, *Gum*: But this hard Sound is melted into a softer, by (*e*), (*i*), or (*y*), as *Gentle*, *Danger*, *Ginger*; but it is harden'd here by the Addition of (*b*) or (*u*), as *Ghes*, *Guilt*, &c. It retains its native Guttural Sound before (*e*) in these: *Altogether*, *anger*, *Auger*, *beget*, *Conger-eel*, *exegetical*, *Finger*, *forget*, *gear*, or *geer*, *Geese*, *geld*, *Gelderland*, *Gelder*, *Rose*, *Gelding*, *get*, *Gewgaws*, *beterogeneous*, *homogeneal*, *beterogeneal*, *homogeneous*, *hunger*, *Hanger*, *Hungerford*, *linger*, *longer*, *Monger*, *springeth*; obsolete, *stringed*, *Vinegar*, *winget*, *wringeth*, *wrongeth*, now written *wrings*, *wrongs*, *younger*; but a *Singer* with a Voice, and a *Singer* by Fire; a *Swinger* on a Rope; and a *Swinger*, a great Lye, must be distinguish'd by the Sense, or the old Way of Spelling the soft Sounds, by adding a (*d*) after the (*n*), as indeed they Sound. (*D*) before (*g*) always softens the Sound of (*g*), as *Hog*, *bodge*, *log*, *lodge*, *dog*, *dodge*, &c. (*G*) is hard before (*i*) in the following Words; as, *Argyle*, *begin*, *gibberish*, *gibblegabble*: *Gibbons*, *Giddens*, *Sirnames*; *giddy*, *gift*, *gig*, *giggle*, *giglet*, *Gilbert*, *gild*, *gilder*, *Gildon*, a *Sirname*; *Gillet*, a *Sirname*; *Gills*, *guilt-head*, *Gimlet*, *gimp*, *gird*, *girder*, *Girdle*, or *Girdler*; *Girl*, *girt*, *Girth* of a Horse; *Gith*, *gittern*, *give*, *Gizzard*; with all the Compounds and Words derived from any of these.

Two (*gg*)'s together make both hard remain,
Tho' (*i*); or (*e*) or (*y*) be in their Train.

When

[25] The (*V*) Consonant we pronounce as the *French*, *Italians*, *Spaniards* and other Nations do, that is with a Sound very near approach-

ing the Letter (*f*); yet (*f*) and (*v*) have the same difference which (*p*) and (*b*) have.

[26] If

Whenever two (*gg*)'s come together, they are both hard, no' (*e*) (*i*) or (*y*) follow.

If the primitive or original Word end in hard (*g*), all Words deriv'd from them do the same; as *Dog*, *dogged*, &c. but most of these latter are under the former Rule, because most of them double the (*g*). (*N*) between the Consonant and (*g*) hardens it; as *stronger*, *longer*, *finger*, &c.

(*Je*)'s always soft, a Vowel still precedes,
And in a Syllable the foremost leads.
All Words, where-e'er this softer Sound we see
Before (*a*), (*o*) and (*u*), are writ with (*Je*).

(*Je*) or (*j*) Consonant always begins a Syllable, is ever plac'd before, never after a Vowel, and has an unvary'd Sound, as being pronounc'd every where as soft (*g*) in *Ginger*; but when the Sound of soft (*g*) is at the end of a Word, it is express'd by (*g*), with silent (*e*) after it, *Rage*, *Sage*, *Wage*, &c. or with (*dg*), as *Knowledge*, &c.

All Words beginning with this soft Sound before (*a*), (*o*) and (*u*), must be written with (*je*) as well as all proper Names deriv'd from the *Greek* and *Hebrew*.

Many Words which now begin with a (*g*) before (*e*), were originally spelt with (*f*), as *fentleman*, not *Gentleman*; and ought indeed, to be thus written always, which wou'd avoid Confusion in the Spelling.

(*Q*) in its Sound, is always sounded *kue*,
And ne'er is writ without a following (*u*).

(*Q*) Sounds (*kue*) or (*que*), and has always (*u*) after it, and begins all Words with that Sound. It ends no Word without (*e*) after it, and that in but a few Words of *French* Termination, as *Antique*, *oblique*, *pique*, *barque*, *cinque*. [26]

To

[26] If the Breath directed thro' the Mouth to the Lips, be intercepted by the closing of the Lips, the (*P*) is form'd; the *Greek* (π); the *Hebrew* (*Pe*). The *Arabians* have not this Letter, but substitute in its place (*Be*) or (*Phe*); the *Persians*, besides this (*Phe*) of the *Arabians*, have their (*H*), which they distinguish from (*Be*), by putting three points under it.

If the Breath reaches not the Lips, but be wholly intercepted in the *Palate*, by moving the tip of the Tongue to the fore-part of the *Palate*, or, which is all one, to the roots of the upper Teeth, the Consonant (*T*) is form'd; the *Greek* (τ), the *Arabian* (*Te*) or (*Ta*), &c.

But if the Breath do not ev'n reach so far, but be intercepted at the top of the Throat, by moving the hinder

To these we shall add some Rules relating to Consonants join'd together.

(Gh) in the beginning does express
(G) hard, as in Ghost we find, and in Ghets.
Elsewhere this (h) we mostly now omit,
Yet by it the Syllable a Length does get.
In Northern Parts this very (h) is found
With a much softer Aspirate to Sound.

In the beginning of Words (gh) is pronounc'd like hard (g): Elsewhere 'tis now almost wholly left out, but yet it implies, that the Syllable is to be lengthen'd. But some (especially the Northern People) Sound the (h) with a softer Aspiration; as in *Might, Light, Night, Right, Sight, Sigh, weigh, Weight, Though*; (but the three last Letters in the Word are now by the Politer thrown away as useless) *Thought, wrought, taught, &c.*

(Gh) sometimes will sound like double (f),
As *Cough, tough, rough, enough, trough* and *laugh*.

When *enough* signifies Number, 'tis spelt *enow*.

(Ch) produces a Compound Sound,
Which from (ty) most surely may rebound.
Or from (tsh), as in *Church* 'tis found.

We must except Words that are deriv'd from the *Greek* and *Hebrew*, especially proper Names, and where a Consonant follows; for there they sound harder, like (c) or (k).

(Sh) like (sy), (ph) like (f) we find,
And the (th) is of a double kind;
Sometimes a softer Sound, a-kin to (d),
Sometimes a stronger, that's a-kin to (t).

(Th) Sounds (dh) sometimes, where it has a softer Sound as it has in the following Words: As *thou, thee, thy, thine, this, that, those, these, they, them, their, there, thence, thither, whither, either, whether, neither, though, although*; but in the two last it is generally left out. And in some Words ending in (ther), as *Father, Mother, Brother, Leather, Feather*; and *smooth, Breath, Wreath, seeke, bequeath, Clothe*.

Elsewhere it generally has a stronger Sound; as in *without, within, through, think, thrive, throw, thrust, Though, Thigh, thing, Throng, Death, Breath, Cloth, Wrath, Length, Strength, thick, thin, &c.*

of the Tongue, to the hinder part of the Palate, (*k*) or hard (*c*) form'd, and the Greek (*κ*), &c. the Welsh always give their (*c*) a hard Sound. These three Consonants we call absolute Mutes; for they give no manner of Sound in themselves, or indeed can give any, because the Breath no way gets into free Air, for it neither gets out the Nostrils, nor by the Mouth. If the Breath, equally divided between the Nostrils and the Mouth, intercepted by the closing of the lips, the Consonant (*B*) is form'd, the Greek (*δ*), the Arabian *Dal*, &c. But if the Breath be intercepted at the Throat by the hinder parts of the Palate and Tongue (*G*) is form'd, the Greek (*γ*), &c. The Welsh always give this hard Sound to their *B*. And these we call *half Mutes*, because they make a little sort of Sound at the Nose, which can be heard by itself without the assistance of the Sound of any other Letter.

If the whole, or, if you please, the greater part of the Breath be divided at the Nostrils, only in its Passage striking the Air that remains in the concave or hollow of the Mouth, the Lips being just clos'd, (*M*) is form'd, the Greek (*μ*), the Arabian *Meem*, &c. But if the Closure or Interception be made in the fore-part of the Palate, (*N*) is form'd, the Greek (*ν*), and the Hebrew and Arabian *Nun*. But if in the Throat, that is in the back-part of the Palate, that Sound is form'd, which the Greeks express by (*γ*) before (*κ*), (*χ*), (*ξ*): And the Latins of old by (*g*), as *Agebisus*, *agceps*, *agulus*, &c. for *Anchises*, *anceps*, *angulus*, as *Priscian* and *Varro* assure us. Which all now write with (*g*) before the same Consonants, especially in the same Syllable; suppose (*g*), (*q*), (*x*), and (*c*), (*g*), (*ch*), pronounced with a hard, that is their genuine Sound. For the Sound of (*g*) is different in the Words *thin*, *gin*, *lynx*, &c. so in *band*, *band*,

ran; from what it is in *bang*, *bank*, *rank*, &c. Nay, the Sound of this Letter is vary'd in the very same Words: For (*n*) sounds otherwise in *long-er*, *strong-er*, *ang-er*, *drink-er*; *in-gruo*, *con-gruo*; but otherwise in *long-er*, *strong-er*, *ang-er*, *drink-er*; *ing-ruo*, *cong-ruo*. So we hear some saying *in-quam*, *tan-quam*, *nun-quam*, &c. while others pronounce them as if they was written *inq-wam*, *tanq-wam*, *nunq-wam*; or *ink-wam*, *tank-wam*, *nunk-wam*. When (*n*) is pronounc'd in the former, the Extremity of the Tongue always strikes the fore-part of the Palate near the roots of the upper Teeth; but in the latter, the same Extremity of the Tongue rather depends to the roots of the lower Teeth; but the hinder-part of the Tongue is rais'd to the hinder-part of the Palate, and there intercepts the Sound; to wit, it is form'd in the Mouth in the same manner, as (*g*); but it has the same Direction of the Breath with (*n*). And this, if we are not deceiv'd, is that very Sound which many wou'd give to the Hebrew *Y*, when they teach us to pronounce it by *ng*, *ngh*, *gn*, *ngbn*, &c. for they insinuate some Sound, which does not perfectly agree with either (*n*) or (*g*), but has something common to both. And we know not but the Spaniards mean the same Sound by their (*ñ*) mark'd thus over head.

We call these three Consonants *half Vowels*; for they have a greater proper Sound than those which we lately call'd *half-Mutes*.

These nine Consonants, which we have discours'd of, are form'd by a total Interception of the Breath, so that it has no manner of Passage through the Mouth, which therefore we nam'd *clos'd*: But the same Formation remaining, if the Breath hard'y press'd, yet (tho' with difficulty) find an Outlet, those Consonants are form'd, which we call *open'd*, which are the *Aspirates* of all those (except the *half Vowels*) from whence they are deriv'd:

More *subtle* and *thin*, if the Breath goes out by an oblong Chink, Slit or Crevice; or more *gross*, if it go out by a round Hole. They are referr'd to the same Classes their *Primitives* were, as being near a-kin to them. We subjoin no *Aspirates* to the *half-Vowels*; nor that there is no Sound when the Breath breaks from him that is about to pronounce them, but because that Sound has not yet, as far as we can discover, obtain'd any Place in the List, or Catalogue of Letters; for it expresses the Lowing of an Ox, or the Humane Sigh; that is, if that be made in the Lips, this chiefly is in the Palate or Throat.

If the Breath escape the Mouth, when we are going to pronounce the Letter (*p*), its Aspirate (*f*), or (*ph*), that is, the *Greek* (*φ*), the *Arabian* (*Phe*), the *Welsh* (*ff*), is form'd and pronounc'd; nor is it of Consequence whether the Breath gets out by a longish Chink, or by a round Hole; for tho' that Way the Sound is more *subtle* and *fine*, and this more *gross*, yet the Distinction of both is so very nice and small, that we doubt whether they in any Language are express'd by different Letters.

If the Breath break out by a Chink, when we are going to pronounce (*b*), it forms the *English* (*v*) Consonant, &c. The *Spaniard* not seldom gives the same Sound to (*b*), using the Letters (*b*) and (*v*) promiscuously. The *Welsh* expresses this Sound by (*f*), and the foregoing Sound by (*ff*). The *English Saxons* either had not this Sound, or express'd it by (*f*) in Writing, for they knew nothing of the (*v*) Consonant; and they wrote many Words with (*f*) (as the *English* did after them for some Ages) which are now written with (*v*), as much as those which still are spelt with (*f*); as *gif*, *Heofen*, &c. which now are writ *give*, *Heaven*, &c. The *Arabians* and *Persians* have not this Sound: And the *Turks* pronounce their *Vau* in this manner, and as a great many,

the *Vau* of the *Hebrews* (which some think more properly pronounc'd the *Arabic Waw*, or *w*). And we doubt not but the *Æolic* (*f*) had the Sound; for since the *Greeks* had before the Character (*φ*), there was no manner of need to invent a new one to express the same Sound. *Belisarius Priscian* owns, that the *Latin* had formerly the same Pronunciation, that is, the same Sound, that was afterwards given to the (*v*) Consonant, and so the Letter (*f*) pass'd to the Sound of (*φ*) or (*ph*).

But if the Breath make its Way out through a round Hole, the *English* (*w*) is form'd and the *Arabic* (*waw*), which Sound many give to the *Hebrew* (*vau*). But the *German* (*w*), if we mistake not, has a Sound compounded of this and the former Letter; that is, by placing that before this; so that the *English* would spell that with *wa*, which the *Germans* express by *wa*. This Sound is not very different from the *English* (*oo*), the *French* (*ou*), and the *German* *groß* or *fat* (*u*) most rapidly pronounc'd. For this Reason some have thought it a Vowel, tho' it be in reality a Consonant, yet it must be own'd very near a-kin to a Vowel. The *Welsh* make that a Vowel, as well as this a Consonant, expressing them by the same Character (*w*), when 'tis a Vowel, it is accented over-head, and sounds long; in other Places 'tis a Consonant, its Sound being short; as, *Gw'ydd*, (which is two Syllables) a Goote; *gw'yr*, crooked; *gw'yr*, Men. Whenever the Sound in *Latin* follows *f*, *q*, *g*, as *suadeo*, *quando*, *lingua*, &c. make it for a Vowel; and perhaps some, who wou'd have it a Consonant in the *English* Words *persuade*, *sway*, &c. and yet the Sound is the very same in both Places. But the subjoin'd Vowel in the Diphthongs or double Vowels (*au*), (*eu*), (*ou*), truly pronounc'd, is no other than this very Consonant, as any Man may see by consulting the discerning *Gataker*, in his Treatise of double Vowels.

of the Breath more grossly goes by the Hole, when we are going to pronounce the Letter (T), the Greek (Θ) is form'd, the Arabic (ث), &c. and the English (Th), *Thigh, thin, thing, thought*, &c. The *Anglo-Saxons* formerly express'd this Sound by this (p), which they call'd *Spina*, the *Thorn*: The *Welsh* always write it with (th).

But if the Breath on this Occasion go more subtilly out of the Mouth by a Chink, that part of the Organe which is next to the Exanthy being lifted up, that the Mouth may, as it were, be flattened thin'd, and press'd with a wider, grosser Form, the Greek (σ) is form'd, the Hebrew *Samech* and *Shin*, Arabic *Sin* and *Sad*; the Latin English (s), pronounc'd with a soft Sound, that is, a sharp, airy, or stridulous, or hissing Sound; as in the Words, *Tes, this, us, thus, less, send, strong*, &c. With this Sound we also pronounce soft before (e), (i) and (y); as in *Ice, Mercy, Peace, since, Princes*, &c. The *French* sometimes use the (c) the same Sound when it is a Tail, as in *Garçon*.

If the Breath get out of the Mouth by a Hole in a grosser manner when you are about to pronounce (D), it forms the Arabic (ذ), the Hebrew *Daleth*, the softer of the *Spaniards*; that is, as the Letter is pronounc'd in the middle and end of Words, as *Majesty, Trinidad*, &c. The *English* use this Sound in the same manner as they do another, which we lately nam'd; that is, with *in thy, thine, this, tho'*, &c. The *Anglo-Saxons* write that Sound with (þ), but this with (Ð), (ȝ). As plain from their Writings, they sometimes confounded these Characters, but in following the *English* express'd both by (p), which by degrees, is changed into the Character (p), which in very many Manuscripts actually begins those Words

which now are written with (th). And hence sprung the Abbreviations of *the, that, thou*, by *ȝ, þ, ȝ*. The *Welsh* express the former Sound by (th), the latter by (dd), only some pretend that it is better written by (dh), who have not been able to alter the old *Orthography*. But we (as we have observ'd) express both Sounds by (th), but erroneously, since neither of them is a compounded Sound, but evidently simple, varying or descending almost in the same manner from the Sounds of (d) and (t); as (f) and (v) do from the Sounds of (p) and (b). We grant, that by the same Reason, that (ph) is written for (f), (bb), (th) and (dh), might be also written, that is in some measure, to shew the Affinity and Derivation of the Aspirate Letters, to those from whence they draw their Original. But it is evident from the following Words, that the genuine Sound compos'd of the Letters, is plainly different from that of the Aspirate Letter; as *Cobham, Chat-ham, Wit-ham, Mait-ham, Wad-ham, Wood-house, Shepherd, Clap-ham, Mess-ham*, &c. And thus we find entirely other Sounds in *Ocham, Block-head, Hog-herd, Cog-hill, Hous-hold, Dis-honour, Mis-hap, dis-honest, dis-beaten, Mas-ham, Caus-ham, Wis-heart*, &c. than those which we commonly write with (ch), (gh), (sh): But the *French*, the *Flemings*, and many others, do not at all, or extremely little, pronounce either of those Sounds which we express by (th); and while the *French* endeavour to pronounce it, they utter (t), the *Flemings* (d), and some others (s). Yet it is not hard to pronounce these genuine Sounds, if we would but take a more peculiar Care of, and have a nearer Regard to their Formation. That is, all the Parts of the Formation remain the same as if we were going to pronounce (t) and (d), only we suffer the Breath to go out of our Mouths here, and not there. We must also take heed, that for want of Attention, the part of the

Tongue

Tongue next to the Extremity rise a little, and so form the Letters (*f*) and (*z*); for as (*f*) is to (*t*), so is (*z*) to (*d*), as we shall now explain.

If when you are about to pronounce (*d*), you extrude the Breath in a more *subtle* manner, as it were thin'd by a Chink or Crevice, (the Part next to the Extremity of the Tongue being to that end lifted up) the *Latin* (*z*) is form'd, the *Greek* (*ζ*), the *Hebrew* *Zain*, and the *Arabian* (*ze*), which Sound the *English* expresses by their (*z*); but they, as well as the *French*, do sometimes express this Sound by (*f*), especially when it is plac'd between two Vowels, and in the end of a Word, as in *Pleasure*, *Ease*, *Laws*, &c. And when a Name or Noun, with hard (*s*) in the last Syllable is made a Verb or Word, then this Verb or Word is pronounc'd with soft (*f*), (that is *z*); so a *House*, a *Louse*, a *Mouse*, a *Price*, *Advice*, (or *Advise*, according to some; tho', in our Opinion, the (*c*) ought to be kept in the Name, as a farther Distinction of the Name from the Word or Verb) *close*, *Brass*, *Glass*, *Grass*, *Grease*, end with hard (*f*); but to *house*, to *louse*, to *mouse*, to *prise*, or *prize*, (tho' *Prize* with a (*z*) signifies a Purchase, a Caption of some Ship, &c. or the Reward of some Action, or so to be obtain'd by some Action, &c.) to *advise*, to *close*, to *braxe*, &c. are pronounc'd with soft (*f*) or (*z*). But other Letters in the like manner have an analogous Alteration. For from the Names *Wife*, *Life*, *Strife*, *Half*, *Calf*, *Safe*, *Breath*, *Cloth*, are pronounc'd with the harder Sounds; they are thus made Verbs or Words, to *Wife*, to *Live*, to *Strive*, to *Halve*, to *Calve*, to *Save*, to *Breathe*, to *Clothe*. The *Italians* (especially when it is doubled) express (*z*) stronger, as the *Hebrew* (*ז*), (*tz*): Thus not a few pronounce in *Latin* Words when (*t*) goes before (*i*) and another Vowel follows; as *Piazza*, *Venetia*, they pronounce *Piatza*, *Venetzia*, &c.

We may add to (*d*), or, if please, to (*n*), two other Letters form'd in the same Seat, that is, the Palate, *viz.* (*l*) and (*r*). We chuse rather to join these Letters (*d*) and (*n*), than to the Letter by reason of the Concussion of *Larynx*, or Wind-pipe, and the emission of the Breath to the Nose in their Pronunciation, of which the Letter (*t*), and all that are deriv'd from it, are utterly incapable.

The Letter (*l*) is form'd if you are about to pronounce the (*d*) or (*n*), you gently send out the Breath from one or both Sides of the Mouth, and by the Turning of the Mouth to the open Lips, with Trembling of the Tongue. And the Sound of this Letter, if we are deceiv'd, is the same in all Languages, as the *Hebrew* *ל*, and *Greek* *λ*.

But the *Welsh* have another stronger, tho' a kindred Sound, this, which they write with *ll*, to distinguish it from that of the gentle (*l*), by the Breath's being more forcibly press'd into the Mouth, whence proceeds a more frothy Sound, as it were, compounded of (*hl*). But this Sound, I think, no other Nation knows, unless perhaps the *Spaniards*.

The Letter (*r*), which is generally call'd the Dog-Letter, is likewise form'd in the Palate; that is, when you are about to pronounce (*d*) or (*n*), the Extremity of the Tongue being turn'd inward, the strong and frequent Concussion of the Breath that is going out; which Conflict that horrid or roaring Sound of the (*r*) proceeds. And the Sound of this Letter is the same in all Nations, as the *Hebrew* *ר*, the *Greek* (*ρ*). The *Welsh* frequently subjoin (*b*) to this Letter; their (*rb*) answers the *Greek* *ρ* (*ρ*). They tell us, that the *Americans* bordering on *England*, or at least a great part of them, cannot pronounce either (*l*) or (*r*), but substitute (*s*) in the

; thus, for *Lobster*, they say, *an*.
 the Breath, being more strictly
 press'd, breaks out *more subtil*.
 when you are about to pronounce
 hard (c), it forms the *Greek*
 the *Arabian* (*cha*), truly pro-
 d, &c. that is by a middle
 betwixt (c) and (b); and this
 is very familiar to the *Ger-*
 and *Welsh*, and they both ex-
 it by *ch*. But it is quite
 in *English*; for our *ch*
 quite different Sound, as we
 shew hereafter.
 if the Breath go out in a grof-
 manner, and less impress'd (by
 of the more lax Position of
 Tongue, and larger Exit for
 Breath) the *Latin* (h) is form'd;
 the *Hebrew* and *Arabian* (He)
 the *Greek* aspirate Spirit. And
 Sound is common to most Na-
 tions. But the *French*, tho' they
 (h), seldom pronounce it. The
 difference between the Sound of this
 that of the foregoing Letter is
 this, that the Breath in the
 is expell'd with a greater
 force, and by a narrower Passage,
 were through a Chink, and is
 before nam'd the double *Aspirate*;
 more freely, and as it were
 through a Hole or larger Passage.
 the *Greeks*, as if it were no Let-
 (because its Sound is but small)
 it an *Aspiration*, and (at least
 a-days) set it not down in the
 & Line of the Letters, but put it
 at the Head of a Letter: Tho'
 merly they did set 'em before the
 vels in the direct Line, but they
 the (e) after them, if we are not
 taken, and this makes them use
 for a Note of an Hundred; for
 that is now written *ἑκατόν*, was
 merly written *Hexάτορ*. But
 can see no manner of Reason
 y (b) should not be a Consonant
 all other Languages; for it is by
 means to be rejected from the
 number of Letters, because the
 end of it is sometimes not pro-
 nounc'd by the *French* and some

others; for that is no more than is
 common to many other Letters, espe-
 cially of the *Hebrew*, and other
 Oriental Tongues, which are quiet-
 scent or silent: Nor because it does
 not hinder the Elision of the forego-
 ing Vowel, when another Vowel
 follows in the subsequent Word; for
 (m) wou'd then lie under the same
 Fate, and (f) anciently did not hin-
 der this Contraction. But we must
 confess, that there is some doubt
 whether the *Latins*, who were such
 mighty Emulators of the *Greeks*, al-
 low'd (h) to be a Letter or not, espe-
 cially when we find the *Gramma-*
rians so earnestly denying, it with
Priscian at the Head of them.

If when you are about to pro-
 nounce (y), or the hard (g), the
 Breath being more hardly com-
 press'd, goes out by a more subtle
 Chink, as I may say, or Slit, that
 Sound is form'd which is express'd
 by *gh*. The *English* seem former-
 ly to have had this Sound in the
 Words *Light*, *Night*, *Right*, *Daugh-*
ter, &c. but now they only retain
 the Spelling, entirely omitting the
 Sound; but the *North-Country* Peo-
 ple, especially the *Scots*, almost re-
 tain it still, or rather substitute the
 Sound of (h) in its room. The *Irish*
 in their (gh) have exactly this
 Sound, as in *Lough*, a Lake, &c. It
 differs from the *German* (ch) as
 (g) does from (c), that is by the
 Direction of the Breath to the No-
 strils, which neither (c) nor (ch)
 can do. But the *Germans* generally
 write by (ch) those very Words
 which the *English* write with (gh),
 for their *Nacht*, *recht*, *liecht*, *secht-*
en, *tochter*, answer our *Night*, *right*,
light, *fight*, *Daughter*; and there are
 many more Words of the same kind.
 The *Latins*, *Greeks*, *Hebrews* and *A-*
rabians knew nothing of this Sound.
 The *Persians* pronounce their *Ghas*
 with this Sound, which is distin-
 guish'd from the *Arabic* *Kef* by
 three Points over it.

But if the Breath go out more
 freely, and as it were through a
 more large Hole, the *English* (y)
 Con-

Consonant is form'd; the German (j) Consonant, the Arabian (ye), which Sound many contend belongs to the Hebrew (jod). For this Sound is very near a-kin to that of the Vowel (i) slender, most rapidly pronounc'd. The Diphthongs, as they are call'd *ai, ei, oi,* or *ay, ey, oy,* are promiscuously written by (i) or (y), especially by the English and the French. *I* is not only put for (i) at the end of Words, but in the middle, when (i) follows the Sound of (i); as *dying, lying,* &c. the Anglo-Saxons, and after them the English, for many Ages always put a Point over (y), when it was us'd for the Vowel (i), thus (y')

But it is manifest, that there is a great Affinity between this Letter and *g* and *gb*, from those Words, which are now written by *gb*, as *light, might, thought,* &c. being in the old Manuscripts written with (y), in the same Character, as *yet, yonder,* &c. For they had a three-fold Figure, one (p), which we now express by *th*, as we have already observ'd; another which was us'd for (i) Vowel, and differing from the former only by the Point over it; and a third (3), which was always put for (y) Consonant, and which was found in those Words which we now spell with *gb*:

But the Library-keepers, of late Times, ignorant of the Matter, by a very gross Error substituted the room of it the Character of the Letter (x), when they made the monstrous Words *thouxt, souxt,* for *thought, sought,* &c. or rather for *thoyxt, souyt,* &c. as they were then us'd to be written by (y) Consonant, as we may find them in the Impressions of *Chaucer*, and others of the old Poets. We must also be that not a few Words, which we now spell with (y), the old Saxons and now most commonly the Germans, wrote with *g*; for our Words *Slay, sayl, say, day, rain,* &c. many more, are partly by the Anglo-Saxons, and partly by the Germans written *Schlagen, legel, lye, sag, tag, tegen.* And on the contrary many Words which are now written with (g), were formerly written with (y); as, *again, again, given,* &c. were anciently written *ayen, ayenst, yeoven,* &c.

Thus we have run through all the simple Sounds that we know, and have given Rules for their several Formations, and distributed them into their several Families and Classes; and as we have of the Vowels, so shall we here of the Consonants, give you a Plan, which your Eye may view all at once.

Consonants,	Labial or Lip	Mute ———	P	F	I	F	
		Half-Mute —	B	V	I	W	
		Half-Vowels	M	a	Low	ing	
	Palatine or Palate	Mute ———	T	S	I	T	H
		Half-Mute —	D	Z	I	D	H
		Half-Vowel —	N	a	Sigh		
	Guttural or Throat	Mute ———	C	CH	I	H	
		Half-Mute —	G	GH	I	T	
		Half-Vowel —	n	a	Sigh		

more subtil,
more gross,
Aspirates,

As we have said something of the Compound Sounds of the Vowels, I shall add a Word or two here of the Compound Consonants. The English (j) Consonant, or soft (g), or (y), is compounded of (d) and (y), as plain from *Jar*, *joy*, *gentle*, *ring*, which sound *Dyar*, *dyoy*, *diile*, *lodying*, &c. the *Arabian* (which Letter, tho' it descend from the Hebrew *Gimel*, retains not Sound) and the *Italian Gi*.

The French (j) Consonant and (g) is compounded of the Consonants (xy); for their *Je*, *J*, *age*, &c. are *Zye*, *axye*, &c. the *Persians* express this Sound by their *j*; which is distinguish'd from the *Arabian Ze* by having three Notes over it.

The German (j) Consonant is only a simple Sound, that is, as we have said, the same with the English (y).

The English (sh), the French (ch), German (sch), the Hebrew and Arabic (shin) sound (sy), for the French *Chambre*, the English *Shame*, the German *scham*, sound *Syam*, *syame*, *syam*. The Welsh express this Sound by (si), wherefore in them (with a Note of Production over the following Vowel) *s*, (*John*), is a *Monosyllable*, but *s* (*Mount Zion*) a Word of two Syllables.

The English (ch) or (tch), sounds for *Orchard*, *Riches*, &c. sound *Jard*, *Rit-yes*, &c. The *Italians* pronounce their (c) thus before (e) (*è*). The *Persians*, to express this Sound, besides the *Arabic Albet*, make use of their (che), which, by having three Points beneath it, is distinguish'd from the *Arabic Gim*. If before the English *y*, you severally put *d*, *r*, *s*, they will be made *dyen*, *tyen*, *syen*, which is the English *Jew*, *shew*, and the French *Jeu*, *Play*. The (X) of the *Latins*, and all other Languages, and the Greek (ξ), is compos'd of (cf) (ks).

This Letter is not known to the *Hebrews*, nor the *Oriental Tongues*; but in the room of it they write those simple Letters of which it is compos'd; which the *Germans* likewise often do, for their *Ochs*, *wachs*, *sechs*, *sechst*, &c. are the English *Ox*, *wax*, *six*, *sixt*; the *Welsh* always write this with (cf).

The Latin (k) was anciently put (ca), and they promiscuously wrote *Calenda*, and *Kalenda*; but it now generally has the same simple Sound which the Greek (κ), whence it is deriv'd, or the Latin (c), and it would be plainly a superfluous Letter if (c) always retain'd its genuine Sound; and therefore the *Welsh*, whose (c) has always one constant Sound, have no such Letter, as well as some other Nations.

The Latin (q) of old, put for (cu) or rather (cw), which has always (u) after it, has the very same Sound with (c) or (k) and is a superfluous Letter. The *Welsh* have it not, but always put for (q), (cw), or (cbw). And the *Anglo-Saxons* wrote *Cpen*, that is, *Even* for *Queen*.

The English (w) is pronounc'd perfectly (hw), and the *Anglo-Saxons* us'd to place them so; and we cannot tell how the succeeding English came to invert the Position, and set the (w) before the (h).

But this is worthy our Observation, That the Consonants (y) and (w), tho' it be not minded, most commonly are subjoin'd to kindred Consonants before kindred Vowels; that is, (y) is often subjoin'd to the Guttural Consonants (c) (g), when a Palatine Vowel follows; for *can*, *get*, *begin*, &c. sound as if they were written *cyan*, *gyet*, *begyin*, &c. for the Tongue can scarce pass from these Guttural Consonants, to form the Palatine Vowels, but it must pronounce (y). But it is not so before the other Vowels, as in *call*, *Gall*, *go*, *Gun*, *Goose*, *come*, &c. (W) is sometimes subjoin'd to the Labial or Lip Consonants (p) and (b) especially before open (o); as *Por*, *Boy*, *best*.

boil, &c. which are sounded as if spelt thus, *Pwot*, *Bwoy*, *bwoil*, &c. but this is not always done, nor by all Men.

We have (page 2) consider'd Letters, as the Signs of Sounds, but have not yet examin'd the *Analogy* they bear to the Sounds they represent. We have already said, that *Sounds* are taken for the Signs of our Thoughts, and that Men invented certain Figures, to be the Signs of those *Sounds*. But whereas these Figures or Characters, in their first Institution, signifie immediately only the *Sounds*, yet Men often carry'd their Thoughts of the Characters, to the very *Things* which the *Sounds* signify'd; whence it comes to pass, that the Characters may be consider'd two ways, *viz.* either as they simply signify the *Sound*, or as they assist us in conceiving that which is signify'd by the *Sound*.

Four Things are necessary to give them their Perfection in the first State.

(1.) That every Figure or Character mark or denote some *Sound*: that is to say, That no Character be set down in any Word, but what is pronounc'd.

(2.) That every *Sound*, which is express'd in the Pronunciation, be mark'd with some Figure: that is to say, That we pronounce nothing but what is written.

(3.) That every Figure mark only one simple, or compounded *Sound*.

(4.) That one and the same *Sound*, be not mark'd by more Figures than one.

But considering the Character in the second manner, that is to say, As they help us in the Conception of those Things, which the *Sounds* signify; we find sometimes, that it is for the Better, that the foregoing Rules are not always observ'd, especially the first and the last.

Because first, it often happens in those Languages which are deriv'd from Others, that there are certain

Letters, which are not pronounc'd and which, for that reason, are of no manner of use to the *Sound*, are yet useful in helping us to understand that which the Words signifie. As for Example, in the First Words, *Champs*, *Temps*, and *Champs*, the (p) and (t) are not pronounc'd which are of use to the signification because by them we find, that the first comes from *Campus*, and the later from *Cantus*.

In Hebrew itself there are Words which differ only by one ending *Aleph*, and the other in *Hameh* that are not pronounc'd; as *לִירָא* which signifies to fear or dread, *לִירָא* to throw, sling, cast, &c.

Hence 'tis plain, that this Abuse of Words (as 'tis call'd) is not without its Benefit to the Language.

The difference between the Capitals and Small Letters, may seem to some a Contradiction to the fourth Rule, That one and the same *Sound* be not mark'd with more than one Figure: And for this Reason, we urge, that the ancient, as well as present Hebrew, had none of this difference; and that the *Greeks* and *Romans*, for a long time, made use of only Capital Letters in their Writing. But this Distinction is of great Advantage, and Beauty, in mingling with a pleasing Variety the Capitals and Small Letters, in the beginning of Periods, proper Names, and to distinguish Names of Words of Affirmation, and all other Parts of Speech.

Besides, this Objection will lie against the Difference of Handwritten Figures of Writing or Printing, the Roman, *Italic*, German, &c. the Impression of this very Book, any other Language, ancient or modern, which is very usefully employ'd in the Distinction, either of certain Words, or certain Discourses and Sentences, which convey Force and Energy intended by the Author, to the Reader, and does at all change the Pronunciation.

Tho' what we have said be

to show, that the use of Letters which are not pronounc'd, is so great an Imperfection as generally imagin'd, at least in those Instances, and Particulars of Words borrow'd from other Languages; yet must be allow'd, that there are many crept in by a Corruption which has spread it self through several Languages. Thus it must be confess'd, that it is a certain Abuse to give the Sound of (*s*) to (*c*), before an (*e*) and (*i*), and of pronouncing (*g*) before the same Vowels, otherwise than before the others; of giving soften'd the (*s*) between two Vowels; and of giving (*t*) the Sound of (*s*) before (*i*), follow'd by another Vowel, as *Gratia*, *Action*, *Distion*, &c.

Some People have imagin'd, that they cou'd Correct this Fault in the vulgar Tongues, by inventing new Characters, as Mr. *Lodwick* has done in his universal *Alphabet*, and *Comenius*, in his *Grammar* of the *French Tongue*, by retrenching every Letter that was not pronounc'd, and writing every Sound by that Letter, to which the Sound to be express'd was proper, as by placing an (*a*) before (*a*) and (*e*), and not a (*c*) and the like: But he, and all others of his Mind, ought to consider, that besides the Disadvantage this wou'd be to the vulgar Tongues, for the Reasons urg'd before, they wou'd attempt an Impossibility; and they little think how difficult a thing it is to change, and bring the People of a whole Nation to the change of a Character they have been us'd to, to turn out of Mind; and the Emperor

Claudian found himself disappointed in an Attempt of this Nature, and was fain to lay aside his Design of introducing a Character he had prepar'd.

All that can be done in this particular, is to retrench by degrees all those Letters which are of no Use, either to the Pronunciation, or the Sense, or Analogy of Languages, as the *French*, and we have begun to do; and to preserve those, that are useful, and to set some certain small Marks to distinguish them from those, which are pronounc'd, or which may intimate to us the several Pronunciations of the same Letter. But even this labours under a Difficulty not to be remov'd but by degrees, and in many Years; for the altering any of the present, or adding any new Characters at once, wou'd be of no manner of Use, while all the chief Books of the Language are without these Marks or Alterations, and so many People must be oblig'd to learn their *Alphabet* over again, or be puzzl'd to read what wou'd then be Written or Printed. And indeed, the Rules we have given in these Cases, will (we persuade our selves) be of more Use than all these Projects for directing the Learner. Yet, to omit nothing that has been offer'd with any Probability, we shall add the Method of a *French* Author, to this End; a Point above or below will serve for the first Case, and when (*c*) is pronounc'd like (*s*), it may have a Tail added; and when the (*g*) is pronounc'd like an (*j*) Consonant, its Tail need not be quite clos'd.

The End of the First Part.

Part II.

CHAP. V.

Of SYLLABLES.

*A Syllable's a compleat and perfect Sound,
In which one single, or one double Vowel's found;
Or either join'd with Consonants, and spoke
In one sole breathing, as in Cloke.*

[1] **A** Syllable is a compleat Sound utter'd in one Breath, which sometimes consists of one Vowel, or double Vowel, sometimes of one Vowel, or double Vowel join'd to one or more Consonants, not exceeding seven in Number.

By this Definition it is plain, that one single Vowel may compose a Syllable; as the first Syllables in the following Words, *A-braham, E-ternal, I-very, O-rient, U-nity.* But no
num-

[1] The Word SYLLABLE is deriv'd from the Latin *Syllaba*, and that from the Greek Word *συλλαβή* from *συλλαμβάνειν*, which is to comprehend; so that *Syllaba*, in the Latitude of the Term, may be taken for any Comprehension or Connection in general, but in a Grammatical Sense, only for a Connection of Letters in one Sound. *Scaliger* has defin'd a Syllable to be an Element under one Accent, that is, what can be pronounc'd at once: *Priscian* more plainly has it, *Comprehensio Literarum, &c. a Comprehension of Letters falling under one Accent, and produc'd by one Motion of breathing.* Yet this has been rejected by some GRAMMARIANS, as imperfect, and excluding all Syllables of one Letter: Another has defin'd it thus, *A SYLLABLE is a*

literal or articulate Voice of an individual Sound; for every Syllable must fall under the same Accent, for as many Vowels as may occur in a Word, to be produc'd under divers Accents, or with several Motions of the breathing so many Syllables; and on the contrary, tho' there be several Vowels, if they are pronounc'd under one Accent, and with one Breathing, they make but one Syllable.

In every Word, therefore, there are as many Syllables as there are vocal Sounds, and vocal Sounds are Vowels simple or compound, and each of these in its Formation, requires a distinct Motion of the Pectoral Muscles. Thus *a, a, a,* make three Syllables, form'd by so many Motions, distinguish'd by small Stops betwixt each Expiration or Breathing.

number of Consonants can be sounded without a Vowel, for tho', after the *Mutes* and *Liquids*, (*bl*), (*cr*), in *Table* and *Acre*, the (*e*) be quiescent, or at least obscure, yet that Sound, which is express'd by those Consonants, is deriv'd from that (*e*), by which, making a sort of Sound, we think (*bl*) and (*cr*) are not just Exceptions made to this Rule, for from *Verification* it is plain, that *Table* is compos'd of a long and a short Syllable.

*As many Vowels as emit a Sound,
So many Syllables in Words are found.*

As many Vowels, or double Vowels, as are found in any Word, of so many Syllables is that Word compos'd, except any of the Vowels be silent or quiescent, as the final (*e*), and some Vowels which make the improper double Vowels, the Rules of which have been already given in the *First Part* treating of LETTERS, and the (*e*) which is added to some Syllables in the middle of Words; as the (*e*) in *Advancement* and *Rudesby*, which serve only to lengthen the foregoing Vowel. Except likewise Words ending in (*es*), and no (*s*) coming before (*e*); as *Names*, *Trades*, &c. but if (*s*), or the Sound of (*s*), comes before (*es*), it is another Syllable; as *Horses*, *Asses*, &c. *Faces*, *Races*, *Pages*, *Prizes*: And when (*u*) follows (*g*) or (*q*); as in *Quart*, *Guide*, *Guilt*, &c. and when (*e*) is follow'd by (*n*); as in *even*, *Heaven*, &c. but when this (*e*) is generally left out, they become one Syllable every where.

*Eight Letters in some Syllables we find,
And no more Syllables in Words are join'd.*

[2] As there are but eight Letters in any Syllable, so has no Word above seven or eight Syllables (and few in *English* so many) as *Re-con-ci-li-a-ti-on*, *In-com-pre-hen-si-bi-li-ty*.

To divide Syllables justly in Writing, especially when part of a Word is written in one Line, and part in another, this is a general Rule.

*When any single Consonant is seen,
Single or double Vowels plac'd between,
The Consonant divides still with the last,
But to the first the (P) and (X) joins fast.*

When

ing, whereas one (*a*) of the same length, is form'd but by one.

[2] In *Hebrew*, all the Syllables

begin with a Consonant, allowing *Aleph* to be one, and a Syllable has never more than one Vowel.

54 *The English Grammar, with Notes.*

When a single Consonant comes between two Vowels, or between a single and double-Vowel, it must in the dividing Syllables be joyn'd to the later.

Except when (x) or (p) comes between two Vowels; for they are joyn'd to the first, as in *Ex-ample*, *Ox-en*, *up-on*; except *Su-pine*.

*In compound Words its own will each retain,
The same additional Endings must obtain.*

Except Compounds, where each Word compounding retains its proper Letters; as *un-arm'd*, *un-usual*, *in-ure*, *ad-orn*, *with-out*, *with-in*, *Safe-ty*, *love-ly*, *Name-less*, &c.

When a Word receives an additional Termination, or ending; as (ed) *Wing-ed*; (edst) *Deliver-edst*; (eth) *Deliver-eth*; (for which *Delivers* is now written, and the former ending entirely rejected) (est) *Deliver-est*; (ing) *Deliver-ing*; (er) *Deliver-er*; (ance) *Deliver-ance*.

*The Consonants preceeding (l) and (r),
Follow'd by (e) never divided are.*

As *in-se-pa-ra-ble*, *Tri-ste*, *Mi-tre*, &c. But this Rule seems included in that of initial Consonants.

*Two Consonants betwixt two Vowels plac'd,
If they begin a Word, pursue the last.
But those that can no Word at all begin,
Can ne'er a Syllable, without a Sin.*

When two Consonants come between two Vowels, if they be such as can begin a Word, they both go to the latter Vowel; but if they cannot begin a Word, they must be parted, one joyning the first Vowel, and the other the latter.

To make this the plainer, we shall here enumerate the double-Consonants that can begin Words; which you may easily know by putting (e), or any other Vowel, after them, and if they naturally and easily fall into one articulate Sound, they can begin a Word; if not, they must be parted into distinct Syllables.

These Consonants that begin Words, are Thirty in number.

{ Bl. Bleed
 Cl. Clear
 Fl. Fleet

{ Br. Brace
 Cr. Croud
 Dr. Dry
 Fr. Frost

{ Gl. Glory
 Pl. Plane
 Sl. Slight

{ Gr. Grove
 Pr. Prince
 Tr. Treat
 Wr. Wrath

{ Ch. Change
Dw. Dwarf
gn. gnaw

{ Kn. Knaves
Qu. Queen
sc. scant
sh. show
sm. smart

{ Sn. Snare
Sp. Spill
Sq. Squib

{ st. still
Sw. Swear
th. this
tw. two
Wh. Wheel.

Nine ways Words begin with three Consonants, as,

{ Sch. Scheme
Scr. Screen
Shr. Shrine
Skr. Skrew
Spr. Spread

{ Spl. Spleen.
str. strain
Thr. Three
Thw. Thwart

In short, all this Rule is compriz'd in this, that a *Mute* and a *liquid* following one-another, go together with the last Vowel, all double-Consonants in the middle besides, are divided. To this, as well as the former Rules, this Exception holds, that Compounds keep each its Part, as has been observ'd; and additional Endings are distinct Syllables.

But such Consonants as cannot begin a Word, can never begin a Syllable, and must therefore be parted in the Division of Syllables; as in *sel-dom*, for (*ld*) can't begin a Word; and in *Mul-ti-ply*, *Trum-pet*, *ar-dent*, *Can-did*, *ac-cord*, *swag-ger*, &c. When three or more Consonants meet in the middle of a word, that Word is generally a Compound, and therefore each keeping its own, generally the first Consonant goes to the first Vowel, and the other to the latter; as in *Con-tract*, *instruc-tion*, &c.

Two Vowels meeting each with its full sound,
Always to make two Syllables are bound.

If two Vowels come together, and both fully sounded, they must be divided, and make two Syllables, as *Re-enter*, *tu-tual*, &c.

The following Observations relating to Syllables, or to the Pronunciation of Letters, as they are plac'd in Syllables, and not singly by themselves, we thought more proper for this place, than where they have been plac'd by Others; for to talk of the Pronunciation of Syllables, before the Learner knows what a Syllable is, seems something preposterous.

The

The Sound of (*shal*) in Words of more Syllables than one is written in some by (*ti*) before (*al*), as *Credential*, *Equinoctial*, *Essential*, *Nuptial*, *Impartial*, &c. Some others write (*ci*) before (*al*), as *Artificial*, *Beneficial*, *Judicial*, *Prejudicial*, &c. and the Reason is, that the Primitive Words from whence these are deriv'd, end in (*ce*), as *Artifice*, *Benefice*, *Prejudice*, &c. or from the Latin Words, in which as (*t*), or (*c*) is us'd, continues in English, as *Judicial*, from *Judicialis*, &c.

The Sound of (*shan*); must be written (*cian*), as *Aritmetician*, *Grecian*, *Logician*, *Magician*, &c. from *Arithmetica*, *Grece*, *Logic*, and *Magic*; and so all others from the (*ti*) Latin, except *Ocean*, *Precisian*, *Tertian*, *Egyptian*, *Asian*, &c.

The Sound of (*shate*) is express'd by (*ti*), before (*ate*), as *Gratiate*, *expatiate*, *negotiate*, *vitiate*, &c. except *emaciate*, *Associate*, *Nauseate*.

The Sound of (*shent*) is written by (*cient*), in *Ancient*, *Proficient*, &c. (*cient*), in *Patient*, *Impatient*, &c. and (*scient*) in *Omnescent*, &c.

The Sound of *shun*, or *shun* in the End of Words, must be written (*tion*), with (*t*), except *Allusion*, *Animadversion*, *Ascension*, *Asperision*, *Aversion*, *Circumcision*, *Collision*, *Collusion*, *Comprehension*, *Compulsion*, *Conclusion*, *Condescension*, *Confusion*, *Contusion*, *Convulsion*; *Decision*, *Decursion*, *Delusion*, *Diversion*, *Diffusion*, *Dimension*, *Discurision*, *Dispansion*, *Dispersion*, *Desecration*, *Distension*, *Dissuasion*, *Diversion*, *Division*, *Divulsion*; *Fusion*, *Emulsion*, *Erosion*, *Evasion*, *Eversion*, *Excision*, *Exclusion*, *Excursion*, *Expansion*, *Explosion*, *Expulsion*, *Extension*, *Extraction*, *Illusion*, *Immersion*, *Incision*, *Inclusion*, *Incurision*, *Inhesion*, *Inspersion*, *Introversion*, *Intrusion*, *Invasion*, *Irrision*; *Mansion*; *Occision*, *Occulsion*; *Pension*, *Persuasion*, *Provision*; *Reprehension*, *Reversion*, *Revulsion*; *Sponision*, *Suffusion*; *Version*: To these add the following Words in (*ssion*), as *Admission*, *Commission*, *Compassion*, *Compression*, *Concession*, *Concussion*, *Confession*, *Decepcion*, *Depression*, *Dismission*; *Expression*; *Impression*, *Intercession*; *Mission*; *Omission*, *Oppression*; *Passion*, *Percussion*, *Permission*, *Procession*, *Profession*, *Progression*; *Secession*, *Session*, *Succession*.

The following Words written (*sition*), tho' most of them like Sound are spelt (*tion*), as *Petition*; *Acquisition*, *Composition*, *Deposition*, *Disposition*, *Disquisition*; *Exposition*; *Inquisition*, *Interposition*; *Position*; *Transsition*, *Transposition*. [3]

] At the End of this short Part
Division, we shall lay down a
Method of learning to Read in
Languages, as we find it in a
each Author, and which perhaps
ingenious School-master may
prove to the Advantage of his
Pupils: To which we shall add,
Mr. Lodwick, our own Coun-
sellor, has advanc'd on the same
Plan.

This Method (says our Author) re-
lates chiefly those, who cannot
Read: It is certain, that the Learn-
ing of no great difficulty in learn-
ing the Letters themselves, but the
great Labour and Pains they go
through, is in joining the Letters
together in Syllables. For every
Word has its peculiar Name, which
is pronounc'd differently by it self,
from what it is in Conjunction with
other Letters; for Example, If you
teach a Child to pronounce Fry in a
Syllable, you first make him pro-
nounce *f*, *e*, *r*, *y*; which must per-
petually confound him; when he comes
to join these three Sounds together,
in order to form the Sound of
the Syllable Fry.

The same Observation is made by
Mr. Lodwick; As the present Al-
phabets, says he, are imperfect, so are
the *Primmers*, or first Books,
which Children are taught to Spell
and Read. First, In not having a
distinct Alphabet. And Secondly,
not being digested in such a Me-
thod, as is fit and proper to teach
in as they ought to be taught.
The usual Way of teaching to
Read, is to dismember every Syllable
into more than one Letter) into many
Syllables, by expressing every Letter
separately, and Syllabically; and the
Monosyllables with such a Vowel as
they are ordinarily nam'd with, and
not requiring them to join all these
Syllables into one Word.

But how preposterous this Me-
thod is, one Instance for all will ma-
nifest: Suppose the Monosyllable
Read, to be spell'd, they will teach
them thus to dismember it; *Bee*, *er*,
ee, *dec*, and then require them to

join these into one Syllable, which
'tis impossible for them to do, and
they must express this one Syllable
by five Syllables, which was not de-
sign'd; whereas they shou'd teach
them to express every Syllable en-
tire at first sight, without dismem-
bering it; and to do this, they must
proceed gradually: First beginning
with the most simple Syllables; and
so by degrees proceeding to the more
difficult and compounded, till they
can readily pronounce a whole Syl-
lable at first sight; even the most
difficult that are. To that end let all
the *Primmers* be thus contriv'd; at
the top of the Leaf, let all the Vo-
wels be plac'd singly in Order, as
they follow in one Rank, and in the
same place Syllables, 1st, Of one
Vowel, and one Consonant following
it, throughout all the Variations;
then of one Consonant, and one Vowel
following that. 2^{dly}, Of two Conso-
nants before, and one Vowel follow-
ing throughout the Variations.
3^{dly}, Of one Vowel, and three or
four Consonants following; and of
three Consonants going before, and
one Vowel following. 4^{thly}, Of one,
two, and three Consonants going
before a Vowel; and one, two, three,
or four Consonants following. 5^{thly},
Of some Syllables with Diphthongs
and Triphthongs. For Example:

a. e. i. o. u, &c.
ab. eb. ib. ob. ub, &c.
ad. ed. id. od. ud, &c.
ba. be. bi. bo. bu, &c.
ald. eld. ild. old. uld, &c.
dra. dre. dri. dro. dru, &c.
balm. belm. bilm. bolm. bulm, &c.

After this, place a number of
Words of two, three, or four Syl-
lables, from the more easy, to the
more difficult Expressions, without
heed to their Significations; the
in our Opinions, if there cou'd be
some Order and Connections in their
Signification, it would help the Me-
mory: Further, let there follow
some Words of several Syllables,
with the Accent variously plac'd, as
on the first, second, and third, &c.

Thus

Thus far Mr. *Loadwick*, who proceeds farther, but that relating too much to his Universal *Alphabet*, can not have a place here.

To this we shall add some Rules of Spelling, which tho' we did not think full enough of Demonstration to be inserted in the Body of the Rules, yet since they really afford Matter of Speculation sufficient to employ the curious Teacher or Learner of his *Mother Tongue*, and may perhaps be render'd capable of Improvement, we shall here add. They were given us by one Dr. *Jones*, who (as we guess by his Name) being a *Welsh-man*, may, in some Particulars of his Book, be misled by the Pronunciation of his own Tongue; yet is his Book worth our Consideration. But this will be plainer from his Observations.

His Maxims are, first, *That all Words were Originally Written as Spels*. Tho' this may be disputed, yet the Consequence is not so great as to make us enter into the Controversie.

His next is, *That all Terms which have since alter'd their Sound*, (the Origin of the difficulty of Spelling) *did it for Ease and Pleasure*.

From the *harder, harsher, longer*, to the *easier, pleasanter, and shorter* Sounds, which for that Reason became the more usual. From hence it follows, *That all Words that can be sounded several ways, must be Written according to the hardest, sharpest, longest and most unusual Sound*. And this Rule, he assures us, is without Exception in our Tongue.

The longest Sound is that which expresses most simple Sounds, or sounds the same number after the longest manner, thus, if you say *agen* and *again*, it must be written *again*; because it sounds more Letters. The same may be said of *Faxor* and *Favour*.

The more unusual Sound is known to all, by common Practice.

Thus none can fail to know which is the *longest* and most *unusual Sound*, and that its sufficient almost in all Cases, because the length and unusualness of the Sound causes it to be the harder Sound, which is the third thing to be observ'd in this universal Rule.

But to make the use of this Rule complear, because it may happen that some Words (tho' not many) may sound divers ways, and yet express the same number of Letters, and that in the same manner, either long or short, and both Sounds almost usual, as in *Anger*, and *Angur*; *Finger*, and *Fingur*, &c. it will be useful to know which in such a Case is the easier and pleasanter simple Sound, and to which harder and harsher Sounds they are so like, that they are apt to exchange Sounds with 'em.

A is much easier than *E* or *O*; *A* than *P*; *D*, than *T* or *th* in *that*; *E*, than *I*, *O*, *U*; *EE*, than *E*, *I*, *O*, *G*, than *C* for *K*, or hard *C*, or *ch* in *chew*; *M*, *ng*, than *N*; *Ou*, than *O* or *U*; *Sh*, than *Ch* or *S*; *T* in *the*, than *Th*; short *U*, than *A*, *E*, *I*, *O*, *V*, than *F* or *Ph*; *Z*, than *S* in *sa*.

Simple Sounds are easier than Compounds; Compounds of one Sound, than Compounds of three, and so on; and Compounds of one Sound, than Compounds of two Sounds.

Double Characters are to be reckon'd as single, if they have but one Sound.

We have omitted the particular Proofs of these Rules, which the Reader may consult his Book for, his Curiosity prompt him; this being sufficient to give Ground to his Enquiry; And, we believe, in trying, he will find 'em sometimes pretty true, if not always.

The End of the Second Part.

L 59.1

Part III.

OF WORDS. [1]

INTRODUCTION.

WE come now from meer Sounds, to [2] *Words*, which convey something to the Understanding: For by these we are able to express our Thoughts, or Sentiments of all that we see, feel, hear, taste, touch, or understand. All *Knowledge* indeed draws its Original from the Senses; and our *Perception*, *Judgment*, and *Reasoning*, under which the several Classes, or Orders of Words, are rang'd, proceed from these Notices of Things, and Beings, and their Relations to each other, and have no other Source: By these we know, that there are Things; that these Things have certain Qualities, Beings, Actions, or Passions, &c. whence it seems pretty plain, that the *Words*, which are to express our Sentiments of these Things, must bear some Proportion and Likeness to the Things they are to express. Being therefore in *Conversation*, or *Writing* to express or signify all the Objects of our Senses, and the mental, or intellectual Deductions from them, *Words* are naturally, to that End, to be divided into four original Classes or Orders, i. e. *Things*, or rather the *Names* of *Things*; the *Qualities* of those Things, the *Circumstances*, *Actions*, *Passions*, and *Beings* of Things, with their *Relations*, *Regards*, and *Connections* to, and with each other in Sentences.

According to this, there are four Parts of Speech, or four Heads, to which every *Word* in all Languages may be reduc'd.

The four Parts of Speech.

[3] NAMES.	}	AFFIRMATIONS.
QUALITIES.		PARTICLES, or the
		<i>Manners of Words.</i>

[1] It may here be proper to Explain what we mean by a *Word*, which we think may be thus defin'd: *A distinct articulate Sound, which Men have made the audible Sign of some one of their Thoughts.* Or if we rather take it from Words, as Written and Spoken, we may define it thus. *Words are distinct articulate Sounds, implying by common Consent, some Thoughts or Operations of the Mind, express'd by some certain Marks, Figures, or Characters agreed on by Men, as the visible Signs of those Sounds and Thoughts.*

This last Definition includes Words in both Senses, that is, both as Spoken and Written.

[2] Man being a Conversible Animal, and form'd for Society, there was a Necessity of some Way or Means of conveying the Mind, or Thoughts of one Man to another; which tho' it might be in some measure done by the Eyes, Hands, Fingers, Motions and Gesticulations of the Body, &c. as in the Pantomimes of the Ancients, and Mures of the Seraglio, &c. yet those being more imperfect, as well as more troublesome and tedious, Nature, (which always chooses the easiest and most efficacious Way) directs Mankind to impart the Sentiments of his Mind, rather by the Voice, and the Motions of the Tongue, which are more easy in the several Variations of Sounds, than any other Way. For this Reason, Men have distinguish'd every Modification of the Voice, by a particular Letter, (of which we have already discours'd at large, both in the Text, and the Notes); and tho' these Letters are not many in number, yet are they by their various Conjunctions, sufficient for all the Languages that ever were, or ever can be in the Universe. They are indeed but Twenty-six in our Tongue, and yet they may be so variously dispos'd, as to make more than five Hundred and Seventy-six several Words of two Letters; and Twenty-six times as

many Words may be form'd of three Letters; that is to say, Fifteen thousand and six; and Twenty-six times as many more may be made of four several Letters, that is, Nine hundred thousand thirty-six; and so on in proportion. From this manifest Generation of Words, from the various Combinations of Letters, we may judge of their vast Variety, being indeed not much less than infinite.

[3] In all Languages there are *Names, Qualities, and Affirmations*: *Names* signify *Things*; *Qualities* signify the *Manners or Qualities* of those *Things*; *Affirmations* affirm something of them. And there are other Words which signify neither of these, but the relation of one to the other, and those are the *Manners of Words*: But these Relations of Words to Words are of several Kinds, which are express'd by some of these Particles, or *Words*, *of, to, for, O, by, with, through, in, &c.* of which in Construction.

It is true, that some have endeavour'd to reduce all Words to three Classes, which we shall consider in our Notes; but others vainly boast, or pretend to contract 'em yet closer into two, either ignorant of the Operations of the Mind, which they were invented to express, and which can never be brought into that compass, as will be plain from what follows; or for want of considering what they say; or to be thought Men of wonderful Penetration by ignorant Hearers. Those Gentlemen, who have with great Clearness of Reason propos'd them under three Heads, have however told us, that some Philosophers have thought themselves oblig'd to add a fourth distinct from the other three; and will appear from the Sequel.

Words having something corporeal and something spiritual in 'em, we may say, they consist of Soul and Body: The Ideas of the Mind, when they command the Organs of the Voice, to form such Sounds, which

the audible Signs of those Ideas, the *Souls* of Words; but Sounds are produc'd by the Organs of the Voice, and are the material Part, and may be call'd the *Body of Words*.

We shall therefore, here consider them, as they are abstracted from Matter, in their Relation to the Mind of Man, and in which we have the Advantage of all other Creatures, and a very strong Proof of our Reason superiour to them; that is, by the Signs we make of *Words*, to convey our Thoughts to each Other, and that surprizing Invention of combining six and twenty Sounds in so multiplicitous a manner, as we have observ'd, by which we discover the Variety of our Thoughts, and all our Sentiments on all manner of Subjects, tho' there be no real or natural Resemblance betwixt the Words, and the Operations of the Soul of Man; but only Signs by Compact, and Agreement, to signify our Thoughts.

Words therefore, being (as is said) invented to express our Thoughts, it follows, that we cannot perfectly discover the different Sorts, and Significations of Words without, first considering what passes in our Minds.

It is agreed by all Philosophers, that there are three Operations of the Mind, *viz. Perception, Judgment, and Reasoning*.

PERCEPTION is the simple Apprehension of any Thing, or Quality of a Thing, whether purely *Intellectual*, as when we simply think of the *Being, Eternity, and Decree* of God; or *Corporeal, and Material*, as a *Square, a Circle, a Horse, a Dog*.

JUDGMENT affirms that the Thing we perceive, is so, or not so, as having the Ideas of the *Earth* and *Roundness*; affirm, *that the Earth is round*.

By REASONING, we draw Consequences to evince the Truth, or Fallacy of a contested Proposition, by comparing it with one or more uncontested Propositions; or in short, from two Judgments, to infer a

third, as when we have judg'd that *Virtue* is Praise-worthy, and that *Patience* is a Virtue, we infer and conclude that *Patience* is Praise-worthy.

Hence we may easily observe, that this *third* Operation of the Mind, is but an Extension of the *second*. It will therefore be sufficient for our present Subject, to consider the first two, or what of the first is contain'd in the second; for if we seriously attend what passes in our Mind, we shall find, that we very rarely consider the simple Perception of Things, without affirming something or other of it, which is the Judgment.

This Judgment we make of Things, as when we say *the Earth is round*, is call'd a *Proposition*; and therefore every Proposition naturally includes two *Terms*, one call'd the *Subject*, which is the Thing, of which the *Affirmation* is, as *the Earth*; and the other is call'd the *Attribute*, which is the Thing that is affirm'd of the *Subject*, as *round*; and then, *is*, which is the Connection betwixt these two Terms.

But it is easy to perceive, that these two Terms do properly belong to the first Operation of the Mind, because that is what we conceive, and is the Objects of our Thoughts; and that the Connection belongs to the *second*, which may be properly call'd the Action of the *Mind*, and the manner in which we think.

And thus the greatest Distinction of that which passes in our Mind, is to signify, that we may consider the Objects of our Thoughts, and the Form and Manner of them, of which the chief is the *Judgments*. But we must besides refer thither the *Conjunctions, Disjunctions*, and other the like Operations of the Mind, as well as all the other Motions of the Soul, as *Desires, Commands, Interrogations, &c.*

From hence it follows, that Men wanting Signs to express what passes in the Mind, the most general

Distinction of Words, must be of those which signify the Objects, and Manner of our Thoughts, tho' it frequently happens, that they do not signify the Manner alone, but in Conjunction with the Objects, as we shall soon demonstrate; having already shown that the Knowledge of what passes in the Mind, is necessary for the understanding the Principles of GRAMMAR.

The Words of the first Class, are those which we call *Names*, *Personal Names*; *QUALITIES* deriv'd from Words of *Affirmation*, or *Verbs*

(call'd in the *Latin* Participles *Fore-plac'd Words*, (or *Prepositions*) and *added Words*, (or *Adverbs*) Those of the second, are Words of *Affirmation*, (or *Verbs*) joining Words, (or *Conjunctions*) and *Interjections*, as the old GRAMMARIANS call'd them absurdly distinguishing them into a peculiar Part of Speech, which are plainly only *added Words* of *Passion*, which all derive themselves by a necessary Consequence, from the natural Manner of expressing our Thoughts.

CHAP. VI. Of NAMES. [1]

*Whate'er we see, feel, hear, or touch, or taste,
Or in our Understanding's Eye is plac'd,
NAMES properly we call; for always they
Some certain Image to the Mind convey;
As Man, Horse, House, Virtue, and Happiness,
And all such Words as Things themselves express.*

[2] **N**AMES express the *Things themselves*, that is, every Thing that is the Object of our several Senses, Reflection, and Understanding; which conveying some certain *Idea*, or *Image*, to the Mind, they want not the Help of any other Word to make us understand 'em. Thus when we hear any one say, *A Man, a House, a Horse, Virtue, Vice, Happiness, &c.* we perfectly understand what he means.

*Before the NAMES, a, an, or the may be,
But Thing you never after them can see.*

[3] Since

[1] The Words that signify the simple Objects of our Thoughts, are in all Languages, but *English*, call'd NAMES; but our first Formers of *Grammar*, either out of Affectation or Folly, corrupted the *Latin* Word *Nomen*, into the Barbarous sound *Noun*, as it is call'd in the *Vulgar Grammars*. And thus the *Grammarians* have made a Division of NAMES, calling the Name of a Thing or Substance, a *Noun Substantive*, and that, which signifies the *Manner* or *Quality*, a *Noun Adjective*.

five. But these additional Terms *Substantive* and *Adjective*, seem us superfluous, and burthensom to the Minds of the young Learners; without any manner of Benefit to the Understanding; for the different Natures of the two Words is fully express'd by the Terms NAMES and QUALITIES, and it is vain to do so by many, which may be done by few. Nature is simple in all her Operations, and he is the best Engineer, who produces the Effect, with the fewest Wheels, Screws, &c. Those who use these Terms give no Reason for them, that they are call'd *Adjectives*, or (as some) *Adnouns*, because having no Natural Substance of their own, they subsist by nothing but the *Noun Substantive*, to which they are joyn'd; as in these two Words, *round Earth*; the last is the *Substantive*, and the first only signifies the Manner or Quality of its Being: That is, the *Adjective*, *Adname* or *Quality* cannot be put by it self in any Sentence; it would not make Sense, it would convey no Idea to the Mind; nor to say *a Round, a White, a Black, a Crooked*, &c. is to say nothing: it requires therefore some *Name*, or *Noun Substantive*, as they call it, to be joyn'd to it, to make Sense, or form any Idea; as *a round Ball, a white Horse, a black Hat, a crooked Stick*, are true Objects of the Thoughts, and every Body understands them: But if you say *a Man, a Horse, a House*, &c. we perfectly know what you mean; and therefore subsisting by it self, in good Sense is call'd a *Substantive Name*, or in the vulgar Phrase a *Noun Substantive*.

[2] The Objects of our Thoughts are either *Things*, as the *Sun, the Earth, Water, Fire, Air Wood*, &c. which we generally call *SUBSTANCE*; or the *Manner* of *Things*, as to be *round, red, hard, knowing*, &c. which are call'd *ACCIDENTS*. And there is this difference betwixt the *Things*, or *Sub-*

stances, and the *Manner of Things*, or *Accidents* that the *Substances* subsist by themselves; but the *Accidents* subsist only by, and in the *Substances*.

This is what makes the principal Difference betwixt Words, that signify the simple Objects of our Thoughts; the Words which signify *Substances*, or the Things themselves, are call'd *Names*, or *Substantive Names*; and those which signify *Accidents*, by expressing the *Subjects*, with which these *Accidents* agree, are call'd *Qualities*, or (according to the common Way) *Adjective Names*, or *Adnames*.

This is the first Original of *Names*, both *Substantive* and *Adjective*, or *Names* and *Qualities*. But we have not stop't here; for less Regard has been had to the Signification, than to the Manner of signifying. For, because the Substance is that which subsists by it self, the Appellation of *Substantive Names* has been given to all those Words which Subsist by themselves in Discourse, without wanting another *Name* to be joyn'd to them, tho' they did only signify *Accidents*. Thus on the contrary, even those Words, which signify *Substances*, are call'd *Adjectives*, when by their Manner of signifying they may be joyn'd to other *Names* in Discourse: As the *Warriour God, the Bowyer King*, and the like, which tho' they are call'd *Names* put together by Apposition, degenerate here plainly into the Signification of *Qualities*, belonging to the *Names*; and are therefore *Names* degenerated into *Qualities*, or *Substantives* into *Adjectives*.

But the Reasons that renders a *Name* incapable of subsisting by it self, is when, besides its distinct Signification, it has another more confus'd, which we call the *CONNOTATION* of a Thing, to which that agrees which is meant by the distinct Signification.

Thus the distinct Signification of *Red*, is *Redness*, but it signifies the

Subject of that Redness, confus'dly, which makes it not capable of subsisting by it self in Discourse, because we must express, or understand the Word which signifies the Subject. As, therefore, that *Connotation* makes the *Adjective*, or *Quality*, so when that is taken away from Words, which signify *Accidents*, they become *Substantives* or *Names*: As from *Colour'd*, *Colour*; from *Red*, *Redness*; from *Hard*, *Hardness*; from *Prudent*, *Prudence*, &c. On the contrary, when you add to Words signifying *Substances*, that *Connotation*, or confus'd Signification of a Thing, to which the *Substances* have Relation, makes them *Adjectives*, or *Qualities*, as *Man*, *Manly*, *Man-kind*, &c.

The *Greeks* and the *Latins* have an infinite Number of these Words; as *ferreus*, *aureus*, *bovinus*, *vitulinus*, &c. but they are not so frequent in the *Hebrew*, nor in *French*, and many of the vulgar Tongues; but in the *English*, we think, they are not more rare, than in the dead Languages.

Again, if we take these *Connotations* from these *Adjectives* or *Qualities* form'd of *Names*, or of *Substantives*, we make them new *Substantives*, which we may properly call *Derivatives*, and so *Humanity* comes from *Humane*, and *Humanus* from *Homo*.

But there is another sort of *Names*, which pass for *Substantives*, tho' in Reality they are *Adjectives*, since they signify an *accidental* Form; and besides, denote a Subject to which that Form agrees: Such are the *Names* of the several Offices, and Professions of Men; as *King*, *Philosopher*, *Painter*, *Soldier*, &c. but the Reason why these pass for *Substantives*, is, that they can have nothing but Man for their Subject, at least, according to the ordinary way of Speaking, and the first Imposition of Names, so not necessary to join their *Substantives* with them, since they may be understood without any Confusion, and they can

have no Relation to any other Subject. By this means, these Words have obtain'd what is peculiar to a *Substantive*, viz. to Subsist by themselves in Discourse.

'Tis for this very same Reason that certain *Names*, and *Persons*, *Names*, or *Pronouns* are taken *Substantively*, because they relate to Substance so general, that it is easily understood, as our *Country*; *Earth* is understood; *Judea*, *Province* is understood.

And we have observ'd, that *Adjectives* or *Qualities* have two Significations; one distinct of the Form, and one confus'd of the Subject: But we infer not from thence, that they signifying the most distinct Signification, are also the most direct; for they signify the Subject directly, tho' more confus'dly, but the Form only indirectly, tho' more distinctly. Thus *White* signifies directly something that has *Whiteness*, but in a very confus'd manner, without denoting in particular any one Thing that may have *Whiteness*, and it signifies *Whiteness* only indirectly, but in as distinct a manner as the Word *Whiteness* it self.

There are two sorts of *Ideas*, one represents to us a single Thing, as the *Idea* of ones *Father*, *Mother*, a Friend, his own Horse, his own Dog, &c. The other *Idea* presents to us several things together, but of the same Kind, as the *Idea* of Man in general, Horses in general, &c. But not having different *Names* for these different *Ideas*, we call the *Names* of single *Ideas*, *proper Names*; as the Name of *Plato*, which agrees to one particular Philosopher, so *London* to one City; and those *Names* which signify common *Ideas*, general, or appellative *Names*, as the Word *Man*, which agrees with all Mankind; of the same Kind are the Words *Lion*, *Dog*, *Horse*, &c. yet the proper Name often belongs to several at the same time, as *Peter*, *John*, *Robert*, &c. but this is only by Accident, by reason that many have taken the same Name; but

Since *Names* express the *Things themselves*, you cannot put the Word *Thing* after 'em, without Nonsense. Thus you cannot say *Man Thing*, *Virtue Thing*, and the like.

They also admit of *a* or *the* before 'em, or *an*, if they begin with a Vowel.

*Of Names three several sorts there are,
As Common, Proper, Personal declare.*

There are three sorts of NAMES; *Common Names* are such as agree to, or express a whole Kind, as the Name *Horse* signifies *my Horse*, *your Horse*, and all the *Horses* that are.

Proper Names distinguish *Particulars* of the Kind from each other; as *Cæsar*, *Pompey*, *Cicero*, distinguish those from all the rest of Mankind. The same holds of the *Proper Names* of *Cities*, *Towns*, *Mountains*, *Rivers*, *Countries*, &c.

Personal Names are us'd when we speak of *Persons* or *Things*, to avoid the Repetition of the same Word, and supply the place of Names of Men, Women, and Things.

*Two different Endings different Numbers show,
And which no other Part of Speech do's know.*

[3] *Names* in general signifying either one, or more of the same Kind, must have two different Numbers to express this difference; as, the *Singular*, which signifies but *One*, and the *Plural*, which signifies *more than One*; and all *Names* discover this Distinction of Number, by the changing their Endings; as, *Man*, *One Man*; *Men*, *more than One*.

This likewise gives another Mark to distinguish *Names* from the other Parts of Speech: For tho' the *Affirmations* have two Numbers, yet are they not thus distinguish'd; as we shall see when we come to 'em. There are two more Distinctions of *Names*, which come properly after all the Parts of Speech, because they depend on the Knowledge of 'em.

*To Singular Names we always add an (s)
When we the Plural Number wou'd express;
Or (es), for more delightful easie sound,
Whene'er the Singular to end is found
In (ex), or (ze), (ch), (sh), or (s)
(Ce), (ge) when they their softer sound confess.*

The *Singular Number* is made *Plural* by adding (*s*) to the *Singular*; as *Tree*, *Trees*; *Hand*, *Hands*; *Miles* and *Mile*: but when the Necessity of Pronunciation requires it in the place

place of (s), we must add (es); that is, when the Singular ends in (s) or (se), (ze), (x), (sh), (ce), (ch) or (ge) pronounced soft, as *Horse, Horses; Fox, Foxes; Fish, Fishes* and *Fish Maze, Mazes; Prince, Princes; Tench, Tenches; Page, Pages* by which means the *Plural Number* consists of two Syllables tho' the *Singular* is but one; as all the foregoing Examples shew.

The following Exceptions yet are seen,
When for the (s) the Plural ends in (en);
As Oxen, Women, Chicken, Brethren, Men. }
Cow has the Plural Cows, or Keen, or Kine;
And so has Sow the Plural Sows or Swine.

Ox, Chick, Man, and all deriv'd from it, as *Horseman, Footman, &c. Woman, Child, Brother*, have the Plural in (en) tho' *Brethren* signifying both *Brothers* and *Sisters*, has likewise *Brothers*; and *Swine* signifies both male and female, and with (a) before it, is us'd for *One Hog* or *Sow*. *Chicken* is sometimes likewise us'd for *one Chick*: *Deer, Sheep, Fern*, are the same in both Numbers; of the Singular with (a) before them.

To these Irregulars some more add yet;
As Louse, Lice; Mouse, Mice; Goose, Geese; & Foot, Feet
And Tooth, Teeth; Die, Dice; and also Penny, Pence
Deriv'd from Penny's, Critics say, long since.

The Names whose Sing'lars end in (f), or (fe),
Their Plurals have in (ves), we always see;

As Calf, Calves; Sheaf, Sheaves; half, halves; and
[Wife, Wives;
Leaf, Leaves; Loaf, Loaves; Shelf, Shelves; self, selves;
[Knife, Knives;

Add unto these Wolf, Wolves; Thief, Thieves; Life, Lives.

Staff has *Staves*, tho' the double (ff) Singular generally makes double (ff) with (s) in the Plural; as *Cliff, Skiff, Muff, &c.* *Mischief* is us'd both *Mischieves* and *Mischiefs* in the Plural; (f) and (ve) are so nearly related, that they easily pass from one into the other, in all Languages.

Except Hoof, Roof, and Wharf, and Proof, Relief,
Ruff, Cuff, Skiff, Muff, Dwarf, Handkerchief, and Grief

There may be some others of the same Kind, these are known to make good the Exception in the sound of those Singulars that end in (s) and (th): There is a like Softning or Alleviation, without changing the Letters, as *House, Houses*

it were *houzes*; *Path, Paths*; *Cloth, Cloths, or Cloaths*. *Earth* keeps its harder Sound when 'tis us'd in the *Plural*, which is not seldom.

*Custom, to which all Languages must bow,
Does to some Names no Singular allow.*

Use has in *English*, as well as other Languages, deny'd the Singular Number to some Words; as *Annals, Alps, Shoes, Bowels, Bellows, Breeches, Calends, Cresses, Goods*, meaning Things possess'd by any one, as the Goods of *Fortune*) *Entrails, Ides, Smallows* of every kind, *Nones, Scissars, snuffers, Shears, Tongs, Lungs, &c.*

*To others she, with arbitrary Will,
Denys the Claim of Plural Number still;
All Proper Names we in this Rule contain,
The Names of Liquids, Herbs, most sorts of Grain,
Fat, Unctuous Matter, Wax, Pitch, and Glue,
The Names of Virtues, Vice, and Metals too.*

As we have some Words which have no Singular Number, on the other hand we have many more without a Plural; some by the Nature of the Things signified, others by meer Use. Thus all Proper Names of Men, Women, Mountains, Rivers, or any other Creature, to whom (for Distinction) a Proper Name is given; as *Bucephalus* to the Horse of *Alexander the Great*: These have no Plural Number, because they naturally agree but to one: For when we say, the *Cesars*, the *Alexanders*, the *Mordants*, and the like, it is figuratively, including under those *Proper Names* all those who resemble them in their Valour, Conduct, Virtue, &c. except *Alps*, and perhaps *Appenines*.

To these we may add the Names of *Virtues, Vices, Habits, abstract Qualities*; of *Metals, Herbs, Spices, Liquids, Unctuous Matter, Fat, Wax, Pitch, Glue*; most sorts of Grain, as *Wheat, Rye, Barley, Darnel*, except *Oats* and *Tares*, (*Peas, Beans* and *Vetches* are Pulse, not Grain, tho' set down by some for 'em) likewise *Chaff, Bran, Meal*. The Names of *Spices*, as *Pepper, Ginger, Mace, Cinnamon*, except *Cloves* and *Nutmegs*: Of *Herbs and Drugs*, *Cochineal, Sotherwood, Grass, Maddar, Rue, Moss, Fennel, Rosemary, Wolfwort, Cliver, Endiff, Sage, Parsley, Spicknard, Spinach, Savory, Hellebore, Hemlock, &c.* except *Colworts, Leeks, Artichoaks, Cabbages, Nettles*, and those whose Names are compounded with *Foot* or *Tongue*, as *Crowfoot, Adders-tongue*: Of *Liquids*, as *Air, Choler, Blood, Must, or new Wine,*

Wine, Ale, Beer, Spittle, Snot, Sweat, Urine, Vinegar, Milk Of Unctuous Matter, as *Honey, Butter, Fat, Grease, Amber, Wax, Marrow, Pitch, Rosin, Tar, Glue, Lard, Dirt, Sulphur, Bitumen, Brimstone*: Of Metals, as *Lead, Brass, Pewter, Tinn, Copper, Silver, Gold*; add *Ivory, Jet*: Of Virtues, *Prudence, Justice, Chastity*; and of Vices, *Pride, Sloath, Envy*: Of Abstract Qualities, *Wisdom, Probity, Modesty, Bashfulness, Swiftness, Boldness, Constancy, Courage, Ardour, Candour, Comtempt, Paleness, Fame*; add to these *Hunger, People, Vulgar, Offspring, Rust, Dust, Soot, Wool, &c.*

The best Rule for this is, That Things that are small and undistinguishable, want the *Plural Number*; but those which are larger, and more distinguish'd, have it.

Thus much for *Names Common and Proper*; we shall conclude this Head with a thorough Examination of the Third sort, call'd *Personal Names*. [4]

Three

then other Names are added, which determine and restore the Quality of a *proper Name*. Thus the Name of *Charles* is common to many, yet if you add the (*2d*), it becomes proper to the King of that Country where 'tis spoken. Nor is it necessary sometimes to make any Addition, because the Circumstances of the Discourse sufficiently denote the Person that is spoken of.

[3] The *common Names* which agree to several, may be consider'd several Ways: For *First*, They may either be apply'd to one of the Things to which they agree, or may all be consider'd in a certain Unity, which the Philosophers call *UNIVERSAL UNITY*. *2dly*, They may be apply'd to several together, considering them as several.

To distinguish these two sorts of Ways of *Signifying*, two Numbers have been invented, the *Singular*, as a Man; the *Plural*, as Men. Nay, the *Greeks* have yet another Number, call'd the *Dual Number*, or signifying two; the *Hebrews* have the same, but that is only when the Words signify a thing double either by Nature, as the *Eyes*, the *Hands*, the *Feet*; or by Art, as *Scissars, Tonges, &c.*

As for *Common and Appellative Names*, they seem all naturally to require a *Plural Number*, yet are there several which have none, whether by the Influence of Custom only, or some Reason; so the Names of *Gold, Silver, Iron*, or other Metals, have scarce any *Plural* in any Language. The Reason of which we fancy to be this, That because of the great Resemblance there is between the Parts of Metals, every Species thereof is not consider'd, as having several Individuals under it. This is very palpable in the *French*, where to denote a singular Metal, we add the Particle of Partition, *de L'or, de L'Argent, du Fer*, Gold, Silver, Iron, as we say *Irons*, but then it signifies not the Metal it self, but Instruments made of Iron; the *Latin Aera*, signifies Money, or a certain sounding Instrument, like the *Cymbal, &c.*

But this difference of Number in the Names, is express'd by a difference of Termination or Ending, as is express'd in the Text. But tho' *Qualities* shou'd have a *Plural*, because they naturally imply an uncertain Signification of a Subject, which renders them capable of agreeing with several Subjects, at least

As to the Manner of signifying, in Effect they did only agree to; yet in *English* there is no difference of the Termination or End, to distinguish this Agreement. There are three Things more, which are *Case, Declension* and *Gender*, which the *English Names* we use. But the *Cases* of the *Latin* and *Greek* expressing the Relations of Word to Word, and their Dependence on each other, we supply with greater ease by Prepositions; as by *of, to, for, from, &c.* But these having a peculiar regard to the Construction of Words join'd in Sentences, we shall refer our Learner to that place.

Tho' we have (in our Language) Note of difference of Gender, either by the Ending or Termination of the Words, or any Article proper to them, yet we thought it proper in this general view of GRAMMAR, which we give you in these *Notes*, to add something on this Head in Relation to other Tongues.

The *Adnames*, or *Adjective Names*, or, as we call them, *Qualities*, naturally agree to several, and therefore it has been thought fit, both for the avoiding of Confusion and the Ornament of Discourse, to add such Variety of Terminations to them, as would have been a Diversity in the *Adjectives*, *Adnames*, or *Qualities*, suitable to the *Names*, or *Substantives* with which they agree.

Now Men having consider'd themselves, and observ'd the considerable difference of the two Sexes, thought to vary the same *Adjective Names*, by giving them different Terminations, as they are different, apply'd to Men or Women; as when we say in *Latin*, *bonus Vir*, a good Man; in the *Masculine*, speaking of a Woman, they change the Ending of the *Adjectives* or *Qualities*, and say *bona Mulier*.

But in *English* we are more strict in this, for we express the difference of Sex by different Words, and not by the Variation of *Epithets* or *Substantives*; as *Boar, Sow*; *Boy,*

Girl; *Brother, Sister*; *Buck, Doe*; *Bull, Cow, Bullock, Heifer*; *Cock, Hen*; *Dog, Bitch*; *Duck, Drake*; *Father, Mother*; *Gander, Goose*; *Horse, Mare*; *Husband, Wife*; *Lad, Lass*; *King, Queen*; *Man, Woman*; *Master, Dame*; *Nephew, Neice*; *Peacock, Peahen*; *Ram, Ewe*; *Son, Daughter*; *Uncle, Aunt*; *Widower, Widow*; *Wizard, Witch*; *Batchelor, Maid, Virgin*; *Knight or Lord, Lady*. But the following twenty four Feminines or Females, are distinguished from the Males, by the Variation of the Termination of the Male into (*ess*.)

Abbot	Abbess
Actor	Actress
Adulterer	Adulteress
Ambassador	Ambassadress
Count	Countess
Deacon	Deaconess
Duke	Duchess
Electer	Electress
Emperor	Empress
Governor	Governess
Heir	Heiress
Jew	Jewess
Lion	Lioness
Marquis	Marques, or Marchioness
Master	Mistress
Prince	Princess
Prior	Prioress
Patron	Patroness
Poet	Poetess
Prophet	Prophetess
Shepherd	Shepherdess
Tutor	Tutress
Viscount	Viscountess

And two in (*ix*), as
Administratrix *Executrix*.

This is all that our Language knows of any thing like the *Genders*, which is only a different way of expressing the Male and the Female; but the old Languages have gone farther; for as same *Adjectives* or *Qualities* might have Relation to other Things, besides Men and Women, it was thought necessary to appropriate to them, one or other of the Terminations invented for Men

Men and Women : Hence all other Names, or Substantives, have been rang'd under the Heads of Masculine or Feminine ; and sometimes indeed not without a plausible Reason, as in the Names of Offices properly belonging to Men, as *Rex, Jux, &c.* (which as we have before hinted, are but improperly *Substantives*) which are of the *Masculine Gender*, because *Homo* is understood. In the same Manner, all the Female Offices are of the *Feminine Gender*, as *Mater, Uxor, Regina, &c.* because *Mulier* is understood.

But this happens in other Cases meerly by Fancy, without any other Reason, than the Tyranny of Custom ; and therefore it varies according to the Languages, or even according to the Words introduc'd from one Language into another. Thus *Arbor*, a Tree, is *Feminine* in *Latin* ; but *Arbre*, is *Masculine* in *French* ; and *Dens* (a Tooth) is *Masculine* in *Latin*, and *Feminine* in *French*, (*Dent*). Nay, that has sometimes chang'd in one, and the same Language according to Time and Occasions. And thus according to *Priscian*, *Alvus* in *Latin*, was anciently *Masculine*, and afterwards became *Feminine* ; *Navire* (a Ship) was anciently *Feminine* in *French*, but is now *Masculine*.

The same Variation of Custom or Use has made some Words, which were formerly certain, of a doubtful Gender, being us'd as *Masculine* by some, as *Feminine* by others ; as *bis*, or *hac Finis*, in *Latin* ; and *le*, or *la Comte* in *French*.

But the Gender which is call'd doubtful, is however not so common as some *Grammarians* imagine, for it properly belongs only to the Names of some Animals, which in *Greek* and *Latin* are promiscuously join'd both to *Masculine* and *Feminine Adjectives* or *Qualities*, to express either the Male or Female, as *Bos, Canis, Sus, &c.*

There are still other Words, which they place under the Neuter Gender, but they are properly only *Adjectives* or *Qualities*, taken Sub-

stantively, because they commonly subsist in Discourse by themselves, and have not different Terminations accommodated to the different Genders, as *Victor, Victrix, Rex, Regina, Pistor, Pistrix*, and the like.

We ought also here to observe from hence, that what the *Grammarians* call *Epicene*, is not a different Gender, for *Vulpes* (a Fox), is it indifferently signifies either the Male or Female, is really of the *Feminine Gender* in the *Latin* ; and thus in *French*, the Word *Aigle* (an Eagle) is truly *Feminine* ; because the *Masculine* or *Feminine Gender* in a Word, does not so properly regard its Signification, as that it shou'd be of such a nature as to join with *Adjective* or *Quality*, in the *Masculine* or *Feminine Termination*, as either does occur : And so in the *Latin*, *Custodia, Vigilia, Prisoner*, or *Watchmen* or *Centinels*, are really *Feminine*, tho' they signify Men : This is what is common in the Genders to all Languages that have them.

The *Latin* and *Greek* in the Neuter Gender do not regard them, having no Relation to the Male or Female Sex, but what Fancy gives them, and the Termination of certain Words.

[4] Tho' we think it pretty obvious, that *Personal Names* are not a different Part of Speech from *Names*, notwithstanding some, who are wedded to the old way only because it is old ; yet we shall here add the learned Mr. Johnson's Proof of this Truth. *Pronoun* (says he in his fifth Animadversion, p. 10) *quod pro Nomine ; It is put for a Noun, then it seems by the Name, and our Author (LILLY) it is much like a Noun in his Definition of it, like indeed, that it is the same. The only difference betwixt it and other Nouns, is, that it signifies a Person Primarily, and Secondly a Thing, which is Vossius's Definition of it. Primario Nomen, significat, I suppose Nomen Personae, secundario rem. Analog. lib. 3. cap. 3.*

Three Persons only every Language claims,
Which we express still by the following Names ;
I, thou, and he, she, it, we, ye, and they,
If you to these will add who, what, you may.

[5] Since in Discourse whatever is said, is spoke either our selves, to another, or of a third, it is necessary that there be three Persons ; *I*, the first, *thou*, the second, and *he*, *she*,

if it signifie a Person, it must be under the Notion of a Noun ; a Person is a Thing, such a thing as may be consider'd alone by Understanding, and be the Subject of a Predicate, I mean the Subjunctive Pronoun, for there are also Nouns Adjective. Indeed, this use of Speech is in order of Nature the first Noun ; for when Adam and Eve were only in the World, they had no other Name but *I* and *thou* to speak to one-another, and these Names were not given them of any Necessity. The Pronoun therefore is a Noun, only a Personal one to be us'd when we speak of things Personally, to which (upon Multiplication of Mankind) we added the proper Name to distinguish Persons by, and also particular Things, which are as it were spoken of Personally, when they are spoken of particularly. And thus we find Nouns us'd in the first Person as *Romulus Rex Regia Arma* aff. Liv. l. 1. also *Anobal pero* pag. Id. l. 30. and *Callopius* recensui the End of Terence's Plays. And as far Mr. Johnson, which is sufficient to show, that we have only plac'd them here under the head of NAMES.

[5] The frequent Repetition of the same Words being as disagreeable as it is necessary for us to speak of the same Thing, to avoid which there are, in all known Languages, certain Words establish'd to supply this defect and remove this Scorum, which are call'd *Pro-nomes*, for Names, *Personal Names*, as vulgarly in English, *Pronouns*. In the first place it has been observ'd, that it wou'd be tedious as well as indecent to be often naming

our selves by our *Proper Names*, and for that Reason the *Pronome* of the first Person was introduc'd to stand in the place of his Name who speaks, as *I*, *Eye*.

And on the other-hand, to avoid the too frequent Repetition of the Name of the Person to whom you speak, *thou* or *you*, (*Pronomes* of the second Person) were invented.

And lastly, to avoid the too often repeating the Names of other Persons or Things of which we discourse, the *Personal Names* of the third Person were invented ; as *He*, *She*, *it*, *who*, *what*.

These *Personal Names* performing the Office, and supplying the Place of other Names, they have like them two Numbers ; that which signifies one, and that which signifies more than one, (i. e. the *Singular*) ; as *I*, *thou*, *you*, *he* ; and the *Plural*, as *we*, *ye*, or *you*, and *they*. *You* (as has been said) is us'd in the *Singular* for *thou* and *thee*, as well as in the *Plural* for *ye*. Thus in French, *vous* for *tū* and *toy*.

In other Languages which have *Genders*, the *Pronoun* has the same, the first and second are common, except in the *Hebrew*, and those Languages which imitate that in which the *Masculine* is distinguish'd from the *Feminine* ; but in the *English* we have no *Genders*, as has been seen in the foregoing Notes. The same may be said of Cases. There is this to be observ'd in these *Personal Names*, That the Termination changes in both Numbers when it comes after a Verb or Word of Affirmation ; as *I*, *me* ; *we*, *us* ; *thou*, *thee* ; *you*, or *ye*, *you* ; *he*, *him* ; *she*, *her*, *they*, *them* ; except *it*, which does not vary. [1] In

she, or *it*, the third, of which all other Words but *I* or *thou* with the *Plurals*, are. If we speak of a Male, we say, *he*; of a Female, *she*; if of Things, that have no Sex, we use *it*. The *Plural Number* of *I* is *we*; of *thou*, *you* and *ye*; tho' by Custom we say *you*, when we speak but to one Person, tho' being seldom us'd but to GOD, as, *wilt thou, O Lord!* and on solemn Occasions to Princes, *Remember, O Prince! thou art born a Man*; otherwise *thou* is never us'd but in Contempt, Anger, Disdain, or Familiarity. *He*, *she*, and *it*, have (in the *Plural Number*) only *they*.

*These Names in both the Numbers we allow
A leading and a following State to know.*

*The leading State is I, the following ME,
The following State is US, the leading WE,
Thus THOU and THEE, YE, YOU, HE, HIM, & SHE,
HER; THEY and THEM; who and whom; but WHAT
To vary like the Rest do not think fit.* [and IT]

Those *Personal Names* have in both Numbers a double Form or State, the first is what we may call the *leading State* as *I*; the second the *following State*, as *ME*. In the *Plural Number* the *leading State* is *WE*, the *following US*. The second is in the *leading State* *THOU*, in the *following THEE*. In the *Plural* *YE* and *YOU*. The third is in the *leading State* *HE*, if we speak of a Male in the *following*, *HIM*, or *SHE*, *HER*, and in the *Plural* *THEY*, *THEM*, which is the *Plural* of *HE*, *SHE* and *IT*, which never varies its Ending, and is in both States *IT*, when we speak of Things of neither Sex. *WHO* in the *leading State* of both Numbers has *WHOM* in the *following State* in both. It is call'd the *Interrogative*, because it asks Questions of Persons or Individuals (as, *Who is there, Peter?*) as *What* does of the Kind, or Quality; and also in the order of a Thing; as, *What is that? it is a Book*; *What art thou?* in the order of Number, the first, second, third, fourth, &c. (which is the same in both the *leading* and *following State*, or indeed, like *It*) *It* has no State.

But to make this the plainer, we shall lay down a view of all these *Personal Names* together, in both their states.

Pers. 1.	{	Sing.	{	I	Me
		Plur.	{	We	Us
Pers. 2.	{	Sing.	{	Thou	Thee
		Plur.	{	Ye	Us
Pers. 3.	{	Sing.	{	He	Him
				She	Her
		Plur.	{	They	Them
Interrog.	{	Persons	{	who	whom
		Things	{	what	

CHAP. VII. of QUALITIES.

*We've seen, that Names the Things themselves express,
Qualities the Manners of those Things confess;
And on the Names entirely depend,
For without them they can no Sense pretend:
As round, black, white, swift, crooked, square;
Must (to be understood) to Names adhere.*

[1] NAMES, as we have seen, express the *Things* themselves, *Qualities* are the Manners of those *Things*, good, bad, round, square, &c. For Example, The Being of *Wax*, is the Substance of *Wax*, or *Wax* it self, without regard to any Form or Colour, and is what we properly call the *Name*; the Roundness, Squareness of the Figure, (which may be absent without any Detriment to the Being of the *Wax*) are the Manners of the *Being*; as, to be ignorant, or knowing, are the Manners or *Qualities* of our *Being*; thus we say a round, black, white, &c. *Table*; *Table* is the *Name*, and round, black, white, &c. are the *Qualities* of that *Name*.

And since these Words are added to *Names* to explain their Manner of Being, in respect of some Quality, Number, Figure, Motion, Relation, Posture, Habit, &c. as a cunning *Fox*, the third *Heaven*, a crooked *Crab-tree*, a swift *Horse*, a Golden *Candlestick*, &c. they are properly call'd *Qualities*, and are incapable, preserving their Nature, of being added to any other Part of Speech.

*Thing, that to follow Names did still deny,
Does after Qualities good Sense supply.
As black Thing, white Thing, good Thing may convince,
This makes, that understood, and be good Sense.*

You

[1] In our Notes on NAMES, we have likewise deliver'd such Sentiments of *Qualities*, under the Title of *Adjectives*, *Adnames*, &c. as are sufficient to be said on this Head, at least as far as relates to the

General GRAMMAR. But we cannot omit Mr. Johnson's Proof, That the Adjective or Quality is a different Part of Speech from the Name or Substantive. Grammatical Commentaries, p. 8. The Ad-

jective (no doubt of it) requires a Substantive to be join'd with it in Speech, to which it may adhere. But the Question is, whether it be a Noun, or Name of a Thing; that is, whether it be equally so with the Substantive; for if it be not, there is not an unequal Participation of the Genus between these two, and so the Division is imperfect and Equivocal: That is, these two have not the same Genus, and therefore cannot be the same Part of Speech. Now I suppose that no body will say, the Adjective is equally, or as much the Name of a Thing as a Substantive. The Substantive represents all that is essential to the Nature of the Thing; as Homo a Man, represents Animal rationale, or a rational Living Creature; but Bonus Good, represents only an accidental Quality, which tho' morally necessary, is not naturally so, but merely accidental. So that tho' a Man may be call'd Good, and therefore Good in same Sense may be said to be his Name, yet it is not equally as much his Name as Man, this last representing all that is essential to his Nature, the other only what is accidental. For Adjectivum comes from adjicio, and there can be no need of adding any thing to the Substantive but what is accidental, for what is necessary and essential, is in the Substantive already. 'Tis therefore a sufficient Definition of a Substantive, That it is the Name of a Thing; but that it may be known what is meant by Thing, I have added, which may so subsist in the Imagination, as to be the Subject of Predication: And the true Definition of an Adjective, is, that it is a Word added to the Substantive to declare some additional Accident of the Substantive consider'd by it self; as of Quality, Property, Relation, Action, Passion, or manner of Being. I have added consider'd by it self, because the Relations of Substantives, as consider'd in Sentences, is declar'd by Prepositions and not by Adjectives.

Here is then a very different Ground and Intention in the use of the Words; and that is one Ground of constituting different Parts of Speech. But then, not only the End in Signification, but the End also in Construction is different, and that is the Ground of making different Parts of Speech. For I know no Reason why any body shou'd be troubled with the Distinction of the several Parts of Speech, but to know their different Significations and Constructions in general, or how generally to make use of them in Speech.

Tho' this be a Demonstration of the difference between the Name and Quality, or Substantive and Adjective, and that they are two different Parts of Speech; yet what follows proves the Partitive and Adjective to be one part of Speech, we shall pursue our learned Author's Discourse, only adding that Scioppius long since contended for the same thing, in his Institutiones Grammaticae Latinae, in the beginning of his Auditorium, 162 of the Book.

Now the Construction of a Substantive is its Government by which it is govern'd, in such Case as its Dependence requires in its several Relations that it may have in a Sentence: Whereas the only Construction of the Adjective is its Agreement with its Substantive, being govern'd by it so as to agree with it in Case, Gender and Number, whatever Relation it be in, whatever Case it be in by that Relation. And tho' Substantives put in Apposition with other Substantives, and agree with them, this is no real Objection, such Substantives becoming Adjectives by that very Use; as an Adjective or any other Part of Speech becomes a Substantive, when it is us'd like a Substantive; that is, consider'd as a Thing. NOW in this the Principle and the Adjective both agree as well in Signification as Construction.

You may know this Part of Speech, by putting *Thing* after it, which it will bear with good Sense, as a good *Thing*, a *black Thing*, a *white Thing*, &c. nor has it any differing End, to express *one*, and *many*. And as it cannot be understood, or convey any Idea, or Notion by it self, (as we cannot in Sense say, a *black*, a *white*, &c.) without being join'd to some *Name*, (as a *black Horse*, a *good Man*, a *white House*, &c.) it bears all *Particles* expressing different *relations of Names* to the *Name* to which it belongs; for it can do nothing, or signify any thing, without a *Name* express'd or understood, as, to *hit the white* (Mark) is understood; to *bowl on a green* (Turf) is understood; *refuse the evil* (Thing), and *possess the good* (Thing), is in both places suppos'd.

*In Qualities no different Number are,
As their unvary'd endings may declare.*

This is spoke as to their Forms in our Language, for in other Languages, where they have various Terminations, they have Numbers.

*Three kinds of Qualities there are we know,
Which from their Names immediately do flow:
First, from possession, we possessive call,
And from all Names by adding (s), do fall.*

These

on. The Adjective declares an accidental difference of the Substantive, so does the Participle. The Adjective denominates the Substantive by that accidental difference, in some Sense becomes its name, so does the Participle; unless any one will say that a trotting horse does not as much denominate the Substantive as a white Horse. The Adjective agrees with its Substantive in Construction, and so does the Participle. The only difference between them is, that the Participle is said to signify some distinct name. I shall consider that hereafter, but if that difference be sufficient to make them two Parts of Speech, the Adjective and Substantive must be two different Parts, because of a greater difference. But

that that difference is not sufficient to make them different Parts of Speech, I shall show in my *Animadversion* upon the Infinitive Mood; which notwithstanding its Consignification of Time, I shall prove to be a Substantive. And therefore, if Consignification of Time will not unsubstative that, as agreeing in the general Signification and Use of a Substantive, so will the like Consignification of Time unadjective the Participle, which agrees in general Signification and Construction with the Adjective.

Thus far Mr. Johnson; and he makes his Word good in *Animadversion*, from p. 341, to 350. which he may consult, that is not satisfied with what we have produced from him on this Head.

These *Possessive Qualities*, or *Qualities of Possession*, are made by any *Name*, whether *Singular* or *Plural*, by adding (*s*) or (*es*), if the necessity of Pronunciation require it; as *Man's Nature*, for the Nature of *Man*; *Mens Nature*, for the Nature of *Men*. *Waller's Poems*.

But if the plural *Name* in (*s*) does end,
The (*s*) possessive and that (*s*) is join'd.

If the *Plural Name* (as it generally does) end in (*s*), the two (*ss*) (that is that which forms the *Number*, and that which forms the *Possession*) join in one, or rather one is left out for the easiness of Sound; as the *Lords House*, for the *House of Lords*; the *Commons House*, for the *House of Commons*, instead of the *Commons's House*, the *Lords's House*.

The same in *Proper Names* is often found,
For the more easy Flowing of the Sound.

The same is often done in the *Singular Number*, when a *proper Name* ends in (*s*), as *Priamus Daughier*, *Venus Temple*, for *Priamus's Daughter*, or *Venus's Temple*. Tho' the full writing is sometimes preserv'd, as *King Charles's Court*, and *St. James's Park*, and the like. [2]

When'er two *Names* compounded we do see,
The first is always deem'd a *Quality*.

This is the other sort of *Qualities* that derive themselves immediately from *NAMES*; as *Sea-fish*, *Self-love*, *River-fish*, *Turkey Voyage*, *Sea Voyage*, *Home-made*, *Self-murder*, *Man-slaughter*, *Gold-Ring*; and this sort of *Qualities* Dr. Wallis calls *respectiva*; in which, almost all other respects (but those of *possessive Qualities*) are imply'd; which are yet more distinct, when they are requir'd to be express'd by *Particles*. This is nothing else but the *Name* put after the manner of a *Quality*, and join'd to the following Word.

[2] Those who have imagin'd that this (*s*) was put in the place of *his*, (the first part being cut off by *Apharesis*) and that therefore the Note of *Apostrophe* ought always to be express'd or understood, are extremely out of the way in their Judgment. For tho' we do not deny, but the Note of the *Apostrophe* may justly (sometimes) be plac'd there, to give a more distinct per-

ception of the use of the (*s*) when there is occasion, yet we must deny that, therefore it ought always to be done, and to signify the Absence of *his*; for it is join'd often to the *Names of Women*, and to *Plural Names*, where *his* cannot be suppos'd to be without a palpable *Solecism*; and in the Words *ours*, *yours*, *theirs*, *hers*, where sure no body cou'd ever dream that *his* cou'd be.

[3] The

Word by this line or mark call'd a *Hyphen* -, to incorporate as it were, into one Word, and which is sometimes done without that short line.

*As Qualities from Names, we see, do flow,
Thus some to Pers'nal Names we likewise owe;
As our, ours; their, theirs; her, hers; my and mine;
His, your, yours, and its, and whose, thy, and thine.*

These are Personal Possessives, and *my, thy, her, our, your*, are us'd when they are join'd to Names; as *this is my horse, this is my Hat*. But *mine, thine, hers, yours, theirs* are us'd when the Name is understood; as *this Horse is mine; this Hat is thine*; that is, *this Horse is my Horse; this Hat is my Hat*, &c. Thus *own* cannot follow the later, but the former, as we say, not *yours own*, or *ours own*, but *your own*, and *our own*. But *mine* and *thine* are most commonly us'd when a Name follows that begins with a Vowel; as *my Arm*, or *mine Arm*; *thy Aunt*, or *thine Aunt*. We shall put them all in one view, as we have done the Personal Names.

			with the Name.	without the Name.
Pers. 1.	Sing.	{	My	Mine
	Plur.	}	Our	Ours
Pers. 2.	Sing.	{	Thy	Thine
	Plur.	}	Thou	Thours
			His	
Pers. 3.	Sing.	{	Her	Hers
	Plur.	}	Their	Theirs

These by no means subsisting by themselves, nor signifying any thing without reference to some other Name or Names, are properly Qualities. [3]

[3] The Demonstratives *this* and *that*, and their Plurals *these* and *those* the same, and the Relative or Interrogative *which*, are by no means Pronouns, but Adjectives.

For they are not put for a Name or Substantive; that is, they do not supply the place of a Name (as is essential to a Pronoun) and which is the very Denomination of the

Another sort of Qualities there are,
 Which being, doing, suffering declare,
 And Time imply, as present, past, to come,
 In some more plainly, more obscure in some.
 In (ing) it ends, when doing is express'd,
 In d, t, n, when suffering's confess'd.

These Qualities are what the old GRAMMARIANS call'd *Participles*, and a modern Author has continu'd under that Name, notwithstanding what Mr. Johnson, Scioppius, and others have urg'd; but without any Reason produc'd for so doing. But we being convinc'd that those Reasons are not to be answer'd, besides several more which might be produc'd; as Words which signify *Time*, *Action*, &c. and yet are allow'd, on all Hands, not to be either *Participle*, or *Affirmation*, venture to call them *Qualities*.

We have not in the Verse said any thing of the Ending when it betokens *Being*, because that is confin'd to that one Word, and therefore needs no Rule; and is only *being* and *been*. *I being sick, sent for a Doctor. I have been a Soldier.* It signifies *doing*; as, *I am hearing a Song; I was tuning my Harpsichord.* It signifies *suffering*; as, *I was beaten, I was abus'd*; and the like. [4]

Word demonstrates to be necessary to it) but they are added to *Names* or *Substantives*, as the *Qualities* or *Adjectives* are; as *this Man, that Man, the same Man*. If they ever occur without their *Names* or *Substantives*, which they often do, the *Substantives* are always understood; thus we say, *one, all, many, others, the Learned, the Unlearned*, omitting or leaving out the *Substantives* or *Names*, and yet these *Adjectives* are not put into the Number of *Pronames*.

Which is the same in both Numbers, and is us'd when we speak of *Things*, as *who* and *whom* are when we talk of *Persons*.

We must observe, that *what* is us'd Adjectively when it signifies *Quality*, and is in a Question, as in *what Man?* that is, what kind of Man, or in Number the first, second, and that is often us'd for *which*; and so is an *Adjective*.

The Word *own*, very often emphatically subjoin'd to *Names* and *Pronames*, is likewise an *Adjective*; as *your own Horse, my own Goods, Alexanders own Sword*.

The Word *self*, tho' plac'd by some among the *Pronames* (because 'tis generally render'd into Latin by the Word *ipse*, is yet plainly a *Substantive* or *Name*, to which there is scarce any Word directly answers in the Latin; that which comes nearest to it is *Persona*, or *Propria Persona*; as *thyself, myself, ourselves, yourselves, himself, itself, themselves*, are we consider us'd for *myself, itself, themselves*; but interpoling *own*, we say *his ownself, its ownself, their ownself*. In the same Sense we meet in the Greek Poets, *as, Bin as Bin, as Bin, Heaxan or Heaxan, Hercules ipse, Hercules himself, Hercules his ownself*.

[4] The time that is simply

(A), (an), and (the), are Qualities *may name*,
Because their Use and Nature are the same.

These Signs of Names, (a) and (the), have the Nature of Qualities, for they are added to Names, nor subsist or con-
vey any Idea without them, and pay the same Attendance
to the Names.

The use of these Signs are worthy Remark; for (a) be-
fore a Consonant, and (an) before a Vowel, extend the Signi-
fication of a Name to any one, and so to all, one by one, of
kind; but (the) restrains it to some Particular, and by that
means makes a Common equivalent to a Proper Name.

But since these Signs don't Individuals show,
They ne'er before a Proper Name can go;
Nor before Personal Names and Qualities,
Nor when the thing in general we express,
Nor before Names of Vertues, Herbs and Vice.

But these Signs not denoting Individuation, are not set
before Proper Names; as Peter, John, William, &c. Nor before
Personal Names or Qualities. Nor are they us'd when the
Name expresses the Thing in General; as we say, Man be-
ing Mortal, soon fades away and dies; not the, or a Man, and
we say Vertue consists in the Mean, not a, or the Vertue, &c.
These Signs signifying Particularity, we say the Justice of God,
once that is particular. Nor are they set before the parti-
cular Names of Vertues or Vices, or Herbs, Metals, &c. as we
say, not a Temperance, a Sloath, a Thyme, an Hissop.

(A) and (an) sometimes signifie one, as all to a Man. [s].
The is a Demonstrative, and signifies the same as that, but
is emphatically. It denotes the determination of one or
more

is sort of Quality or Adjective, is
generally obscure in English, and
other plac'd in the Word of Affir-
mation, which is generally plac'd
with it; but in Latin we agree
with Mr. Johnson against Sam-
son, That the time is signify'd pre-
cisely by the Participle.

[s] Names generally signify
things in a general and unlimited
sense, but Signs, or Articles (as
some call them) restrain and deter-
mine the Signification of Names,
and apply them to a particular
thing. If we say, 'tis a Happiness

to be King, 'tis an uncertain, wan-
dring and undetermin'd Word; but
if you add (the) to it, and says 'tis a
Happiness to be the King, it deter-
mines it to be the King of the Peo-
ple mention'd before. So that these
little Signs contribute much to the
clearness of Discourse.

The Latins have none of these
Signs or Articles, whence Scaliger
falsely concluded, that they were
useless; but he is indeed a Critic
that very often is in the wrong:
And here 'tis plain from the In-
stances given, that they are necessa-
ry

more, to which the general Word is actually apply'd. Thus we use the Word *Earth* when we design the Species or Element; but *the Earth*, when we mean the Globe of Earth (which is a certain determin'd Individual) 'tis plac'd with both in the Singular or Plural Number, because we may speak determinately of one, as well as more Individuals.

As neither of these are fix'd to a Word of a general Signification, or proper Name, so are they not us'd when any other Quality is present that virtually contains 'em; as, *a Man, one Man, some Man, any Man; the World, this World;* for here *one, some, any, this*, certainly imply *a* and *the*.

There are besides some particular Phrases, as *many a Man, never a Man*, which differ from *many Men, no Men*, as every *Man* from *all Men*; the former signify *many Men, all Men, no Men*, separately, or taken distinctly; the later conjunctly, or collectively. Nor are the following absolutely unlike these, when (after *such*, and the Particles of Comparison, *as, so, too*, and scarce any others) the *Quality (a)* is interpos'd between the *Name* and its *Quality*, (which is usually put after it) as, *Such a Gift is, too small a Reward for so great a Labour, and as great a Benefit.*

When QUALITIES for NAMES we e'er find set,
They then the Properties of NAMES will get.

Qualities are sometimes put for *Names*, and then they assume their Rights and Properties; tho' some contend, that the *Names* are always understood, tho' not express'd, to make 'em subsist in good Sense.

ry to the avoiding Ambiguities. The Greeks have one $\delta, \eta, \gamma\delta$. Tho' these Signs shou'd not be put before proper Names for the Reason given, yet the Greeks do sometimes put the Article to the Proper Names of Men, a δ $\phi\alpha\lambda\iota\omega\gamma$ &c, and the Italians do it Customarily, as *l'Ariosto, Il Tasso, l'Aristotele*; which the French imitate in those Words or Names which are purely of Italian Original, but in none else; and we put them to the Names of Ri-

vers, as the *Thames, the Ouse, the Rhine, &c.*

In fine, the *Articles* or *Signs* are not put to the *Qualities* or *Adjectives*, because they must receive their determination from other *Names* or *Substantives*. Or when we find them set before *Qualities* or *Adjectives*; as the *Black, the White, &c.* then are they set for *Names*, or *Substantively*: The *White* means as much as *Whiteness*, or else the *Substantive* is understood; as the *Black* is the *black Mark, or Spot.*

Most Qualities by two Degrees do rise,
Or fall as much in Number, Bulk, or Price;
By adding to its end or, er, or est,
Which by some little Words is else exprest;
As wise, wiser, wisest, and most wise;
But (very) oft the Place of (more) supplys.

Qualities have yet another Difference from Names, for they admit by the Variation of their Endings, or by the Addition of some little Words, Degrees of Comparison. For, signifying Manners or Qualities, they naturally must be of several Degrees, which encrease twice, by adding (er) to the QUALITY it self, and (est). Fair is the Quality it self, for example, its first rising or Degree is fairer; and the next, beyond which there's none, is fairest. These again are im'd by little Words, without altering the Ending or Termination of the Quality; as, fair; more fair; most or very fair. All Words therefore, whose Signification will admit Encrease, and consequently in good Sense will suffer these words (more, most, or very) before 'em, are Qualities, that have their Degrees of Comparison, or of Encrease and Decrease.

These three alone irregular are found,
Good, bad, and little, alter Name and Sound.

These three have an irregular manner of being compar'd, good, better, best; bad, or ill; worse (and worser) worst; little, less, (or lesser) least: To which add much, (or many) more, most.

But there are some Qualities, before which you cannot in good Sense put more or most, as all, some, any, &c. for we cannot say more all, most all, &c. Much, more, and most, when they are joyn'd to Names of the Singular Number, signify Quantity; as, much, more, most Wine: But when the same joyn'd to them is of the Plural Number, they signify Number, as, much, more, and most Company; but much is chang'd into many when Numbers are signified. Thus the Quality ALL joyn'd with a Name of the Singular Number, relates to Quantity, as all the Wine; but with a Name of the Plural Number, it signifies Number, as all the Children. Every is never put with a Name of the Plural Number, as every Man, not every Men. Thus enough signifies Quantity, whose Plural is enough, which signifies Number; I have Wine enough, I have Books enough.

When the Quality NO has no Name after it, we say none; Is there no Wine? There's none.

CHAP. VIII.

Of AFFIRMATIONS.

[1] **W**E come now to that Part of Speech which is the Soul of a Sentence, for without this a Sentence cannot subsist, since nothing can be spoken that is affirm'd or deny'd without it. The *Latins* call this Part of Speech *Verbum*, from whence our *English* Grammarians very awkwardly have borrow'd *Verb*, which all other Nations, that borrow from the *Latin*, call in their own Tongue *Word*, for that is the plain English of *Verbum*: The *Word* was us'd by way of Eminence; but if our Grammarians had us'd *Word* instead of *Verb*, tho' it wou'd have been more easie and obvious to the Learner's Memory and Understanding, yet it would require a long Explanation of its Nature as a Part of Speech, nothing of that being contain'd in its Name; but the very Essence of it is express'd in the Term *Affirmation*, since all Words of this kind do affirm *Something of Something*; as will be plain from the Notes on this Head.

[2] *As*

[1] We have thus far explain'd those Words, which signify the Objects of our Thoughts, to which indeed the Prepositions and Adverbs belong, tho' the Order of the Text has postpon'd 'em: We now come to consider those Words, which signify the Manner, as *Verbs*, or *Affirmations*, *Conjunctions*, or joining Words, and *Interjections*.

The knowledge of the Nature of the *Verb*, or *Affirmation*, depends on what has been said at the beginning of these Notes on Words, and that is, that the Judgment we make of Things (as when I say, *the Earth is round*) necessarily implies two Terms, one call'd the *SUBJECT*, which is the Thing of which the Affirmation is made, as the *Earth*; and the other the *ATTRIBUTE*, which is what is affirm'd of the

Subject, as *round*. And besides these two Terms, there is in that Proposition another Word, which is the Connection of those two Terms, and which is properly the Action of the Mind, which affirms the Attribute of the Subject. Men are therefore under an equal Necessity of inventing Words, that mark and denote the Affirmation, which is the principal Manner of our Thoughts, as we invent those, which mark the Objects of 'em. And this third Connective Term, is what is generally call'd a *Verb*, but more intelligibly an *AFFIRMATION*, since in this Use is to signify the Affirmation; that is, to shew that the Discourse in which this Word is us'd, is the Discourse of a Man, who not only conceives Things, but judges, and affirms something of 'em; in which

the Verb, or Affirmation, is distinguished from some Names and Qualities, which signify Affirmation likewise; as, *affirmans, affirmatio*, because they do not signify, that the thing is become the Object of our thoughts, by the Reflection of the mind, and therefore do not mark, that he who uses those Words affirms, but only, that he barely conveys an Affirmation.

We have said, that the chief use of the Verb, is to signify the Affirmation, because we shall see, that the Verb is likewise made use of, to signify other Motions of the Soul, as *desire, to pray, to command, &c.* It is only by changing the Inflection, and the Mode. We shall present only consider the Verb in its chief Use and Signification, which is that which it has to the Indicative, or first State, Mode, or Manner.

According to this Sense, it may be said, that the Verb or Affirmation ought to have no other Use, but the marking the Connection we make in our Minds, between the Terms of the Proposition. Thus there is only the Verb *esse, to be*, (which is call'd the Verb Substantive) that remains in its simplicity: And further, we may say, that even this Verb is properly thus simple, only in the third Person of the Present Tense or Time, *est, is*, and on certain Occasions: For as Men naturally incline to shorten their Expressions, they have always join'd to the Affirmation, other Significations in the same Word. 1st, They have join'd that of some Attribute, by which means two Words then make a Proposition; as when I say, *Petrus vivit*, Peter lives, because the Word *vivit* (or lives) includes both the Affirmation, and Attribute of being alive, since it is the same thing to say, *Peter lives*, and *Peter is living*; hence arises the great diversity of Verbs, in every Language; whereas if the general Signification of the Affirmation were only given to the

Verb, without joining any particular Attribute, there would be no need of more than one Verb in each Language, which is that we call Substantive.

2^{dly}, They have join'd the Subject of the Proposition on certain Occasions, so that Two Words (nay, even One) may make an entire Proposition, two Words, as *sum Homo*, because *sum* not only signifies the Affirmation, but includes the Signification of the Pronoun, or Personal Name, *Ego, I*; which is the Subject of the Proposition. And in our own Tongue we always express it, *I am a Man*. One Word may likewise express an entire Proposition; as, *vivo, sedeo, &c.* For these Verbs include both the Affirmation and the Attribute, as we have already said; and being in the first Person, they include the Subject likewise, as, *I am living, I am sitting*: And hence comes the difference of Persons, which is generally in Verbs.

3^{dly}, They have also join'd a Relation to the Time, with respect to the Thing affirm'd; so that one Word (as *cynasti*) signifies that I affirm of him, to whom I speak, the Action of *supping*, not for the present time, but the past, *Thou hast supped*. And from hence the Verbs derive their diversity of Times, (or as the Vulgar has it, Tenses) which is also generally common to all Verbs, or Words of Affirmation.

The diversity of these Significations, join'd in the same Word, is what has hinder'd a great many otherwise, of a very good Capacity, from rightly understanding the Nature of the Verb, because they have not consider'd it according to what is essential to it, which is the Affirmation, but according to the various Relations accidental to it, as a Verb, or Word of Affirmation.

Thus *Aristotle* confining himself to the third Signification, added to that which is essential to it, defines a Verb, *Verbum significans cum Tempore*,

poze, a Word, that signifies with Time. Others, as *Buxtorfius*, adding to it the second, defines it, *Vox flexilis cum Tempore, & Persona*, a Word that has divers Inflections with Time and Person.

Others have confin'd themselves to the first Signification, added to the Essential, which is that of the Attribute; and considering, that the Attributes Men have join'd to the Affirmation in the same Word, are commonly Actives and Passives, have thought the Essence of a Verb consists in signifying the Actions and Passions. And in fine, *Julius Scaliger* thought that he had discover'd a great Mystery in his Book of the Principles of the Latin Tongue, by saying, that the distinction of Things into permanentes, & fluentes, Things permanent or lasting, or fast, and passing, or that pass away, was the true Original of the distinction of Names, or Nouns and Verbs or Affirmations; since Names are to signify the former, and Verbs the latter. But we may easily perceive that these Definitions are false, and do by no means explain the true Nature of the Verb.

The manner of the Connection of the two first show it sufficiently, because 'tis not there express'd, what the Verb signifies, but only that with which it signifies, viz. *Cum Tempore, cum Persona*; the two latter are still worse, having the two great Vices of Definitions, which is to agree, *neque omni, neque soli*; For there are Verbs which signify neither Actions nor Passions, nor what passes away, as *existit, quiescit, friget, alget, tepet, calet, albet, vires, clares*, &c. of which we may have occasion to speak elsewhere.

There are Words which are not Verbs, that signify Actions and Passions, and even Things transiunt, according to *Scaliger's* Definition. For 'tis certain, that Participles (or Qualities deriv'd from Verbs) are true Nouns, and yet those of

Verbs active, signify Actions, and these of Verbs passive, Passions, much as the Verbs themselves in which they are form'd, and there is no Reason to pretend, that *fluere* does not signify a Thing that passes as well as *fluere*. To which may be added against the two first Definitions of the Verb, that the Participles signify also with Time, that being a present, a past, and a future, especially in the Latin and Greek. And those who (not without Reason) believe that a *Vocative Case* is truly the second Person, especially when it has a distinct Termination from the Nominative will find, that on that side there would be but a difference of more, or the less, between the Participle and the Verb. And thus the essential Reason, why a Participle is not a Verb, is, that it does not signify the Affirmation; whence comes that to make a Proposition which is the Property of the Verb, the Participle must add a Verb, that is, restore that which was taken away, by turning the Verb into a Participle. For how comes it that *Petrus vivit, Peter lives*, is a Proposition; and *Petrus vivens, Peter living*, is not so, unless *est*, is added, as *Petrus est vivens, Peter is living*, but because that Affirmation (which is in *vivit*) was taken away by making the Participle *vivens*; whence it appears, that the Affirmation that is, or is not found in a Word, makes it to be, or not to be a Verb.

Upon which we may observe, that the Infinitive Mood is a Form, or Mood, which is very different from a Noun or Name, (as when we say in French, *le Boire, le Manger*) the Participles being Noun Adjectives, or what we call Qualities: But the Infinitive Moods are Noun Substantives, or Names made by the abstraction of those Adjectives in the same manner as of *Candidus* *Candor* is made, and of *Whites*

Whiteness. Thus *rubet*, a *Verb*, signifies *red*, including the Affirmation and the Attribute; *rubens*, the Participle signifies only *Red*, without Affirmation, and *Rubere* taken for a *Noun*, signifies *Redness*.

It shou'd, therefore, be allow'd a constant Rule, that considering simply what is essential to a *Verb*, the only true Definition is *Vox significans Affirmationem*, a *Word that signifies an Affirmation*, since we can find no *Word* that marks an Affirmation, but what is a *Verb*; nor any *Verb* but what marks it (at least) in the *Indicative*, or *first Mood*: And there can no manner of doubt be made, that if a *Word* were invented, as *est*, wou'd be, which should always mark the Affirmation, without having any difference of Time or Person; so that the diversity of Person shou'd be mark'd only by *Nouns* or *Names*, and *Pro-names* or *Personal Names*, and the diversity of Times by *Adverbs* or added *Words*, (as in *English*) it wou'd however be a true *Verb*. As in the Propositions, which the Philosophers call eternally true, as *God is infinite*, *Body is divisible*, *the whole is greater than its Parts*; the *Word(s)* implies only the simple Signification, without any Relation to Time, because 'tis true to all Times, and without our Minds stopping at any diversity of Persons.

Thus the *Verb* (according to what is essential to it) is a *Word that signifies Affirmation*. But if we wou'd join its principal Accidents, it may be thus defin'd, *Vox significans Affirmationem, cum Designatione Personæ, Numeri & Temporis*, a *Word which signifies Affirmation with the Designation of the Person, Number and Time*, which agrees properly with the *Verb Substantive*. But for the others, in as much as they differ by that Union, Men have made of the Affirmation with certain Attributes, they may be thus defin'd, *Vox significans Af-*

firmationem alicujus. Attributi, cum Designatione Personæ, &c. a *Word signifying the Affirmation of some Attribute, with the Designation of Person, Number and Time*: We may likewise transiently observe, that the Affirmation (as 'tis conceiv'd) may be the Attribute of the *Verb* also, as in the *Verb affirmo*, which *Verb* signifies two Affirmations, one regards the Person speaking, and the other the Person spoken of, whether it be of himself, or of another. For when we say, *Petrus affirmat*, it is the same as to say, *Petrus est affirmans*, and then *est* marks our Affirmation, and the Judgment we make concerning *Peter* and *affirmans*, that we conceive, and attribute to *Peter*.

The *Verb* *NEGO* (on the contrary) contains by the same Reason an Affirmation and Negation. For it must be farther observ'd, that tho' all Judgments are not affirmative, and that there are some Negatives; nevertheless *Verbs* never signify any thing of themselves but Affirmations; Negations are only mark'd by Particles, or little Words, as *non*, *ne*, *haud*, &c. or by *Nouns* that imply it, as *Nullus*, *nemo*, &c. which being join'd to *Verbs*, change the Affirmation into a Negation, as, *non Minus immortalis*, *Nullum Corpus est indivisibile*. Tho' much of these Notes, which relate to the Knowledge of the true Nature of a *Verb*, may seem to (and indeed in many Things do) relate more to the dead Languages than the living, yet there is nothing advanc'd which will not be useful to the Student of GRAMMAR, since by these Observations he will enter into the very Essence of the Art, and see in what it is founded on the Nature of Things; and we are very certain, that great part of these Notes are equally advantageous to our understanding the Nature of our own Words, and in what they are founded on the general Reason of all Languages.

[2] *An Affirmation (as the Word do's show)
Something affirms, and do's Number know,*

[3] *And Time and Person; whether it express
Action, Being, Passion; or their want confess.*

An *Affirmation* is a Part of Speech (as the Word imports) which affirms some Attribute, which the Designation of Time, Number and Person, expressing *being, doing or suffering*, or the want of them, or the like.

*Two Times the English Language only knows,
The first the present, next the passing shows;
And they by diff'rent Ending are made known
By adding (d), or (ed) are mostly shown;
The present Love, the passing lov'd do's make,
Or else some other Affirmations take
Before it, which its different Times declare,
And in the Rules of Affirmations share.*

All *Affirmations* affirming in *Time*, this *Time* is express'd either by different Endings, as *Love, lov'd, or lov'd; burn, burn'd, or burned*; or by putting other *Affirmations* before them, which also express the Manner of the *Affirmation*, as *have, shall, will, might, wou'd, shou'd, &c.* as will be seen in the Sequel.

In *English* we have but two *Times* distinguish'd by the different ending; the *Present* is the *Affirmation* it self, as *I Love*; the second is the *passing*, as *I lov'd*: All other *Times* are express'd by the fore-said Words.

*The Personal Names the Persons do express,
As I, thou, he, we, ye, and they confess.
With these their various Endings too agree,
As we by love, lovest and loves may see.*

The *Persons* of the *Affirmations* are always express'd by the *Personal Names* *I, thou, he*, in the *Singular*, and *We, ye, or you, and they*, in the *Plural Number*; the two first reaching only themselves, the *third* all other *Names*, because all other *NAMES* are of the *third Person*. They also vary their Endings in the *second* and *third Person Singular*; as *I love, thou lovest, he loves*; *we, ye and they love*, in the *present Time*; and *I loved, thou lovedst, he loved*, in the *passing Time*; the *Soldier fights, Gold prevails. I love*, besides the *first Person*, denotes the *Time* when *I love*, that is, the *present Time* when *I am speaking*; but by adding (*d*), it signifies the *Time passing*, as *I loved, lov'd, or did love*.

[2] We have in the foregoing Notes observ'd, that the diversity of *Persons* and *Numbers* in *Affirmations* or *Verbs*, proceeds from the joining in the same Word the Subject or the Proposition, at least on certain Occasions; to the *Affirmation* proper to the *Verb*, to shorten the Expression, (tho' this will not hold in most Modern Tongues, at least in none which want variety of Terminations, to distinguish the Persons, which we do by Personal Names) for when a Man speaks of himself, the Subject of the Proposition is the *Pronoun* or *Personal Name*, of the first Person *Ego, I*, and when he speaks of him, to whom he addresses himself, the Subject of the Proposition is the *Pronoun* of the second Person *Tu, thou, you*.

Now that he may not always be oblig'd to use these *Pronouns*, it has been thought sufficient to give to the Word which signifies the Affirmation, a certain Termination which shows, that it is of himself a Man speaks, and that is what is call'd the first Person of the Verb, as *Video, I see*.

The same is done with Respect to him, to whom a Man addresses himself; and this is call'd the second Person, *vides, thou seest, or you see*. And as these *Pronouns* have their *Plurals*, that signify more than one, as when a Man talking of himself joins others, as *us, we*; or of him, to whom he speaks, by joining others, as *you*, to two different Terminations in the *Latin*, are join'd to the Plural, as *videmus, we see, videtis, you see*.

But because often the Subject of the Proposition is neither a Man's self, nor the Person to whom he speaks, 'tis necessary not only to reserve these two Terminations to those two Persons, but that a third be made, to be join'd to all other Subjects of a Proposition. And this is what is call'd the third Person, as well in the Singular Number, as Plural; tho' the Word *Person*,

which properly agrees only to rational and intellectual Beings, and so is proper but to the two former, since the third is for all other sorts of Things, and not for Persons only. By that we see, that naturally what we call the third Person ought to be the *Theme* of the *Verb*, as it is also in all the Oriental Tongues, for it is more natural, that the Verb shou'd signify properly the Affirmation, without making any Subject in particular, and that afterwards, it be determin'd by a new Inflection, to include the first or second Person, for a Subject.

This diversity of Terminations for the first Person, shows that the Ancient Languages had a great deal of Reason not to join the *Pronouns* of the first and second Person to the Verb, but very rarely (and on particular Considerations) contenting themselves to say, *Video, vides, videmus, videtis*, because these Terminations were originally invented for this very Reason, *viz.* to avoid joining the *Pronouns* to the Verbs: Yet all the vulgar or living Languages, and ours especially, always joyn them to their Verbs; for we say, *I see, thou seest, or you see, we see, &c.* the Reason of which may be, or rather plainly is, that our Verbs have no distinct Terminations to express the Persons without them.

But besides these two Numbers, *Singular* and *Plural*, which are in Verbs as well as Nouns, the *Greeks* have a *Dual Number*, which is proper only to two, but this is not so commonly made Use of, as the other two.

The Oriental Languages thought it proper to distinguish when the Affirmation related to the one, or the other, and to the Masculine, or Feminine; for this Reason they gave the same Person of the Verb two Terminations to express the two Genders, which indeed is a great help in avoiding *Equivocals*.

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[3] The Signification of the *Time*, is another thing which we

have said to be join'd to the Affirmation of the Verb; for the Affirmation is made according to different Times, since we may affirm a Thing *is, was, or will be*; whence other Inflections are given to Verbs, signifying these several Times, which our English Grammarians have by a barbarous Word call'd *Tenses*: But there are but three *simple Tenses*, or *Times*, the *Present*, as *am* *I love*; the *Past*, as *amavi, I have lov'd*; and the *Future*, as *amabo, I will (or shall) love*.

But because in the Past one may mark, that the Thing is but just past or done, or indefinitely that it was done; it from this proceeds that in the greatest part of the Vulgar Languages there are two sorts of *Preterits* or *Past Times*, one that marks the Thing to be precisely done, and is therefore call'd *Definite*; as, *I have written, I have said*; and the other that marks or denotes it done indeterminately, and therefore call'd *Indefinite*, or *Aorist*; as, *I wrote, I went, I din'd*; which is properly only spoke of a Time, at least of a Days distance from that in which we speak. But this holds truer in the French Language, than in any other, for in that they say, *Écrivis hier, I wrote Yesterday*, but not *Écrivis ce Matin*, nor *Écrivis cette Nuit*; but *Jay écrit ce Matin, Jay écrit cette Nuit, &c.*

The Future will also admit of the same Differences; for we may have a mind to denote or mark a Thing that is suddenly to be. Thus the Greeks have their *Paulo-post* future, *ὀλίγον μέλλον*, which marks the Thing about to be done, as *ποιήσω, I am about to do it*: And we may also mark a Thing that is simply to happen, as, *ποιήσω, I will do it*; *amabo, I will love*.

This is what we may say of the Times, or Tenses of Verbs, considering 'em simply in their Nature, as Present, Past, and Future. But because it has been thought fit to mark

these Tenses, with a relation to another, by one Word, other Inflections have been invented in the Verbs or Affirmations, which may be call'd the *Compound Tenses*, or *Times*.

The first is that, which marks the Past, in relation to the Present, and 'tis call'd the *Preterimperfect Tense*, or *Time*, because it marks not the Thing simply and properly, as done, but as imperfect, and present, with respect to a Thing which is already nevertheless past. Thus when I say, *Cum intravit cenabam, I was at Supper when he enter'd*, the Action of Supping is past in respect of the Time, of which I speak, but I mark it as present in respect of the Thing of which I speak, which is the *Entrance* of such a one.

The second Compound Time, or Tense, is that which doubly marks the past, and on that account is call'd the *Preterpluperfect Tense*, or the Time more than perfectly past; *Cenaveram, I had supp'd*; by which I denote my Action of supping, not only as past in it self, but also as past in respect to another Thing, which is also past; as, *I had supp'd when he enter'd*; which shews my Supping was before his Entrance; which however is also past.

The third Compound Time is that which denotes the Future with respect to the Past, viz. the Future Perfect; as *Cenavero, I shall have supp'd*; by which I mark my Action of Supping as Future in it self, and past'd in regard to another Thing to come, that is to follow, as *when I shall have supp'd, he will enter*; which is to say, That my Supper (which is not yet come) will be past when his Entrance (which is also not yet come) will be present.

Thus a fourth Compound Time may be added, that is, that which marks the Future with relation to the Present, to make as many Compound Futures as Compound Preterits, or Past Times, or Tenses; and perhaps the second Future of the Greeks

- [4] *The following Nine are of most general use,
And various Meanings in the rest produce;
Do, will, and shall, must, ought, and may,
Have, am, or be, this Doctrine will display.
For these Necessity, or Pow'r, or Will,
And Time, or Duty are expressing still.*

Of *Affirmations*, the following *Nine* are most generally us'd, being plac'd before all other *Affirmations*, to signify their *Time, Power, Will, Liberty, Necessity, Duty, &c.* Of these therefore it is necessary we first treat.

Do does the Present Time with force express,
And did the Passing shews us with no less.

Do is, and denotes the *present Time*, which in the *passing Time* changes its ending into *did*: Both these are us'd to express their several Times with the greater force, distinction, and fulness; as, *I do love, I do not love.* Thus *did* expresses the *passing Time* emphatically, except when *whilst* goes before it, for then 'tis but imperfectly past, or passing. The Personal Endings of this *Affirmation* are, *I do, thou dost, he does*, singular; *we, ye, and they do*, plural.

When *do* signifies Action, as, *I do such a thing*, it admits these other *Affirmations* before it, to denote its Time and Manner of *doing*. *Will* does the same when it signifies *willing*, as, *I will this to be done*; tho' this is seldom found in our present way of Writing.

Will is the present Time, and wou'd the past,
But before other Affirmations cast,
The Time to come by both is still express.

Will

Greek marks this in its Origin, whence it comes that it almost always preserves the Figurative of the present; nevertheless in the use of it, it has been confounded with the former; and even the Latin makes use of the simple Future for that; *Cum canavero intravis, Thou wilt enter when I have sup'd*; by which I mark my Supper as future, and it self, but as present when you enter.

This is what has given Rise to the several Inflections of *Verbs* or *Affirmations*, that they may distin-

guish the several Times or Tenses upon which We must observe, that the Oriental Tongues have only the Past and the Future, without any of the other Differences of *imperfect, preterpluperfect, &c.* which renders these Languages subject to great and many Ambiguities, not to be met with in others. But these Differences of the Times (in our Tongue especially) are clearly denoted by the *Auxiliary Verbs*, and very few Alterations of the Terminations, as in *Latin*; as is shown in the Text.

Will is the present Time, and *wou'd* the past, of this Affirmation; but they signifie the Time to come, when they are plac'd before other Affirmations, as, *I will love, I wou'd love.* Its Persons are *I will, thou wilt, he will sing; we, ye, they will.* *Will* implys the Inclination of the Agent.

The same Rule holds of *shall*, and *shou'd*; *we find, Since all the Time to come alone intend.*

Shall is the present Time, and *shou'd* the past; but it signifies the Time to come, when added to other Affirmations; as, *I shall love, I shou'd love.* *Shall* is sometimes left out, as, *I be write, for If he shall write; if he have written, for if he shall have written.*

In the first Person simply shall foretells;

In will a Threat, or else a Promise dwells.

Shall in the second and the third does threat;

Will simply then foretells the future Feat.

We use not *shall* and *will* promiscuously for one another, for *shall* in the first Person simply foretells, *will* implys a Promise, or a Threat. In the second and third Person *shall* promises, or threatens, and *will* only simply foretells; thus, *I shall burn, you will, or thou wilt burn, he will burn, we shall, ye will, they will burn;* that is, I foretell this will be. *I will, you shall, or thou shalt; he shall, we will, ye shall, they shall burn;* that is, I promise, or engage, that such a thing shall be done.

Wou'd and *shou'd* foretells what was to come, but with this difference, *wou'd* implys the Will and Propension of the Agent; *shou'd*, only the simple Futurity; as, *I wou'd burn, I shou'd burn; rather than turn, I wou'd burn; if the Fire were about me, I shou'd burn.*

Shou'd seems likewise, in many places, to be the same as ought; as, *I have been oblig'd to Roger, and shou'd now return the Obligation.* The Persons of these are, *I shou'd, thou shou'dst, he shou'd; I wou'd, thou wou'dst, he wou'd.*

We, ye, and they { *wou'd*
 shou'd.

The Time to come most absolutely note

Both shall and will; but wou'd and shou'd do not;

But with Condition Time to come express;

Which Difference they every-where confess.

Shall and *will* denote absolutely the Time to come; *shou'd* and *wou'd* do it conditionally.

May does the Right, or Possibility;
And can the Agents Pow'r to do, imply.

May and can, with their past or passing Times might and could, imply a Power; but with this distinction, may and might are said of the Right, Possibility, and Liberty of doing a thing; can and could of the Power of the Agent; I can burn, thou couldst burn; I may burn, I might burn; that is, it is possible or lawful for me to burn. The Persons are, I may, thou may'st, we may; we, ye, and they may. I might, thou might'st, or you might, he might; we, ye, and they might. I can, thou canst, he can; we, ye, and they can. I could, thou couldst, he could; we, ye, and they could. May and can are us'd with Relation both to the Time present, and to come; could from can, and might from may, have Relation to the Time past, and to come.

Must the Necessity does still denote,
And still the Duty we express by ought.

Must implies Necessity, I must burn; ought implies Duty, as, I ought to burn. But these two Affirmations have only the present Time, and their Persons are only express'd by the personal Names, for it is now quite obsolete to say, thou oughtest; for it now changes its Ending no more than must.

Have (when with Qualities of suff'ring plac't)

Denotes the Time that perfectly is past;

And thus by had is most directly shown

The Time, that more than perfectly is gone.

Shall, and will have, do still the Time declare

That will be past before some others are.

Have (join'd to a Quality that signifies suffering) denotes the Time perfectly past, that is, that which is now past. Had marks the Time that is more than perfectly past, or sometime past, that is, at the Time when it was spoken of; as, I have burn'd, I had burn'd. Thus shall have, and will have burn'd, denote the Time which will be past before another Thing which is to come, happens, or is. As, when I shall have read a Page, I will shut the Book. The Persons of these Affirmations are, I have, thou hast, he has; we, ye, and they have. I had, thou hadst, he had; we, ye, or you and they had.

Whenever have, Possession does denote,

These Affirmations it admits, else not.

When have signifies Possession, as I have a Horse, I have a Commission, and the like, it admits some of the nine Affirmations we have been treating of before it, to express its Times, Manner, &c. else not.

Am,

*Am, or be, still in their Native Sense
Being import; but then they still dispense
The Affirmation to the Quality*

(Without it lost) that suff'ring does imply.

Am, or be (for they are the same) naturally, or in themselves signify being; but join'd to, or set before a Quality signifying suffering, restore the Affirmation of suffering, which as a Quality it lost; as I am burn'd, he must be burn'd. It has therefore a double Formation.

Singular, Plur.

In the present Time { *Am, art, is,* } *are.*
 { *be, best, be,* } *be.*

In the passing, or past Time { *was, wast, was,* } *were.*
 { *were, wert, were,*

I am burn'd, thou art burn'd, he is burn'd, if I were burn'd, I was burn'd, I have been burn'd, I had been burn'd, I shou'd be burn'd, I shou'd have been burn'd.

All other English Affirmations having no other differing Endings to signify all the other different Times, which are in Nature, must of necessity supply that Defect, by making use of one or more of these nine foregoing Words; for besides the present and the passing Times, which the English distinguishes by varying the Ending of the Affirmation, there is the future, or Time to come, the Time perfectly past, and the Time more than perfectly past; all which these little Affirmations easily supply.

*Where'er these Affirmations do precede,
The Endings of the following have no need
To change at all, but these must vary still,
The Use of Pers'nal Endings to fulfil.*

Whenever these foregoing Affirmations are plac'd before any others, they not only change their own Personal Endings, but hinder the following Affirmations from changing theirs, as *I do love, thou dost love, he does love, we, ye, and they do love;* not *I do love, thou dost lovest, he does loves, &c.* But the Personal Name is often left out when the Affirmation implies Exhortation or Command, as *burn, for burn thou, or ye.*

We have shewn, that Affirmations form their passing Time by adding (d) to the present, or by changing (e) into (d) or (ed); as, *I love, I lov'd or loved; I burn, I burn'd or burned;* but the (ed) is now almost wholly left out, except in *mingel*, and a very few more; and therefore it is only on account of some old Books, that we mention it here.

These

These Personal Endings are not only omitted after the Affirmations, but after *if, that, tho', alibo', whether, &c.*

But when the present ends in (d) or (t),

The passing Time the same we always see.

When the *present Time* ends in (d), or (t), the *passing* has same ending; as, *read, spread, cast, hit, knit*, and some others, which are distinguish'd only by the Pronunciation, they were doubtless of old *readed, spreaded, casted, hit-knitted, &c.* And if they were still spelt with a double consonant, it would be much better for the Distinction, this Defect is fully supply'd by the former nine little Affirmations of Time, &c.

Other Exceptions to this Rule we find,

Which to the following List are most consign'd.

There are some *Affirmations*, which are irregular in this Matter, or are Exceptions to this Rule, but this Irregularity reaches only those which are Native, and originally English Words, and of one Syllable, or deriv'd from Words of one Syllable.

The first Irregularity, and that which is the most general, arises from our Quickness of Pronunciation, by changing the consonant (d) into (t), as often as by that means the Pronunciation is made the more expeditious; and indeed seems rather a Contraction, than an Irregularity; particularly after *c, ch, sh, f, k, p, x*; and after *s*, and *th*, when pronounc'd hard; and sometimes after *l, m, n, r*, when a short Vowel comes before; for these Letters more easily admit a (t) than (d) after 'em; as, *plac't, snatch't, fish't, wak't, dwellt, smelt*, instead of *plac'd, snatch'd, fish'd, wak'd, dwell'd, smell'd*.

But (d) remains after the Consonants *b, g, v, w, z, s, th*, when they have a softer Sound, and when a long Vowel precedes *l, m, n, r*, for they more easily unite and incorporate with (d) than (t), because of the like direction of the Breath from the Nostrils; as you may find in the Notes to this Grammar on the formation of those Letters, thus, *liv'd, smil'd, believ'd, &c.* from *live, smile, raise, believe*.

Except when the long Vowel is shortned before *l, m, n, r*; when (b) and (v) are chang'd into (p) or (f), and the softer sound of (s) passes into their harder, as, *felt, delt, dreamt, went, left, bereft, &c.* from *to feel, deal, dream, mean, leave, &c.*

But

But when (d) or (t) go before, and are join'd by (d) or (t), (in this contracted Form), they incorporate with the radical (d) or (t), into one Letter; that is, if (t) be the radical Letter, they unite into (t), but if (d) be the radical Letter, then they incorporate into (d) or (t), according as that or that Letter is the easier to be pronounc'd, as *read, spread, dread, shred, tread, bid, bid, chid, fed, bled, bred, strid, slid, rid, &c.* (which, doubtless, were Originally, *read'd, bid'd, &c.* as it were, *read'd, bid'd, &c.*) from to *read, spread, shed, dread, shread, bid, bide, chide, feed, bleed, breed, speed, stride, slide, ride, &c.* thus, *cast, hurt, cost, burst, eat, beat, sweat, sit, quit, smit, writ, bit, bit, met, shot, &c.* (tho' perhaps these Words wou'd for the distinction of the passing Time, from the present, be better Spelt; *eatr, beatr, bitt, &c.* as it were *eat't, bit't bit't, &c.*) from these WORDS to *cast, hurt, cost, burst, eat, beat, sweat, sit, quit, smite, write, bite, bit, meet, shoot, &c.* thus, *lent, sent, rent, girt, &c.* from to *lend'd, send'd, &c.* from to *lend, send, rend, gird, &c.*

Tho' this Irregularity be sometimes lost, and the regular Spelling observ'd, as *plac'd, fish'd, &c.* yet 'tis but seldom, and in few Words.

There are not a few other irregular WORDS in the passing Time, but those which are more particular and special, may be reduc'd to their Classes; as,

1. *Won, spun, begun, swam, struck, sung, stung, swung, rung, wrung, sprung, swung, drunk, sunk, shrunk, slunk, come, run, found, bound, ground, wound*; many of them are likewise spelt with (a), as *began, sang, rang, sprang, drank, came, ran*, and some others, tho' not so often; from to *win, spin, begin, swim, strike, stick, sing, sting, sling, ring, bring, spring, swing, drink, sink, shrink, stink, bang, come, run, find, bind, grind, Wind, &c.*

2. *Fought, taught, raught, sought, besought, caught, brought, brought, thought, wrought*; from to *fight, teach, reach, seek, speech, catch, buy, bring, think, work*; yet some of these sometimes keep their Regularity; as *reach'd, beseech'd, catch'd, work'd, &c.*

3. *Took, shook, forsook, woke, awoke, stood, broke, spoke, bore, shore, swore, tore, wore, move, clove, strove, throve, shone, rose, arose, smote, wrote, bode, abode, rose, chose, trod, began, forgot, rod*; some likewise write *thrive, rise, writ, abid, rid, &c.* others form them by (a), as *brake, bare, share, sware, tare, ware, clave, gat, begat, forgot*, and perhaps some others; but this Way is seldom, and very unpo-

the present Times of these Words are, *take, shake, for-
wake, awake, stand, break, speak, bear, shear, swear, tear,
weave, cleave, (to cling to), cleave (to split), strive,
shine, rise, arise, smite, write, bide, abide, ride, chuse
hoose) tread, beget, forget.*

Give, bid, sit, having their passing Times, gave, bad,

*Draw, know, snow, grow, throw, blow, crow, fly, slay,
, make their passing Times, drew, knew, snow (or rather
d), grew, threw, blew (or rather blow'd), crow, (or rather
d;) flew, slew, saw, lay, flee (or flye) fled; from go, went.
e are all, or the most part at least, of the most conse-
ce of all the irregular WORDS in the English Tongue.*

When Affirmations are together join'd,

To, still between them does its Station find.

When two Words of Affirmation come together, before
matter the Sign (*to*) is always express'd or understood; as
to read, I dare fight; in the latter, (*to*) is understood,
means, *I dare to fight*, as *do, will, may, can*; with their
g Times, *did, wou'd, shou'd, might, cou'd, and must, bid,
let, help, and make.*

CHAP.

In this Place we shall also
what we have to say of the
s or Forms of Verbs, or Af-
firmations. We have therefore al-
said, that Verbs are of that
of Words that signify the Man-
d Form of our Thoughts, the
of which is Affirmation :
we have also observ'd, that
receive different Inflections, ac-
ing as the Affirmation relates
ferent Persons and Times; but
have found, that it was proper
ent other Inflections also, more
ely to explain what pass'd in
Minds. For first they observ'd;
besides simple Affirmations, as
ves, *be lov'd, &c.* there were
a conditional and modify'd, as
*he might have lov'd, tho' he
have lov'd, &c.* and the bet-
distinguish these Affirmations
the others, they doubl'd the
tions of the same *Tenses* or

Times, making some serve for sim-
ple Affirmations, as *loves, lov'd*;
and others for those Affirmations
which were modify'd; as, *might
have lov'd, wou'd have lov'd*; tho'
not constantly observing the Rules;
they made use of simple Inflections
to express modify'd Affirmations,
as, *etsi vereor*, for *etsi verear*; and
'tis of these latter sort of Inflections,
that the GRAMMARIANS make
their Mood call'd the Subjunctive :
Moreover (besides the Affirmation)
the Action of our Will may be ta-
ken for a Manner of our Thought,
and Men had Occasion to mark
what they wou'd have understood,
as well as what they thought.
Now we may will a Thing several
Ways, of which three may be con-
sider'd as chief :

1. We would have Things that
do not depend on ourselves, and then
we

we will it only by a simple Wish, which is explain'd in *Latin* by the particle *Utinam*, and in our Tongue by *would to God*. Some Languages (as the *Greek*) have invented particular Inflections for that; which has given Occasion to the GRAMMARIANS to call them the *Optative* Mood: And there's in *French*, and in the *Spanish*, and *Italian*, something like it, since there are Triple Tenses; but in others, the same Inflections serve for the *Subjunctive* and *Optative*; and for this Reason, one may very well retrench this Mood in the *Latin* Conjugations; for 'tis not only the different way of signifying, which may be very much multiply'd, but the different Inflections that ought to make Moods.

2. We will sometimes after another manner, when we content our selves with granting a Thing, tho' absolutely we would not do it; as when *Terence* says, *Profundat, perdat, pereat*, Let him lavish, let him sink, let him perish, &c. Men might have invented an Inflection to mark this Movement, as well as they have invent'd one in *Greek*, to mark a simple Desire, but they have not done it, and make use of the *Subjunctive* for it; and in *French* and *English* we add *qu'e*, *let*. Some GRAMMARIANS have call'd this the *Potential* Mood, *Modus Potentialis*, or *Modus Concessionis*.

3. The third sort of willing is, when what we will depends on a Person of whom we may obtain it, signifying to him the Desire we have that he will do it. This is the Motion we have when we command or pray. 'Tis to mark this Motion, that the Mood call'd *Imperative* was invented: It has no first Person, especially in the *Singular*, because one cannot properly command ones self; nor the third in several Languages, because we don't properly command any but those to whom we Address and Speak. And because the Command or Desire in this Mood has always regard to

the Future, it thence happens the *Imperative* and *Future* are ten taken one for another, especially in the *Hebrew*, as *non occides* you shall not kill, for kill. Whence it comes to pass that the GRAMMARIANS have plac'd the *Imperative* among the *Futures*.

Of all the Moods we have in speaking of, the Oriental Tongues have only this latter, which is *Imperative*: And on the contrary the *Vulgar* Tongues have no particular Inflection for the *Imperative*; but our way of marking it in *French*, is to take the second Person plural, and even the first with the Pronouns that go before it. Thus *Vous aimez*, You love, is a simple Affirmation; *aimez* is an *Imperative*. *Nous aimons*, We love, is an *Imperative*: But we command by the *Singular*, which is very rare, we do not take the second Person, *Tu aimes*, but the first, *aime*.

There's another Inflection of a Verb, that admits of neither Number nor Person, which is what we call *Infinitive*; as *esse*, *estre*, *amare*, *aimer*, to love. But it may be observ'd that sometimes the *Infinitive* retains the Affirmation, when I say, *Scio malum esse cogitandum*, I know the Evil is to be avoided; then often it loses it, and becomes a Noun, especially in *Greek* and the *Vulgar* Tongues; as we say, *Le boire*, *le manger*, also *je viens boire*, *volo habere* for 'tis as much as to say, *Facile est*, or *posionem*.

This being suppos'd, 'tis demand'd what the *Infinitive* is proper to when 'tis not a Noun, but retains its Affirmation; as in this Example, *Scio malum esse fugiendum*, I know of no body that has any Notice of what I am about to serve, which is, that we think the *Infinitive* is among the other Members of Verbs, what the *Relative* is among the Pronouns; for as the *Relative* has more in it than the *Pronouns*, that it joyns the *Pronouns*, that it joyns the *Pronouns*.

in which it is to another Proposition, so I believe the Infinitive, besides the Affirmation of the Verb, joyn the Proposition in which it is to another; for *Scio* is as good as a Proposition of it self; and if we add *malum est fugiendum*, 'twould be two several Propositions; putting *esse* instead of *est*, you make the last Proposition but a part of the first. And thence it is that in French they almost always retain the Infinitive by the Indicative of the Verb, *Je scay, que le mal est*; and then this *que* signifies only this Union of one Proposition to another; which Union is in Latin retain'd in the Infinitive, and in French also, tho' rarely, as when I say, *Il croit scavoir toutes les*.

This way of joyning Propositions in an Infinitive, or by *quod* and *quod* is chiefly in use when we make a part of a Discourse have a relation to another; as if I would repeat that the King said to me, *Je donneray une charge*, I shall generally do it in these terms, the King said to me, *I will give you a Post*, le Roy m'a dit, *Je vous donneray une charge*, by leaving the two Propositions separate, one for me, the other for the King, but if I joyn 'em together by a *Que le Roy m'a dit, qu'il me donnera une charge*; and then it being only a Proposition, which is of my self, I repeat the first, *je donneray*, into the third, *il donnera*, and the Proposition *vous* (signifying the King speaking) to the Pronoun *me*, (signifying my self) who speak, this Union of the Proposition is made by *si* in French, and by *si* in Latin, in relating an Interrogation; as if any one may demand of me, *Pouvez vous faire cela*, Can you do that? I shou'd in relating it to him, *On m'a demande si je pouvois faire cela*, I was ask'd if I could do that: And sometimes without an article, by changing only the Pronoun; as, He ask'd me, *Who are you?* He ask'd me, *who I was*.

But we must observe, that the Hebrews, tho' they spoke in another Language (as the Evangelists) make very little use of this Union of Propositions, but always relate Discourses directly as they were made, so that the *quod* which they frequently us'd, did often serve for nothing, and did not joyn Propositions: An Example of which is in St. John, ch. 1. *Miserunt Judaei ab Hierosolymis Sacerdotes & scribas ad Joannem ut interrogarent eum, Tu quis es? Et confessus est & non negavit; & confessus est quia (quod) non sum ego Christus. Et interrogaverunt eum, Quis ergo? Elias es tu? Et dixit, Non sum. Propheta es tu? Et respondit, Non.* According to the common use of our Tongue, these Questions and Answers would have been related indirectly thus: *They sent to ask John who he was, and he confess'd he was not Christ. And they demanded who he was then, if he was Elias; and he said, No. If he was a Prophet, and he reply'd, No.* This Custom is even met with in prophane Authors, who seem to have borrow'd it also from the Hebrews: And thence it is that the Hebrews had often among them only the Strength of a Pronoun, depriv'd of its common Use of Connection even when Discourse is reported not directly.

We have already said, that Men have, on an infinite number of Occasions, join'd some particular Attribute with the Affirmation, made so many Verbs different from Substantives, which are to be found in all Tongues, and that they may be call'd *Adjective*; to shew that the Signification, which is proper to each, is added to the Signification common to all Verbs, which is that of *Affirmation*. But 'tis a vulgar Error to believe that all these Verbs signify *Action* or *Passion*; for there's nothing a Verb cannot have for its Attribute, if the Affirmation be join'd to the Attribute. Nay, we

See that the Verb-Substantive *Sum*, *I am*, is frequently Adjective, because instead of taking it to signify the Affirmation simply, the most general of all Attributes is join'd to it; which is *Being*; as when I say, *I think therefore I am*; *I am* signifies *Sum ens*, *I am a Being*, a *Thing*; *Existo*, signifies also *sum existens*, *I am*, *I exist*.

However that does not hinder, but that the common Division of these Verbs into *Active*, *Passive* and *Neuter*, may be retained. Those Verbs are properly call'd *Active*, which signify *Action*, to which is oppos'd *Passion*; as, *To beat*, *to be beaten*; *to love*, *to be lov'd*: Whether those *Actions* be determin'd to a *Subject*, which is called real *Action*, as, *To beat*, *to break*, *to kill*, &c. or only to an *Object*, which is called intentional *Action*; as, *To love*, *to know*, *to see*.

Whence it is that in several Languages, Men make use of the same Word, by giving it several Inflections, to signify both the one and the other, calling that a *Verb Active*, which has an Inflection, by which the *Action* is mark'd, and a *Verb Passive*, that which has an Inflection, by which the *Passion* is mark'd; *Amo*, *amor*; *verbero*, *verberor*. This was the Custom in all the Ancient Languages, *Latin*, *Greek*, and *Oriental*; and moreover, these latter gave three Actives to the same Verb, with each their Passive, and a Reciprocal between both the one and the other; as, *s'aimer* would be, which signifies the *Action* of the Verb, on the Subject of that Verb. But the vulgar Tongues of *Europe* have no *Passive*, and instead of that, they make use of a Participle made of the *Verb Active*, which is taken in a *Passive* Sense, with the Verb Substantive; *Je suis*, *I am*; as, *I am beloved*, *Je suis aime*; *Je suis battu*, *I am beaten*, &c. Thus much for Verbs, *Active* and *Passive*.

Neuters, call'd by some GRAMMARIANS *Verba Intransitiva*, are two sorts; the one does not signify

the *Action*, but a *Quality*; as, *Albet*, *it is white*; *vires*, *it is green*; *friget*, *it is cold*, &c. Or some Situation; as, *Sedet*, *he sits*; *stat*, *he stands*; *jacet*, *he lies*. Or has some relation to Place; *Adest*, *he is present*; *absit*, *he is absent*. Or some other State or Attribute; as, *Quiescit*, *he is quiet*; *excellit*, *he excels*; *præst*, *he is Superiour*; *regnat*, *he is King*.

The other Verbs *Neuter*, signify *Actions*, but such as do not pass in a Subject different from him who Acts, or which do not relate to another Object; as, *To dine*, *to sleep*, *to march*, to speak.

Nevertheless, these latter sorts of Verbs *Neuter*, sometimes become *Transitive*, when a Subject is given them; as, *Ambulare viam*, when the Way is taken for the Subject of the *Action*; often also in *Greek*, and sometimes in *Latin*, a Subject is given it, being a Noun form'd of the same Verb; as, *Pugnare pugnam*, *servire servitutum*, *vivere vitam*.

But we believe these later Ways of Speaking were occasion'd only to mark something particular, that was not entirely contain'd in the Verb, as when one wou'd say, *Mas leads a shameful Life*, which is not imply'd in the Word *vivere*; it has been said, *vivere vitam beatam*, as also *Servire duram Servitutum*. Thus when we say, *vivere vitam*, 'tis without doubt a Pleonasm come from those other Ways of Speaking. For this Reason (in all the new Languages) we avoid joining the Noun to the Verb, as a fault, and don't say, for Example: *To fight a great fight*.

By this that Question may be resolv'd, whether every Verb not *Passive*, govern always an Accusative, at least understood: 'Tis the Opinion of some very able GRAMMARIANS, but for our Parts we don't think it. For first, The Verbs that signify no *Action*, but some Condition; as, *quiescit*, *existit*; or some Quality; as, *albet*, *calet*, have no Accusative they can govern; and

the rest it must be regarded, whether the Action they signify has a Subject or an Object, that may be different from that which Acts. For when the Verb governs the Subject, where this Object has the Accusative. But when the Action signified by the Verb has neither Subject nor Object different from that which acts, as, *to dine, to sup; manducare, cenare, &c.* then there is not sufficient Reason to say they govern the Accusative: Tho' those GRAMMARIANS thought the Infinitive of the Verb to be understood as a Noun form'd by the Verb, and by this Example, *Curro*, they will have it *curro cursum*, or *curro currere*: However, this does not appear to be solid enough, for the Verb signifies every Thing; the Infinitive signifies taken as a Noun; and further, the Affirmation and Designation of the Person and Tense. As the Adjective *candidus*, *white*, signifies the Substantive drawn from the Adjective (to wit) *candor*, *whiteness*, and also the Connotation of a Subject, in which is that abstract; wherefore, there's as much Reason to pretend, that when we say, *Homo candidus*, *candere* must be understood, as to imagine that when we say *curris*, *currere* is to be understood.

The Infinitive (which we have been explaining) is what properly should be call'd a Verb Impersonal, since it marks the Affirmation, which is the Property of the Verb, and marks it indefinitely, without Number and Person, which is properly to be Impersonal.

Nevertheless, the GRAMMARIANS generally give the Name of Impersonal to certain Defective Verbs, that have hardly any thing but the third Person.

There are two sorts of these Verbs, the one have the Form of Verbs Neuter, as *Ponitur, pudet, piget, licet, lubet, &c.* the other are made of Verbs Passive, and retain the Form, as *Statur, curritur, amatur, vivitur, &c.* Now these

Verbs have sometimes more Persons than the GRAMMARIANS think of, as may be seen in the *Method. Latin Remarks on Verbs*, Chap. 5. But what we may consider here, and which few Persons have taken Notice of, is, that it seems they are call'd Impersonal, only because implying in their Signification a Subject, which agrees only to the third Person. 'Twas not necessary to express the Fact, because 'tis mark'd enough by the Verb itself; and thus the Affirmation and Attribute have been compriz'd by the Subject in one Word, as *Pudet me*, that is *pudor tenet*, or *est tenens me*; *Ponitur me*, *pena habet me*; *Libet mihi*, *libido est mihi*: Where it must be observ'd that the Verb *est* is not only simply the Substantive, but signifies also Existence. For 'tis as it 'twas said, *Libido existit mihi*, or *est existens mihi*. And thus in other Impersonals resolv'd by *est*; as *licet mihi*, for *licitum est mihi*, *Oportet orare*, for *opus est orare*, &c. As to Passive Impersonals, *Statur, curritur, vivitur, &c.* they may also be resolv'd by the Verb *est*, or *fit*, or *existit*, and the Nouns Verbal taken of themselves, as *Statur*, that is, *Statio fit*, or *est facta*, or *Existit*; *Curritur*, *cursum fit*; *Concurritur*, *Concursus fit*; *Vivitur*, *vita est*, or rather *vita agitur*. *Si sic vivitur*, *si vita est talis*, If Life is such. *Miserere vivitur cum medice vivitur*. Life is miserable when 'tis too much subjected to the Rules of Physick, and then *est* becomes a Substantive, because of the addition of *miserere*, which makes the Attribute of the Proposition.

Dum servitur libidini, that is, *dum servitum exhibetur libidini*, when a Man makes himself a Slave to his Passions. By this methinks may be concluded the Vulgar Languages have not properly Impersonals; as when we say in French, *il faut*, it must, *il est permis*, it may be; for *il* is there properly a Relative, which always serves in-

stead of the Nominative of the Verb, which generally comes after in the Construction, as if we say, *il me plaît defaire cela*; that is to say, *il de faire*, for the *Action* or the *Motion* to do that pleases me, or *est mon plaisir*, 'tis my Pleasure. However, this *il* (which few People in our Opinion have rightly understood) is only a sort of Pronoun, for *id* that, which serves instead of the Nominative understood, or imply'd in the Sense, and represents *il*, so that 'tis properly taken from the Article *il*, of the *Italians*; instead of which we say *le*; or from the Pronoun *ille*, from whence we also take our Pronoun of the third Person *il*; *il aime*, *il parle*, *il court*, &c.

For the Passive Impersonals, *amatur*, *curritur* express'd in *French* by *on aime*, *on court*; 'tis certain these Ways of Speaking in our Modern Languages, are still less Impersonal, tho' Indefinite; this *on*, is there for *Man*, *Homme*, and consequently serves instead of the Nominative to the Verb: All this relates particularly to the *French*, and we have less of the Impersonal than they, but the same Reasons will remove ours, justly apply'd. And one may also observe, that the Verbs of the Effects of Nature, as, *Pluit*, *ningit*, *grandinat*, may be explain'd by these same, in both Tongues.

As *Pluit* is properly a Word, in which for brevity sake the Subject, the Affirmation, and Attribute are included, instead of *Pluvia fit*, or *cadit*; and when we say *it Rains*, *it Snows*, *it Hails*, &c. it is therefore the Nominative, that is to say, *Rains*, *Snows*, *Hails*, &c. included with their Verb Substantive *est* or *fait*; as if we should say, *il pluit est*, *le Neige se fait*, for *id quod dicitur pluvia est*, *id quod vocatur nix fit*.

This is better seen in the Way of Speaking, where the *French* join a Verb with their *il*, as *il fait chaud*, *il est tard*, *il est six heures*, *il est jour*, &c. For 'tis the same as may be said in *Italian*, *il caldo fa*, tho' in use we say simply *fa caldo*;

Astus, or *Calor est*, or *fit*, or *existit*. And *il fait chaud*, that is to say, *il chaud* (*il caldo*) or *le chaud se fait*, to say *existit*, *est*. Thus we also say, *il se fait tard*, for *il tard*, that is to say, *il tarde* (*le tard*, or the Evening) *se fait*. Or as is said in some Provinces, *il s'en va tard*, for *il tarde*, *le tard s'en va venir*, that is, the Night approaches: As also *il est jour*, that is *il jour* (or the Day) *est*, is. *Il est six heures*, that is, *il temps six heures est*: The Time or part of the Day call'd six a-Clock, is. And thus in other the like Terms.

Tho' we have no Participles in *English*, but what by the best Judges are reduc'd to *Qualities*, yet to carry on this general *Grammar*, we here add something on them: Participles are true Noun Adjectives, and 'twou'd not be proper to discourse of 'em here, if they had not such a near Relation to Verbs. This Relation consists (as we have said) in that they signify the same Thing as the Verb, except the Affirmation, which is taken away, and the Designation of the three different Persons, which follows the Affirmation. For which Reason (when 'tis restor'd to it) we do the same thing by the Participle, as by the Verb; as *amatus sum*, is the same thing as *Amor*; and *sum amans*, as *ami*. And this Way of Speaking by Participle, is more usual in *Greek* and *Hebrew*, than in *Latin*, tho' *Cicero* makes use of it sometimes.

Thus the Participle retains the Attribute of the Verb, and also the Designation of the Time or Tense, there being Participles of the Present, the Preterit, and the Future, especially in *Greek*. But this is not always observ'd, tho' some Participles joyn often all sorts of Tenses; as for Example, the Passive Participle *Amatus*, which in most GRAMMARIANS passes for the Preterit, is often of the Present and Future; as *amatus sum*, *amatus ero*. And on the contrary, that of the Present; as *amans* is often of the

Preterit, Aprī super se dimicant, durantes Att. itū arborū costa, Plin. That is to say, *postquam incuravere*, and the like, *Nouv. Meth. Lat. Remarq. on Participles.*

There are Active and Passive Participles, the Active in *Latin* end in *ans* or *ens, curans, docens*; the Passive in *us, amatus, doctus*; tho' there are some of these that are Active, to wit, those of Verbs Dependent; as *Locutus*. But there are some also, that add this Passive Signification, *que cela doit estre, qu'il faut que cela soit*, that must or ought to be, as are the Participles in *du, amandus*, that *that ought to be* below'd; tho' sometimes that later Signification is almost quite lost.

The Property of Participles of Verbs Active, is to signify the Action of the Verb, as 'tis in the Verb; that is to say, in the Course of the Action it self; whereas Verbal Nouns that signify Actions also, signify them rather in the Habit, than in the Act. Thence it is that Participles have the same Regimen as the *amans Deum*. Whereas Verbal Nouns have the same Regimen as Nouns, *amator Dei*. And the Participle itself, has the same Regimen as Nouns, when it signifies rather the Habit than the Act of the Verb, because it then has the Nature of a simple Noun Verbal, as *amans Virtutis*.

We have seen, that by taking away the Affirmation from Verbs, Active and Passive Participles are made, which are Noun Adjectives, retaining the Regimen of the Verb, at least in the Active.

But there are in *Latin* two Noun Substantives form'd, one in *dum*, call'd a Gerund, which has divers Cases, *dum, di, do; amandum, amandi, amando*; but it has but one Gender, and one Number, in which it differs from the Participle in *du, amandus, amanda, amandum*.

Another in *um*, call'd Supine, which has also two Cases, *tum, tu; amatum, amatu*; but it has no

more diversity either of Gender or Number, in which it differs from the Participle in *tus; amatus, amata, amatum*.

We know very well the GRAMMARIANS are puzzled a little to explain the Nature of the Gerund; and that some very able ones have thought 'twas an Adjective Passive, whose Substantive was the Infinitive of the Verb; so that they pretend for Example, that *tempus est legendi Libros*, or *Librorum* (for both the one and the other is us'd) is as if it were *tempus est legendi qđ legere libros vel librorum*.

There are two Speeches, to wit, *tempus legendi qđ legere*, which is the Adjective and Substantive, as if it was *legenda lectionis, & legere Libros*, which is the Noun Verbal that then governs the Case of the Verb, as well as a Substantive governs the Genitive, when we say *librorum* for *Libros*. But considering every thing, we don't see that this Term is necessary.

For 1. As they say of *legere*, that 'tis a Verbal Noun Substantive, which as such may govern either the Genitive, or even the Accusative, as the Ancients said, *curatio hanc rem; Quid tibi hanc tactio est?* Plaut. We say the same Thing of *legendum*, that 'tis a Verbal Noun Substantive, as well as *legere*, and that consequently it may do all that's attributed to *legere*.

2. There is no Ground to say that a Word is understood when 'tis never express'd, and cannot be express'd without appearing absurd: Now never was an Infinitive join'd to its Gerund; and if one shou'd say *legendum est legere*, it wou'd appear altogether absurd therefore, &c.

3. If the Gerund *legendum* were an Adjective Passive, it wou'd not be different from the Participle *legendus*; for what Reason therefore did the Ancients, who understood their Tongue, distinguish Gerunds from Participles? We believe therefore the Gerund is a Noun Substantive,

tive, which is always Active, and which differs from the Infinitive, only consider'd as a Noun; because it adds to the Signification of the Action of the Verb, another of the Necessity or Duty; as if one wou'd say, the Action that is to be done, which seems to be mark'd by the Word Gerund, which is taken from *gerere*, to do; whence it comes that *pugnandum est*, is the same Thing as *pugnare oportet*; and the *English* and *French*, which have not this, render it by the *Infinitive*, and a Word which signifies *ought to be*.

Il faut combattre; and in *English*, we ought to fight.

But as Words do not always preserve the Force for which they were invented, this Gerund in *Latin* often loses that *Oportet*, and preserves only the Action of the Verb; *Quis talia fando Temperet a Lacrymis*? That is to say, *in fando*, or *in fari talia*.

As for the *Supine*, we agree with those GRAMMARIANS, that it is a Noun Substantive which is Passive, whereas the Gerund in our Opinion is always active.

CHAP. IX.

OF PARTICLES, or Manners of WORDS.

By PARTICLES these several Things are done;
 Circumstance and Manner of Words are shewn,
 And then to every Part of Speech are shewn;
 Or else they do denote of Words the State,
 And how each Word to other does relate:
 Or Sentence, else to Sentence they unite,
 And their Dependance on each other cite.

[1] PARTICLES (that is little WORDS) or Manners of WORDS, have these several Offices: 1st, They express or signify the Circumstance or Manner of Words; as, *I love you dearly*; explaining (when join'd to an Affirmation) how, when, where, or whether or no one is, does, or suffers; as, *he reads well*; *he dances scurvily*; *he sings now*; *the Play is acted here*; *it is a doubt whether he sings or not*. It is join'd to a QUALITY; as *he is very happy*; *he is always fortunate*; *a Woman truly loving, is ever disappointed*; *a Wife seldom scolding, is very rare*, &c. 'Tis sometimes join'd to it self; as, *I live very comfortably*. They farther denote, or shew the State of Words, and their Reference or Relation to each

[1] We have already observ'd, that Cases and Prepositions, or *Fore-plac'd Words*, were invented for the same Use; that is, to shew the Re-

lations that Things have to one another. In all Languages these Relations are shewn by Prepositions.

[2] The

each other; as, Stephen goes over *Highbate-hill*; James went under *Temple-bar*; Mary went through the *Hall*; Susan went to *Westminster*, from *St. James's Park*; the *Queen* dwells at *St. James's*; Henry lives in the *Town*, but Matthew without, or out of it, &c. It connects Sentences; as, Roger went to his *Country-house*, and study'd there the whole *Season*; Peter also accompany'd him; nor was there any thing wanting; neither did Ralph stay long behind.

[2] They are therefore divided into three sorts, or rather rang'd under these three Heads; the first shewing, the *Manners*, or *Qualities of Words*, by being added to them; the second denotes some *Circumstances of Actions*, and joins Words to Words, and little Members of a Sentence to each other; the third joins Sentence to Sentence, as greater Members of a Period.

*These from the other Parts of Speech are known,
Because before them they do still disown*

By, with, for, through, from, of; and all

Those Names which we the Personal do call.

[2] The Desire Men have to shorten Discourse, gave Rise to *Adverbs*; for the greatest part of these *Particles*, are only to signify in one Word, what cou'd not else be done without a *Preposition* and a *Noun*; as *Sapienter*, for *cum sapientia*, with *Wisdom*; *hodie*, to *Day*, for *in hoc die*, in this *Day*.

And this is the Reason, that in the vulgar Languages the greatest Part of the *Adverbs* are generally more Elegantly explain'd by the *Noun* and the *Preposition*; thus we rather say (we speak generally, for it holds not always) *with Wisdom*, *with Prudence*, *with Pride*, *with Moderation*, than *wisely*, *prudently*, *proudly*, *moderately*; tho' in *Latin* it is generally more Elegant to use the *Adverbs*.

Thence it is that a *Noun* or *Name*, is often taken for an *Adverb*; as *Insuper* in *Latin*, *primum*, or *primo*, *partim*, &c. Thus in *French* *Deſus*, *deſſous*, *dedans*, which are indeed *Nouns*. These two sorts of *Particles*, which we have just remark'd on, are concern'd in the Objects of the Mind, not in the Actions or Judgment.

The second sort of Words, which

signify the Form of our Thoughts, and not properly their Objects, are the *Conjunctions* or *Joining-Words*, as *et*, *non*, *vel*, *ſed*, *ergo*, &c. *and*, *not*, *or*, *if*, *therefore*, because if we consider well, and reflect justly, we shall find that these *Particles* signify nothing but the very Operation of the Mind, which joyns or disjoyns Things which we deny, or which we consider absolutely or conditionally; for Example, There is no Object in the World lies out of our Mind; which answers the Particle *Non*; but it is plain, that it denotes nothing but the Judgment which we make to shew, that one thing is not another.

Thus *Ne*, which in *Latin* is a Particle of Interrogation, as *Aisne*? *Do you say it?* is not the Object of our Mind, but only marks the Motion of our Soul, by which we desire to know something. And the same may be said of all Words of Interrogation, as *quis*, *que*, *quod*.

Interjections are Words that signify nothing without us, but they are Words, or rather Sounds, which are more Natural than Artificial, which express the Emotions of our Souls; as *alas!* *woe's me!* *oh!* &c.

This

This Part of Speech is easily distinguish'd from the Rest, because in good Sense they cannot admit these Words, *of, to, for, O, with, by, from, through*; nor the *Personal Names, I, thou, he, we, ye, they*; for we cannot say, *of foolishly, to foolishly, by, from foolishly, &c. nor I foolishly, thou foolishly, he foolishly.*

*This first, with Affirmation and its Name,
Makes perfect Sense, as Peter slowly came;
And by its answering to the Questions How,
(And in what manner) do they steer the Plough?*

You may know the first, by its making compleat Sense with one *Affirmation* and its *Name*; as, *A Philosopher speaks wisely; A Wise Man lives happily.* And by answering the Question *How?* or *after what Manner?* This Part of Speech is sometimes join'd to a *Name* or *Quality* to express their Manner, as, *too much a Philosopher; egregiously impudent.* But here indeed, and in most Cases, a *Word* is express'd or understood, to which this also relates.

*This sort the Manner, Time, and Place imply,
As by the following Scale you will descry.*

This sort relates either to the *Manner, Place, or Time*: The first expresses the Manner of *being, doing, or suffering, Absolutely, or Comparatively.*

I. Absolutely.

- | | | |
|----|---|---|
| By | { | 1. { Certainty; as, <i>Verily, truly, undoubtedly.</i> |
| | | 2. { Contingence; as, <i>Happily, perhaps, by chance, perchance.</i> |
| | | 3. { Negation; as, <i>Not, in no wise.</i> |
| | | 4. { Natural Powers, or Habits; as, <i>Wisely, liberally, justly.</i> |
| | | 5. { Sensible Impressions; as, <i>Brightly, nastily, bitterly, loudly, smoothly.</i> |
| | | 6. { Passions of the Soul; as, <i>Merrily, joyfully</i> ; as, <i>Ha! ha! he! wondrously</i> , as, <i>Lo! O! oh! Scornfully</i> , as, <i>Tush</i> ; <i>lovingly</i> , as, <i>Ah! hatefully</i> , as, <i>Fob</i> ; <i>sorrowingly</i> , as, <i>Alas! ah! wo's me!</i> |

II. Comparatively.

- | | | |
|----|---|--|
| By | { | 1. { Excess; as <i>very, exceedingly, too much, more, most</i> ; as <i>more hardly, most softly.</i> |
| | | 2. { Defect; as <i>almost, well nigh, little less, least of all.</i> |
| | | 3. { Likeness, or Equality; as <i>so, alike, as it were, as.</i> |
| | | 4. { Unlikeliness, or Inequality; as <i>otherwise, differently, far otherwise.</i> |

III. of Place.

1. { Presence in a Place, answering to the Question **where** ? as, *here, there, elsewhere, every where, no where, somewhere else, above, below, within, without* ; or to the Question, **with whom** ? as, *together, at once, apart, severally.*
2. { Motion from a Place ; as *whence, hence, thence.*
3. { Motion towards a Place ; as *Whitherwards, hitherwards, thitherwards, otherward, toward, upward, backward.*
4. { The Way to a Place ; as *Whitheraway, this, that, or another way.* Tho' these are scarce to be allow'd Particles, or Manners of Words.
5. { The Term or End of Motion ; as *whither, hither, thither, whitherto, hitherto.*

IV. of Time.

1. { Being in Time ; as, **when** ? either the Present, as *now, to day* ; the Past, as *already, yesterday, before, long since, heretofore* ; the Future, as *to morrow, not yet, after, hereafter, henceforward.*
2. { Duration and Continuance ; **how long** ? a long *while, slowly, quickly, shortly, hitherto.*
3. { Vicissitude, or Repetition ; **how often** ? *often, sometimes, seldom, daily, yearly ; by turns, alternately ; once, twice, thrice, ten times, &c.*

Those that are deriv'd from *Qualities*, which admit degrees of Comparison, do the same ; as *hardly, more hardly, soft or very hardly.*

*The second sort that shew of Words the state,
And how each Word to Others does relate,
You in the following Catalogue you'll find,
And how its Use and Meaning is to each assign'd.*

[OF] denotes Relations betwixt the Word that goes before, and the Word that follows it, whether that Word be *Name, Quality, or Affirmation* ; as, *the Son of Adam* ; but this properly belongs to *Construction*, to which we refer you.

It signifies *concerning*, or the Object, or Matter about which you speak or write ; as, *a Treatise of Virtue, or on, or concerning Virtue.*

The

The Matter; as, *a Cup of Gold.*

The Means, (or WITH) to die of Hunger.

It signifies AMONG; as, *of five Horses four were blind.*

THROUGH; 'tis of God's great Mercy: But this is a Vulgarism, and scarce worth Notice.

FROM, *South of Windsor.*

OFF] signifies Separation and Distance, and has its Opposite in ON, which implys Continuation; as, *to put off, to put on; He put off his Hat, he stood off to Sea.* It signifies Delay; *He put me off from Day to Day, he is off and on with me.*

FROM] implys the Term from which, or Motion, and is oppos'd to TO; as, *He went from Hackney to London; from Head to Foot, from first to last, from hence, from thence, &c.*

It signifies OFF; as, *He took me from the Ground, or from off the Ground.* Out of Sincerity, *I speak from my Heart.*

TO (*Unto*, not much us'd) signifies Motion to, *I go to Windsor; Relation, faithful to his Sovereign.*

IN] *to Day, i. e. in this Day, to morrow.*

FOR] *she had a Thousand Pounds to her Fortune.*

BEFORE] *you promis'd me to my Face.*

ABOUT, or concerning] *Speak to the Head we agreed on.*

TOWARDS] *I thank you for your Kindness to me.*

TILL, or Until] *The Meeting is put off to November.*

In Comparison OF] *He is nothing to Hercules, or in comparison of Hercules.*

MAY, can or will] *I have nothing to comfort me; i. e. that may, can, or will comfort me.*

TILL, or Until] is only spoke of Time; *He play'd till eight a-Clock.*

Before] *He wou'd not remove his Quarters till (or until) his Contributions were paid.*

FOR] denotes the Purpose, End, or Use, Benefit or Damage for, &c. *George got a House for Stephen; the Advocate pleads for his Client.*

Oppos'd to against.] *William is for me, John is against me.*

Fitness, Inconvenience] as, *This Hat is too light for me.*

Exchange, or trucking] as, *He had Barley for his Hops.*

In place, or instead of] *Harry did Duty for John. Distribution] I appointed one Room for every Company.*

In regard or consideration of] as, *He liv'd high enough for his Estate.*

In consideration of] *James was rewarded for his Valour.*

During] *He was Captain of the Fort, for Life.*

Notwithstanding] *For all his conceited Wisdom, he was a Fool.*

Y] The several Meanings of this Word is seen in this Sentence: *He was slain by his Enemy, by (near, or beside) a Spring of Water, but wounded first by his own Fear, and then by his Enemy's Sword.*

In] *By Day, by Night.*

ITH] shews the Instrument, or Means, and Concomitance; *He was slain with a Sword; he abides with me; he purg'd with Follor.*

HROUGH] implies the Cause, Means, or Medium, but chiefly the local Medium, tho' it signifies the Moral and Natural likewise; as, *The Beams of the Sun with incredible Speed pass from Heaven, through the Air to the Earth, endu'd with Light, and Heat, by (with, through) which it comforts us, and quickens the Plants, which God has prepar'd for us, and given to us, for our Use, and his Glory.*

FTER] opposes before, relates to Time and Place, the Posteriority of the former, and Inferiority of the later: *After Christmas comes Hilary Term; the Sheriff is after the Mayor.*

For] *She pines after Melons.*

N, INTO] denotes Time, Place, the Manner of Being, thinking, doing; with the Motive, Cause, or Means of doing. *John lives in the Castle; William goes into the Country; in Winter; in the City.*

Posture Disposition] *To stand in a decent posture; he is in his Cloak.*

The Motive] *He did it in Revenge.*

Among] *Harry has not Sobriety in all his Meditations.*

Manner of Change] *He changes Water into Wine.*

AT] implies nearness to a Place, Time, Price; the Instrument, Cause, Manner, &c. At School, at Westminster, at the beginning, at the bottom.

Near, close by.] He watches at the end of the Street.
For.] He dispos'd of his Tickets at a good Rate.
What do you sell this at?

With.] He plays at Bowls, at Cards, at Dice.
According to.] At my Pleasure.

On, or Upon.] Banister is good at the Flute; Potter is a Marksman at Shooting.

Employment.] To be at Study, at Supper, at Prayer.

WARD] is always put after a Word; as, toward, homeward, Heav'nward, and implies so.

There are many more of this sort, but we shall be content with these, as well as Dr. Wallis, since abundantly sufficient for our End: For the rest, we shall refer you to a Treatise of our *English Particles*, which We shall publish as a Supplement to the Study of the *English Tongue*; as Tursellinus, and others, have done to that of the *Latin*.

By the third sort of Particles is shown
How Sentences Dependence may be known,
And to each other Sentences we join. }

The third sort of these Particles, or Manners of Words, joyn Sentences together, and let us see by that the Relation of one Notion to another, and the Dependence of one Sentence on another; as, and, also, so as; nor, neither, but, unless, nevertheless, however, otherwise; if, save, except, tho', altho', as, namely, to wit, why, wherefore, for, because, therefore, whereas, since, likewise, thereupon, &c.

What else is necessary to be known in Grammar, concerning these Particles, will be shewn in the following Part of our Division of Grammar, under the Title of Sentences.

Here we think it proper to add some Proprieties in Writing, which make Words more beautiful, because more distinct, and expressive. All Proper Names (and indeed all Names) ought to be written with the initial Letter a Capital. The same must be done by any other Part of Speech, when there's a Force or Emphasis laid on it: Otherwise Qualities, Affirmations, Particles, are always written with small Letters. The first Word of every Epistle, Book, Chapter, Verse, &c. begins with a Capital; but some Sentences of Importance are express'd all in Capitals, as Inscriptions, &c.

The End of the Third Part.

Part IV.

CHAP. X.

Of SENTENCES.

*At least, three Words a Sentence must contain,
Which must some Sentiment or Thought explain.*

A Sentence comprehends at least three Words, by which some Sentiment or Thought of the Mind is express'd : Nor can it be without one *Affirmation*, and a *Name* signifying the Subject of that *Affirmation*, i. e. a *Term* of which something is affirm'd ; as, *a Lie is abominable*.
[1] The Construction of this Sentence, is the regular Connection of the Words in the Form of Nature, which is generally more regarded by the *English*, and other Modern Languages, than by those of the Ancients.

[1] As we have done in our Treatise on the Parts of Speech, or Words, so we shall here add the general Notions of *Grammar* in the Syntax, or Construction of Words either in a Sentence, according to the Principles of the Art, which have been drawn from Reason establish'd.

The Construction of Words, is generally distinguish'd into *Construction* and *Government* ; the first, by which the Words ought to agree among themselves, and the second, when one causes any Alteration in the other.

The first, generally speaking, is the same in all Languages, because it follows the natural Order, which is in general Usage, the better to distinguish our Discourse.

Thus the distinction of the two Numbers, Singular and Plural, is the

Reason why the Adjective is to agree with the Substantive in Number ; that is, that one be put either in the Singular or Plural, as the other is. Because the Substantive is the Subject that is confusedly, though directly mark'd by the Adjective. If the Substantive marks many, there are many Subjects of the Form, mark'd by the Adjective, and by Consequence it ought to be in the Plural Number, as *Homines docti, learned Men*. But there being no Termination in the Quality in *English*, to distinguish the Number, it is only imply'd in Reason, the same Word signifying the Singular, as well as Plural Number.

The distinction of the Masculine and Feminine Gender, obliges the Languages, which have distinct Terminations, to have a Concordance or Agreement between the

L

Name

Name and Quality, or Substantive, and Adjective in Gender, as well as Number.

The *Verbs, or Affirmations* for the same Reason are to agree with the *Nouns and Pronouns, or Names, and Personal Names in Number and Person.*

But if at any time, in Reading, you meet with any Thing that may appear contrary to these Rules, it is by a Figure of Discourse, that is, by having some Word understood, or by considering the Thoughts more than the Words themselves, as we shall see anon.

The Construction of Government on the contrary, is entirely Arbitrary, and for that very Reason, is different in all Languages. For one Language forms their Government or *Regimen* by Cases; others make use of little Signs or Particles in their Place, which yet do not mark all the Cases, as in *French* and *Spanish*, they have only *de* and *a*, which mark the *Genitive* and *Dative* Cases; the *Italians* add *da*, for the *Ablative*, the *English* have *of*, *to*, *for*, *from*, *by*, &c. yet none for the *Accusative*, and the same sometimes for two Cases. Here you may look back to what has been said on the Cases, and forward to what may be added in the *Appendix of Prepositions*, to the short Remark on them in their Places.

Yet it will not be amiss to observe some general Maxims, which are of great Use in all Languages.

The *First*, That there is no *Nominative Case*, or *first State of the Name* in any Sentence, which has not a Reference to some *Verb* or *Affirmation*, either express'd or understood; because we never talk merely to mark the bare Objects of our Conception, but to express our Sentiments of what we conceive, which is the Office of the *Verb* or *Affirmation* to mark.

The *Second*, That there is no *Verb* or *Affirmation*, which has not its *Name* or *Nominative Case*, either express'd or understood; be-

cause it is the proper Office of the *Verb* to affirm, and therefore it must have something to affirm of, which is the *Subject* or the *Nominative* of the *Verb*; tho' before an *Infinitive*, there is an *Accusative*, (not a *Nominative Case*) as *Scio Petrum esse doctum*, I know Peter to be learned. But this of the *Accusative* relates only to those Languages which have that Case.

The *Third*, That there can be no *Adjective* or *Quality*, which has not a Reference to some *Substantive* or *Name*, because the *Adjective* marks confus'dly the *Substantive* or *Name*, which is the *Subject* of the Form that is distinctly mark'd by the *Adjective* or *Quality*; as *Doctus*, learn'd, must have regard to some Man who is learn'd.

The *Fourth*, That there never is a *Genitive Case*, which is not govern'd by some other *Name* or *Noun*, because that Case continually marks that which is as the Possessor, so that it must be govern'd by the Thing possess'd. For this Reason, both in *Latin* and *Greek*, this Case is never govern'd properly by a *Verb*. This Rule is with more difficulty apply'd in the *Vulgar Tongues*, because the Particle or Sign of, which properly is the Sign of the *Genitive Case*, is sometimes put for the Preposition *of*, and *de French*, for *ex* and *de*.

The *Fifth*, That the Government of *Verbs* is oftentimes taken from divers sorts of References, included in the Cases according to the Capriciousness of Custom or Usage, which yet does not change the Specifick Reference of each Case, but only shews, that Custom has made choice of *this* or *that*, according to Fancy.

Thus in *Latin* we say, *Juvare aliquem*, and *Opusculari alicui*, for these are two *Verbs* of *Aid*, because it pleas'd the *Latins* to regard the Government of the first *Verb*, as the Form, to which the Action passes; and that of the second, as a Case of Attribution, to which the Action

*A Sentence is, or simple, or compound,
Still in the first, One AFFIRMATION's found,
And of the Subject too, One NAME express'd,
Or understood, as is by all confess'd.*

Sentences are twofold, *simple and compound*; a *simple Sentence* is, where there is but one **AFFIRMATION** and one **NAME** of the *Subject* of that *Affirmation*, either *express'd* or *understood*.

*A compound Sentence is of two compos'd,
Or more, by Particles together clos'd;
Or by conjunctive Qualities combin'd,
As in th' Examples you may quickly find.*

A compound Sentence is made up of two, or more simple Sentences join'd to each other by some *Particle* or *conjunctive QUALITY*; as, *I ride, and thou walkest. This is the Man, who did the Savage kill.*

Of the Construction of NAMES.

*The NAME, the Subject of the AFFIRMATION,
Before it generally assumes its Station.*

The *Name*, or *Personal Name*, of which the *Affirmation* affirms something, is generally plac'd in *Construction* before the *Affirmation*; as, *I am happy. Susan loves Roger. The Parson preaches. The Book is read.*

*Except Command, or Question be imply'd;
Then to the Name Precedence is deny'd.
But if may, can, shall, will, ought, wou'd, and do,
Before the principal Affirmation go,
Then does the Name between them take its place.
Else will the Style want all its proper Grace.*

Ex-

of the Verb has a Reference.

Thus in *French* they say *Servir Quelqu'un*, and *Servir a quelque chose*, to serve one, to serve for, or to a Use.

Thus in *Spanish* the greatest part of the Verbs *Active* govern indifferently a *Dative*, and an *Accusative Case*.

Thus the same Verb may receive several Governments; as *Prestare alicui*, or *aliquem*; and thus they for Example say, *Eripere Morti alicui*, or *Aliquem a Morte*, and the like.

Sometimes these different Regimens of the Verbs cause an alteration in the Sense, in which the use of a Language must be consider'd; as for Example in *Latin*, *Cavere alicui*, to watch, or be careful of the Preservation of one; but *cavere Aliquem*, is to be aware of him. But in this we must always have a particular regard to the Usage of all Languages.

We have in the Text said what is necessary for the Knowledge of the Figures of Speech, to which we refer you. [2] These

Except when a *Question, Command, Permission, or Concession* be imply'd, for then the *Name* is put after the *Affirmation*, or betwixt one of the *nine Affirmations*; *Do, may, can, will, shall, ought, &c.* as, *does Stephen write? will you depart? burn I? burnst thou? or dost thou burn? &c.*

If of the Nine, two do at once precede
The principal Affirmation, take heed
The Name between those two obtain its Lot,
Cou'd I have gone? cou'd Calia have forgot?

But if the *principal Affirmation* have two of the *nine* before it, then the *Name* is set between them; as,

Cou'd Cælia have forgotten me, soon
Might Roger have gone out of Town?
When the Command the second Person takes
The Pers'nal Name then no appearance makes.

When the *Command, Permission, Concession, &c.* is in the *second Person*, the *Personal Name*, which usually goes before the *Affirmation*, is often omitted or understood; as, *burn, for burn thou? or you, or ye.*

In other Persons there is frequently a *Circumlocution* by the *Affirmation* let; as, *let me burn; let him burn; let them burn. Let him ask as often as he will, he never shall obtain. Let me do what I will, it is to no purpose.* As for *ask I, or ask he, &c. never so often, &c.* it is *Barbarism*, and never us'd by any good Author.

When did, might, shou'd, wou'd, cou'd, and had & were,
If do imply; and also after there
The Affirmation goes before the Name;
By Way of Emphasis it will do the same.

When the *passing, or past Times* of *do, may, can, will, shall, have, am,* supplies the place of, or implies *if*, the *Name* is set after the *Affirmation*, and also there is us'd; as, *had he (for if he had) ask'd, he had obtain'd. Had I (for if I had) heard this, I wou'd not have been so complaisant. Were I a Prince, I wou'd govern better. There fell a Thousand Men on the spot. There is cold in the Ice (or cold is in the Ice).* The same is likewise done by *Way of Emphasis*; as, *it was Mor-daunt, who conquer'd. It was the Church, that fell.*

This happens sometimes, when there are none of these *Considerations*; as, *said I; said he; then follow'd Belinda.*

To, and an Affirmation of we know
Will for the Name to th' Affirmation go;
And to a Sentence we the same allow.

Instead of the Name that goes before the Affirmation, and of which the later affirms something, sometimes another Affirmation, with to before it, supplies its place, as having something affirm'd of it; as, to Dance is wholsom; to Play is delightful. To Consider is useful.

A whole Sentence is the same; as, That the Day is broke, is evident, since the Sun shines. In short, whatever will answer to the Questions who? or what? will supply the Office of the Name to the Affirmation.

The Pers'nal Name, or follows, or precedes,
Ev'n as the Name it self pursues, or leads.

The leading State of the Personal Name is set before, or after the Affirmation, according to the foregoing Rules of Names; as I read, bearest thou? &c.

That Affirmation, which its Act extends
To something else, still after it commands
A Name, to which that Action does relate;
As, Roger spurns me with his usual Hate.

As the Name, when it signifies the Subject of which something is affirm'd by the Affirmation, goes before the Affirmation, (except before excepted) so a Name is always plac'd after the Affirmation, which signifies the Thing to which the Action of the Affirmation immediately relates; as, I read a Book; the Fire burns Robert.

Thus the following State of the Personal Names generally are set after the Affirmation, and the Particles to, for, of, &c. tho' whom generally goes before the Affirmation; as Martin is the Man whom I saw last.

These Names distinguish'd are by what and who?
And whom and what? as the Examples shew.

These two Names are easily known, or distinguish'd by asking the Question who? or what? and whom? and what? the first Name answers to the Question who? or what? as who reads? answ. I; what burns? the Fire: on the contrary, what do I read? answ. the Book; whom does the Fire burn? answ. Robert.

But when the Action don't at all relate
T'another, but in the Subject terminate

*No Name the Affirmation then requires
To follow it, but in it self expires.*

All the Buffle some GRAMMARIANS have made about *Verbs Neuter*, is dispatch'd in these four Lines, that is in this one Rule; that when the Action of the *Affirmation* does not extend or relate to any other Person or Thing, but terminates in the Subject, there is no *Name* requir'd after it; as, *I grieve, I rejoyce, I sit, I run, I stand, &c.*

Of the Construction of AFFIRMATIONS.

This very nearly relating to the former, seems to demand our next Consideration, both indeed being interwoven with each another.

*The Affirmation always must agree
In Number and Person with the Name you'll see.*

The *Affirmation* must agree with the *Name* of which it affirms something in *Number* and *Person*: That is, if that be of the Singular, or Plural, this must be so too; if that be of the first, second, or third Person, this must be of the same, whether the Number or Person be express'd by the Ending or Termination, or by the nine *Affirmations* discours'd of under the Head of Affirmations; as, *I write or do write, thou writest or dost write, he writes or does write; we, ye, and they write, or do write: Not I writest, he write, &c.*

*When of two Names (tho' each be Singular)
We ought affirm, the Affirmations are
Most justly in the Plural seen t'appear.*

But when the *Affirmation* relates to, or affirms of two foregoing *Names*, tho' they are both of the Singular Number, must be of the Plural; as, *the King and Queen are happy, not is happy.*

It is a lame Allowance of a late Author of *Grammar*, That it may be also of the Singular in English, since he is forc'd to salve the Solecism, by understanding other Words to make up the Defect; as in this, *His Justice and Goodness was great*; that is, says he, *His Justice was great, and his Goodness was great.*

*An Affirmation may be (at your Ease)
Or Singular, or Plural, as you please,
When to a NAME of Number it is join'd,
Tho' still the NAME you Singular do find.*

A Name of Number, or whose Meaning implies more than one, or many, tho' it be it self of the *Singular Number*, the Affirmation may yet be in the *Plural*; as, *the MOB is unruly*, or *the MOB are unruly*; *the Convocation are debating*, or *is debating*. The Affirmation agreeing sometimes with the Number of the Name, and sometimes with the Signification.

When two Affirmations are together seen,
Then must the Particle (to) be set between,
Except let, bid, dare, help, and all the Nine.

When two Affirmations follow one-another, the Particle is ought to be set between 'em, except *do, will, shall, may, can*, with their passing or past Times, *did, shou'd, wou'd, cou'd, might* and *must*. Add to these *let, bid, dare, and help*, and perhaps some few others.

Have, am, or be, with passive Qual'ty join'd,
Or with a Quality that Being does intend,
All Suffering and Being does express
That the Britannic Language will confess.

Have, am, or be, join'd to a Quality, expresses all manner of Being, or Suffering, in our Tongue, which has no other way of doing it. They are set before Qualities of all sorts, and even Names.

There is no change of the Personal, or Numeral Terminations, when the Affirmation signifies Command, or is preceded by *if, that, tho', altho', whether*, and sometimes by other Particles.

Of the Construction of QUALITIES.

The Qualities in English mostly claim
The Place immediately before their Name.

Tho' in Nature we think of the Name before the Quality, yet in English, Qualities are generally plac'd before the Names to which they belong, or of which they express the Manner,

Except an Affirmation come between;
As in the following Example's seen.

Unless when an Affirmation comes between the Quality and the Name; as, *Just art thou, O! God!* and *righteous are thy Judgments*; or, *GOD is just, and his Judgments are righteous*. Otherwise when it comes alone, without its Attendants, which it governs, it always goes immediately before its Name; as, *A good Man is rarely to be found, a good Woman*

man much more rarely. Good Men are valuable Jewels in a Commonwealth, good Women make good Wives. Good Things are only so in Opinion.

Poetic Diction with peculiar Grace

Allows the Name (not Prose) the foremost place.

The *Quality* rarely in Prose is set after the Name, but in Verse 'tis beautiful and harmonious; as, *Hail Bard divine!*

But when there are more Qualities than one

That come together, or together join;

Or else one Quality with its govern'd Train;

Then do they follow the preceding Name.

But when there are more *Qualities* than one come together, tho' collaterally join'd, or one *Quality* with its depending Words, it generally comes after the Name; as, *a Man both wise and valiant, a Man exceeding wise and valiant; a Man skilful in many things.* But then we likewise say, *a wise and valiant Man, an exceeding wise Man, a skilful Man in many things.*

A Name and all its Qualities unite,

And form one Word, as all the Learned write;

But when these several Words in one conspire,

They then some other Quality require.

A Name, with its *Qualities*, (or any governing Word, with its Attendants) is as one compounded Word; on which these join'd Names and *Qualities* assume another *Quality*, as if they were one Word, (and these being join'd, another; and so onward) as, *a Man, an old Man; a wise old Man, a very wise old Man, three wise old Men.* Here to the NAME *Man* is prefix'd *a*, which is of the *Quality* kind; and then to the *Quality* *old* is added; and to that, *an*; then *wise*, *very wise*; and to all these aggregated or incorporated Words the *Quality* *a*, or *three*, is prefix'd.

Two sorts of Qualities from Names do flow,

And both before their Names directly go.

There are two sorts of *Qualities*, (as we have observ'd under that Head) which are deriv'd immediately from Names, and go immediately before 'em, supplying the place of almost all the Manners of Words or Particles; the first we call *Possessives*: And this is form'd from almost all Names, Singular or Plural. By adding (*s*) or (if the Pronunciation requires it) (*'s*) it implys the same as the Particle *of*; as,

Man's

an's Nature, the Nature of Man; Mens Nature, or the Nature of Men; Virgil's Poems, &c.

The same is done when an aggregated Name occurs, (that is, a primary Name with its Attendants;) for the formative of the Possessive is put after the whole aggregate; as, the King's Court, or the Court of the King; the King of Spain's Court, or the Court of the King of Spain: For the (s) is put after the whole aggregate (the King of Spain) as after one single Name.

A, or an, immediately we place
Before the NAME, a Man, an Hour, a Face.
But if another QUALITY come in,
'Tis mostly plac'd the a and Name between.

The Quality a, or an, is generally plac'd immediately before the Name; as, a Man, an Arm, a Mountain: But if any other Quality comes with it, it must be plac'd generally between the a and the Name; as, a good Man, a black Horse. But a is sometimes set between the other Quality and the Name, as, many a Man, never a Man. (A) is always before the Singular Number, but (the) before both Singular and Plural.

The Construction of PARTICLES; or, the Manners of WORDS.

We have shewn under the Head of *Particles*, or *Manners of Words*, that besides *Names*, *Qualities*, and *Affirmations*, there is another Part of Speech, which denotes the Reference and Relation of *Names to Names*, *Names to Affirmations*, and the Connections of *Sentence to Sentence*: For this Reason we have divided them into three sorts; the First shew the Circumstances or Manners of Words, which are join'd to every Part of Speech.

These after Affirmations we admit,
But before Qualities we mostly set.

This first sort are generally put after the Affirmation whose Manner it does express; as, Cynthia *danc'd* admirably; Peter *spoke* learnedly; Dorothy *acted* finely; Harry *fought* lately. But it is set before Qualities; as, Robert *was* very lucky; John *is* extremely rich, very rich.

[*] Secondly, All *Names, Qualities, and Affirmations* have various States, Relations, and References to each other, which are mostly express'd by these Particles, *of, to, from, O! by, with, through, &c.* These are at least of the most frequent Use, the rest we shall treat of in a Discourse by itself, as we have before observ'd under *Particles*: An Example will render the Use more plain; as, *O! God! the Memorial of thy Love to the Sons of Men, from the Beginning of the World to this Day, is recorded with Thankfulness in the Hearts of the Righteous.* All these Particles in this Sentence shew the Relation or Reference of *Name to Name*, and their Connection, in that Manner, with each other.

Between the Words whose Reference they express, These Particles demand the certain Place.

These *Particles*, which denote the Dependance of one thing on another, or the Reference or Relation of one Word to another, must naturally be plac'd betwixt them whose Relation

[*] These several States or Relations of *Name to Name*, are express'd in *Latin* by varying the Terminations, or Ending of the *Name*, five several Ways, which were call'd *Cases, a cadendo*. So that there were threescore various Endings in the *Latin*, and double the number in *Greek*, all express'd by these few *English Particles*; the first State of, or the *Name* it self is call'd the *Nominative Case*. If things were always consider'd separately from one-another, *Names* wou'd have only the two Changes of *Number*, and *Gender* to the

QUALITIES.

But since they are often consider'd with Regard to the Relation they have to one-another, the giving of divers Terminations or Endings to *Names*, which are call'd *Cases*, are made use of in some Languages, to express these Relations.

It must be confess'd, that the *Greek* and the *Latin* are (we think) almost the only Languages, in which the *Names* have what are properly call'd *Cases*, that is, in which these Relations are express'd by the dif-

ferent Endings of the same Words; but as there are some sort of *Virtual Cases*, or State in all Languages, (especially in the Pronouns or Personal Names, as we have observ'd) and because without that the Connection of Discourse, which is call'd Construction, wou'd not be well understood; 'tis in a great measure necessary for the right understanding of any Language whatsoever, to know what is meant by the *Cases*, or States of the *Names*; which we shall here endeavour to explain with all the Perspicuity we are able, keeping to the old *Names* of them, and applying them to the new.

Of the first State, or Nominative Case.

The simple Position of the *Name*, is call'd the *Nominative*, which indeed is not properly a *Case*, (tho' it be a State) but the Matter from which the *Cases* are form'd, by the various Changes of the first Termination, or Ending of the *Name*. Its chief Use is to be set before the *Verb* or *Affirmation*, to be the Sub-

of the Proposition in Discourse ;
minu regit me, the Lord governs
Deus exaudit me, God hears
 or my Prayer.

Of the Vocative.

When we name the Person to
 om we speak, or any other
 ing to which we apply our
 es, as if it were a Person, the
 me does by that acquire a new
 ation, which is sometimes
 k'd by a Termination, different
 n that of the *Nominative*, and
 ich is call'd *Vocative*, from *Vo-*
 e, to call ; and thus from *Domi-*
 in the *Nominative*, they make
 mine in the *Vocative* ; of *Anto-*
 e, *Antoni*. But as that was not
 y necessary, since the *Nomina-*
 e might be us'd in the place of
Vocative, it has happen'd, 1st,
 at this different Termination of
Nominative, is not us'd in the
 ral Number. 2^{dly}, That even
 the Singular Number, it is only
 d in the second Declension of the
 ia Tongue. 3^{dly}, That in the
 rek (where it is more common)

Nominative is often us'd for
Vocative, as may be seen in the
 rek Version of the *Psalms* : From
 eence St. Paul in his Epistle to
 Hebrews, cites these Words oo
 ve the Divinity of CHRIST,
 θς & ον, ο Θεός ; where 'tis
 in, that ο Θεός is a Nomina-
 e for a Vocative, since the Sense
 ox, God is thy Throne, but thy
 one, O God : &c. 4^{thly}, In
 e, Nominatives are sometimes
 n'd to Vocatives ; as *Domine*,
 u meus ! Nate mea vires, mea
 gna Potentia solus !

All these Difficulties in this and
 er Cases, in the *Latin* and *Greek*
 avoided by the Signs express'd
 th Ease, without studying the
 rious Terminations of so many
 ousands of Names ; which are
 isted upon, only for the Informa-
 n of the Student in the general
 tion of the Grammar of the An-

cient Tongues, and the Analogy of
 Ours to them.

Of the Genitive Case.

This Case is so call'd from *Genus*,
 Kindred or Family, because 'tis
 us'd to express Alliances of Blood
 between Persons ; besides, it im-
 ports great Variety of other Rela-
 tions between Things, as well as
 Persons. For the Relation of one
 Thing to another, in any manner
 whatever, has occasion'd in the Lan-
 guages that have *Cases*, a new
 Termination in the *Names* or
Nouns, which is call'd the *Geni-*
tive (as we have said) to express
 that general Relation, which is after
 diversity'd into several *Species*, such
 as the Relations are of the *whole* to
 its *Parts*, as *Caput Hominis* ; of
Parts to the *whole*, as *Homo crassi-*
capitis ; of the *Subject* to the *Ac-*
cident or *Attribute*, as *Color Rosa*,
Misericordia Dei ; of the *Accident*
 to the *Subject*, as *Puer optima In-*
dolis ; of the *Efficient Cause* to the
Effect, as *Opus Dei*, *Oratio Cicero-*
nis ; of the *Effect* to the *Cause*, as
Creator Mundi ; of the *final Cause*
 to the *Effect*, as *Potio Saporis* ; of
 the *Matter* to the *Compound*, as
Vas Auri ; of the *Object* to the *Acts*
 of the *Soul*, as *Cogitatio Belli*, *Con-*
temptus Mortis ; of the *Possessor*
 to the *Things* possess'd, as *Pecus*
Melibæi, *Divitia Crassi* ; of the
Proper Name to the *Common*, or
 the *Individual* to the *Species*, as
Oppidum Londini.

And as amongst all these Rela-
 tions there is some Opposite, which
 sometimes occasions Equivocal
 Terms, (for in these Words, *Vulnus*
Achilles, the *Genitive Achilles*
 may signify either the Relation of
 the *Subject*, and then 'tis taken
 passively for the Wound that *A-*
chilles has receiv'd ; or the Rela-
 tion of the *Cause*, and then 'tis taken
 actively for the Wound which *A-*
chilles gave ;) so in that Passage of
 St. Paul, *Certum sum qui a neq ;*
Mors neque Vita, &c. poterit nos
 se-

separate a Charitate Dei in Christo Jesu, Domino Nostro, &c. The Genitive *Dei*, has been understood two different Ways by Interpreters; those who have ascrib'd to it the Relation of the Object, believing, that in this Passage was meant the Love which the Elect bear to God, in *Jesum Christum*; whilst Others (who have ascrib'd to it the Relation of the Subject) do understand by the Passage aforesaid, the Love of God to the Elect in *Jesum Christum*.

Tho' the Hebrew Names are not declin'd by Cases, the Relation express'd by the Genitive, does notwithstanding cause a change in the Names, tho' quite different from that of the Greek and Latin, for in these Languages the change is in the Word governed; but in the Hebrew, in the Word governing.

In the Vulgar Tongues they make use of a Sign to express the Relations of this Case, as of in *English*, *de* in *French*, &c. as *Deum*, God, of God; *Dieu*, de *Dieu*.

What we have said (that the Genitive was made use of) to denote the Relation between the Proper Name and the Common, or which is the same Thing, between the Individual and the Species, is much more common in the Vulgar Tongues. For in *Latin*, the Common and the Proper Name, are frequently put in the same Case, by Apposition, as 'tis call'd, as *Urbs Roma*, *Flavius Thamefis*, *Mons Parnassus*, but we ordinarily say, the City of Rome, the Hill of *Parnassus*; but we say the River *Thames*, as well as of *Thames*.

Of the Dative Case.

There is yet another Relation, which is that of the Thing to the Benefit or Damage of which other Things have a Relation. This in the Languages which have Cases is call'd the *Dative Case*, which is also us'd so many other Ways, that 'tis hardly possible to mention the

Particulars: *Commodare Socratem* lend to Socrates; *Utilis Reipublice*, useful to the Commonwealth; *Perniciosus Ecclesie*, pernicious to the Church; *Promittere Amicum*, promise a Friend, or to a Friend; *Visum est Platoni*, it seem'd good to Plato; *Affinis Regi*, related to the King, &c.

In *English* we express this Case or that which is equivalent to it by the Sign *to*, or *for*, which usually do or may come before it, tho' the same Signs are likewise us'd to what is the Accusative and the Ablative in the Latin.

Of the Accusative.

The Verbs or Affirmations that express Actions which pass from the Agent, as *to beat*, *to break*, *to beat*, *to love*, *to hate*, have Subjects that receive these Things or Objects which they regard: For if I beat, I must beat Something; and so of the rest. So that it is plain, that these Verbs or Affirmations require after 'em a Name, to be the Subject or Object of the Action they express. And hence it is that in the Languages which have Cases the Names have a Termination they call *Accusative*; as *amo Deum*, I love God; *Cæsar vicit Pompeium*, *Cæsar vanquish'd Pompey*.

There is nothing in *English* to distinguish this Case from the Nominative, or rather to distinguish this State of the Name from the first; but as we almost ever place the Words in their natural order, they are easily discover'd, because the Nominative (or first state) is generally before, and the Accusative after the Verb or Affirmation, as *The King loves the Queen*; and *the Queen loves the King*: The King is the Nominative in the first place, and the Accusative in the second; and the Queen the Accusative in the first, and the Nominative in the second.

Relation and Dependance it is to express; as we may observe in the following List.

OF *has this peculiar Eminence,*
Always to bound of Words the general Sense.

As *of* signifies the Relation between the Name that follows it, and that which goes before it, and joins the following Name to the foregoing, as, *the Sons of Adam*, so in all the following Instances, and all others that may be thought it is observable, that *of* has the Property of limiting and terminating the general Signification of the Word on which it depends.

Of the Part to the Whole.

The Tail of the Lion.

Of the Subject to the Accident.

The Splendor of the Sun.

The Whole to the Part.

A Man of a thick Skull.

The Accident to the Subject.

A Boy of a good Understanding.

3. Of

Of the Ablative Case.

Besides the five Cases already mention'd, the *Latins* have a sixth, which was not invented to express any particular Relation, but to be join'd with some of the Particles, call'd *Prepositions*: For the first five Cases, not being sufficient to express all the Relations Things have to one-another, they have in all Languages had recourse to another Invention, which is that of contriving *little Words* to be put before *Names*, which for that Reason are call'd *Prepositions*. And so as the Relation of a Thing, in which another is contain'd, is express'd in *Latin* by *(in)*, it is in *French* by *(dans)*, as *Vinum in Dolio*, *le Muid*, the Wine in the Muid. But in the Languages which have Cases, these *Prepositions* are not join'd with the first of the Name, which is the *Nominative*, but with some of the other Cases: And tho' in *Latin*,

there are some join'd with the *Accusative*, as *Amor erga Deum*, love towards God; they yet have invented another Case, call'd the *Ablative*, to be join'd with several other *Prepositions*, from which it is inseparable in Sense; whereas an *Accusative* is often separated from its *Prepositions*, as when it is after a *Verb Active* or an *Infinitive*.

That Case in Propriety of Speech is wanting in the Plural Number, since it never has there a different Termination, from that of the *Dative*: But because it wou'd too much confound the Analogy, to say that the *Preposition* govern'd an *Ablative* in the *Singular*, and a *Dative* in the *Plural*, it has been judg'd fitter to suppose an *Ablative* in the Plural Number, tho' always the same with the *Dative*.

And for the same Reason it is, that they have given an *Ablative* to the *Greek Names*, which are always like the *Dative*, for preserving the greater Analogy between these two Languages, which are commonly learn'd by one-another.

3. <i>Of the Efficient to the Effect.</i> The Temple of Solomon.	1010	[<i>The Effect to the Efficient.</i> The Creator of the World.
4. <i>Of the End to the Means.</i> The Preparations of the Feast.		<i>The Means to the End.</i> The Death of the Cross.
5. <i>Of Material to Materiate.</i> A Cup of Silver.		<i>Materiate to Material.</i> The Stones of the Temple.
6. <i>Of the Object to the Act.</i> The Love of God.		<i>The Act to the Object.</i> The Delight of the Eye.
7. <i>Offices Political.</i> The King of England.		<i>Relations Oeconomical.</i> The Master of the House.
8. <i>Of the Possessor to Possession.</i> The Flock of Malibeu.		<i>Possession to the Possessor.</i> The Shepherd of the Flock.
9. <i>Of Time to the Event.</i> The Time of War, the Hour of Supper.		<i>Event to Time.</i> The Luxury of the Age.
10. <i>Of the Contents to the Continent.</i> The Fish of the Sea.		<i>The Silence of the Night.</i> <i>Continent to the Contents.</i> A handful of Flowers.

*Two Names without a Word between,
Of betwixt both most frequently is seen.*

When two Names come together, *of* generally goes before the later; as may be seen in all the foregoing Examples. But when this *of* signifies Possession, then it may be left out, and *s*, or *es* put at the end of the first Name, by which it becomes a *Quality*; as we have sufficiently prov'd already. *The House of Roger, or Roger's House.*

*Except they to the same Thing do relate,
For then the middle of is out of date.*

For Names that relate to the same Things have no Particle between them; as the *River Thames, Christopher Columbus, London City*; tho' we likewise say, *the River of Thames, the City of London, &c.*

*Between Superlatives and following Names
OF (by Grammatic Right) a Station claims.*

All Superlatives may have the Particle *of* before the following Name; as *the greatest of Villains, the most Wise Philosophers, the Best of Princes.*

*Qualities that do Partition signify,
Affection, Vice, or Virtue do imply
Any Desire or Passion of the Mind,
Follow'd by of we generally find.*

*Such as want Knowledge, Ignorance declare,
Forgetfulness, or Mem'ry in this Rule are.*

Qualities that signify Partition, generally have of after them; as *One of the French Prisoners, none of these, the third Family, &c.* and those which signify Affection, Passion, Desire of the Mind; any Knowledge, Ignorance, Memory, Forgetfulness, Vice, Virtue, or any such Disposition of the Soul, have of between them and the Word to which they relate; as *Covetous of Gold, fearful of Thunder, anxious of Glory, void of Grace, empty of Sense, conscious of Guilt, ignorant of all things, forgetful of his Friends, mindful of his Children, guilty of Bribes, weary of the Journey, free of the Corporation, needy of Money, &c.* we say also, *forsaken of all Men, worthy of Happiness, born of Royal Race, naked of Friends, deprived of Estate, robb'd of Money.* Thus after some AFFIRMATIONS, as, to repent of Sin, to treat, talk, write of Happiness, &c.

*Where Benefit or Hurt comes from the Name,
TO, to direct you whither 'tis aim'd, do's claim.*

TO or FOR import the Thing or Person to or for whom any Convenience or Inconvenience is meant by the NAME, QUALITY, or AFFIRMATION; as, *a Friend to the Muses, good for the Stomach, yielding to his Betters.* Hence all Words that signify the use, Relation, likeness, doing, or giving of one Thing to another, must have to or for after it. Tho' to is sometimes left out, as *give me, like me, tell me, hear me*; where to is understood much better than express'd.

In Invocations we prefix an O!

O! God, our Frailty thou dost surely know.

When we call on God, the King, or any one else, in a solemn manner, we put O! before the Name of him we address to; as *O! King, remember that thou art a Man!*

When you the Instrument or Manner how,

By which, wherewith express, allow

These Particles to be always seen

By, with, and through, and from and also in.

When we express the Instrument, the Medium by which, wherewith, or the Manner how a Thing is done, you make use of *by, with, from, through, in* and the like; as, *the Beams of the Sun with incredible speed, pass from Heav'n, through the Air, to the Earth, endu'd with Light and Heat by (with,*
M 2 *through)*

through) *which it comforts us, and quickens the Plants which God has provided for us, and given to us for our Use, and his Glory. He was slain with his Sword. He abides with me.*

By is us'd for the Efficient Cause, (as well Principal as Instrumental and Moral) and also signifies *near to*, &c. as, *he was slain by his Enemy*, by (beside or near) *a Spring of Water*, but wounded first by his own Fear, then by his Enemies Sword.

In signifies, as it were, Presence in a Place, and is us'd when we wou'd either express *Rest*; as, *Mary lives in the Cellar, in the City, in the Winter, in a strange Posture, in an ill state of Health, in Battle Array*; in *act to strike*, in *his Cloak*, in *Favour*, in *War*, rich in *Land or Money*, in *Fear*, in *Doubt*, in *good Part*; *he is in Esteem*, *he did it in Revenge*, in *Hope*, in *my Thoughts*.

These are the several Senses in which the Particle *IN* is us'd.

The third sort of *Particles* which connect *Sentence to Sentence*, we have only this Remark:

*That they between those Sentences take site,
Which by the joining Vertue they unite.*

They are plac'd between the two Propositions, or Sentences which they unite; as for their Names, see *Particles* the third sort. 'Tis true, we might here give, or might there have given you several Denominations of them, as *Copulative, Disjunctive, Comparative*, and the like, as some others have done, and so given a several Head or Term to every other *Particle* of this Kind, but we seeing no Advantage accrue from such a multiplying of Terms, but the Burthen very much encreas'd to the Learner, have thought fit to leave out all that unnecessary Jargon.

What more may be said of *Particles*, and their various Meanings and Use, shall be found in our forecited Treatise of *Particles*.

We shall not conclude this short Discourse of *Construction*, without adding a few Words of a *Period*, and of *Figurative Construction*; tho' we are of Opinion, that the first is more proper to fall under the consideration of *Rhetoric*, and that the Use of the later is in English the Effect of Custom, not Art: Yet since we find others have thought fit to deliver Rules relating to both, we shall not omit them entirely.

To compose therefore a *Period*, or to express a Sentence, that is compos'd of two or more Sentences, with Art, we must first take care that the Expressions be not too long,

ong, and that the whole Period be proportion'd to the Breath of the Speaker. The Expressions of particular Sentences, that are Members of the Body of a Sentence, ought to be equal, that the Voice may repose at the end of these Members by equal Intervals. The more exact this Equality is, the more Pleasure it will produce, and the more excellent the Period.

A Period ought to consist at least of two Members, and at most but of four. A Period is at least to have two Members, because its Beauty proceeds from the Equality of the Members, and Equality supposes at least two Terms. To have a Period perfect, there should not be four Members crowded into one Period, because being too long, the Pronunciation must be forc'd, which must by consequence be displeasing to the Ear, because a Discourse that is incommodious to the Speaker, can never be agreeable to the Hearer.

The Members of a Period ought to be join'd close, that the Ear may perceive the Equality of the Intervals of Respiration: For this cause the Members of a Period ought to be united by the Union of a single Sentence, of that Body of which they are Members. This Union is very discernable, for the Voice reposes at the end of every Member, only the better to continue its Course, it stops not fully, but at the end of the whole Sentence.

Variety may be two ways in a Period, *i.e.* in the Sense, and in the Words. The Sense of each Member of the Period ought to differ with each other. We cannot express the different Thoughts of our Minds, but by different Words of different signification: Equal Periods are not to follow one another too near.

An Example of a Period of two Members: As, (1.) *Before I shall say those Things (O Conscript Fathers) about the Public Affairs, which are to be spoken at this time;* (2.) *I shall lay before you, in few Words, the Motives of the Journey, and the Return.* The next consists of three Members; as, (1.) *Since, by reason of my Age, I durst not pretend to assume the Authority of this Post,* (2.) *And had fix'd it as a Maxim that nothing ought here to be produc'd but what was perfected by Industry and labour'd by the Understanding;* (3.) *I thought that my whole Time and Pains should be transfer'd to those of my Friends.* The last consists of four Members, of which this is an Example: (1.) *If Impudence should have as great Prevalence in the Court,* (2.) *as Insolence has found in the Country and desert Places,*

Places, (3.) Aulus Cæcinna wou'd not less in this Tryal give way to the Impudence of Æbutius, (4.) than he has already in Violence given place to his Insolence.

This is sufficient to give a full Idea of the Nature and Beauties of a Period, which we have inserted merely in compliance with Custom, being sensible that the Learner will be so far from being able to make his Advantage from it, till he has arriv'd much beyond the Province of Grammar, that there will be few *Masters* found, who have the Education of Children, that know any thing of this Matter.

Custom, produc'd by the general Inclination of Men to short Speaking, has introduc'd several Figures or Forms of Construction, by which Words are transpos'd, left out, one put for another, and the like. The Figures therefore of Construction are these :

I. *Transposition*, which is the placing of Words in a Sentence out of their Natural Order of Construction, to please the Ear in rendring the Contexture more agreeable, elegant, and harmonious : For when the concurrence of rough Consonants, and gaping Vowels, renders the Sound and Pronunciation inelegant, this Figure may be us'd, but never but upon such an Occasion, except in Verse, where *Transposition* is generally more elegant and harmonious than in Prose.

II. *Suppression*, which is an Omission of Words in a Sentence, which yet are necessary to a full and perfect Construction ; as, *I come from my Father's* ; that is, *from my Father's House* ; but *House* is omitted. Words are suppress'd for Brevity or Elegance, but their number in English is too great to be enumerated ; but for our direction, we may mind these Rules : 1st, That whatever Word comes to be repeated in a Sentence oftner than once, to avoid the inelegant repetition of the same Word, it must be left out ; as, *This is my Master's Horse* ; or, *This Horse is my Master's* ; for, *This Horse is my Master's Horse*. 2^{dly}, Words that are necessarily imply'd need not be express'd ; as, *I live at York* : *Life* is necessarily imply'd, and therefore need not be express'd. 3^{dly}, All Words that Use and Custom suppress in any Language, are not to be express'd without some particular Reason ; as, *A good Man leads a good Life* ; where the *Quality Good* is necessary to the *Name Life*.

III. *Substitution*, is the using one Word for another, or the Mode, State, Manner, Person, or Number of a Word for another: And the Construction indeed often lies in the Sense, and not in the Words; as, *The whole Nation were in Uproar*; where *the whole Nation* is put for *all the People* of the Nation. *Part of the Men are kill'd*; *Part* and *Nation* signifying Number, (tho' the Name be of the Number signifying one) it puts the Affirmation in the Plural, or the Number signifying many, but it may be in either.

CHAP. XI.

Of Stops or Pauses in Sentences; the Use of Marks in Writing, and Abbreviations of Words.

From what has been said of Sentences 'tis plain, that in a full Sentence there may be four Members, viz. *Comma* (,) *Semicolon* (;) *Colon* (:) and *Period*, or *full-Stop* (.) and these bear a kind of Musical proportion of Time one to another: For a *Comma* stops the Readers Voice, while he may privately tell one; the *Semicolon*, two; the *Colon*, three; and the *Period* four.

The Use of these Points, Pauses or Stops, is not only to give a proper Time for Breathing, but to avoid Obscurity and Confusion of the Sense in the joining Words together in a Sentence. After a *Comma* always follows something else which depends upon that which is separated from it by a *Comma*; as,

*If Pulse of Verse a Nation's Temper shows
In keen Iambics English Metre flows.*

Where the Sense is not compleat in the first Verse, and the second has a plain Dependence on the first. A *Semi*, or *half Colon*, is made use of when half the Sentence remains yet behind; as,

*Tho' God bids Peace with Promises of Life,
Men only Reason arm for deadly Strife;
By bloody Wars Earth making desolate,
And sacrificing Thousands to their Hate, &c.*

A Colon, or two Points, is made when the Sense is perfect, but the Sentence not ended; as,

O Lord! in thee do I put my Trust: save me from all those, that persecute me, and deliver me: &c.

The full-Point is when the Sentence is compleat and ended; as,

*O Shame! O Curse! O more than bellish Spight!
Damn'd Devils! with each other never fight.*

Besides these Points, there is a Mark that signifies a Question is ask'd, and is put when the Sense of that Question is compleat; this is the Figure of it (?) as,

*Why so Frolick? Why so Merry?
Is your Noddle full of Sherry?*

When we express our Wonder, or Admiration of any thing after the Sentence, we put this Point (!), which is call'd a Point of Admiration; as, *O Times! O Manners!*

In Sentences there is sometimes occasion to interpose another distinct Sentence, which being left out, the Sense of the Sentence is entire, and it is thus mark'd (), and is call'd a Parenthesis; as, *For to their Power (I bear Record) they were willing.*

When Words cannot be written entirely in the Line, the Syllables are parted, one ending the Line, and another of the same Word beginning the next; and this is mark'd at the end of the first Line thus (-)

The (e) is often left out as well as other Vowels, for the sake of the Sound, and that is call'd an Apostrophe, and is thus express'd ('), as, *I am amaz'd*, for *amazed*; *Henry lov'd me*, for *Henry loved me*, &c.

Accent (`) being plac'd over any Vowel in a Word, notes that the tone, or stress of the Vowel in pronouncing, is upon that Syllable.

Breve (¨) is a curve, or crooked mark over a Vowel, and denotes that the Syllable is sounded quick or short.

Dialysis (. .) being two Points plac'd over two Vowels of a Word, that wou'd otherwise make a Diphthong, parts 'em into two several Syllables.

Index (☞) the Fore-finger pointing, signifies that passage to be very remarkable against which its plac'd.

Asterism (*) guides to some Remark in the Margin, or at the foot of the Page. Several of 'em set together signify that

that there is something wanting, defective, or immodest in that passage of the Author, thus, * * *.

Obelisk (†) a Dagger, is us'd as well as the *Asterism*, to refer the Reader to the Margin,

Section (§), or *Division* is us'd in subdividing of a Chapter into lesser parts.

Caret (^), when any Letter, Syllable or Word happens, by Inadvertence, to be left out in Writing or Printing, this mark (^) is put under the Interlineation in the

Alice

exact place where it is to come; as *when* ^A *was gone*, &c.

Circumflex (˘) is the same in shape as the *Caret*, but is always plac'd over some Vowel of a Word, to denote a long Syllable; as, *Eu-phrā-tes*.

Hyphen (-) *Connexion*, is us'd to join or compound two Words into one, as, *Male-contents*, *Male-administration*; or when Names or Words are purposely left out, a stroke or small Line is thus put — to signify the Name or Word understood, with the *initial* and *final* Letters at the beginning, or end, or both. Being plac'd over a Vowel, it is not then call'd *Hyphen*, but a *dash* for *M* or *N*.

Parathesis [], or *Brackets* include Words or Sentences of the same value and signification with those they are join'd to, and may be us'd in their stead.

Quotation ("), or a double *Comma* turn'd, is put at the beginning of such Lines as are recited out of other Authors; as, "LOOK UPON ME THAT I MAY BE SEEN."

N. Note.

N. B. Nota Bene, mark well,

v. vid. vide, see.

viz. videlicet, or videre licet,

you may see.

i. d. idem, the same.

i. e. id est, that is.

q. quasi, as it were.

q. d. quasi dicat, as if he should say.

f. c. scilicet or scirelicet, you may know.

etc. et cætera, the rest.

&c. and so forth, or so on.

N. L. Non Liquet, it appears not.

dit. ditto, the same.

p. per pro, by.

Cent. Centum, an Hundred.

e. g. exempli gratia, examples.

v. g. verbi gratia, as for example.

MS. Manuscript, a written Book or Copy.

p. pagina, side or page.

li. Linea, Line.

l. liber, Book.

fol. folio, Books of the largest size, or a half Sheet.

q. 4to. quarto, a quarter of a Sheet.

8vo. Octavo, having eight leaves to a Sheet.

12mo. Duodecimo, Twelves, or a Sheet divided into 12 parts, as this Grammar.

A Column is half a side of a Leaf, as in the Notes of this Book.

P.S. Postscript, after written.

Fra. Francis, Frances.

R. Recipe, Take thou.
ana. Of each alike.

P. A Pugil, or half a handful.

M. Manipulus, a handful.

Ss. Semissis, half a pound,

q. l. quantum sufficit, a sufficient quantity.

q. l. quantum libet, as much as you please.

CC. Two hundred.

D. or D. Five hundred.

DC. Six hundred.

M. or M. One Thousand.

IIII. Five thousand.

CCCC. Ten thousand.

IIIIII. Fifty thousand.

MDCCXII One thousand seven hundred and twelve.

Pr. Priest.

Deac. Deacon.

Cur. Curius, Curate.

Cl. Clericus, Clergyman.

Bp. Bishop.

ABp. Archbishop.

S. S. T. D. } Sacro sanctæ
or D. D. } Theologiæ Do-
ctris, Doctor
of Divinity.

L. L. D. } Legum } Doctor,
J. D. } Juris } a Doctor
of Laws.

M. D. Medicinæ Doctor. a
Doctor of Physic.

A. B. Artium Baccalaureus,
Bachelor of Arts.

A. M. Artium Magister, Ma-
ster of Arts.

F. R. S. Fellow of the Royal
Society.

Astr. P. G. Astronomy Pro-
fessor of Gresham College.

P. M. G. Professor of Music;
at Gresham College.

C. C. C. Corpus Christi Col-
lege, at Oxford.

C. S. Custos Sigilli, the Keeper
of the Seal.

C. P. S. Custos Privati Sigilli,
Keeper of the Privy-Seal.

Philom. Philomathes, a lover
of Learning.

V. D. M. Verbi Dei Mini-
ster, Minister of the Word
of God.

IHS. Jesus, the three first
Letters of his
Name in Greek.

S. V. Siste Viator, Stand still
Traveller.

The End of the GRAMMAR.

The Art of POETRY.

CHAP. I.

Of Accents and Quantities.

THE Art of Pronunciation is reckon'd a part of *Grammar*, and is the true Utterance of Words, according to their *Quantity* and *Accent*. *Quantity*, is the Length or Shortness of Syllables; and the Proportion, generally speaking, betwixt a long and short Syllable is two to one; as in *Music*, two *Quavers* to one *Crotchet*.

In English, as well as in Latin and Greek, there are not only these long and short Syllables, but those which are either long or short, as the Measure requires; as, *Récords* and *Récords*.

[a] *Accent* is the raising and falling of the Voice, above or under its usual Tone, but an Art of which we have little Use, and know less, in the English Tongue; nor are we like to improve our Knowledge in this Particular, unless the Art of *Delivery*, or *Utterance*, were a little more study'd.

Of

[a] There are three sorts of Accents, an *Acute*, a *Grave*, and an *Inflex*, which is also call'd a *Circumflex*. The *Acute*, or *Sharp*, naturally raises the Voice; and the *Grave*, or *Base*, as naturally falls it. The *Circumflex* is a kind of Undulation, or Waving of the Voice; as in pronouncing *amare*, to love, you should pronounce it as if spelt *a-a-mare*, rising at the first *a*, and falling at the second. But tho' the *Latins* (in imitation of the *Greeks*) have some Signs to express these Marks, yet the Use of them is not known, except in the distinction of Adverbs: Nay, should some old *Roman* arise from the Dead, if we believe *Quintilian*, the Rules of

them could not be deliver'd in Writing. Some of our Moderus (especially Mr. *Bish*, in his Art of Poetry) and lately Mr. *Masseire*, in what he calls *The English Grammar*, erroneously use *Accent* for *Quantity*, one signifying the Length or Shortness of a Syllable, the other the raising or falling of the Voice in *Discourse*; which indeed most People have naturally, except such who have the Misfortune of a Monotony, or of Speaking always in the same Tone of Voice; which is a great Vice in Utterance, and what few are guilty of, but such as have a small and acute Voice; for those of a grosser Constitution seldom are fixt to one Tone.

Of this long and short Syllable are all *Poetic Feet* in English (as well as all other Languages) form'd; and tho' *Horace* himself makes use of no less than twenty-eight several sorts of Feet, yet do they all, and many more, arise from the various Compositions of long and short Syllables.

Before we come to the different Feet that are in use in our Mother Tongue, it will be proper to lay down some Rules of Quantity, by which we may in some measure arrive at some Certainty in this particular.

*In Words whose Letters still appear the same,
By differing Sense yet gaining different Name,
The Sense lies still, distinguishes the sound*

In Names that's short, in Words which long is found.

In Words that differ in the *Sense*, but not in the *Spelling*, the first Syllable of the *Name* is long, but the last Syllable of the *Affirmation* is short; as the following Examples will shew; for no Words of different sense are exactly spelt alike, unless the *Name*, and the *Affirmation*.

	Names.
The first Syllable is pronounc'd long.	<i>Absent</i>
	<i>Accent</i>
	<i>Cement</i>
	<i>Collect</i>
	<i>Conduct</i>
	<i>Confort</i>
	<i>Convert</i>
	<i>Contest</i>

	Words of Affirmation.
The last Syllable is pronounc'd long.	<i>Absent</i>
	<i>Accent</i>
	<i>Cement</i>
	<i>Collect</i>
	<i>Conduct</i>
	<i>Confort</i>
	<i>Convert</i>
	<i>Contest</i>

The

A very Learned and Ingenious Author gives us this familiar and easie Distinction betwixt *Quantity* and *Accent*: 'It may be observ'd, that the Variations of the Voice, by *high* and *low*, *long* and *short*, *loud* or *soft*, (howeyer they happen to be confounded by some) are all of as different Nature and Effects, as the Beats of a Drum are from the Sounds of a Trumpet, or the Reading in one unvaried Tone is from Singing. All the possible Diversities of Poetic Feet, together with the Changes of *loud* and *soft*, the Drum expresses to a wonder; But while yet there is *μνηστικὴ*

'in the Sound, there can be no place for Accents: This plain Instrument does indeed in one single Tone shew what a Power there is in Musical Numbers, and of the various movement of Poetic Feet, and how the Ear is affected with the sudden intermixture of *loud* and *soft* Notes; but let the Trumpet tell how far short all these are of well-turn'd and rightly-plac'd Accents: In these consist the Beauties of Language, these being the Elements of Language, which being justly apply'd to well-chosen Words, lead all the Passions captive, and surprize the Soul itself in its most Recesses. (b) But

Names.		Affirmations.	
The first Syllable is pronounc'd long.	Ferment	The last Syllable is pronounc'd long.	Ferment
	Frequent		Frequent
	Incense		Incense
	Object		Object
	Present		Present
	Project		Project
	Record		Record
	Subject		Subject
	Torment		Torment
	Unite.		Unite.

and some others. But the following Rules of Quantity will be of some Use; as,

*When Endings to One-Syllab^r-Words are join'd,
Long the first Syllable you always find.*

(1.) When an Ending is join'd to a Word of one Syllable, the first Syllable is long; as, *Peace-able, sin-ful, self-ish, good-ness, toil-some, faith-less, heart-y, godly, &c.*

*When (er), (or), (ure) two Syllab^r-Words do end,
Of the first Syllab^r they the sound extend.*

(2.) In Words of two Syllables which end in *er, or, or-ure*, the first is long, as *enter, Honor, or Honour, venture, &c.* but we must except *defer, refer, prefer*, which indeed belong to the Rule of *Particles*.

*When (le), or (en) obscure do end a Word,
To the first Syllable they Length afford.*

As for Example; *Trouble, double, Fiddle, Garden, &c.*

*When Particles with other Words compound,
The last still lengthen their own proper Sound.*

(3.) When *Particles* are compounded with Words of one Syllable, the Word it self is long; as, *allure, colleague, allure, except object, adjunct, Advent, Aspect, Compass, Concourse, Conduit, perfect, Perfume, Prelate, Profit, Progress, Prologue, Reliques, Respit, Succour, Substance, Suburbs, Implice.* Note, that *perfect* and *Perfume*, when they are Affirmations, relate to the foregoing Rule, not the Exception.

*If to two Syllab^r-Words an Ending's bound,
That which before was long maintains its Sound.*

If an Ending be added to a Word of two Syllables, that Syllable which was originally long continues so; as, *Profit, profitable*, except *protest, Protestant*.

*When many Syllables compose a Word,
That Vowel's long, that from the last is third;
Except Position give the last but one
(By crowding Consonants) a longer Tone.*

(4.) In Words of many Syllables (as we call all that consist of more than two) the third Vowel from the last is long, as, *Salvation, Damnation, &c.* except when the last Syllable but one is long by Position, that is, by the coming together of many Consonants, and bearing the Vowel hard upon 'em; as, *abundance, accomplish, illustrate*, to which we may add *Affiance, Affidavit, antecedent, Armado, Balconey, Bravado, Carbonado, Cathedral, Dandation, Horizon, obdurate, Opponent, pellucid, Precedent*, tho' erroneously too often spelt *President*, *Recusant, Vagary*. In these that follow the last Syllable is long; as, *acquiesce, comprehend, condescend*.

*Some Words of many Syllables are found
Ev'n of two Vowels to extend the sound;
The fourth, or fifth, and of the last but one;
But still the last is of a weaker Tone.*

(5.) Some Words of many Syllables have two long Syllables, the fourth or fifth Vowel from the last, and the last but one; tho' the Quantity of the last be not so loudly sounded in the Delivery; as, *Academy*, which yet is often pronounc'd *Academy, necessary, Acrimony, admirable*. Tho' it may be doubted whether *admirable*, as usually pronounc'd, be not more properly one long and three short. *Adversary, Antimony, Alimony, ambulatory, amicable, anniversary, antiquated, Apoplexy, arbitrary, Auditory, habitable, Hierarchy, ignominy, necessary, Necromancy, refractory, sedentary*.

*Four or more Syllables, that end in ness,
The first and last long Syllables confess.*

But *Temperament*, and all Words of four or more Syllables ending in *ness*, have the first and last Syllables long, as, *Righteousness, Tediousness, &c.* except *Forgetfulness, Forgetfulness*.

*Some are of doubtful Quantity by Use,
And shorten now, and now the same produce.*

Some are of a doubtful Quantity, according to the Will or Occasion of the Writer or Speaker; as, *acceptable, contribute, corruptible, Confessor, Successor, &c.* and indeed some of the former.

*Back to the Vowels now convey your Eye,
And there the Rules of Quantity you'll spy,
In Words that many Syllables deny.
For Common most they short, and long are found,
But those that to such Consonants are bound
As close the Lips, can ne'r extend their Sound.
Emphatic Words we justly still produce;
But every Sign is short by sacred Use.*

The Rules of the Vowels will be found at the beginning of the Grammar; and we here may add to these Observations, that most Words of one Syllable are common, except they end with silent (*e*), whose nature it is to lengthen the foregoing Vowel. All the Signs are short, without an Emphasis, which they seldom have; as, *a, the, an, for, by, with, to, from, &c.* but whatever Word of one Syllable ends with a Letter that closes the Mouth, can never be long; as all such as end in (*m*), or the sound of (*m*), and in most Mutes.

*Two Syllables our English Feet compose,
But Quantities distinguish them from Prose.
By long and short in various Stations plac'd
Our English Verse harmoniously is grac'd.
With short and long Heroic Feet we raise,
But these to vary is the Poets Praise.
For the same Sounds perpetually disgust:
DRYDEN to this Variety was Just.*

Having given these Rules for Quantities in the English Tongue, we must observe, that two Syllables make a Poetic Foot, which hitherto will not admit a greater number, tho' in the Latin and Greek a Foot might contain six, and those might be resolv'd into the simple Feet of two or three Syllables. *Heroic Verses* consist of five short, and five long Syllables intermixt, but not so very strictly, as never to alter that Order. Mr. Dryden has vary'd them with admirable Beauty, beginning his Heroic Verse sometimes with a long Syllable, follow'd by two short, and other Changes, which a Master only must venture on.

From hence 'tis plain, that the Learner can never imagine that any number of Syllables is sufficient to make any kind

of Verse, for by that means there could be no Prose; so that to constitute a Verse, variety of Numbers is necessary.

In *English*, the Metre or sorts of Verse are extremely various and arbitrary, every Poet being at liberty to introduce any new Form he pleases. The most us'd are, first the *Heroic*, consisting of five long and five short Syllables generally speaking; Verses of four Feet, and of three Feet, and three Feet and a Cefure, or one Syllable. *Stanza's* have been endeavour'd to be introduc'd, but never yet have been able to establish themselves.

[6] To help the Learner to some Means or Examples of forming new Feet in the *English Tongue*, we shall here set down the Variations made by the Ancients, of a long and a short Syllable.

A *Spondee*, Two long Syllables.

Pirrie, Two short Syllables.

Trochee, A long and short Syllable.

Iambic, A short and a long Syllable.

These are of Two Syllables.

A *Moloss*, Three long Syllables.

Tribrach, Three short Syllables.

Dactyl, One long and two short Syllables.

Anapest, Two short and one long Syllable.

[6] But as many Ways as Quantities may be varied by Composition and Transposition, so many different Feet have the Greek Poets contriv'd, and that under distinct Names, from two to six Syllables, to the number of 124. But it is the Opinion of some Learned Men in this Way, that Poetic Numbers may be sufficiently explain'd, by those of two or three Syllables, into which the rest are to be resolv'd.

Of those eight here set down, the *Spondee* and the *Dactyl* are the most considerable, as being the Measures us'd in the *Heroic Verse* by *Homer*, *Vergil*, &c. These two Feet are of equal Time, but of different Motion: The *Spondee* has an even, strong, and steddly Pace, like a Trot, as I may say; but the *Dactyl* resembles the nimbler strokes of a Gallop. An inverted *Dactyl* is an *Anapest*, a very spritely Trot, and a Motion proper to excite and enrage. The *Iambic* is also of a light and spritely nature, and reigns

most in our *English Verse*. The *Trochee* is quite contrary to the *Iambic*, fit to express weak and languid Motions; as all these Measures are which move from long to short Syllables. The *Pirrie* and *Tribrach* are very rapid, as the *Moloss* is slow and heavy.

Tho' Rhime has been (by the Ignorance of our Fore-fathers) thought the only Essential of *English Verse*, yet it is in Reality the most inconsiderable Part of it, and may be left out without any Detriment; as is plain from the Great *Milton*. But if you resolve to write in Rhime, you must take a peculiar Care of observing them exactly, for a Botch in this is unpardonable. My Lord *Roscommon*, tho' he was an Enemy to Rhime, yet was most exact in it, when he vouchsafed to make use of it. This Niceness must be observ'd in double or triple Rhimes, which yet are never properly us'd, but in *Burlesque*.

CHAP. II.

The Art of POETRY in General; and first, of
Epigram, Pastoral, Elegy, and Lyric.

HAVING in the foregoing Chapter laid down the Rules of the Mechanic part of Poetry, which is as far as the Grammar generally goes, tho' with great Absurdity, we shall now proceed to the Art it self, which (by we know not what Infatuation) has never been yet taught in our Schools. For Poetry is to be banish'd our Studies entirely, to what purpose does every Petty School teach the Rules of Quantity? But if we are allow'd to read the Poets, nay, if we are so kind of them, as to teach them to Children before they are Masters of the Tongue they study, why must not the Beauty and Excellence of their Works be shown? By the first we teach Boys to be meer *Verfifiers*, *Poetasters*; by the second we form their Judgment, and let them see the Difficulty of being a good *Poet*; which wou'd deter them attempting an Art for which they find no true Genius, and at the same time give them a just value for the Books they read. The common *Profodia's* make Scriblers, which is a Scandal; the present Rules institute a Poet, which is an Honour.

For the Learner must not fancy, that to write a Verse, or conclude a Rhime, gives the Title of Poet; no, he must understand the Nature of his Subject thoroughly; and let his Copy of Verses or Poem be never so short, he must form Design, or Plan, by which every Verse shall be directed to certain End, and each have a just Dependance on the others; for only this can produce the Beauty of Order and Harmony, and satisfy a rational Mind. For to jumble a Company of Verses together without any Design, let them be never so smooth and flowing, is an Undertaking of no Value, and incapable of any thing Great and Noble. A Blockhead with a good Ear, and a tolerable Knowledge of the Language, may do these, but nothing but a Poet the other.

But if a Design be necessary in the shortest and least of our Poems, it is vastly more necessary in those of greater length; which without this will infallibly prove intolerably

tedious, and a rude indigested Heap. Fix this, therefore, in the *Learner's* Mind, that a *VERSIFYER* and *POET* are two different Things; the first is Contemptible, and has been so these 2000 years, but the later Honourable in the Opinion of the Men of Sense and Learning, in all Ages and Nations, since the Birth of this Heav'nly Art.

Before we come to the Rules of the several Parts of Poetry, we must premise a Word or two to the Teachers. The *Master*, or *Mistress*, who instructs the Young in this Art, shou'd thoroughly know its Nature and Parts, not only in this, which is but an Abridgment of a larger Discourse, that will be publish'd soon after it, but the full display of this Art in a much greater Volume.

They shou'd likewise read themselves, with Application, all the best Translations of the old *Latin* and *Greek* Poets; and direct their Scholars to Read and Study the same. For tho' these Translations are far short of the Originals, yet are they capable, as they are, of fixing a just and true Taste and Relish of the Nature of Poetry in the *English* Student; which has not been kept so much in View in most of our Modern Compositions, but as they depart from Nature, want her Regularity of Order and Beauty. *Ovid's* *Metamorphosis* shou'd be first read thoroughly, because it furnishes all the Histories of the *Heathen* Gods, and their Notions about them. To these you may add my Lord *Bacon*, *Danet*, and other Books on that Subject. *Virgil*, *Ovid*, *Horace*, *Homer*, we have in part in pretty good Versions: And in some of these the Scholar shou'd every day take a Lesson, besides that which he takes in the Rules of the Art; by which he may come to join the Theory and Practice, which only can make a Poet, or Judge of Poetry.

We now come to the Rules of POETRY, in which I shall begin with the most inferiour Kind, and so ascend by degrees up to the highest Performance in the Art.

Epigram is the lowest Step of the Temple of the MUSES, or rather the Ground nearest to the first Step of its Ascent.

OF EPIGRAM.

The Epigram in Shortness takes delight,
And tho' all Subjects are its proper Right,
Yet each of one alone can only write.

}

An *Epigram* is a short Copy of Verses treating of one only Thing, with Beauty and Point: All Things are allow'd to be

be treated of in the *Epigram*, provided that *Brevity*, *Beauty* and *Point* are preserved.

*Two Parts this little whole must still compose,
Recital of the Subject, and the Close:
To make this Poem perfect, be your Care
That Beauty, Point and Brevity appear.*

The *Epigram* consists of two Parts, the *Recital of the Subject*, and the *Conclusion*. *Beauty* runs through the whole, but the *Point* is for the *Conclusion* only.

*That you this needful Brevity may claim,
Let one Thing only be your careful Aim;
And in few Words that only Thing express,
But Words that Force and Energy confess.*

To attain this *Brevity*, you must not aim at many Things through the whole *Epigram*, and then take care to express that *Little* as concisely as possibly you can; that is, in such Words, as that to extend them into more, would enervate and lose the Force and Strength of the Thought, and the *Point* or *Acumen*.

*Beauty's harmonious Symetry of Parts,
Which to the whole an Excellence imparts,
Adorn'd with sweet Simplicity and Truth,
The Diction still polite, and ne'r uncouth.
This BEAUTY Sweetness always must comprize,
Which from the Subject, well express'd, will rise.*

The next Quality is *Beauty*, that is, an exact and harmonious Formation of the whole, and the apt Agreement of all the Parts of the Poem, from the beginning to the end, with a sweet *Simplicity* and *Truth*. The Language must be *Po- lite*, not *Rustic*: The *Beauty* must always be accompany'd with *Sweetness*, which varies according to the Subject; if that be delicate, soft, tender, amorous, &c. those Qualities will arise from the well expressing of the Subject, that will give *Beauty* and *Sweetness*. But this must not be too visibly sought after; avoid rather what is harsh, and an Enemy to *Sweetness* in the Language, than study too much to encrease it.

*The POINT in the Conclusion takes its Place,
And is the Epigram's peculiar Grace;
Some unexpected, and some biting Thought
With poignant Wit, and sharp Expression fraught.*

The third necessary Quality of the *Epigram* is the *POINT*; and it is much insisted on by the *Epigrammatical Critics*, and is chiefly in the *Conclusion*; where it must end with something biting and unexpected. There are others who ever exclude the *Point* from *Epigram*, because *Catullus* has it not so frequently as *Martial*; but here, as in other Things, we must be guided by the majority, and if we here exclude the *Point*, we may have it spread still through greater Works, where it is abominable.

*From two to twenty Verses it extends,
But best when two, or four, it not transcends.*

The number of Verses in an *Epigram* is from two to twenty, or even to fifty; but the shorter the better, because it comes nearest to the Perfection of *Brevity*. We have not many formal *Epigrams* in *English*, but then we run into a worse Error, by scattering the *Epigrammatic Point* through all our Verses, to the scandal of the *English Poets*, since that wholly belongs to *Epigram*. One Example shall suffice, and that is from Mr. *Brown*, — on a Gentleman who took the Oaths, and made three Gods of the Trinity.

*The same Allegiance to two Kings he pays,
Swears the same Faith to both, and both betrays:
No wonder, if to Swear he's always free,
Who has two Gods to Swear by, more than we.*

Here is the *Brevity*, *Point* and *Beauty* of an *Epigram*, express'd by a Domestic Example: You may find several *Epigrams* of *Martial* translated by the same Author, and by Mr. *Cowley*, and some out of *Catullus*, which are too long to insert in this Abridgment.

OF PASTORAL.

*The Pastoral, that sings of happy Swains
And harmless Nymphs that haunt the Woods and Plains,
Shou'd through the whole discover every where
Their old simplicity and pious Air.
And in the Characters of Maids and Youth,
Unpractic'd Plainness, Innocence, and Truth.*

As every sort of Poetry is an Imitation of something, so is the *Pastoral* an Imitation of a Shepherd's Life, consider'd under that Character, or rather an Imitation of rural Actions. For this Reason there ought to be an Air of Piety, on all occasions,

ations, maintain'd through the whole Poem; the Persons introduced being Innocent and Simple, without Corruption; such as *Shepherds, Goatberds, Cowberds, Pruners*, and the like. The Characters therefore shou'd represent that ancient Innocence, and unpractic'd Plainness which was then in the World, and which is visible in *Theocritus* and *Virgil*, as may be seen in the Translations of those Poets.

*Each Pastoral a little Plot must own,
Which as it must be simple, must be one;
With small Digressions it will yet dispense,
Nor needs it always Allegoric Sense.*

Every Pastoral Poem shou'd have a little Plot or Fable, which may deserve the Title of a Pastoral Scene; it must be simple, and one, yet not so as to refuse all manner of Digressions, provided they be little. Nor is the Poet oblig'd always to make it *Allegoric*, that is, to have some real Persons meant by those fictitious Shepherds which are introduc'd. This Rule of the Plot is every where observ'd by *Virgil*, particularly in his first, which is the Standard of Pastorals. The Plans, or Arguments of this and two or three more, will make this plain: Of the first.

Melibceus, an unfortunate Shepherd, is introduc'd with *Tityrus*, one more fortunate; the former addresses his Complaint of his Sufferings and Banishment to the latter, who enjoys his Flocks and Folds in this public Calamity, and therefore expresses his Gratitude to the Benefactor from whence this Favour flow'd: But *Melibceus* accuses Fortune, Civil War, &c. bidding Adieu to his Native Home. This is therefore a Dialogue—the next—

Is a Pastoral Complaint without any Dialogue; for *CORYDON* in a Courtship wholly Pastoral, complains of the Coyness of *Alexis*, recommends himself for his Beauty, and Skill in playing on the rural Pipe; invites him into the Country, promising him the Pleasures of the Place, with a Present of Nuts and Apples. But finding all in vain, he resolves to quit his Amour, and betake himself again to his Business. Here is a visible Plan or Design, which makes every thing depend upon the other.

In the third *Menalcas*, *Dametas*, and *Palæmon* are introduc'd in this manner. — *Dametas* and *Menalcas*, after some Country Railery, agree to try which has the best Skill at Song, and that their Neighbour *Palæmon* shall be judge of their Performance; who, after hearing both, declares himself unfit to decide the Controversie, and so leaves it undetermin'd.

We

We need give no more Examples here of the little *Fable of a Pastoral*; you may consult Mr. Dryden's *Virgil*, and the several Translations of *Theocritus*, by which you will confirm the Rule abundantly.

Connections, and Transitions, pray take Care
They are not made too strict and regular.

The Connections shou'd be negligent, and the Transitions easy; as may be observ'd in those of *Virgil*; for a too strict Regularity in these, will make the Poem stiff and formal.

The Pastoral admits of Vows and Praise,
Of Promises, Complaints, of Mirth and Joys,
Congratulations, Singing, Riddles, Jest,
Of Parables, Sentences, and the rest.

Philosophic Questions, Riddles, Parables, ought to be eminent in this Poem, which gives a peculiar Relish of the ancient Manner of Writing; and the Writer shou'd show some competent Skill in the *Subject-Matter*, which makes the Character of the Persons introduc'd; as *Virgil* every where does, but the Moderns seldom or never.

The Style must still be natural and clear,
And Elegance in every Part appear;
Its humble Method nothing has of fierce,
But hates the Ratling of a lofty Verse.

The Style ought to be natural, clear and elegant, but nothing sublime or lofty, or set off with such Ornaments as are not at all agreeable to the Humility of the Subject. The Sentences shou'd be short and smart, and the Versification smooth, easy and harmonious, without Affectation of Grandeur and Majesty, but when akin to the Subject; as in one of *Virgil's* to *Pollio*.

Oppos'd to this another low in Style,
Makes Shepherds speak a Language base and vile.

This Randal has done in his *Pastorals*, and several others; changing *Damon* and *Phillis* into *Tom* an *Bess*. Nor must Battles and War be treated of in a *Pastoral*; We must either feign Names according to the Subject, or borrow those which we find already in good Authors. This Poem ought never to exceed one hundred Verses; the best of *Virgil's* is but fifty, that is (in *English*) about seventy.

OF ELEGY.

*The Elegy demands a solemn Style,
It mourns with flowing Hair at Funeral Pile,
It paints the Lover's Torments and Delights,
A Mistress flatters, threatens, and invites.*

Elegy was first made on Melancholy Subjects, as on the Death of Friends, &c. as *Ovid* on *Tibullus*, which is translated. In Process of Time, Joy, Wilhes, and almost every Subject, was made free of the *Elegy*, as Complaints, Expostulations, Prayers, Love, Vows, Praises, Congratulations, Admonitions, Reproaches.

*The Model of this Poem shou'd be made,
And every step of all its Progress laid;
And all directed to some certain End,
And Verse on Verse perpetually depend.*

This and all other Poems ought to have a Plan made of the whole Design before a Line is written: For else the Author will not know where to begin, and where to end, but ramble in the Dark, and give us Verse which have no Relation to each other, or at least have not any Dependance on each other. This is the Fault of those who are ignorant of Art, and are only *Versifiers*.

*No glittering Points, nor any nice Conceit
Must load the Elegy with Foreign Weight;
Passion and Nature here avow their Rights,
And with Disdain throw back that mean Delight.*

The *Epigrammatic Point* must never be here admitted, 'tis abominable; none of the fine things that some are so fond of in all places, no Conceits, nor the like: These give place to the Passions, which must here speak with Nature.

*Remember that the Diction every where
Be gentle, clean, perspicuous, and clear,
Correct; the Manners all-along express,
In every place the Passions still confess.*

The Diction to the *Elegy* should be standard, correct, clean, gentle, perspicuous, clear, expressive of the Manners tender, full of Passions, or pathetic; but never oppress'd or deboch'd with fine Sayings and exquisite Sentences. It is wonderfully adorn'd with frequent Commiserations, Complaints, Exclamations, Addresses to Things or Persons, Words

Words of feign'd Persons, or Things inanimate made to speak, short Digressions, yet pertinent to the Subject; nor does it receive a little Beauty from Allusions to Sayings: Examples not only from the *like*, but *unlike*, and Contraries. Sometimes Comparisons are made, Smart and short Sentences are thrown in, to confirm what is propos'd.

*No cutting off the Vowels must be found,
That wou'd destroy that smooth, that flowing Sound
Which in the Elegy must still abound.*

There should be no Apostrophe's, by which when one Vowel ends a Word, and the next begins with another, the former is cut off; for that begets a sort of Roughness, which is not agreeable to this kind of Poetic.

*Some to two Verses will the Sense confine,
Consummate in the close of every other Line.*

The Reason of this Opinion seems to be the sort of Verse this Poem makes use of in the Latin, which seems to require a Full-point or Period at the end of every *Distich* compos'd of a Verse of six Feet, and another of five, and so begins again like a short *Stanza*. But this Rule will not always hold in English, nor is it always observ'd in Latin.

The L T R I C.

*Sweetness is most peculiar to the Ode,
Ev'n when it rises to the Praise of GOD.*

The Characteristic of this sort of Poetic from all others is *Sweetness*: For as Gravity rules, and most prevails in *Heroic Verse*, Simplicity in *Pastoral*, Tenderness and Softness in *Elegy*, Sharpness and Poinancy in *Satire*, Humor and Mirth in *Comedy*, the Pathetic in *Tragedy*, and the Point in the *Epigram*, so in this sort of Poetic the Poet applies himself entirely to sooth the Minds of Men by *Sweetness* and Variety of the Verses, and the exquisite Elegance of the Words of the whole *Song* or *Ode*, in the Beauty and Agreeableness of Numbers, and the Description of Things most delightful in their own nature.

*The Expression shou'd be easie, Fancy high,
That not seem to creep, nor this to fly:
No Words transpos'd, but in such Order all,
As tho' hard wrought, may seem by Chance to fall.
But Obscene Words do always give Offence,
And in all Poetry debase the Sense.*

Songs are a Part of *Lyric Poetry*, for *Ode* indeed signifies a *Song*; tho' our common *Madrigals* degenerate much from their Original the *Ode*; yet, that we may have better for the future, we here take Notice of them, and they shou'd be most exact in the Propriety of Words and Thoughts; but here, as well as in all manner of true Poësie, Obscurity shou'd with the utmost Care be avoided.

*Variety of Numbers still belong
To the soft Melody of Ode or Song.*

The Verse of the *Lyric Poetry* in the beginning, was only of one kind, but for the sake of Pleasure, and the Music to which they were sung, they so vary'd the Numbers and Feet, that their sorts are now almost innumerable.

*Pindaric Odes are of a higher Flight,
And happier Force, and fiercer is the Delight:
The Poet here must be indeed inspir'd
With Fury too, as well as Fancy fir'd;
For Art and Nature in this Ode must join,
To make the wondrous Harmony Divine.
But tho' all seem to be in Fury done,
The Language still must soft and easy run;
The bright Transitions, and Digressions rise,
And with their natural Returns surprize.*

As the Language, or Expressions shou'd be elegantly soft, so an ill or low Expression cloggs and debases the Beauty and Brightness of the Thought. This Poem is distinguish'd from all other *Odes* by the happy Transitions and Digressions which it beautifully admits, and the surprizing and naturally easy Returns to the Subject; which is not to be obtain'd without great Judgment and Genius. The suppos'd Irregularity of *Pindar's Numbers*, has made our ignorant Imitators pretend to be *Pindaric Poets*; by their wild irregular Verses alone, tho' very falsely. Here the Poet that wou'd excel, shou'd draw the Plan of his Poem, and mark out the places where these elegant Wandrings may properly be, and how the Returns may justly be made to the Subject; for without that it must be Chaos and Confusion in bold Sonorous Verses. Consult and study *Pindar's Odes*, translated by Mr. Cowley; and a Poem entitled, *The Female Reign*; in which the Transitions and Returns are excellent. [a]

CHAP.

[a] The *Ode* Originally had but last divided into three Parts; the *Strophe* or *Stanza*, but was at last divided into three Parts; the *Strophe*, *Antistrophe*, and *Epode*.
O For

For the Priests went round the Altar singing the Praises of the Gods, or Goddesses in Verse: So they call'd their first Entrance to the Left, *Strophe*, or *turning to*; the second, returning to the Right, they call'd *Antistrophe*, or the *Returning*; and the Songs they call'd *Ode*, or *Antode*; as they call'd their Entrance and Return *Strophe*, and *Antistrophe*: At last standing still before the Altar, they sung the rest, and that they call'd the *Epode*. The *Strophe* and *Antistrophe* consisted

of the same number and kind of Verses, nay, almost of Syllables, but the *Epode* of Verses of a different kind, which were sometimes more in number, sometimes less; and if the *Ode* contain'd several *Strophes*, and *Antistrophes*, and *Epodes*, the same Rule was follow'd in all the rest.

The *Odes* of Horace are compos'd of two, three or four sorts of Verse, after which the *Stanzas*, or *Strophes* begin again, &c.

CHAP. III.

Of SATIRE and COMEDY.

Satire and Comedy being both directed to lash and ridicule Folly and Vice, may (we think) properly come into one Chapter.

*Folly and Vice of every Sort and Kind
That wound our Reason, or debase the Mind;
All that deserves our Laughter or our Hate,
To biting SATIRE's Province do relate
The sloathful Parasite, affected Fool,
Th' Ingrateful, and the pert loquacious Tool,
The Lustful, Drunkard, th' avaritious Slave,
The noisy Bravo, and the tricking Knave.
Satire, by wholesome Lessons, would reclaim,
And heal their Vices, to secure their Fame.*

Satire, like the old Comedy, takes Cognizance of, and has for its Subject *Turpitude*, or such things as are worthy our Laughter, or our Hatred. Whatever therefore is not ridiculous or odious, is not the Subject of *Satire*; as any thing that is full of Grief, Terror, Pity, or other Tragical Passions. *Satire* derides and falls on the Sloathful, the Parasite, Affectation, the Loquacious or Talkative, the Ingrateful, Libidinous, Drunkards, the Avaritious Usurers, Bravos, public Robbers, Adulterers, &c. He was in the Right that subjected the Distempers of the Mind to *Satire*, since it is as much employ'd in this, as the Physician in curing the Body.

Body. Both propose to themselves the Health of the Patient, *Satire* by Discourse, the Physician by his Potions and Pills. The Medicines of both are in themselves unsavory and disagreeable to the Palate of the Distemper'd on whom they make Incisions, whom they cauterize and spare not. The Physician gilds his Pill, that it may go down glibly, the *Satiric* Investives must be sweeten'd with the mixture of Pleasantry and Wit, and agreeable Railery, till both the Medicines are swallow'd, and in the Bowels perform their Operation. The Railery and biting of *Satire* correct the Perverse, and deter others from falling into Folly and Vice.

*The Latin Writer's Decency neglect,
But Modern Readers challenge more Respect;
And at immodest Writings take offence,
If clean Expression cover not the Sense.
Satire shou'd be from all Obsceneness free,
Not Impudent, and yet preach Modesty.*

The *Satiric* Poet shou'd not expose Vice and Lewdness as *Horace* and *Juvenal* have done, in Words and Expressions that may corrupt the Innocent, whilst they strive to correct the Guilty. He must, therefore, carefully avoid all obscene Words and Images.

*Tho' Vice and Folly be keen Satire's aim,
It must not on their Nature here declaim.*

Tho' the Business of *Satire* be to call Men from Vice and Folly, and invite them to Wisdom and Virtue, yet it is by no means to waste it self on Disquisitions on the Nature of Virtue and Vice; which is the proper Business of *Moral Philosophy*. In short, this Poem requires for its Author, a Man of Wit and Address, Sagacity and Eloquence; and a Sharpness that is not opposite to Mirth and Pleasantry.

*No Parts distinct do's biting Satire know,
And without certain Rules its Course will go.*

oft by Insinuation it begins,

* *And oft abruptly falls upon our Sins,*

But this Abruptness must regard the Whole,

Which must its Words, and Manner too, controul.

Satire has no certain nor distinct Parts; sometimes it begins by insinuating it self by degrees; but more commonly abruptly, and with Ardour. But tho' the beginning be a-

brupt; yet it ought to have a Reference and Regard to the the Composition of the whole Body of the Poem. Examples you may see in *Juvenal*, translated by Mr. Dryden.

*Of well-chose Words some take not Care enough,
And think they shou'd be (like the Subject) rough.
But this great Work is more exactly made,
And sharpest Thoughts in smoothest Words convey'd.*

Here, as well as in all Poems, there ought to be care taken of the smooth flowing of the Verse, which Mr. Dryden in his *Mac Fleckno* has perfectly observ'd, and ought to be the Model of our Verse in all *English Satires* [b]

OF COMEDY.

We come now to the *Drammatic Poetry*, which is much the most useful and difficult, as well as delightful of any: We can scarce except a just *Epic Poem*, which has not been seen these 1700 years; for tho' that be more difficult because of its Length and Variety, yet it is, beyond Controversie, less useful, and less capable of giving that strong and lively Pleasure which is to be found in a just *Tragedy*: But we begin with *Comedy*.

*In Comic Scenes the common Life we draw,
According to its humorous Actions Law,
And Vice and Folly laughing, keep in awe.
But what is yet a nobler, juster End,
To all the Charms of Virtue do's commend.*

Comedy imitates common Life in its Actions and Humors, laughing at, and rendring Vice and Folly ridiculous; and recommending Virtue. It is indeed an Imitation of Life, the Mirrour of Custom, and the Image of Truth; and whatever *Comedy* follows not this Track, is unworthy of the Name.

To

[b] *Satire* is allow'd to be an urbane, jocose, and biting Poem, form'd to reprehend corrupt Manners, and expose Improbability of Life; but yet there is no certainty of the Etymology of its Name. Some draw it from a sort of *Plata* or *Charger*, in which the various sorts of *First-fruits* were offer'd to *Ceres*; thus, say they, in *Satire* are handled various and different sorts of Things

or Subjects, with which it is as it were fill'd to Satiety; so from Fulness or Satiety they draw *Satire*. Others derive it from the Dances of the *Satyrs* leaping from side to side, skipping and jumping this way, and that. Or perhaps from the *Satyrs* themselves, these Gods having of old been often introduc'd into this sort of Poetry.

To four essential Things w^e assign a Part
 In every Comedy that's writ with Art;
 The Fable, Manners, Sentiments are these,
 And proper Diction, that must all express.
 The Fable is the Plot that is design'd
 To imitate the Actions of Mankind.
 But without Manners those cannot be drawn
 In them the Temper, and the Humours shown;
 As by the Sentiments these are made known.
 The Diction is the Language that do's show
 In Words, the Sentiments that from them flow.

COMEDY has Parts of *Quality*, and Parts of *Quantity*.
 Of the first kind there are four essential, the *Fable*, the *Manners*, the *Sentiments*, and the *Diction*; to which two are added which only relate to the *Representation*, viz. the *Music* and *Decoration*; without the first four Parts no *Comedy* can be written. For the *Poet* must necessarily invent the *Matter*, or *Subject* on which he writes, and that is what we call the *Fable* or *Plot*: But since the *Fable* imitates, there is a necessity that it shou'd have the *Manners*, that is, nicely and justly express the *Temper*, *Humours* or *Manners* of the several *Dramatic Persons* that are represented in *Comedy*. The *Sentiments* are added, because we must discover by them the Sense and Opinion of them in Words; and because the *Sentiments* are, and must be express'd more plainly by Words, the *Diction* obtain its place in these four Parts of *Comedy*.

The difference of the *Person* much alters the *Manners*, and differences them from one-another. For these *Manners* which are Praise-worthy in one, are far from being so in another, being not at all convenient to his Character, and therefore to be disprais'd. Thus we find in Arts themselves, for one of the *Vulgar* gains Reputation by being a good *Fidler* or *Piper*; but this in a *King* is ridiculous and disagreeable to his Dignity. A *Woman* has a just Praise for sowing well, and working finely with her Needle; but this being no Manly Quality, is dispicable in a *Man*. The *Manners* must therefore be agreeable to every Man's Station. Quality, or Years, and the like. And Life is the best *Book* to study these in, when we are once Masters of the *Rules* of Art. In the meanwhile, learn these following *Verses* out of *Horace*, of what is proper to the several Ages and Stations of Man, that you may not err against them: They are found thus in blank Verse, in my Lord *Reynolds*'s Translation.

One that has newly learn'd to speak and go,
 Loves Childish Plays; is soon provok'd and pleas'd,
 And changes every Hour his wavering Mind.
 A Youth, that first casts off his Tutor's Yoke,
 Loves Horses, Hounds, and Sports, and Exercise;
 Prone to all Vice, impatient of Reproof;
 Proud, careless, fond, inconstant, and profuse.
 Gain, and Ambition rule our riper Years,
 And make us Slaves to Interest and Power.
 Old Men are only walking Hospitals,
 Where all Defects, and all Diseases croud,
 With restless Pain, and more tormenting Fear,
 Lazy, morose, full of Delays, and Hopes,
 Oppress'd with Riches, which they dare not use;
 Ill-natur'd Censors of the present Age,
 And fond of all the Follies of the past.
 Thus all the Treasure of our flowing Tears
 Our Ebb of Life for ever takes away.
 Boys must not have th' ambitious Cares of Men,
 Nor Men the weak Anxieties of Age.
 Observe the Characters of those that speak,
 Whether an honest Servant, or a Cheat,
 Or one whose Blood boils in his Youthful Veins,
 Or a grave Matron, or a busy Nurse,
 Extorting Tradesmen, careful Husbandmen.

These are the general Rules for those Characters that
 fall under them; but *Humour* being essential to English
Comedy, we must see what that is.

Subordinate Passion we Humour name,
 By which our Rards have gain'd peculiar Fame.
 Each Passion does a double Face confess,
 The strong is Tragic, Comic is the less.
 Here Affectation some to Humour add,
 By that are some ridiculously mad.
 Whatever Humours you at first bestow,
 Those in the end your Persons still must show,
 Those must be uppermost in all they do.

Humour is said by the Critics to be a subordinate, or a
 weaker Passion, and that in Persons of a lower degree than
 those who are fit for Tragedy, and it is more visible in the
 lower sort of People, whose Characters are therefore fitter
 for Comedy. Every Passion has two different Faces; one

that is serious, great, terrible, solemn, that is for *Tragedy*; and another that is low, comical, ridiculous.

Affectation is thought also to be a Character fit for *Comedy*, as being highly ridiculous, and capable of being corrected by it. Your Characters must always retain the same Humour through the Play, which you give them at first, or else 'tis absurd and preposterous.

*Expose no single Fop, but lay the Load
More equally, and spread the Folly broad;
The other Way is vulgar: Oft we see
A Fool derided by as great as he:
Ill Poets so will one poor Fop devour.
But to collect, like Bees, from every Flour
Ingredients to compose this precious Juice,
Which serves the World for Pleasure, and for Use,
In spite of Faction, will our Favour find,
And meet with the Applause of all Mankind.*

The Poet should not pick out any one particular Fop he may meet with in his Conversation, but form the general Follies from a Character that may be of Use to many, and a Diversion to all.

*All Fools in this speak Sense, as if posselt,
And each by Inspiration breaks his Jest.
If once the Justness of each part be lost,
We well may laugh, but at the Poet's cost.
That silly thing Men call Sheer-Wit avoid,
With which our Age so nauseously is cloy'd:
Humour is all, Wit shou'd be only brought
To turn agreeably some proper Thought.*

'Tis a Breach of Character to make the Coxcombs speak Wit, and fine Raillery, and therefore good for nothing. Humour is the true Wit of Comedy, the fine Things, the *Sheer-Wit* is only for Epigram.

*The Parts of Quantity are likewise four;
The Entrance does the Characters explore:
And to the Action something does proceed,
The Working up. Action and Warmth does breed.
The Counter-turn does Expectation cross,
But the Discovery settles all i'th' close.*

The Parts of Quantity of a Comedy are four; the Entrance, which gives Light only to the Characters, and proceeds very little into any part of the Action. 2dly, The Working up of the

the *Plot*, where the Play grows warmer, and the Design or Action of it is drawing on, and you see something promising, 3dly, The *full Growth* of the Plot, which we may properly call the *Counter-turn*, destroys the Expectation, and embroils the Action in new Difficulties, leaving you far distant from the Hopes, in which it found you. 4thly, The *Discovery* or *Unraveling* of the Plot, where you see all things settling again on their first Foundation. The Obstacles, which hinder'd the Design or Action of the Play, once remov'd, it ends with the Resemblance of Truth, and Nature and the Audience are satisfied with the Conduct of it.

But our Plays being divided into Acts, I shall add a word about them. There must be no more, nor less, than five Acts; this is a Rule of 1700 Years standing at the least.

The first contains the Matter or Argument of the Fable, with the shewing the principal Characters. The second brings the Affairs or Business into Act. The third furnishes Obstacles and Difficulties. The fourth either shews how those Difficulties may be remov'd, or finds new in the Attempt. The fifth puts an end to them all, in a fortunate Discovery, and settles all as it should be.

CHAP. IV. OF TRAGEDY.

ONE only Action, that's entire and grave,
And of just length, the Tragic Muse must have
The Object of its artful Imitation,
And that without the Help of the Narration,
By the strong Pow'r of Terrour and Compassion. }
All sorts of Passion perfectly refines,
And what in us to Passion else inclines.

As all the other Parts of Poetry are Imitations, so is Tragedy; for the best Critics define it thus: — “Tragedy is the Imitation of one grave, and entire Action, of a just length, and which, without the Assistance of Narration, by the Means of Terrour and Compassion, perfectly refines in us all sorts of Passions, and whatever is like them.”

Thus Tragedy is the Imitation of some one Action, and not of all the Actions of a Man's Life; and 'tis equally plain, that there is no room for any thing in this Poem

(the most useful and noble of all Poesie) but what is grave and serious. This Action must be *entire*, it must have a *Beginning*, *Middle*, and *End*. The *Beginning* is that before, which we have no need to suppose any necessary Cause of it; the *Middle* is all that this *Beginning* produces, and the *End* is that after which nothing is necessarily suppos'd to compleat the Action. It must be of a just *length*, that is, it must not be so long as that of an Heroic Poem, nor so short as a single Fable. The excluding *Narration*, and the confining it to Terror and Compassion, distinguishes it from an Heroic Poem; which may be perfect without them, and employs *Admiration*. By the refining the Passions, we mean not Extirpation, but the reducing them to just Bounds and Moderation, which makes them as useful as necessary. For by showing the Miseries that attend the Subjection to them, it teaches us to watch them more narrowly, and by seeing the great Misfortunes of Others, it lessens our Own, either present or to come.

*There is no Action that do's not proceed
From Manners, and the Sentiments indeed.
And therefore these, in this sublimer Art
Of Tragedy, must claim essential Part.*

As Tragedy is the Imitation of an Action, not of Inclinations or Habits, so there is no Action that does not proceed from the *Manners* and the *Sentiments*, and therefore the *Manners* and the *Sentiments* are essential Parts of Tragedy; for nothing but these can distinguish an Action. The *Manners* form, and the *Sentiments* explain it, discovering its Causes and Motives.

*All Tragedies four Parts do claim,
Fable the first, and Principal we Name;
The Manners and the Sentiments succeed,
The last place to Diction is decreed.*

There is no Subject of a Tragedy where these following Parts are not to be found; the *Fable*, the *Manners*, the *Sentiments*, and the *Diction*. Some add the *Decoration*, because that denotes the Place; and every Action requiring some Place, the *Decoration* is in some measure the Object of the Poets Care, that the Place may be proper for the Representation. The chief and much most considerable, is the *Fable*, or the Composition of the *Incidents*, which form the Subject of the Tragedy. For Action being the Object of the Imi-

Imitation of this sort of Poetry, must be the most considerable; but the *Action* consists of the *Incidents* and their Conduct, which is the *Fable*: The *Fable* must be the most considerable; and all the Beauties of *Manners*, *Diction*, and *Sentiments*, can't make amends for the Defects of this. The general End that Mankind propose, is, to live Happily, but to live Happily is an *Action*; for Man is either Happy or Miserable by his *Actions*, not *Manners*. *Tragedy* only adds them for the Production of *Actions*. The *Fable* being therefore the End of *Tragedy*, as being the Imitation of the *Action*, it must be of the greatest Importance; for so is the End in all Things.

*The Manners next, by the Dramatic Laws,
As they of Action are the Source and Cause,
Demand our Study, and our utmost Care;
By whose the Persons, their Designs declare,
And from each other best distinguish'd are.* }

The *Manners* are the most considerable next to the *Fable*. For as *Tragedy* is the Imitation of an *Action*, so there are no *Actions* without the *Manners*; as no Effect without a Cause. The *Manners* distinguish Character from Character, and discover the Inclinations of the Speaker, and what Part Side, or Course he will take on any important and difficult Emergence, know how he will behave himself before we see the *Actions*. If Pride, Choler, Piety, or the like, be the *Manners* of the Hero, we may know that he will follow the Dictates of the prevailing Passion of his Character.

*The Sentiments obtain the next Degree,
Tho' least in Excellence of all the Three.
The Sentiments the Manners do express,
But must with Truth and Likelihood confess.*

The *Sentiments* are next in degree of Excellence to the *Fable* and the *Manners*: For these are for the *Manners*, what the *Manners* are for the *Fable*. The *Action* cannot be justly imitated without the *Manners*, nor the *Manners* without the *Sentiments*. In these we must regard Truth and Versimilitude. As when the Poet makes a *Madman* speak just as a *Madman* does; or as it is probable he wou'd do. For this see *King Lear* in *Shakespeare*.

*The Diction must the Sentiments unfold,
Which in their proper Language must be told.*

The *Distion*, or Language of *Tragedy*, can demand but the fourth Place in the essential Parts, and is of the least importance of any of them; yet must peculiar Care be likewise taken of this, that every Passion speak in such Words and Expressions as is natural to it.

Having thus seen the several Parts of *Tragedy*, and their Excellence in regard of each other, we shall now proceed to give Directions necessary to the making each of them perfect, and to the knowing when they are so in what we read.

*First on a Plot employ thy careful Thoughts,
And guard thy self against its usual Faults.
Turn it with Time a thousand several ways
That (as it ought) gives sure Success to Plays.*

As the *Plot*, or *Fable*, is the chief Thing in a *Tragedy*, so our first and principal care ought to be employ'd in contriving this Part with that care, that each may produce and depend upon the former. This Part being perform'd with Skill, has given Success to those Plays which have been defective in all the other Parts.

*Besides the main Design compos'd with Art,
Each moving Scene must have a Plot apart.
Contrive each little Turn, mark every Place;
As Painters first chalk out the future Face.
Yet be not fondly your own Slave for this,
But change hereafter what appears amiss.*

As the main *Plot*, or *Fable*, consists of many *Incidents* or *Scenes*, the Poet must make a Draught of these before he begins to write; which will appear more plainly when we come to discourse of the *Incidents*. In this Scheme we must mark all the fine Touches of the Passions, and all the admirable Turns that produce them. But when we come to write, we may discover Faults in the first Draught, which we must correct.

*Each Tragic Action must be both entire,
And of that length which Tragedies require.
Beginning it must have, and Middle, and End,
Each to produce the other still must tend.
The Cause of Undertaking and Design
Of Action, to Beginning we confine;
All the Effects and Obstacles we find
In th' Execution, to Middle are assign'd
Th' unravelling and dissolving of the same,
With Justice we the End do always name.*

Every *Action*, that is fit for a *Tragic Imitation*, ought not only to be *entire*, but of a *just length*; that is, must have a *Beginning*, *Middle*, and *End*. This distinguishes it from *momentaneous Actions*, or those which happen in an instant, without Preparation or Sequel, which, wanting Extension, may come into the *Incidents*, not build a *Fable* on. The Cause or Design of undertaking an *Action* is the *Beginning*; and the Effects of those Causes, and the Difficulties we find in the Execution, are the *Middle*: The unravelling and dissolving these Difficulties, is the *End*.

An Explanation of this will best appear by an Example, which we will take from the *Plot* of the *Antigone* of *Sophocles*. On the Death of the two Brothers, Eteocles and Polynices, Creon, who succeeds them in the Kingdom of Thebes, prohibits the burying the Body of the later, because he invaded his Native Country with Foreign Troops: This Decree makes Antigone, who was betrothed to Hæmon the Son of Creon, bury him, is discover'd, and condemn'd to be bury'd alive: Creon cou'd not be brought to relent by Hæmon, or Teresias; and so Hæmon kills himself with her: This makes Eurydice, his Mother, destroy herself; and Creon, in these Miseries seeing the fatal Consequence of his Decree, repents too late, and becomes miserable.

The *Beginning* of this *Action* has no necessary Consequence of the Death of Polynices, since that Decree might have been let alone by Creon, tho' it cou'd not have been without that Death; so that the *Action* naturally begins with that Decree. The *Middle* is the Effects produc'd by that Decree, the Deaths of *Antigone*, *Hæmon*, and *Eurydice*, which produce the *End* by breaking the Obstinacy of Creon, and making him repent, and miserable. Thus the Poet cannot begin or end his *Action* where he pleases (which is the fault of most of our old Plays) if he wou'd manage his Subject with true Oeconomy and Beauty. For there must be the Cause or *Beginning*; the Effect of that Cause, which is naturally the *Middle*; and the unravelling or finishing of it, which is the *End* produc'd by the *Middle*, as that by the *Beginning*. The *Middle* supposes something before it, as its Cause and following, as its Effect; the *Beginning* supposes nothing before, and the *End* nothing to follow, to make the *Action* complet.

*The Unities of Action, Time, and Place,
If well observ'd, give Plays a perfect Grace.*

The Subject of a *Tragedy* shou'd be of a just extent, neither too large, nor too narrow, but that it may be seen, view'd, and consider'd at once, without confounding the Mind, which if too little or narrow, it will do; nor make it wander to distract it, as it will do if it be too large and extensive. That is, the Piece ought to take up just so much Time as is necessary or probable for the introducing the Incidents with their just Preparation. For to make a good *Tragedy* that is a just Imitation, the *Action* imitated ought not, in Reality, to be longer than the *Representation*; for this makes the *Likeness* greater, and by consequence more perfect. But since there are *Actions* of ten or twelve Hours, we must bring some of the Incidents into the Intervals of the *Acts*, the better to deceive the Audience.

Next, the *Unity of Action* is such, that it can never be broke without destroying the Poem. This *Unity* is not preserv'd by representing of several *Actions* of *One Man*; as of *Julius Caesar*, of *Anthony*, or *Brutus*; for then the Poet has no Reason to begin at any certain place; and *Shakespeare* might have brought his Play down to the last Emperor of *Rome*, as well as to the Death of *Brutus*.

But this *Unity of Action* does not exclude the various *under-Actions*, which are perfectly dependent on, and contribute to, the chief; and which without it are nothing. Nor does this Exception make for our silly *under-Plots*, which have nothing to do with the main Design, but is another *Plot*; as *Adrastus* and *Eurydice* in *Dryden's Oedipus*, which are abominable. In the *Orphan* the *Action* is *One*, and every Part or *under-Action* carries on and contributes to the main *Action*, or *Subject*. Thus the different *Actions* of different Men are not more distinctly different *Actions*, than those of *One Man* at different Times. Whatever can be transpos'd, or left out, without a sensible Maim to the *Action*, has nothing to do there.

The Tragic Person is no certain Man,

The Bard PARTICULARS wou'd draw in vain;

For to no Purpose is that uselefs Draught,

By which no moral Lessons can be taught,

Great Homer, in th' *Achilles*, whom he drew,

Sets not that one sole Person in our view;

But in that Person to explain did choose

What Violence and Anger wou'd produce.

P The

The Poet is not oblig'd to relate Things just as they happen'd, but as they might, or ought to have happen'd: That is, the *Action* ought to be *general*, not *particular*; for *particular Actions* can have no *general Influence*. Thus *Homer*, in *Achilles*, intends not the Description of that *one individual Man*, but to shew what *Violence* and *Anger* wou'd make all *Men* of that *Character* say or do: And therefore, *Achilles* is a *general* and *Allegoric* Person, and so ought all *Tragic Heroes* to be, where they shou'd speak and act necessarily, or probably, as all *Men* so qualify'd, and in those *Circumstances* wou'd do; differing from *History* in this, that *Tragedy* consults not the Truth of what any particular Person did say, or do, but only the general Nature of such Qualities, to produce such *Words*, and such *Actions*. 'Tis true, that *Tragedy* sometimes makes use of true Names, but that is to give a *Credibility* to the *Action*, the Persons still remaining *general*. The Poet may take Incidents from *History* and *Matter of Fact*, but then they must have that *Probability* and *Likelihood* which Art requires; for there are many *Actions* which have really been done, which are not probable; and then *History* will not justify the Poet in making use of them.

*The Tragic Action, to be just and right,
Terror and Compassion must excite.*

The *Action* that must be imitated in *Tragedy*, besides the former Properties, must excite *Terror* and *Compassion*, and not *Admiration*; which is a *Passion* too weak to have the Effect of *Tragedy*. *Terror* and *Pity* are rais'd by *Surprize*, when *Events* are produc'd out of *Causes*, contrary to our *Expectation*; that is, — when the Incidents produce each other, and not merely follow after each other. For if it do not necessarily follow, it is no Incident for *Tragedy*.

*Two Kinds of Fables, Tragedy allows,
The simple this, the implex that avows.
The simple does no Change of Fortune know,
Or in the End does no Discovery show.
The implex either one or both contains,
So greater Beauty and Perfection gains.*

As the *Actions* which *Tragedy* imitates, so are all its *Fables*, *simple* or *implex*. The *simple* is that, in which there is neither a *Change* of the *Condition* or *State* of the principal Person or Persons, or a *Discovery*; and the *unravelling* of the *Plot* is only a single *Passage* of *Agitation*, of *Trouble*, or *Respose*

pose and Tranquility. The *implex Fable* in which the principal Person or Persons have a Change of Fortune, or a *Discovery*, or both; which is the most beautiful and least common. In the *Antigone* of *Sophocles*, the Argument of which we have before given you, there is the Change of the Fortune of *Creon*, and that produc'd by the Effect of his own Decree and Obstinacy; but in his *Oedipus* and *Electra* there is both a *Change* and *Discovery*; the first to *Misery*, the later to *Revenge* and *Happiness*. *Oedipus*, with his Change of Fortune, discovers, that he is the Son of *Jocasta* and *Laius*, and so is guilty of Incest and Parricide. But *Electra* discovers *Orestes* to be her Brother, and by that changes her Miseries into Happiness, in the Revenge of her Fathers Death. In the *Iphigenia in Tauris* of *Euripides* (written by Mr. Dennis in *English*) *Iphigenia* making a *Discovery* that *Orestes* is her Brother, changes both their Fortunes from Despair to a happy Escape from the barbarous Altars of *Taurica*. But the *Change* can neither be necessary nor probable (without which Qualities it is of no Value) if it be not the natural Result, or at least the Effect of the foregoing Actions, or of the *Subject* it self. As in *Oedipus*: For *Ægeon*, who comes to bring him agreeable News, and which ought to have deliver'd him from those Apprehensions into which the Fear of committing Incest with his Mother had thrown him, does quite the contrary, in discovering to him who and what he is. The Fact is thus—A Messenger from Corinth brings *Oedipus* Word of the Death of *Polybus*, and invites him to take Possession of that Kingdom; but he afraid of committing the Incest the Oracle had told him of, believing *Polybus* to be his Father, declar'd he wou'd never go to the Place where his Mother was. The Corinthian told him, that he did not know himself, and so disturb'd himself about nothing; and so thinking to do *Oedipus* a signal Piece of Service, by delivering him from his Fears, informs him, that *Polybus* and *Merope* were not his Father or Mother, which began the *Discovery*; that cast him into the most terrible of his Misfortunes.

What in the Drama we DISCOVERY call,
May in the Notion of Remembrance fall.
For, by remembring, the chief Persons move
From Ignorance to Knowledge, which or Love
Or Hatred in them always must produce,
And all their Happiness or Misery induce.

Discovery being here us'd for a Term of Art, and therefore signifying more than in its vulgar Acceptation, you must know, that here it means a Discovery, which is made by the principal Characters; by remembring or calling to Mind either one-another, or something of Importance to their Change of Fortune, and is thus defin'd. — **THE DISCOVERY is a CHANGE**, which bringing us from Ignorance to Knowledge, produces either LOVE or HATRED in those whom the Poet has a Design to make either Happy or Miserable. That is, it ought not to be in vain, by leaving those who remember one-another in the same Sentiments they were in before; it must produce either Love or Hatred in the Principal, not inferiour Characters. But those Discoveries which are immediately follow'd by the Change of Fortune, are the most Beautiful; as that of *Oedipus*, for the Discovery of his being the Son of *Jocasta* and *Laius*, immediately makes him of the most Happy, the most Miserable. And this *Catastrophe* or Ending, which has a Change of Fortune immediately after the *Discovery*, will always produce Terror and Pity in the End and Aim of Tragedy. We shall say something of the several sorts of Discoveries, after the Manners, on which they have some kind of Dependence.

*Reject that vulgar Error, which appears
So fair, of making perfect Characters.
There's no such Thing in Nature, and you'll draw
A faulty Monster, which the World ne'er saw:
Some Faults must be, which his Misfortunes drew,
But such as may deserve Compassion too.*

The next Thing which we are to consider, are the Characters. Those which are to compose a perfect Tragedy, must be neither perfectly virtuous and innocent, nor scandalously wicked. To make a perfectly virtuous and innocent Character unfortunate, excites Horror, not Terror, nor Compassion. To punish the Wicked, gives indeed a sort of Satisfaction, but neither Terror nor Pity; which are the Business of Tragedy. For what we never think our selves capable of committing, we can never Pity. But the Characters of a perfect Tragedy shou'd be the Medium between both, but rather good than bad. Thus the Dramatic Person shou'd not draw his Misfortunes on himself by superlative Wickedness, or Crimes notoriously Scandalous, but by involuntary Faults, that is Frailties proceeding from the Excels of Passion. We call them involuntary Faults, which are committed either by Ignorance,

norance, or Imprudence against the natural Temper of the Man, when he is transported by a violent Passion, which he cou'd not suppress; or by some greater or external Force, in the Execution of such Orders, which he neither cou'd nor ought to disobey. The Fault of *Oedipus* is of the first sort, tho' he be also guilty of the second. That of *Thyestes*, in the murdering his Nephews of the second, viz. a violent Passion of Anger and Revenge. That of *Orestes*, in the killing of his Mother for the Death of his Father, of the third; being order'd to do it by the Oracle of the Gods. 'Tis true, our *Oedipus* is made sovereignly Virtuous; but all that *Sophocles* gives him, are *Courage, good Fortune, and Judgment*; Qualities equally common to the good and the bad, and to those who are made up of Virtues and Vices. *Sophocles* has indeed shewn him a Character that has a mixture of Virtue and Vice. His Vices plainly are, *Pride, Violence, Anger, Rashness and Imprudence*; so that it is not for his Parricide and Incest that he is punish'd, for they were the Effect of his Curiosity, Rashness, Pride, Anger, and Violence, and the Punishment of them. And those are the Vices *Sophocles* wou'd correct in us by his Example.

Two several Ends the Fable may obtain,
 Either the Persons happy may remain,
 Or sink beneath the cruel Hand of Fate;
 Or else it may obtain a double State.
 Good for the Good, and Bad for those who err,
 The single and unhappy still prefer.

The Fable may have either a single End or Catastrophe, or one that is double; one that is happy, or one that is unhappy; or one that is happy for the Good, and unhappy for the Guilty; but that which is best is the single and unhappy, for that will most likely produce Terror and Pity.

As Incidents the Fable do compose,
 So still we must consider most in Those
 Which Pity will, and Terror most disclose.
 All such Events 'twixt Friends are only found,
 From Others nothing Tragic can redound.
 When the Friend's Hand against a Friend is arm'd,
 We find our Hearts on either side alarm'd.
 Thus when we see the Son's unhallow'd Knife
 With impious Rage assault a Parent's Life;

When Ignorance or Rage the Parent move,
 To point the Steel against the Child they love,
 Fear and Compassion every Breast will prove. }

Terror and Compassion being the chief End of *Tragedy*, and that being only produc'd by the *Fable*, let us consider what *Incidents* (for such compose every *Fable*) are the most productive of those two Passions.

All *Incidents* are Events that happen between somebody or other; and all *Incidents* that are terrible, or pitiful, happen between Friends, Relations, or the like; for what happens betwixt Enemies, can have no Tragical Effect. Thus when a *Brother* is going to kill (or kills) a *Brother*; a *Father* his *Son*, or a *Son* his *Father*; the *Mother* the *Son*, or the *Son* the *Mother*; it is very terrible, and forces our Compassion. Now all these Actions or Events may be thus divided, — into those which the Actor performs with an entire Knowledge of what he does, or is going to do; as *Medea*, when she kill'd her Children; or *Orestes*, when he kill'd his Mother, and the like: Or those, where the Actor does not know the Guilt of the Crime he commits, or is going to commit, till after the Deed is done, when the Relation of the Persons they have destroy'd is discover'd to them. Thus *Telegonus* did not know it was his Father *Ulysses* whom he mortally wounded, 'till he had done it. The third sort of *Incidents*, and which is the most beautiful, is when a Man or Woman is going to kill a Relation, who is not known to him or her, and is prevented by a Discovery of their Friendship and Relation. The first is the worst, and the last best; the second next in Excellence to the third, because here is nothing flagitious, and inhumane, but the Sin of Ignorance; for then the Discovery is wonderfully pathetic and moving, as that of *Oedipus* killing his Father *Laius*.

In Manners four Qualities we see;
 They must good, like, convenient, equal be.
 The Manners fully mark'd, we here call good,
 When by their Words their Bent is understood;
 What Resolutions they will surely take,
 What they will seek, and what they will forsake.
 LIKENESS to well-known Characters relates,
 For History no Quality abates.
 Convenient Manners we those ever call
 Which to each Rank, Age, Sex, and Climate fall.
 Those Manners Poets always equal name,
 Which thro' the Drama always are the same.

We come now to the *Manners*, which are in the next degree of Excellence to the *Fable*. The *Manners* distinguish the *Characters*; and if the *Manners* be ill express'd, we can never be acquainted with them, and consequently never be surpris'd by foreseeing the Dangers they will produce to the *Dramatic Persons*, nor melt into Pity by seeing their Sufferings. All *Dramatic Persons* therefore ought to have the *Manners*; that is, their Discourse ought to discover their Inclinations, and what Resolutions they will certainly pursue. The *Manners* therefore should have four Qualities, and they must be, (1.) *good*; (2.) *like*; (3.) *convenient*, (4.) *equal*. *Good* is when they are mark'd; that is, when the Discourse of the Persons makes us clearly and distinctly see their Inclinations, and what good or evil Resolutions they are certain to take. *Like* only relates to known and public Persons, whose Characters are in History, with which our Poetic Characters must agree; that is, the Poet must not give a Person any Quality contrary to any of those which History has given him. We must remember, that the ill Qualities given to Princes, and Great Men, ought to be omitted by the Poet, if they are contrary to the Character of a Prince, &c. but the Virtues opposite to those known to Princes ought not to be impos'd, by making him generous, liberal in the Poem, who was avaritious in the History. The *Manners* must likewise be *convenient*; that is, they must be agreeable to the Age, Sex, Rank, Climate, and Condition of the Person that has them: For this you may look back to what is quoted out of my Lord Roscommon's Translation of *Horace*, in what we have said of Comedy. You must indeed study Mankind, and from them draw the Proprieties of Characters or Manners: It would be well if you studied *Moral Philosophy*, to lead you into the Study of Mankind.

They must be *equal*; that is, they must be constant, or consistent, through the whole Character; or the Variety and Inequality of the Manners (as in Nature, so in this Drama) must be *equal*. The *Fearful* must not be *brave*, nor the *Brave* fearful: The *Avaritious* must never be liberal, and the like. *Shakespeare* is excellent in this Distinction of Characters, and he should be thoroughly studied on this Head.

*One Quality essential does remain,
By which the greatest Beauty they obtain.*

*The Manners must so regularly flow,
That to Necessity their Birth they owe.
No Vicious Quality must be their Lot,
But what is needful to promote the Plot.*

Besides the four Qualities we have mention'd, there is a fifth essential to their Beauty, that is, that they be necessary. That is, that no vicious Quality or Inclination ought to be given to any Poetic Person, unless it appear to be absolutely necessary, or requisite to the carrying on of the Action; as all those mention'd in *Oedipus* were, to the promoting that Fable.

*Three sorts of Discoveries are found
In the Dramatic Poets to abound;
The first by certain Marks the Business do,
Whether from Chance or Nature they accrue;
As Scars, or Moles, that in the Body lye,
Or certain Tokens which those Marks supply.*

Having run through the Manners, I now return to the Discoveries, because (well manag'd) they add a wonderful Beauty to the Piece, tho' it is indeed a Beauty almost entirely unknown on our Stage. The first sort of Discovery is by certain Marks in the Body, either *natural*, or *accidental*. Thus *Ulysses* having formerly, before the Trojan War, receiv'd a Wound in his Thigh, by a Boar, in the Mountain of *Parnassus*, when he return'd incognito home, the Nurse who wash'd his Legs discover'd him by the Scar of that Wound. Tho' these be the least beautiful Discoveries, yet they may be us'd with more or less Art: As that we have just mention'd of *Ulysses*, was artful and fine; but when he is fain to shew it himself to the Shepherds, to confirm them that he is *Ulysses*, it is less artful.

The second Way is by *Tokens*; as, the Casket of Things which the Priest had found with *Ion*, when he was expos'd, discovers *Creusa*, whom he was going to kill, to be his Mother. And *Orestes*, when he had found out *Iphigenia* by her Letter, which she was going to send to him by *Pylades*, is fain to tell particular Tokens in her Father's Palace, to make himself be believ'd to be *Orestes*. For these Tokens are no great matter of Invention, since the Poet might have made them twenty other ways.

Third from Remembrance takes its pleasing Rise,
 And forces the Discovery from the Eyes.
 The fourth sort we do in Reasoning find,
 Which brings the Unknown Object to the Mind.
 Thus when Orestes saw the fatal Knife
 With impious Blow directed at his Life,
 Thus to the Goddess in Despair did call,
 Ah! must I then like Iphigenia fall?

The third sort of Discovery is what is made by Remembrance; that is, when the sight, or hearing, of any thing makes us remember our Misfortunes, &c. Thus when *Ulysses* heard *Domodocus* sing his Actions at *Troy*, the Memory of them struck him, and drew Tears from his Eyes, which discover'd him to *Alcinous*. The fourth sort of Discoveries are made by Reasoning; as *Iphigenia* in *Æschylus*, *Hither is Man come like me; no body is like me but Orestes, it must therefore be Orestes*. And in the *Iphigenia* of *Polyides*, a Greek Poet, *Orestes* kneeling at the Altar, and just opening his Bosom to receive the sacred Knife, crys out, 'Tis not sufficient that my Sister has been sacrific'd to *Diana*, but I must be so too.

The finest sort is that which arises from the Subject, or incidents of the Fable; as that of *Oedipus* from his excessive Curiosity, and the Letter that *Iphigenia* sent by *Pylades*; for it was very natural for her on that Occasion to send that Letter. We have been forc'd to make mention of Greek Plays, because we have not yet had any thing of this kind, but in those taken from those Poets; but our *Oedipus* and *Iphigenia* will shew this in some measure.

The Sentiments here next assume their Place,
 To which to give their just and proper Grace,
 The Poet still must look within to find
 The secret Turns of Nature in the Mind.
 He must be sad, be proud, and in a Storm,
 And to each Character his Mind conform.
 The Proteus must all Shapes, all Passions wear,
 If he wou'd have just Sentiments appear:
 Think not at all where shining Thoughts to place,
 But what a Man wou'd say in such a Case.

Having done with the Fable, Incidents, and Manners, we come now to the Sentiments.

The Poet here must not be content to look into his Mind, to see what he himself wou'd think on such an Occasion,
 but

but he must put himself into the Passion, Quality, and Temper of the Character he is to draw; that is, he must assume those *Manners* he gives each Dramatic Person, and then see what Sentiments or Thoughts such an Occasion, Passion, or the like, will produce. And the *Poet* must change the Habit of his Mind, and assume a new Person, as a different Character or Person speaks, or he will make all speak alike without any distinction of Character. But this can't be done, but by a strong Imagination, and great Genius.

We shall say no more of the *Sentiments* here, because they are to be learnt from the Art of *Rhetoric*; for the *Sentiments* being all that makes up the Discourse, they consist in proving, refuting, exciting, and expressing the Passions, as *Pity*, *Anger*, *Fear*, and all the others, to raise or debase the Value of a Thing. The Reasons of *Poets* and *Orators* are the same, when they would make Things appear worthy of *Pity*, or terrible, or great, or probable; tho' some Things are render'd so by Art, and some by their own Nature.

*Wise Nature by Variety does please,
With differing Passions in a differing Dress;
Bold Anger in rough haughty Words appears,
Sorrow is humble, and dissolves in Tears.
Make not your Hecuba with Fury rage,
And shew a canting Spirit on the Stage:
There swoln Expressions, and affected Noise,
Shews like some Pedant that declaims to Boys.
In Sorrow you must softer Methods keep,
And, to excite our Tears, your self must weep.
Those noise Words which in ill Plays are found
Come not from Hearts that are in Sadness drown'd.
To please, you must a hundred Changes try;
Sometimes be humble, then must soar on high;
In natural Thoughts must every where abound,
Be easie, pleasant, solid, and profound.
To these you must surprizing Touches join,
And shew us a New Wonder in each Line.*

The *Diction*, or Language, is that which next comes under our consideration; and tho' it is confess'd, that it is of the least importance of all those Parts, yet when the Elocution is proper and elegant, and varies as it ought, it gives a great, and advantageous Beauty to a Play; and therefore we will not pass it over in silence. Some have been betray'd by their Ignorance of Art and Nature, to imagine that *Mil-*

's Stile, because noble in the *Epic*, was best for *Tragedy*,
 ever reflecting that he himself varied his Stile in his *Samp-*
Agonistes. If you would therefore merit Praise, you
 must diversifie your Stile incessantly; too equal, and too
 uniform a Manner then is to no purpose, and inclines us to
 sleep. Rarely are those Authors read, who are born to
 plague us, and who appear always whining in the same Un-
 grateful Tone. Happy the Man, who can so command his
 voice, as to pass without Constraint from that which is *grave*,
 that which is *moving*, and from that which is *pleasant*, to
 that which is *severe* and *solemn*. Every Passion has its pro-
 per Way of Speaking, which a Man of *Genius* will easily de-
 rive from the very Nature of the Passion he writes. *Anger* is
 proud, and utters haughty Words, but speaks in Words less
 force and fiery when it abates. *Grief* is more humble, and
 speaks a Language like it self, *dejected*, *plain*, and *sorrowful*.

*Soliloquies had need be very few,
 Extremely short, and spoke in Passion too.
 Our Lovers talking to themselves, for want
 Of others, make the Pitt their Confidant.
 Nor is the Matter mended yet, if thus
 They trust a Friend only to tell it us.
 Th' Occasion shou'd as naturally fall
 As when Bellario confesses all.*

There is nothing more common in our *Plays*, tho' nothing
 so inartificial and unnatural, as the Persons making long
 speeches to themselves, only to convey their Intentions and
 notions to the Knowledge of the Audience: But the *Poet*
 shou'd take care to make the Dramatic Persons have such
 confidants, as may necessarily share their inmost Thoughts,
 and then they would be more justly, and with more Nature,
 convey'd to the Audience. A lively Picture of the absurd
 characters and Conduct of our *Plays*, take from the Duke of
 Buckingham's *Essays on Poetry*; which being in Verse, may be
 read by hart, and remember'd, and so always about you, for
 the Test of any new Hero.

*First a Soliloquy is calmly made,
 Where every Reason is exactly weigh'd;
 Which once perform'd, most opportunely comes
 A Hero, frighted at the Noise of Drums,
 For her sweet sake, whom at first sight he loves,
 And all in Metaphor his Passion proves.*

But

But some sad Accident, tho' yet unknown,
 Parting this Pair, to leave the Swain alone,
 He strait grows jealous, yet we know not why,
 And, to oblige his Rival, needs will dye:
 But first he makes a Speech, wherein he tells
 The absent Nymph how much his Flame excels,
 And yet bequeaths her generously now
 To that dear Rival, whom he does not know,
 Who strait appears, (but, Who can Fate withstand?)
 Too late, alas! to hold his hasty Hand,
 That just has given himself a cruel Stroke:
 At which this very Stranger's Heart is broke.
 He more to his new Friend than Mistress kind
 Most sadly mourns at being left behind;
 Of such a Death prefers the pleasing Charms
 To Love, and living in his Lady's Arms.

Of the EPIC, or HEROIC POEM.

An Epic Poem, is a Discourse invented with Art, to form the Manners by Instructions, disguis'd under the Allegory of an Action which is important, and which is related in Verse in a delightful, probable, and wonderful manner.

That is, it is a Fable which consists of two Parts, first Truth, its Foundation and Fiction, which disguises that Truth and gives it the Form of a Fable. The Truth is the Moral and the Fiction of the Action that is built upon it. Its Importance distinguishes it from the Comedy, and its Relation from the Tragic Actions. The Action here, as in Tragedy must be One, and all its Episodes, or under-Actions are to be dependent on the main Action. It must be entire, that is, have a Beginning, Middle, and End. It must have the Manner, that is, the Characters must be distinguish'd, and Manners must be necessary, and have those Qualities inserted already in Tragedy. The Incidents ought to be delightful, and to the End various, and rightly dispos'd, and surprizing. The Episodes shou'd be pathetic. The Sentiments will fall under the same Rules as those of Tragedy, but the Diction is allow'd to be more lofty, and more figurative, as being a Narration and having Admiration, not Terror and Pity, for its End.

We need say no more of this Poem, the Rules at large wou'd be too extensive for this Treatise, and but of little Use; the Poem being not to be undertaken but by a Master and by a Genius that does not appear once in a Thousand Years.

R H E T O R I C ;

O R,

The ART of P E R S U A S I O N .

1. **R**HETORIC is the Faculty of discovering what every Subject affords of Use to PERSUASION. And as every Author must invent, or find out Arguments to make his Subject prevail, dispose those Arguments, thus found out, into their proper Places, range them in their just Order, and to the same End give them those Embellishments and Beauties of Language which are proper to each Subject ; and, if his Discourse be to be deliver'd to a public, to utter them with that Decency, and Force, which may strike the Hearer ; So this *Art of Persuasion* is generally divided into four parts, *Invention, Disposition, Elocution* or Language, and *Delivery* or Pronunciation.

§ 2. *Invention* is the finding out such Motives, Reasons, or Arguments as are adapted to persuade, or gain the Assent or Belief of the Hearer or Reader.

These Arguments may be divided into *artificial*, and *inartificial*. The former are the proper Object of the Invention of him who writes ; the latter the Author or Writer does not invent, but borrowing them from abroad, applies and accommodates them to his Subject.

The *artificial* Arguments are of three sorts, *Reasons* or Argumentations, the *Manners*, and the *Passions*. The first are to inform the Hearer's Judgment ; the second, to ingratiate with him, or win his *Inclination* or *Favour* ; the third, to move.

The Student, or Writer, is abundantly assisted in finding out these Arguments, Reasonings, or Argumentations, by consulting such Heads, as contain, by general Consent, or the Rules of Art, such Proofs or Evidences under them.

Some of these HEADS are general, others particular : The General contain those Propositions which are common to all Subjects or Causes ; and these the Masters of this Art have

have agreed to be *two* in number, under these two Titles; the first, *Possible*, or *Impossible*; for whether we *persuade* or *dissuade*, *praise* or *dispraise*, *accuse* or *defend*, we must prove that the *Fact* or *Subject*, has been, or is *possible* or *impossible* to be done.

The other Title is *Great* or *Small*, and to this all *Comparisons* relate; as when we shew, that *This* is more or less beneficial or pernicious, more useful or unuseful, more honourable or dishonourable, more just or equitable, unjust and illegal, than *That*.

Every Subject has, besides these *general Heads* common to all, others *particular* to themselves, from whence all Arguments are drawn, which are *peculiar* to each *Subject* or *Cause*; and for that Reason vary according to the Variety of *That*.

All *Causes*, or *Subjects* of any Weight, are recommended to the Reader or Hearer in one of these three Ways, viz. either by *Persuasion* or *Dissuasion*; *Praise* or *Dispraise*; *Accusation* or *Defence*. And indeed, a Man can scarce write on any Subject that requires or falls under Persuasion, but in a more or less important, or extensive Degree, falls under one of these *Heads*.

But these differ from each other, as in the *Parts*, and *Office* or *Duty*, as we have just seen; and in the *End* doubly, (1.) In regard of the *Thing* it self; (2.) and the *Hearer*. (1.) In regard of the *Thing*; for the *End* propos'd by the *Persuasive*, or *Dissuasive Discourse*, is *Profit*, *Advantage* or *Benefit*; by the *Praise* or *Dispraise*, *Honour*; and *Right* and *Equity* by the *Accusation* or *Defence*. (2.) In regard of the *Hearer*, because the Object of him who writes in *Persuasion* or *Dissuasion*, is *Hope* and *Fear*; in *Praise* and *Dispraise*, *Pleasure* and *Delight*; in *Accusation* and *Defence*, *Clemency* or *Severity*.

The first has to do with the *future*, or *Time* to come; the second most commonly with the *Present*; and the third with the *Past*. The *Hearers*, in the important Subjects of each Kind, may be consider'd thus: a *Man*, or Men of *Power* in a State hear the first; Men of *Pleasure*, or such as are chiefly led by the Ear, the second; and a *Judge*, or *Senate* the last.

§ 3. When the Design of our Discourse is to *persuade* or *dissuade*, we must consider the *Matter* or *Subject* of our Discourse, or the Thing we wou'd render eligible or odious; and those *Heads* from whence *Motives*, *Reasons*, or Arguments are to be drawn, to bring about what we propose.

The Subject, or *Matter*, is whatever can be done either in a public or private Capacity. Those Subjects which have Regard to a *public Capacity*, have been divided into five Heads. (1.) *Funds, Revenues, and Pecuniary Matters*. (2.) *Peace or War*. (3.) *Garrisons or Forces*, which are the Defence of Countries. (4.) *Trade in Commodities*, exported or imported: And, (5.) the Proposal of *Laws* to be establish'd or abrogated.

Private Subjects are whatever may be of Advantage or Detriment to *Particulars*.

The *Heads* from which Motives, Reasons, or Arguments are to be drawn under this Division of the Art of PERSUASION, are six. The chief and most peculiar to this, is the *Profitable, or Beneficial*. It farther borrows from the next Kind, the *Honourable*; and from *Accusation and Defence*, the *Rightful or Legal*; and from the *common, or general Heads* the *Possible*; and frames from all these a Judgment, or Conjecture of the *Event*.

§ 4. We come now to *Praise or Dispraise*: And this sort of Discourse is threefold; the first of *Persons* real, or imaginary; the second of *Facts or Deeds*; and the third of *Things*.

In the *Praise or Dispraise of real Persons*, the Order is either *Natural or Artificial*.

The *Artificial* is, when, without Regard to Time, we refer what we say to certain *Heads*; as the *Goods of Mind, of Body, or of Fortune*.

But the *Natural Method* is, when we strictly confine our selves to the observation of the Order of History. And this is divided into *three Times*. (1.) That which preceeded the Birth of the *Person*, who is the Subject of our *Praise or Dispraise*. (2.) The Time of his Life; and, (3.) What follows, his Death.

In the first *Time* we must consider the *Prognostics, Omens, Prophecies*, and the like, if any such there were, and his *Family and Country*; from which arises a twofold Praise: For if these were really illustrious, we say, that such a Person has come up to the Ancient Honour of his *Country and Family*; or has done Deeds worthy such a *Country and such a Family*. On the contrary, if his *Country or Family*, or both were obscure, we must shew, that he has ennobled and rais'd the Obscurity of both, by his own proper *Virtues and Worth*.

In the next *Time*, which is that of his Life, we have four Things to consider; first, The Nature of his *Body*, as *Health, Robustness, Activity, Beauty*; and of his *Mind*, as

Wit, Capacity, Judgment, Memory, &c. The second is his *Fortune, or Riches.* The third his *Education, Institution, and Conduct of Life.* The fourth his *Actions, and their Circumstances and Rewards.*

In the last place, comes the *Manner and Kind* of his *Death, the Funeral Pomp, and the like;* chiefly the *Loss, and the Grief* that attended that *Loss;* to which may be subjoin'd a *Consolation* for it. This is the *Praise of the Person,* let it be of an *Alexander, a Marlborough, a Peterborow, or the like.* From hence we may easily gather the *Praise of what* we call an *imaginary Person;* as of *Bucephalus, or the like;* but this is of little use, except a *Sport of Fancy.*

When we undertake to praise *Deeds or Actions,* we are to make use of those *Heads of Arguments* which are recurr'd to in the former Division; since we praise that here, which we wou'd recommend or persuade in the other.

There are here eight *Heads,* from which we draw Materials of amplifying and setting off the Subject; for to the praise of *Deeds or Actions,* it very much imports, that the *Subject* of our Praise, did it either *first, singly or alone,* or with *few, or chiefly, or principally,* or at a necessary *Exigence of Time, Place, or juncture of Affairs, or often:* Or that the *Action* has a great *Regard to the Benefit, Reputation, and Glory of his Country;* or that he, *first of all Men, gain'd his Country new, or fresh Honours, Dignity, Power, &c.*

When Things are the Subject of our Praise, the Method is not the same in all: For in the *Praise of Countries, Cities, and the like,* we pursue very near the same Method, as in that of *Persons;* for that which in *Men* is *Country and Family,* is in *Places,* are the *Founders,* and the *Princes* who have there govern'd; that which in the former is *Beauty of Body,* is in these the *Situation:* What in *those* is the *Virtue of the Mind,* is the *Fertility, Wholsomness, wise Laws, &c.*

But in the Praise of *other Things,* as of *Arts and Sciences,* we have recourse to the same *Heads of Argument* as in the Praise of *Actions.* The *Honourableness* is shewn in the *efficient, or productive Causes and Antiquity;* and the *Utility or Benefit* from the *Effect and Aim.*

§ 5. The last Kind or Sort of Subject of RHETORIC, is that which *Accuses or Defends,* and the *Heads of Arguments or Proofs* in this, vary according to the variety of the State of the Cause, which is the Subject of our *Accusation or Defence.*

There

There are four *States* ; the first enquires *whether it be so, or not* ; the second, *what it is* ; the third, *its Nature* ; the fourth, *its Magnitude, or how great any Crime is.*

Every Speech, or Oration of this Kind, has one, or more of these *States*. If there be more than *One*, they must either be of the same Kind, as if they all enquire *whether it be or not*, or they must be of several sorts ; as, one of the first, and another of the second.

§ 6. There are three *Heads* of Argument, which we consult for Proofs in the first *State*, which we may call the *State of Ghess, or Presumption*, viz. The *Will*, the *Power*, and *Signs, or Tokens*.

The *Will* contains the *Motives* and *Reasoning*. The *Motives* contain the *Affections* or *Passions*, which are urg'd as the *efficient Cause*. The *Reasoning* is drawn from the *final Causes* ; as from the Hope of Advantage, and the like : And to the *Power* or *Faculty*, the Strength of Body, the Inclinations of the Mind, Riches, Capacity, Time, Place, the Prospect or Hopes of concealing the Fact, when committed, relate. Some of the *Signs, or Tokens* precede ; some attend, and some follow the Fact.

§ 7. In the *State*, which enquires by *what Name* the Fact is to be call'd, we must endeavour to confirm and make out our own *Definition* of it, and confute that of the Adversary. As when the *Accus'd* shall acknowledge that he had *taken* such Goods from such a Place, but not *stole* them ; that he *struck* such a Person indeed, but made no *Assault* and *Battery*. Or shou'd he confess the Robbery, but deny the Sacrilege, and the like ; in all such Cases the Nature of the Fact must be defin'd, and the Adversary confuted on that Head by a Confirmation of your own *Definition*.

§ 8. The *State* which enquires into the *Nature of the Fact, Crime* or *Cause*, is twofold ; the first treats of *what is to come*, and is therefore proper to *Persuasion* or *Dissuasion*. The latter of what is already done, and is therefore agreeable to Courts of *Judicature*, or *Accusation* and *Defence*. That which is properly *juridical*, has its Place either in *Judgment*, or before it ; we divide the first into *Rational* and *Legal* : The *Rational* relates to the Fact, the *Legal* to the Sense of the Laws, Statutes, or written Authorities.

The *Rational* is divided into the *Absolute* and *Assumptive*. The *Absolute* plainly, and simply defends the Fact ; as when we allow it *done*, and assert it *laudibly done*. The *Assumptive* is when the Defence in it self is weak, but is supported

or assisted by something Foreign, or out of the Cause assum'd. And this is done four Ways, by *Comparison*, *Relation*, *Removing* and *Concession*. *Comparison* is when we shew, that there was a necessity of doing *One* of two Things ; and that what was done was juster, and more justifiably eligible than the *other* wou'd have been. *Relation* is when we throw the Fault on the very Person who has receiv'd the Injury. The *Removing* is, when we throw the Fault on some other Person than he who has receiv'd the Injury, or on a Thing that cannot come before the Court, as not falling under its Jurisdiction, as on the *Law*.

Concession is usually divided into *Purgation* and *Deprecation*. *Purgation* is when we defend not the *Fact*, but the *Will* or *Intention* ; as when the Guilt or Fault is thrown on *Necessity*, *Fortune*, *Ignorance*, or *Inadvertence*.

Deprecation is when we acknowledge the Fault, or plead Guilty, and fly to *Pity* and *Mercy*.

§ 9. There are four *States* which enquire into the Nature of the Crime, or what it is. The first is of the *written Letter*, and the *Opinion* or *Intention* ; as, when the *Writing* is one Thing, and the *Intention* of the Writer another ; and one insists on the *Letter*, and the other on the *Intention* of the *Writer*. Here *Equity* and the *Rigour* of the Law contend.

The next is *Reasoning*, when from what is written, we gather another Thing that is *not* written, because founded on the same Reason.

The third is the *Contradiction* of the *Law* ; that is, when the Law either is contrary to it self, or to some other Law.

The fourth is the *Ambiguity* of the *Discourse* ; which arises either from the Change of the Tone or Accent, or from the Division of the Diction ; or the various Significations of the Words. To this we may add a Species of it, the examining the Force of the Word, which differs from the former *State*, which enquires into the Nature of the *Fact* and *Crime*, to see what Name is its due. We may here farther consider Exceptions to the Court it self : First, the *Person* ; as when he acts who ought not to act, or with him with whom he ought not. Secondly, the *Place* ; as when the Action is brought in a wrong Court. Thirdly, to the *Time* ; as when we say, we cou'd formerly have accus'd one whom we cannot at *this Time*. And, Fourthly, to the *Thing* ; as when we deny that the *Indictment* can be grounded on this Law, or requires such a Punishment for such a Crime.

§ 10. The *State*, which enquires into the *Magnitude* or *Greatness* of the Crime, examines and informs us what are the *greatest* and *most* *leinous* Injuries, and which are the *least*. They are shewn to be *great*, either because done on *very* slight *Grounds*, or *Provocation*; or because they have drawn on in their Consequences *very* great Damages; or because he who receiv'd the Injury, was a Man of great *Merit*; or because the *accus'd* was the first who did commit it, or the *only*; or *with a few*; or *often*; or on *Purpose*; or on many other *Causes*.

§ 11. Having thus cursorily ran over the *Artificial Arguments*, we come now to those which are call'd *Inartificial*; which are such as are not deriv'd from this *Art of Persuasion*, but being press'd in from abroad, are, however, *artificially* created of: And these in the Accusation and Defence, are five. (1.) The *Laws*. (2.) *Witnesses*. (3.) *Contracts* or *Agreements*. (4.) *Questions*. (5.) *Oaths*. From all which, according to the Nature of the Cause, there are different Ways of arguing.

§ 12. We come now to the other Part of *Rhetorical Invention*, and that treats of the *Passions*. The *Passions* are *Commotions of the Mind*, by means of which those who are mov'd, judge differently from those who are not; and this is attended either with *Pleasure* or *Pain*.

We must necessarily know three Things to be able to move the *Passions*. — *Who*, and *to whom*, and *for what Causes* or *Reasons* Men are us'd to be mov'd by this, or that *Passion*.

§ 13. *Anger* is a certain *Desire of Revenge*, accompany'd with *Pain*, which we seem to ourselves able to execute, caus'd by a disagreeable *Contempt of our selves*, or of ours.

But this *Contempt* is of three sorts: *Despising*, *incommoding*, and *Contumelious*. The first is a meer simple *despising*; the *Others* require that *One* oppose an *Other*, not to advantage himself, but meerly to oppose the *Other*. And *incommoding* is in *Design*, or by depriving him of, or hindring his Advantage; but the End of *Contumelies*, is *Shame* and *Ignominy*.

§ 14. The Opposite of *Anger* is *Lenity*, which is the *Cra-ving*, or *Remission of Anger*.

§ 15. *Love* is a *Passion* by which we wish heartily well to some *One*, and wou'd do all the Good we cou'd to that *One*, not for our own sake, but for his, or hers.

§ 16. Ha-

§ 16. *Hatred* and *Enmity* are oppos'd to *Love* and *Friendship* : But these differ from *Anger* in many Particulars. We are *angry* on account of Things which relate to our selves ; but we *hate* without any Regard to our own Affairs, Interest or Advantage : *Anger* is directed to *Particulars* ; but *Hatred* rages against *whole Kinds* ; *Anger* is a short-liv'd Fury, but *Hatred* and *Enmity* are lasting. He that is *angry* endeavours to give Pain to the Person with whom he is *angry* ; for he wou'd have *him* feel Evil, on *whom* he wreaks his *Revenge*. He that *hates*, studies to bring *Damage* or *Ruin* ; but is not in Pain whether his Enemy feel it, or not.

§ 17. *Fear* is a certain Pain and Trouble of Mind arising from the Imagination of some impending Evil, which may either be attended with Destruction, or Inconvenience, or Trouble.

§ 18. *Boldness*, or *Confidence*, is opposite to *Fear* ; it is a Hope join'd with an Imagination of Advantages, as if they were near, and all Things and Persons, that might strike us with Fear, being far remov'd, or not at all in Being.

§ 19. *Shame* is a sort of Grief, Pain, or Trouble arising from an Opinion of *Infamy*, when the *Evils* are either *present* or *past*, or *imminent*. And *Impudence* is that by which we despise such Things, and receive no Trouble from them.

§ 20. *Favour* is that, by which any one is said to do a *Favour* or *Grace* to any one, who wants it ; not for any Prospect whatever, or that he may get any Thing by it, but that he whom he relieves, may receive a Benefit. *Favour* is amplify'd or enlarg'd on three Ways ; from the Person who bestows the *Favour*, from the Person to whom it is done ; and from the Thing or Gift it self. And the same is lessen'd three Ways ; first from the *Effects* ; secondly, from the *Gift* it self, and its *Qualities* ; and, thirdly, from the Tokens and Signs of a Mind not truly benevolent.

§ 21. That *Pity*, which we here only define, is the Pain of *Good Men*, from the Opinion of an Evil that may bring Destruction or Trouble to one that does not deserve it ; and such as any one may think may befall himself or his, and that seem to be impending over him, or coming upon him.

§ 22. *Indignation* is a Pain or Trouble for another's *Success* or *Happiness*, who does not seem to deserve it.

In this it differs from *Pity* ; that proceeding from the Sight of the ill *Fortune* of the *Good* ; this from the good *Fortune* of the *Bad*.

§ 23. *Envy* is a Pain or Grief on account of real Honours or Benefits another enjoys, or which we can't obtain, existing between those who are alike in Temper or Nature; not that another has them, but that we have them not.

It is contrary to *Contempt*, with which any one is affected against those, in whom he sees not those *Goods*, or *Advantages*, which either he has himself obtain'd, or endeavours to attain.

§ 24. Having thus gone through a succinct Account of the Passions, we come to the *Third Part of Invention*, which considers the *Manners*. That *Discourse* therefore, or *Speech*, in which the *Manners* are well mark'd, we call *Moral*; for it discovers the *Habits of the Mind*, and the *Will* or *Inclination*. In this are seen *Convenience* and *Probity*.

The *Manners* regard either the *Person himself* who speaks, the *Audience* to whom he speaks, or the *whole City* or *Nation* in which he delivers his *Discourse*.

The *Manners*, which ought to be conspicuous in the *Speaker*, are threefold; *Prudence*, *Probity*, and *Benevolence*.

The *Manners* of the *Nation* are known by the Form of the Government: *Liberty* is in a *Democracy*; the *Discipline of the Laws* in an *Aristocracy*; *pompous Wealth* in an *Oligarchy*; *Guards and Arms* in a *Monarchy*.

The *Manners* in regard of the *Audience* vary four several ways, according to their fourfold Distinction: 1st, When they differ in the Passions, as in *Anger*, *Lenity*, *Fear*, *Pity*, &c. 2^{dly}, When they differ in the *Habits*, as in *Virtues*, or *Vices*. 3^{dly}, In *Tears* or *Age*, which is threefold, *Youth*, *Man's Estate*, *Old-age*. 4^{thly}, In *Fortune*, by which they are either *Noble* or *Ignoble*, *Powerful* or without *Power*, *Rich* or *Poor*, *Fortunate* or *Unhappy*.

§ 25. Besides these *Seats* or *Heads* of Arguments, which are peculiar to each *Kind* of Cause, we must have Recourse to those which are common to *All*; and those, as we have before observ'd, are two, *Possible* and *Impossible*, *Great* and *Small*, or of *Importance* and of little *Consequence*.

We must consider the *Head* of *Possible* and *Impossible* three several ways, — for we must shew a Thing *done* or *not done*, that *can* be done, or *can not* be done; or that *will* be done, or *will not* be done.

Done or *not done* is the Subject of our Proof most in that kind where we *accuse* or *defend*; but in *Persuasion* or *Dissuasion* our Business is chiefly to prove, whether it *can* or *can not*, or *will* or *will not* be done. The

The *Important* or *Great*, and *Small* and of little *Consequence*, belongs chiefly to *Praise* and *Dispraise*.

§ 25. Having given the foregoing Rules for the *Invention of Arguments*, we naturally now proceed to deliver the Method of disposing or marshaling the whole in their proper Places and Order; for *Disposition*, the second Division of this Art, is a proper placing, or ranging of the several Parts of the *Speech* or *Discourse*. These Parts are four in number the *Beginning* or *Opening* of the *Discourse*, the *Proposition*, the *Proof*, and the *Conclusion*. Others make six Parts; as the *Beginning*, *Narration*, *Proposition*, *Confirmation*, *Confutation*, and *Conclusion*: Of which, the first is to ingratiate with the *Hearers*, the last to move them, and the middle to inform them.

The Order of these are either *Natural* or *Artificial*. We call that *Natural*, when the Parts are dispos'd in the Order we have laid down.

The *Artificial* is, when the Nature of the Cause requires us to depart from this *Natural Order*.

§ 26. In the *Beginning* or *Opening* of the *Discourse* we set forth the Aim and Scope of what we have to say; and the Minds of the *Hearers* are prepar'd for the rest that is to come.

The Method of all *Beginnings* is not the same, but varies according to the Quality of the Cause.

For that is either *honourable* or *dishonourable*, *doubtful* or *mean*, or *plain* or *clear*, or *obscure*.

In an *honourable Cause* the *Goodwill*, *Attention*, and *Devotion* of the *Hearers* are prepar'd plainly, and without *Disguise* or *Insinuation*.

In a Cause that is *dishonourable*, we must take care to insinuate into the *Hearers* Minds, and subtly prepare them to give us a Hearing: And this *Beginning* they call *Insinuation*. But this kind of *Beginning* is sometimes made use of in an *honourable Cause*, and that when the *Hearers* are either tir'd with hearing, or prepossess'd by the *Discourse* of him who spoke first.

In the *dubious* or *doubtful* we make use of a *Beginning* drawn from the Nature of the Cause it self; that is, from that Face of it which is *honourable*.

In a *low* or *mean Cause* we must endeavour to raise *Attention*; and in an *obscure Cause*, a *Willingness* or *Desire* to be inform'd.

The Method of *Beginnings* is not the same in the three sorts of Subjects, on which we may speak : For in *Praise* and *Dispraise* it must be taken from the five *Heads* of Arguments proper to that ; from the *Praise* or *Dispraise* ; from *Persuasion* or *Dissuasion* ; and from those Things which relate to the *Hearers*.

In *Accusation* and *Defence* there are four *Heads*, from which the Beginning is taken : For the Mind of the *Hearer* prepar'd, as it were, by certain *Medicines*, taken either from the *Speaker* himself, or from the *Accused* ; or from the *Hearer* ; or from the *Accuser* ; or from the *Thing*.

They are taken from the *Accused*, or the *Adversary*, by objecting, or disproving a *Crime* ; from the *Hearer*, by addressing him our *Friend*, or *angry*, *attentive* or *not attentive*, *willing* to be inform'd : Lastly, from the *Thing*, by declaring its *Nature*.

§ 27. The *Narration* is a Recital of the Things done, or that seem to be done, adapted to *Persuasion*.

This we make use of in *Accusation* and *Defence*, when we do not agree with the *Adversary* about the *Manner* of the fact : But when we *persuade* or *dissuade*, there is seldom any occasion for this Part ; nor is there any in *Praise* or *Dispraise*, but what has its place in the *Confirmation*.

The *Narration* ought to be *perspicuous*, that it may be understood ; *likely* or *probable*, that it may be believ'd ; distinguished by the *Manners*, that it may be heard with the greater *Willingness* : But to be so, it ought to express those Things which relate to the *Proof* of our own *Virtue*, and the *Improbability* of the *Adversary*.

Care must likewise be taken, that what is said may be pleasing to the *Judges* ; and it ought, besides all this, to move the *Passions*.

This Part does not always follow the Beginning, but is sometimes defer'd to another place, and must always be shorter for the Defendant than Plaintiff. We sometimes support the *Narration*, by giving it on the Credit of others, which promotes *Security*. Sometimes we make use of *Asserations*, which still procures *Belief* much stronger ; and sometimes we make use of *both*.

§ 28. The *Narration* being over, we propose the *State* of the *Speech* or *Discourse* ; and divide the Cause into certain Parts, if it consist of *many States*.

This Division is made either by *Separation* or *Enumeration*.

In the *Separation* we lay open in what we agree with our Adversary, and what is yet remaining in *Controversie*.

In the *Enumeration* we sum up the several Heads, and Kinds of Things, of which we are about to speak.

The *Beauty* of the *Partition* or *Division* is, that it be full and perfect; plain, and perspicuous; short, and certain; containing not more than three, or at most more than four Parts.

§ 29. The *Confirmation*, and *Confutation*, are sometimes plac'd under the *Head*, or *Title* of *The Contention*. The first confirms our own Cause by Arguments; the last destroys or confutes those of the Adversary. We must in the *Confirmation* have Regard to the Disposition, as well of the Arguments, as Reasoning or Argumentation.

The strongest Arguments are to be plac'd in the Front or Beginning; when the *Hearers*, being fir'd by the *Narration*, are desirous to know what we have to offer for the Proof or Defence of our Cause. And we must take care to place a Part of the most forcible Arguments at the end, because what we hear last makes the strongest Impression. But those Arguments which carry the least Weight, are to be rang'd in the middle, that those which by their Weight may be inconsiderable, may by their number seem of importance.

Farther, — If the Strength of our Cause depend on an Argument that is alien to it, we must introduce it in such a manner, as may make it appear to be proper to the Cause; but we must shew, that what is offer'd by our Adversaries is indeed foreign to it.

But we must take heed that we do not throng our Arguments, for when the Passions are mov'd, Sentences are more taken notice of than Arguments.

If the End and Aim of the *Argumentation*, or *Reasoning* be more to move than inform, it is call'd *Amplification*, or *Enlarging*. And since this is employ'd partly in lengthning or drawing out the *Speech*, and partly in exaggerating the *Matter*, the latter is the Chief or Principal in this Place. And this is done by *Argumentation*, *Comparison*, *Reasoning* of the Magnitude or Quantity of the *Thing* or *Guilt*, &c.

The *Confutation* is not always made in the same manner: sometimes we shew, that *Falshoods* are taken for *Truths*; sometimes allowing the Premises, we deny the Consequences drawn from them; sometimes against a firm and strong Argumentation we oppose another, at least of equal, or if we

an, of a superiour Force and Energy ; sometimes we de-
 case a Thing, and laugh at the Arguments of the *Adversary*.

But in *General*, we first attack the most firm and valid of
 the *Adversaries* Arguments ; that having destroy'd them,
 the rest may fall of course.

§ 30. The *Conclusion* has two Parts ; the *Enumeration*, or
recapitulation, and the *Passions*.

The *Enumeration* repeats the *principal* Arguments. But
 this is seldom made use of in *Praise* and *Dispraise* ; more of-
 ten in such Speeches, or Discourses which are directed to
 persuade or *Dissuade*, but most commonly in *Accusation* and
Defense ; and there the *Plaintiff* makes more use of it than
 the *Defendant*. We make the chief use of this when we are
 apprehensive, that the *Hearers* may (by reason of the length
 of the Speech) not so well remember them, or their Force ;
 and when the heaping together of Arguments may add
 Weight to the Discourse.

The *Passions* ought to be here more strong and vehement.
 There are two Virtues of a *Conclusion*, Brevity and Vehemence.

§ 31. Before we proceed to *Elocution*, or the *Language*,
 we shall here add some other common Heads, or Places,
 whence the Artists use to draw Arguments.

The first of these is the *General*, or *Kind* ; that is to say,
 we must consider in every Subject, what it has in common
 with all other Subjects of the same *Kind* or *Nature*. If we
 speak of the War with *France*, we may consider *War* in ge-
 neral, and draw our Arguments from that *Generality*.

The second Head, or Place, is call'd *Difference* ; by which
 we consider whatever it is peculiar to the *Question*, or *Cause*.

The third is *Definition* ; that is to say, we must consider
 the whole Nature of the Subject. The Discourse, which
 presses the Nature of a Thing, is the *Definition* of that
 thing.

The fourth is the *Enumeration of the Parts* contain'd in
 the Subject of which we speak.

The fifth is the *Derivation* of the Name of the Subject.

The sixth, *What are deriv'd from the same Head*, or *Service*,
 which are the Names that have Connection with the Name
 of our Subject ; as the Word *Love* has Connection with these
 other Words — *to love*, *loving*, *Friendship*, *lovely*, *Friend*, &c.

We may likewise consider the *Likeness*, or *Unlikeness* in
 the Things of which we treat ; and these make the seventh
 and eighth Places, or common Heads.

We may likewise make *Comparison*, and in our *Comparison* introduce every thing to which our Subject is oppos'd; and this *Comparison* and *Opposition*, are the ninth and tenth *Places*, or *Heads* of Arguments.

The eleventh is *Repugnance*, i. e. In discoursing upon a Subject, we must have an Eye upon those Things that are repugnant to it, to discover the Proofs, with which that Prospect may furnish us.

'Tis of Importance to consider all the *Circumstances* of the Matter propos'd; but these *Circumstances* have either preceded, or accompany'd, or follow'd the Thing in Question. So these *Circumstances* make the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth *Places*. All the *Circumstances* that can accompany an Action, are comprehended in these Words; *who? what? where? with what Help or Assistance, or Means? Why? how? and when?* That is to say, we must examin who is the Author of the Action? what the Action is? where it was done? by what Means? for what End? how? and when?

The fifteenth *Place* is the *Effect*; and the sixteenth is the *Cause*: i. e. we must have regard to the *Effect*, of which the Thing in Dispute may be the *Cause*; and to the Things of which it may be the *Effect*.

§ 32. We come now to what we call *Elocution*, or the *Language*, or *Diſtion* in which proper Words are adapted to the just Expression of the Things which we have invented. It consists of *Elegance*, *Composition* and *Dignity*: The first is the Foundation of this Structure; the second joins, or ranges the Words in such a manner, that the Speaker may rise with Equality; the last adds the Ornaments of Tropes and Figures, to give Importance and Solemnity to what is said.

Elegance comprehends the *Purity* of the *Language*, and the *Perspiciuity*: In the choice of Words we must have peculiar Regard to their *Purity*; that is, we must take Care that they be genuine, that is, free of our Tongue, not Foreign; that they be not Obsolete, or quite out of Use; for both these will not only affect the *Perspiciuity* of what you deliver, but discover either Rusticity, or great Affectation, and often give a uncouth and rough Cadence to your Sentences, which a good Style refuses; and Care must be taken to avoid vulgar and low Words, (the Language of the Mob.) This robs what you say of that Dignity you shou'd aim at. Sir Roger L'Estrange, and some of our Divines too, have been guilty in Subjects of Importance and Majesty. But as you

must not affect too great Brevity on one side, so on the other, you must not aspire to too great a Looseness ; both being Enemies to that Perspicuity, which must always be your particular Care.

Elegance is gain'd by reading the best, or most polite Authors, by keeping the best Company, and by Practice ; Use in all things being the best Instructor.

Composition is the apt and proper Order of the Parts adhering to each other ; and this teaches partly Things that are common to Speakers in *public*, *Historians*, and *Poets*, and partly those Things which are peculiar to a *public Speaker*.

The first *Composition* regards as well the artificial joining of the *Letters*, by which the Style is render'd soft and smooth, gentle, and flowing ; or full and sonorous, or the contrary of all these ; as the *Order*, which requires, that we place the Grave after the Humble or Low ; and that we set that which is of greater Dignity, and first in Nature, before that which is less, and of more inferiour Consideration.

Composition relates to the *Period*, but having treated at the End of GRAMMAR on that Head, and forgot to put it in its right Place in this Second Edition, we shall refer you to that.

Dignity produces a figurative manner of Speaking, both in the *Words*, and in *Sentences* ; those which affect *Words* alone, have been so long call'd *Tropes*, that the Word is known almost to the very *Fishwives*. Those which affect *Sentences* have been as long, and generally known to be call'd *Figures*.

§ 33. We shall begin the *Tropes* with *Transmutation*, or the exchange of one Name for another ; as if we say, Peterborow conquer'd Spain ; every one reads Milton ; London is in an Uproar. 'Tis plain we mean, that Peterborow's Army conquer'd Spain, or he with the help of his Army ; every one reads Milton's Works ; the People of London are in an Uproar. The Relation is so strong betwixt a General and his Army, an Author and his Works, a Town and its Inhabitants, that the Thought of one excites the Idea of the other, and so changing of Names produces no Confusion.

The next is *Comprehension*. This is something related to the former ; for by this we put the Name of a *Whole* for a *Part* ; as if we shou'd say England for London, or London for England ; as, the Plague is in England, when only in London. Thus by this *Trope* we have the Liberty of putting the Name of a *Part* for the *Whole*, and that of the *Whole* for a *Part* ; and to this we may likewise refer the Use of a certain Num-

ber, for an uncertain Number; as *an Hundred Avenues to the House convey*, when there may be more or less; *an Hundred years old*, when he may want some Months, or perhaps Years.

Exchange of Names is another *Trope*, and akin likewise to the first call'd *Transmutation*; for by this we apply a Name proper to one, to several, and common Names to particular Persons; as when we call a Luxurious Prince a *Sardanapalus*, or a cruel one a *Nero*. On the contrary, when for *Cicero*, we say the *Orator*; or for *Aristotle*, the *Philosopher*; for *Virgil*, the *Poet*; and the like.

Metaphor is so well known, a Word in our Tongue now, that we scarce have need to explain it by *Translation*. It is a *Trope*, by which we put a strange and remote Word for a proper Word, by reason of its resemblance with the Thing of which we speak. Thus we call the King the Head of his Kingdom; because as the Head commands the Members of the Natural, so the King commands the Members of the Political Body. Thus we say, the Vallies smile, or laugh upon us; because there is a similitude between the agreeable Appearance of one and the other.

Allegory is the joining of several *Metaphors* together, and so extends to several Words; 'tis likewise call'd *Inversion*. But great Care must then be taken in an *Allegory*, that it ends as it begins; that the *Metaphors* be continu'd, and the same things made Use of to the last, from whence we borrow our first Expressions. The famous Speech of our celebrated *Shakespeare*, is extreamly faulty in this particular.

*To be, or not to be, that is the Question;
Whether 'tis nobler in the Mind to suffer
The Slings and Arrows of Outragious Fortune,
Or to take Arms against a Sea of Troubles,
And by opposing, end them?*

Here the Poet begins the *Allegory* with *Slings and Arrows*, and ends it in a *Sea*, besides the taking Arms against a Sea.

When these *Allegories* are obscure, and the natural Sense of the Words not obvious, they are call'd *Enigma's*, or *Riddles*.

Diminution, or *Lessening*, is the next *Trope*, and by this we speak less than we think; as when we say, *you are not indeed to be commended*, it implies a secret Reproach, or Reprehension.

Hyperbole, or *Excess*, represents things greater or less than really they are; as, *This Horse is swifter than the Wind*; he goes slower than a Tortoise.

By

By *Irony* we speak contrary to our Thoughts, but 'tis discover'd by the Tone of our Voice; as when we say, Robert is a very honest Man, when we mean a Rogue.

By the *Trope*, call'd *Abuse*, we may borrow the Name of a Thing, tho' quite contrary to what we wou'd signify, because we can't else express it; as when we say, an *Iron Candlestick*, or a *Silver Inkhorn*.

These are the most considerable *Tropes*, and to one or other of these, all others may be reduc'd. But before we dismiss this Point, we must give a few Rules to be observ'd in the Use of them. First, therefore, we must use *Tropes* only where we cannot express our selves perfectly without them; and, secondly, when we are oblig'd to use them, they must have two Qualities. (1st;) They must be clear, and contribute to the Understanding of what we intend; (2^{dly};) That they hold a Proportion to the Idea we wou'd paint to our Readers, or Hearers.

A *Trope* loses its Perspicuity three Ways: (1.) When 'tis too remote, not helping the Hearer to the Intention of the Speaker; as to call a lewd House the *Syrtes of Youth*; the *Rock of Youth*, is nearer and more obvious; the former requiring our Knowledge and Remembrance, that the *Syrtes* were dangerous Banks of Sand on the Coast of *Africa*. A *Metaphor* is, therefore, best taken from such sensible Objects as are most familiar to the Eye, which Images are apprehended without Enquiry or Trouble. The ill Connexion of these is the second Thing that brings Obscurity on the *Metaphor*, by using Words which are not commonly known, but relate to Places, perhaps at the farthest Parts of the Globe, from Terms of Art, Antiquities, or the like, which ought to be avoided. This Connexion is either *Natural* or *Artificial*. That we call *Natural*, when Things signify'd by their Proper and Metaphorical Names, have Natural Resemblance to, or Dependence on each other; as when we say, a Man has Arms of Brass, to signify their Strength, this Resemblance between the *Trope* and proper Name, we may call *Natural*. The *Artificial* comes from *Custom*; a wild untractable Temper has by *Custom* been given to the Arab, which makes the Name Arab awake the Idea of an untractable Man.

The third Thing which renders *Tropes* obscure, is a too frequent Use of them. Lastly, *Tropes* must always be proportion'd to the Ideas they wou'd give.

§ 34. Having said all that we thought necessary about the Tropes, their Nature, Virtues, Vices and Use, we now come to the Language of the Passions ; which is of peculiar Use both in *Oratory* and *Poetry*, both which make Use of them in a particular manner.

We shall begin with the *Exclamation*, because by that our Passions first flie out, and discover themselves in Discourse. *Exclamation*, therefore, is a violent extension of the Voice, as, *O Heavens ! O Earth ! good God ! alas !* and the like.

Doubting is the next, or *Irresolution*, is the Effect of Passion, as *what shall I do ? shall I apply to those I once neglected ? or, shall I implore those who now forsake me ?* &c.

Correction is a Figure by which one in Passion, fearing he has not express'd himself full enough, endeavours by a stronger Phrase to correct that Error ; as, *Nor was thy Mother a Goddess, nor perfidious Man was Dardanus the Author of thy Race, but rugged Rocky Caucasus brought thee forth, and the Hyrcanian Tygres nurs'd thee up.*

Omission, in a violent Passion, permits us not to say all that we wou'd. When our Passions are interrupted, or directed another Way, the Tongue following them, produces Words that have no Reference to what we were saying before ; as, *of all Men —* meaning, *the worst of all Men.*

Suppression, is a sudden suppression of the Passion, or rather the Threats of a Passion ; as — *which I — but now we must think of the present Matter.*

Concession seems to omit what we say ; as, *I will not speak of the Injury you have done me ; I am willing to forget the Wrong you have done me ; I will not see the Contrivances that you make against me, &c.*

Repetition is made two Ways : (1.) When we repeat the same Words, or (2.) the same Thing in different Words. The former, as — *You design Nothing, Nothing that is not visible to me, what I do not see, &c.* The second, as — *of our selves we can do nothing Well, whatever Good we do, is by the Divine Grace.*

Redundance makes us use more Words than are absolutely necessary, and is emphatical, *I heard thee with these Ears, I saw thee with these Eyes.*

Like Meanings, are Words of the same Sense, and put together to express one Thing ; as, *be departed, be went out, he's gone.*

Description figures the Thing in such lively Colours, as to make its Image appear before us.

Distribution is a kind of *Description*, in which we enumerate the Parts of the Object of our Passion ; as——*their Throat is an open Sepulchre, they flatter with their Tongues, the poison of Asps is under their Lips ; their Mouth is full of Cursing and Lyes, and their Feet are swift to shed Blood.*

Opposites place Contraries against one-another ; as, *Flattery begets Friends, Truth Enemies.*

Similies bring a Likeness to the Thing we are speaking of—as, *he shall be like a Tree plac'd by the Water-side, &c.*

Comparison. The difference is not great between this and the former Figure, only this later is more sprightly and emphatic—as, *the finest Gold to them looks wan and pale, &c.* But two Things are to be consider'd in *Comparisons* ; first, that we are not to expect an exact proportion betwixt all the Parts of the Comparison, and the Subject of which we speak ; as when *Virgil* compares the young *Ligurian* to a Pigeon in the Claws of an Hawk ; adding what relates more to the Description of a Pigeon torn to pieces by a Hawk, than to the Subject compar'd. The second Thing to be observ'd, is, That it is not necessary that the Thing compar'd to, be more elevated than the Thing compar'd ; as the quoted Instance from *Virgil* shews.

Suspension keeps the Hearer in suspense, and attentive, by Expectation of what the Speaker will conclude in ; as, *O God ! Darkness is not more opposite to Light, Frost to Fire, Rage and Hatred to Love, Tempests to Calms, Pain to Pleasure, or Death to Life, than Sin to thee.*

Representation gives a Tongue to Things inanimate, and makes them speak in Passion ; as, *Hear, thou stupid Creature, near the very Walls of this sacred Pile complaining of thy Wickedness : Have we, say they, so many hundred Years been consecrated to the sacred Rites of the Immortal Gods, and now at last to be polluted with thy Impieties ? Have the most Valiant, and the most Wise, enter'd here with Awe and Veneration, and shall one so Worthless dare to condemn the Sanctity of this Place ? &c.*

Sentences are but Reflections made upon a Thing that surprizes, and deserves to be consider'd ; as, *Love cannot long be conceal'd where it is, nor dissembled where it is not.*

Applause is a Sentence or Exclamation, containing some Sentence plac'd at the end of a Discourse ; as, *Can Minds Divine such Anger entertain !*

Interrogation is frequently produc'd by our Passions to them we would persuade, and is useful to fix the Attention of the Hearers ; as, *Let me ask you, the Men of Athens, is it*

it worthy the Glory of your City, or is it fit that Athens, once the Head of Greece, should submit to Barbarians, take Measures from a foreign Lord? &c.

Adress is when in an extraordinary Commotion a Man turns himself to all sides, and adresses Heaven, Earth, the Rocks, Fields, Things sensible and insensible; as, *Ye Mountains of Gilboa, let there be no Dew, &c.*

Prevention is a Figure, by which we prevent what might be objected by the Adversary; as, *But some will say, How are the Dead rais'd up? And with what Body do they come? Thou Fool, that which thou sowest is not quickned, unless it die, &c.*

Communication is when we desire the Judgment of our Hearers; as, *What would you, Gentlemen, do in the Case? Would you take other Measures than, &c.*

Confession is the owning of our Fault, arising from a Confidence of Forgiveness of the Person to whom it is acknowledged; as, *I confess my self to have err'd, but I am a Man, and what is humane, is what we are all subject to; let him that is free from humane Error cast the first Stone.*

Consent makes us grant a Thing freely that might be deny'd, to obtain another Thing that we desire; as, *I allow the Greeks Learning; I grant them the Discipline of many Arts, the Brightness of Wit, the Copiousness of Discourse; I will not deny them any thing else they can justly claim: But that Nation were never eminent for the Religion of an Oath in their Testimonies, or for Truth and Faith, &c.* And here it has always a Sting in the Tail; but on the contrary it has sometimes a healing Clove; as, *Let him be Sacrilegious, let him be a Robber, let him be the Chief of all Wickedness and Vice, yet still he is a good General.*

By this Figure we sometimes invite our Enemy to do all the Mischief he can, in order to give him a Sense and Honour of his Cruelty. 'Tis also common in Complaints between Friends; as, when *Aristaus*, in *Virgil*, complains to his Mother:

Proceed, inhumane Parent, in thy Scorn;
 Root up my Trees, with Blites destroy my Corn,
 My Vineyards ruin, and my Sheepfolds burn,
 Let loose thy Rage, let all thy Spight be shown,
 Since thus thy Hate pursues the Praises of thy Son.

Dryd. Virg.

Circumlocution is us'd, to avoid some Words whose Ideas are unpleasant, or to avoid saying some things which may have an ill Effect; as, when *Cicero* is forc'd to confess that *Clodius* was slain by *Milo*, he did it with this Adress: "The Servants of *Milo* (says he) being hinder'd from assisting their Master, whom *Clodius* was reported to have kill'd, and believing it true, they did in his absence, without his Knowledge or Consent, what every body would have expected from his Servants on the like Occasion. In which he avoids mentioning the Words *kill*, or *put to Death*, as Words ingrateful or odious to the Ear.

Thus much we have thought fit to say of the Figurative Expressions of the *Passions*; but they are indeed almost infinite, each being to be express'd a hundred ways. We shall conclude this Discourse of the *Art of Persuasion* with a few Reflections on *Style*, and fewer Remarks on other Compositions, in which the Learner ought to be exercis'd.

§ 35. What we mean by *Style*, is the Manner of expressing our selves, or of cloathing our Thoughts in Words: The Rules already given, as to *Elocution*, or the *Language*, regard (as we may say) only the Members of Discourse, but *Style* relates to the entire Body of the *Composition*.

The *Matter* ought to direct us in the Choice of the *Style*. Noble Expressions render the *Style* lofty, and represent Things great, and noble; but if the Subject be low and mean, sonorous Words and pompous Expression is Bombast, and discovers Want of Judgment in the Writer. *Figures* and *Tropes* paint the Motions of the Heart, but to make them just, and truly ornamental, the Passion ought to be reasonable. There's nothing more ridiculous than to be transported without Cause, to put one's self in a Heat for what ought to be argued coolly: Whence 'tis plain, that the *Matter* regulates the *Style*. When the Subject, or *Matter*, is great, the *Style* ought to be spritely, full of Motion, and enrich'd with *Figures*, and *Tropes*; if our Subject contain nothing extraordinary, and we can consider it without Emotion, the *Style* must be plain.

The Subjects of Discourse being extreamly various in the Nature, it follows, that there must be as great a Variety in the *Style*: But the Masters of this Art have reduc'd them all to three Kinds, which they call the *Sublime*, the *Mean*, or the *Indifferent*.

§ 36. Let the Subject of which we design a lofty *Idea* be never so noble, its Nobleness will never be seen, unless we have Skill enough to present the best of its Faces to the View. The best of Things have their Imperfections, the least of which discover'd, may lessen our Esteem, if not extinguish it quite: We must therefore take care not to say any thing in one place, which may contradict what we have said in another: We ought to pick out all that is most great and noble in our Subject, and put that in its best light, and then our Expression must be noble and sublime, capable of raising lofty Ideas: And 'tis our Duty to observe a certain Uniformity in our *Style*; tho' all we say have not an equal Magnificence, so far at least as to make all the Parts of a piece, and bear a Correspondence with the whole.

The Danger here is, lest you fall into a puffy *Style* which some call *Inflation*, or swell'd; for if you stretch Things beyond their Nature, and hunt only after great and sounding Words, you seldom mind their Agreeableness to the Nature of the Subject. And this has been the Fault of many of our modern Tragic Writers, who yet with the Vulgar have gain'd Applause, and settled a Reputation.

§ 37. We come next to the *plain Style*; and this simple and plain Character of Writing is not without its Difficulties, not in the Choice of *Subjects*, those being always ordinary and common, but because there is wanting in this *Style* that Pomp and Magnificence which often hide the Faults of the Writer, at least from the general Reader or Hearer. But on common and ordinary Subjects there is little room for *Figures* and *Tropes*, so we must make choice of Words that are proper and obvious.

When we call this *Style* simple and plain, we intend not *Meanness of Expression*; that is never good, and should always be avoided: For tho' the *Matter* or *Subject* of this *Style* have nothing of Elevation, yet ought not the Language to be vile and contemptible; Mob Expressions, and Vulgarisms, are to be avoided, and yet all must be clean and natural.

§ 38. The *mean* or *middle Style* consists of a participation of the *sublime* on one side, and of *simplicity* of the *Plain*, on the other. *Virgil* furnishes us with Examples of all the three; of the *Sublime* in his *Æneids*, the *Plain* in his *Pastorals*, and the *Mean* (or *Middle*) in his *Georgics*.

§ 39 Tho'

§ 39. Tho' the *Style* of an Orator, or one that speaks in public, of an Historian and Poet, are different, yet there are some Differences in Styles of the same Character; for some are soft and easie, others more strong; some gay, others more severe. Let us reflect on the Differences, and how they are distinguish'd.

The first Quality is *Easiness*, and that is when Things are deliver'd with that Clearness and Perspicuity that the Mind without any Trouble conceives them. To give this *Easiness* to a *Style*, we must leave nothing to the Hearer's or Reader's decision; we must deliver things in their necessary extent, with Clearness, that they may be easily comprehended; and here Care must be taken of the Fluency, and to avoid all Roughness of Cadence.

The second Quality is *Strength*, and it is directly opposite to the first; it strikes the Mind boldly, and forces Attention. To render a *Style* strong, we must use short and nervous Expressions, of great and comprehensive Meaning, and such as excite many Ideas.

The third Quality renders a *Style* pleasant and florid, and depends in part on the first; for the third is not pleas'd with too strong an Intention. *Tropes* and *Figures* are the Flowers of *Style*; the first give a sensible Conception to the most abstruse Thoughts; *Figures* awaken our Attention, and warm and animate the Hearer or Reader, by giving them Pleasure. Motion is the Principle of Life and Pleasure, but Coldness mortifies every thing.

The last Quality is *Severe*: It retrenches every thing that is not absolutely necessary; it allows nothing to Pleasure, admitting no Ornaments or Decorations. In short, we are to endeavour that our *Style* have such Qualities, as are proper to the Subject of which we discourse.

§ 40. Having said thus much of *Styles*, we shall only add a Word or two about other Exercises, in which the Learner should be train'd up: The first and most general is the writing of *Letters*. Here an easie and genteel way of conveying our Mind in the shortest and most expressive Terms, is the greatest Excellence. *Business* requires no Ornaments, and a plain and succinct Information is all that is requir'd. Letters of *Complement* must have Gaiety, but no Affectation. *Easiness* must shine thro' all, and a clean Expression; here is no room for the Luxuriance of Fancy, or the Embellishments of longer Discourses. The same may be said of *Condolence*, and even of *Persuasion*. The most poignant

poignant and coercive Reasons must be us'd, and those that by want of Native Force require the Help of Art to recommend them, laid aside.

ESSAYS have, in these later Ages, mightily prevail'd and here, as in *Letters*, all must be easie, free, and natural and written just as you think, sometimes leaving the Subject, and then returning again, as the Thoughts arise in the Mind. At least this has hitherto been the Practice; and *Montaigne*, who has got no small Reputation by this Way of Writing, seldom keeps many Lines to the Subject he proposes: Tho' it is our Opinion, that my Lord *Bacon* is a much better Pattern; for indeed they seem to us to be sudden Reflections on some one particular Subject, not very unlike the common Themes given to Scholars in the Schools with this difference, that the Author of these is suppos'd to have gain'd much from Observation and Reflection on those Heads, and that therefore his Discoveries may be of Value; whereas the proposing such particular Moral Subjects to Boys, is requiring Impertinencies from them, who have no Fund of Observation to furnish out the Entertainment.

As for the Subjects of Poetical Exercises, we have given sufficient Rules for them, in our *Art of Poetry*.

The End of the Art of Persuasion.

LOGIC;

O-R,

The ART of REASONING.

PART I.

CHAP. I.

Of Particular IDEAS.

LOGIC is the Art of Reasoning. The Art is divided into four Parts; the first treats of *Ideas*; the second of *Judgments*; the third of *Method*; and the fourth of *Reasoning*, or *Argumentation*.

An *Idea*, in General, we define—*The immediate Object of the Mind; or that Thought or Image of any Thing which is immediately set before the Mind.*

All *Ideas* become the Objects of our Mind, or are presented to the Judgment by the Perception of the Senses, which we call *Sensation*; or by the Meditation of the Mind, which we call *Reflection*.

1. *Ideas* are either *Simple* or *Compound*: We call those *Simple*, in which the most subtile Penetration of the Mind it self cannot discover any Parts, or Plurality; and we call those *Compound* which are made up, or compos'd of two or more of those which are *Simple*. Examples of both we shall see hereafter.

2. There are *Ideas* of *Substances*, we know not what obscure Subject, in which there are the Properties of Things which we know; and *Ideas* of *Modes* or *Manners*, which are the *Qualities* or *Attributes* of *Substances*, which we cannot conceive capable of subsisting alone without their *Substances*.

3. There are certain *Relations* between *Substances* and *Substances*; *Modes* and *Modes*; and *Modes* and *Substances*; the Consideration of one including the Consideration of the other, from whence these *Relations* derive that Name.

4. There are *Ideas* which are to be consider'd as the Images of something Existent, and which convey themselves

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to, and fix themselves in the Mind, without any Operation of its own. But there are others, which by the Mind are join'd to new *Ideas* at Pleasure, and separated from them by Abstraction.

5. Farther, there are *Ideas* of a larger, or less extent, or join'd to more or fewer *Ideas*, whence we call them *Singular*, *Particular*, or *Universal*.

6. There are some *Ideas* that are *clear* and *plain*, and others that are *obscure*. All *clear Ideas* are *simple*, as are those of the *compounded*, all whose Parts are distinctly plac'd before, or represented to, the Mind.

7. There are some *Ideas* that are *perfect*, or *adequate*; and others that are *inadequate*, or *imperfect*. Those we call *perfect*, or *adequate*, which contain all the Parts of the Things whose Images they are, and offer them so to the Mind; those are *inadequate*, or *imperfect*, which only contain and offer some Parts of the Things of which they are the Images. We call *Ideas* Images of the Things, because there are some Things without us, which are like, and answers to them.

To these *particular Heads* of *Ideas* all others may be refer'd. These therefore we shall particularly examine.

CH A P. II.

Of simple Compound IDEAS.

1. **V**ERY many of the *simple Ideas* we have from, or by our *Senses*, and very many from the Attention of the Mind turn'd inwards on it self, without regard to *Sensation*.

2. To the *first* we must refer all our *Sensations*; the chief of which may be reduc'd to five Classes, Forms, or Heads, according to the five Parts of the Body, which are affected by them. For they come to us by the Means of our *Eyes*, our *Ears*, our *Nose*, our *Tongue* or *Palate*, and by the *Touch*, or *Feeling* of all the other Parts of the Body. *Colours* are *simple Ideas* (we mean Colours themselves, and distinct from colour'd Bodies which have Parts) as *Blue* for Example, of which the Mind can discover no Manner of Parts.

3. The *Ideas* of Sounds are likewise *simple*, as well as those of *Smell*, *Taste*, *Touch*. We speak here of *One simple particular* Sensation consider'd distinctly from the Variety of *Sounds*, *Smells*, *Tastes*, and *Touches*. Thus——if any one smell to a Rose without mixing any other Scent he will have a *Sensation*, in which he can distinguish no Parts; and this holds of the other *Sensations*.

4. Pain and Pleasure are the chief, and most eminent *Sensations* we have, whose Kinds and Sorts vary according to the Part or Member affected; but there are no Parts to be distinguish'd in Pain and Pleasure, which we can conceive to be separated from each other. - We speak not of the *Duration* of Pain or Pleasure, which evidently has Parts; but of the simple Sensation of a prick with a Needle; for Example, none can conceive any Parts of it, the concurrence of which shou'd produce Pain.

5. In the *Idea* of Motion, which comes to us by our *Senses*, when consider'd in general, we can conceive no Parts, tho' we may of its *Duration*, of the Line it describes, and its Quickness or Slowness.

6. Thus in many simple *Ideas*, which arise from *Reflection*, we shou'd in vain seek for Parts, as in *Volition*, or *Willing*, &c. The same may be said of *Existence* consider'd in general; tho' there are visible Parts in the *Duration*.

7. *Compound Ideas*, we have said, contain or comprehend several simple *Ideas*, which may be distinguish'd and separately consider'd. Thus the *Ideas* of all Bodies are compound; because in them we can consider some Parts without the others, or distinctly from the others. If we consider a Body, we clearly and plainly distinguish the *higher* and *lower*, the *fore* and *hind*, the *left* and *right* Parts of it; and can distinctly think of one without the others. If we consider the *Idea* of *Pity*, we find that it consists of the *Ideas* of *Misery*, of a miserable Person, and of one who grieves for him. Such are the *Ideas* of all *Virtues* and *Vices*, tho' they come to us by *Reflection* of the Mind.

8. Tho' we shall not, in this Part of *Logic*, or the *Art of Reasoning*, treat of those *Judgments* we pass upon *Ideas*, yet it is of importance to remember never to pretend to define what cannot be defin'd without making it more obscure; for a Definition ought always to be made use of to make the Subject of our Discourse more plain and clear, than the bare Name of the Thing wou'd make it; but in simple *Ideas*, we cannot better explain them, than by their very Name, or some Synonymous Words, the Knowledge of which depends on the Tongue we use, and the Sense of him we speak to. The contrary Method has made the *Aristotelians* fill us with unintelligible Jargon; as defining of *Motion*, they say, 'in an *Act* of a Being in Power, as in Power; nor have the *Moderns* much mended the Matter, by defining it the *change of Situation*. The first labours with inexplicable Obscurity,

and the Terms of the later are not more clear or known than the Word *Motion* it self.

9. *Definition*, indeed, has only to do with *compound Ideas* for its an Enumeration, or reckoning up of the several *simple Ideas*, of which that consists.

C H A P. III.

Of IDEAS of Substances and Modes.

1. **A** Nother sort of *Ideas* are those of *Substances* and *Modes*; for we consider all Things separately, and by themselves, or else as existing in other Things so much, that we can't allow them Existence without 'em. The first we call *Substances* and *Subjects*, the later *Modes* and *Accidents*; as when we reflect on *Wax* and *some Figure*, as Roundness, we consider the *Wax* as a Thing which may subsist without that Roundness, or any other particular Figure; we therefore call *Wax* a *Substance*. On the contrary; we consider *Roundness* so inherent to the *Wax* or some other Substance, that it can't subsist without it, for we are not capable of conceiving *Roundness* distinctly and separately from a round Body. This therefore we call a *Mode*, or *Accident*.

2. We always consider Bodies cloath'd, as I may say, in some certain *Modes*, except when we reflect on the Abstract, or General. The *Substances* the *Grammarians* express by the *Name*; the *Modes* may be render'd by the *Qualities*; as *Wax* and *Roundness* is express'd by *round Wax*.

3. We have besides, certain compound *Ideas*, which consist only of *Modes*; and others which are compounded, or made up only with a sort of Species, or kind of *Modes*. As a *Furlong*, as far as it expresses a Mensuration of the Road; for it comprehends uniform *Modes*, as *Paces* or *Feet*: Others consist of several sorts of *Modes*; as the *Idea* of *Pity*, which has been already defin'd, and of the other Passions, and Virtues and Vices.

4. We have, farther, *Ideas* compounded of a Collection of Substances of a like Nature, such is the *Idea* of an *Army*, of a *City*, of a *Flock*; consisting of many *Soldiers*, *Citizens*, or *Sheep*, &c. or they are compos'd of a Collection of *Ideas* of unlike Substances; such is the *Idea* of the Matter of which a *House*, a *Ship*, or a *Desert* is compounded. And in these *Ideas* we consider not only Substances, as they are such, but also as attended with certain *Modes*, which produce *Ideas* that are very much compounded.

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5. We define Substances in general, *Things subsisting by themselves*, but then they are consider'd abstractly, or without regard to any particular Substance actually existing; and in that Sense it is sufficiently plain what is meant by the Word *Substance*; but since there is no Substance consider'd in general which has any Existence, but in our *Ideas*, where we consider existing *Substances*, the Matter is alter'd. The *Ideas* of single or particular Substances, are very obscure; nor do we understand any thing by their several Names, but certain we know not what unknown Subjects, in which there are certain Properties which constantly co-exist. Thus if any one shou'd ask what that Substance is which we call Body, we can only say, that it is an unknown Subject, in which we always discover *Extension*, *Divisibility*, and *Impenetrability*.

6. 'Tis plain, that nothing more obscure can be meant, than what is express'd by these Terms, *extended Substances*. For all that is here meant, is, that there is an *unknown Subject*, one of whose Properties is to consist of other unknown Subjects, or Substances plac'd close to each other, and of that Nature, that we have no *Idea* of any one of those Substances of which we say a Body consists. For we cannot affirm of any *Idea*, that it is the *Idea* of any one Substance, of which a Body is compos'd, since we have no *Idea* of corporeal Substance, which do's not comprehend or contain innumerable Substances. If therefore we express what we understand by the Name of *corporeal Substance*, we must say, that it is a *Composition of unknown Beings, some of whose Properties we know*.

7. The same we may say of other Substances, as of the *Spiritual* (we examine not here whether or not there be any more) as whoever will consider with Attention, and not suffer himself to be amus'd and deceiv'd by empty Words, will experience. We find in our Mind various Thoughts, whence we form the *Idea* of Spirits; but we are ignorant of what that Subject, is in which these Thoughts are.

8. It will be of great Use to as perfect a Knowledge of Things as we are capable of obtaining, to distinguish in those Subjects which we call Substances, those Things, without which we can conceive those Subjects or Modes from those without which we cannot conceive them. For when we think with Attention on those Subjects, we shall find that there are some Things so essential to them, that we can't deprive them of, without changing their Nature; and other Things which may be taken away from the Subject, and destroy its Nature.

9. *Modes* are commonly divided into *internal*, which we conceive, as it were, inherent in the Substance ; as, *Roughness*, &c. Or *external*, as when we say any Thing is *desir'd*, *lov'd*, *beheld*, and the like ; which we call *Relations*.

10. There are likewise *Modes*, which are also *Substances* as, *Apparel*, *Hair*, &c. without which the *Subject* can subsist and they can likewise be without the *Subject*. As for these *Ideas*, which are compos'd of *Modes* and *Substances* variously join'd together, some are call'd *real*, as being the *Ideas* of Things that either really *do*, or are at least believ'd to exist others *rational*, that is, when the Mind compounds various *Ideas* together ; as when we consider a Stick reaching up to the Stars themselves.

11. In compound *Ideas* we ought carefully to observe how manifold, and of how many *Ideas* they consist ; as we shall more plainly see under the Head of the *Obscurity* and *Peripicuity* of *Ideas*.

C H A P. IV. Of R E L A T I O N S.

1. **T**Here are, besides *Substances*, and *Modes* which are inherent in *Substances*, certain external Denominations which tho' they add nothing to the Substance, yet depend on some Mode or Manner of it ; and these we call *Relations* by which the Consideration of one Thing includes the Consideration of another. Thus when we call any one a *Father* on this Expression depends this, that he whom we call so has begot Children, and so comprehends and includes the Consideration of Children.

2. Every *Idea*, consider'd in a certain manner, may be the Foundation of a *Relation*, that is, may lead us by some Property of its own to the Consideration of some other *Idea*. So that all Existence may be divided into the *Creator* and the *Creature* ; for the Name of the *Creator* includes the Thought of the *Creature* ; and so on the contrary.

3. *Relations* are innumerable ; for they may be between *Substances* and *Substances*, *Modes* and *Modes*, *Modes* and *Substances*, *Relations* and *Substances*, *Relations* and *Modes*, *Relations* and *Relations* ; for there is nothing that cannot excite our Thoughts on something else, since we can compound or join our *Ideas* together as we think fit. But avoiding too nice a Scrutiny, we shall only make our Observations

ons on those of the greatest moment, which regard *Relations* consider'd in *general*.

4. We very often consider *Ideas* as *absolute*, or including no *Relations*, which yet have necessarily a Reference to Others. Thus we cannot call any thing *Great* or *Large*, but that the *Idea* which answers that Word, must be *relative*. For we call those Things *great*, in a certain Kind, which are the *greatest* among those Things of the same Nature, which we have known. We call that *Hill* or *Mountain great*, which is as *great* as any *Hill* that we have ever seen. That Kingdom is *large*, which exceeds the Bounds of our own Country, or of those Countries we have known, &c. That Tower we call *high*, which is higher than most of the same kind that we have known. In Number we call that *great*, than which there is not many greater in the same Kind: Thus sixty Thousand Men in Arms in *Greece* was call'd a *great Army*, because *Greece* scarce ever had a greater; but it had been little in *Persia*, where much larger were assembled. Thus likewise as to *Time*, we call it long or short with Reference to another. We call a hundred Years Life, a long Life; *Jacob* call his (a 130) short, because his Ancestors liv'd so many longer. Sickness, Pain, and Expectation, make that *Time* seem long, which to one in Action, Health, or Pleasure, seems short. That Burthen is heavy to a Child, a weak Woman, an old Man, the Sickly, which is light to a Man in Health and Vigour. Thus in the Ornaments of the Mind, we call that Wit great, that Learning profound, that Memory tenacious, that Prudence consummate, which we find excel, after the Manners of our Country, all that we know among us; tho' by Foreigners they may be thought but of a moderate size. Thus *Great Learning* has a very different Signification in the Mouth of a Man of Letters, and of an ignorant Person; it is of a much larger extent in the former, than in the later.

5. In short, all the Modes both of Mind and Body that admit of Encrease or Diminution, are the Prototypes of Relative *Ideas*. But this is to be observ'd with the utmost Attention, because their Number is very large, which if confounded with *absolute Ideas*, will give rise to great Errors, and render us incapable of understanding the Discourse of Others.

6. Here we must, in short, remark, that the Judgments that we make are only the Perceptions of the *Relations* between various *Ideas*; in which *Relations* our Mind do's acquiesce,

quiesce. Thus when we judge that two times two make four, or that two times two do not make five : our Mind observes the *Relation* of Equality which is between two times two and four, and the Inequality which is between two times two and five ; in which Perception, as evident, the Mind does acquiesce or is best satisfy'd, or gives it self no farther Trouble to consider of its Truth. But of this more at large in the second Part.

7. *Reasoning* also is a like Perception of the *Relations* join'd with that Acquiescence of the Mind. But it is not a Perception of the *Relations* which are among various Things, but of those *Relations* which the *Relations* themselves have among themselves. Thus when we gather from this, that 4 is a smaller Number than 6, and that twice 2 equals 4, that twice 2 is a less Number than 6 ; we perceive the Relation of Inequality, which is between the Relation of the Number twice 2 and 4, and the Relation of 4 and 6 acquiescing in which Perception, we conclude it a less Number than 6. But this belongs to the third and fourth Parts yet we thought it proper to make this short remark here, that the Distinction we brought in the beginning of various Relations shoud not be look'd on as empty and vain ; for unless we retain this, we know not what our Mind do's in Judging and Reasoning. All our *Ideas* may be referr'd to *Substances*, *Modes* and *Relations*.

C H A P. V.

Of *I D E A S* which are offer'd to the Mind without any Operation of its own ; and of those, in the forming which, some Operation of the Mind does intervene.

1. **T**Here are certain *Ideas* which are only consider'd by the Mind, without any manner of addition ; such are all *Simple Ideas*, which have not any Dependence on the Will and Pleasure of the Mind, and in spite of that, are always the same. Thus the Mind has no Command over Pleasure, or Pain. Now the other simple *Ideas*, which we have enumerated before, we find to be of that nature, as that if the Mind endeavour to detract any thing from them, they utterly perish, and cease to be ; nor can it add any thing, without the destruction of their Simplicity.

2. To this same Head we may refer those *Compound Ideas* which offer themselves to the Mind, without our thinking of the Matter, such as the Ideas of Things that exist; which Things affect our Senses, and excite certain Ideas of themselves in our Mind.

3. These *Ideas* are term'd *Real*, because they proceed from Things existing without us. On the contrary, there are other *Compound Ideas*, which are not brought to the Mind from abroad, but are compounded by that, according to its Pleasure. Thus, by joining the Ideas of *half a Man*, and *half a Horse*, the *Idea* of a *Centaur* is form'd; which is done in no other manner, than by the Mind's Will to have the Image of a *Centaur* the Object of its View; or by considering at once the Body of a *Man* from the Waiste to the Head, and the Body of a *Horse* with the Head and Neck cut off: For such is the Force of the Humane Mind, that it can joyn whatever is not contradictory, by its Contemplation, and rescind whatever it pleases. These *Ideas*, thus compounded by the Mind, we call *Phantastic*.

4. As the Mind can consider those Things together, which in Reality, and without it self, are not joyn'd together in one Existence; so can it consider those Things separately, which do not in Reality exist separately. And this sort of Contemplation, which is call'd *Abstraction*, is of great Use to the accurate Consideration of *Compound Ideas*. For we cannot, if they consist of a larger number of Parts, distinctly see them in our Mind all together; 'tis therefore an Advantage to us, that we can examine some of them separately, a little delaying the Consideration of the rest.

5. *Abstraction* is made principally three ways: *First*, Our Mind can consider any one Part of a Thing really distinct from it, as a *Man's Arm*, without the Contemplation of the rest of his Body. But this is not properly *Abstraction*, since the *Arm* is, without the Interposition of the *Mind*, separated distinct from the *Body*, tho' it cannot live, that is, be nourish'd, encrease, or move in that Separation.

6. *Secondly*, We think by *Abstraction* of the *Mode* of a *Substance*, omitting the Substance it self, or when we separately consider several Modes, which subsist together in one Subject. This *Abstraction* the *Geometricians* make use of, when they consider the Length of a Body separately, which they call a *Line*, omitting evidently the Consideration of its Breadth and Depth. And then its Length and Breadth together, which they call the *Surface*. By the same *Abstraction* we can

can distinguish the determination of a Motion, towards what Place directed, from the Motion it self.

7. *Thirdly*, We, by *Abstraction*, omit the *Modes* and *Relations* of any particular Thing, if from it we form a *Universal Idea*. Thus, when we wou'd understand a *Thinking Being* in general, we gather from our self Consciousness what it is to *Think*, and, omitting the Consideration of those Things which have a peculiar Reference to the Humane Mind, we think of a thinking Being in general. By this means particular *Ideas* become general.

8. That we may not err in judging of the *Ideas* mentioned in this Chapter, we must make these Observations. First, That those *Ideas* which offer themselves to the Mind without any Operation of its own, must of necessity be excited by some external Cause, and so are plac'd before the Mind as they are. But we must take heed that we do not think that there is always in those Things themselves which excite those *Ideas*, any thing like them, because it may happen that they are not the true and real Causes, but only the Occasions by which those *Ideas* are produc'd. And this Suspicion ought to be heighten'd by what we experience in our Dreams when by the occasion of the Motion of the Brain there are the Images of Things set before us, which are not present themselves, and often have no Existence in Nature. Whence we may gather from suchlike *Ideas*, that the Cause or Occasion of their Production has an external Subsistence, and not in the Mind.

9. *Secondly*, As to those *Ideas* which are compounded by the Mind, we easily imagine, first, that the Originals of such *Ideas* may possibly somewhere exist; and then, that they really do, unless we are manifestly convinc'd by Experience, that they never did really exist conjunctly, and so join'd together. And on the contrary, that those Things which the Mind considers separately by *Abstraction*, do really exist in that separate State. As the Mathematical *Point* without any Parts; and *Lines* consisting only of those *Points* join'd together, without Breadth or Depth, and *Surfaces* without Depth; whereas Demonstration shows the contrary, and those Terms are only made use of by the Mathematicians for the sake of the Instruction of the Learners of that Art.

10. We must here farther warn you against another Error too frequent among the *School Men*, that is, not to make those really distinct Things, or different Beings, which we have distinguish'd by *Abstraction*.

C H A P. VI.

Of Individual, Particular, and Universal IDEAS.

WHAT we have said of *Abstractions* leads us to the consideration of *Ideas*, as they are *individual*, *particular*, and *universal*, for they are made *particular* and *universal* from *individual*, by *Abstraction*; in which Matter we proceed in this manner. When we consider our selves, in our Mind, or any one Man before us, then we have the *Idea* of an *Individual*, or an *Individual Idea*. But if we omit those Things which are peculiar to us, or that one Man, and consider what is common to us and many others; such as to be born in the same Country, to be of the same Party, and the like, then is the *Idea* of some *Particular Nation*, or Family, &c. plac'd before us: But lastly, if omitting these particular Distinctions common to us and a certain number of Men, we consider what is common to us and all Mankind, we have then a *Universal Idea*.

2. The Names that signify *individual Ideas*, are call'd *proper*; as, *Alexander*, *Cæsar*. But those which signify *particular* and *universal Ideas*, are call'd *Appellative*, or *Common*; as, a *Briton*, a *Christian*, a *Man*.

3. Farther — We may distinguish in those *Ideas* certain properties which are constantly united in them, and external *Subjects* agreeable to those *Ideas*, or such as the *Ideas* agree with. Thus in the *Idea* of Man we discover or see a thinking Mind and a Body consisting of certain Organs; but this *Idea* agrees with the Inhabitants of *Europe*, *Asia*, *Africa* and *America*.

C H A P. VII.

Of the Perspicuity and Obscurity of IDEAS.

BEFORE we can pass any certain Judgment of an *Idea*, it is first necessary that it shou'd be *clear* or *perspicuous*, otherwise if we shou'd happen to pass a right Judgment on a thing that is not known, or at least not sufficiently clear, it must be attributed to Chance, and not to Knowledge. The Obscurity and Clearness of *Ideas* are therefore worthy our Consideration in the *Art of Reasoning*.

2. We call that a *clear Idea*, when all it comprehends is so distinctly plac'd before our Mind, that we can easily distinguish it from all others.

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3. All *simple Ideas* are clear, such as *Sensations*; such therefore is the *Idea* of Light: For when we have that *Idea* before us, we see all that is in it, nor can we confound it with any other. We may say the same of Sounds, Scents, Taste, Pleasure, Pain, &c. which can never be confounded or mingled with each other. And these *Sensations* encrease in their Clearness in proportion to the Liveliness of their striking on the Organ proper to them; for by how much more vehemently the Mind is strook, with so much the more Attention it applies to the Subject, and so this lively *Idea* is more clearly distinguish'd from all others.

4. These *simple Ideas* are also *perspicuous* or clear, which the Mind receives without the Interposition of the Body. Examples of which we have given under the Head of *simple Compounded Ideas*. But as we can consider the Parts of a *compound Idea* separately, so we view them singly, or one by one as *simple Ideas*, of which they are compounded: Thus also all *abstract Ideas* are clear, tho' the Subject in which they exist be unknown. We can in all Substances, of which we know any Properties, select some Property, which being by *Abstraction* separated from all the rest, becomes *simple*, and by consequence clear, altho' it exist in a Subject which we do not know. Thus *Humanity* generally consider'd, is made a *simple Idea*, and therefore indivisible.

5. But these same *Ideas* are often made obscure when they are consider'd without *Abstraction*, together with other *Ideas* that are obscure, and co-exist in the Subject. Thus when the Question is not, what *Humanity* or *Reason* is in general, but what *Reason* is in *Stephen*, or in *Thomas*, and what is its numerical Difference.

6. Those *compounded Ideas* are clear, all whose Parts, or *simple Ideas* of which they are compounded, are perfectly known to us. But those we call obscure of which we only know some Parts. Thus when we know all the *Unites* of which any Number consists, we certainly know the Number; but if we have gone through but some of the *Unites*, we cannot know how much the whole is; and have therefore a confus'd *Idea* of it.

7. Whenever, therefore, we are to judge of any Thing we must first distinguish all its Parts, if it consist of Parts, and then give Judgment: Else we shall do as if we should give the Sum Total of an Account, and not know the particular Numbers or Figures which make it up. But more of this in the *Third Part*.

8. But if in the Things which fall under our Consideration we cannot sufficiently distinguish their Parts, and give a certain Enumeration of them, we must then fairly confess, that either they are not in the number of those Things to which the Knowledge of Man can extend, or that it requires more Time to examine into the Matter.

9. It much conduces to the *clearness* of an *Idea* compounded by our selves or others, if the Parts which compose it are always of the same Number, and in the same Order ; otherwise, if the Number of the *simple Ideas* of which it's compos'd, can be encreas'd or lessen'd, or their Order inverted, the Memory, and so the Mind, is confounded. Thus if any one has with Care cast up any Sums, and plac'd them in any certain Order, as often as he has a Mind to remember them, he easily does it, if there has been no Abstraction or displacing in the Accompt. But on the contrary, the former Computation and Disposition is destroy'd if the Numbers are disturb'd, and thrown out of their Places.

10. In short, the Nature of *Perspicuity* or *Clearness*, is such when it is at its height, that it compels our Assent. We cannot have the least doubt but that Pleasure is different from Pain, or that twice two make four. On the contrary, we find a Power in our Minds of suspending our Judgment when there is any Obscurity in the *Ideas*. But 'tis certain, that we often rashly yield our Assent to obscure *Ideas*, but still we have Liberty to deny it ; which we cannot do to an *Idea* which has a compleat *Perspicuity* or *Clearness*.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Adequate and Inadequate, or Perfect or Imperfect IDEAS.

1. **W**E have observ'd in the first Chapter, that *Ideas* are the Images of Things which are without us, by the Force or Occasion of which they are excited in us ; but they may be the Images of the whole Thing that excites them, or only of a part. When they represent the whole, they are call'd *Adequate*, or perfect ; when but a part, they are call'd *Inadequate*, or imperfect. Thus if we see only the square Surface of a *Cube*, then the *Idea* of a square Figure, not of a *Cube*, is in our Mind ; which, therefore, is call'd an *inadequate* or *imperfect Idea*. On the contrary, if

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we

we behold a Triangle drawn on a piece of Paper, and think of a Triangle in Plane, we have an *adequate* or *perfect* Idea in our Mind.

2. All simple Ideas are *adequate* or *perfect*, because the Faculty (be it what it will) that excites them represents them entire. Thus the Pain that we feel signifies, that there is some Faculty of some Being without us, which excites that Idea in us against our Will. But we must proceed no farther, for a *simple Idea* represents a *simple Object*, but it does not inform us where it is, or whether that Faculty be united to any others. We may therefore, without fear of Error, gather from any Sensation, that there is something out of our Mind which is by Nature adapted to excite it in us.

3. The Ideas of Modes are also *adequate* or *perfect*, except of those Modes which are likewise Substances. For when we understand no Modes separately existing, they are only consider'd by us separately from the Substances by way of *Abstraction*; but all *abstract Ideas* are *adequate* or *perfect*, since they represent all that Part of the Subject which we then consider. Thus the Idea of *Roundness* is *perfect* or *adequate* because it offers to our Mind all that is in *Roundness* in general. The Idea of a *Triangle* in general is *adequate* or *perfect* because when it's before my Mind, I see all that is common to all the Triangles that can be.

4. Of the same kind are all Ideas, of which we know no original or external Object really existing out of them, but the occasion of which those Ideas are excited in us, and of which we think them the Images. Thus, when a Dog is before us, it is the external Object without us, which raises the Idea in our Mind; but the Idea of an *Animal* in general has no external Object to excite it; 'tis created by the Mind it self, which adds to, and detracts from it whatever it pleases; whence it must of necessity be *adequate* or *perfect*.

5. But here again, we must take heed of what we have before caution'd, that is, that we do not suppose that there are any such Objects really existing without us, because the Mind has been pleas'd to entertain it self with the Ideas. For that wou'd be as if a Painter that had drawn a *Centaur* or *Hundred-handed Encelades*, shou'd contend, that there were such Beings really-existent in Nature.

6. The Ideas of all Substances are *inadequate* or *imperfect*, which are not form'd at the pleasure of the Mind, but gather'd from certain Properties which Experience discovers in them. This is sufficiently evident from what we have

said

aid of *Substances* in the third *Chapter*. For there we have shown that we only know some of the Properties of *Substances*, not all; and therefore their *Ideas* must be *imperfect*, or *inadequate*. Thus we know that Silver is white, that it can be melted, and be diminish'd by the Fire as it melts; that it can be drawn out into Wire, and dissolv'd by *Aqua fortis*, &c. but we are wholly ignorant of the inward Disposition or Constitution of the Particles of which Silver consists, and from whence those Properties proceed. Thus the *Idea* of Silver not representing to the Mind all the Properties of Silver, is *inadequate* or *imperfect*.

7. Here the greatest Danger is, least we confound *inadequate* or *imperfect Ideas* with the *adequate* or *perfect*. For we are too apt to fancy, that when we know a great many Properties of any Thing, and cannot discover any more by all our Industry, we have the whole Subject. Thus some ingenious Men of our Times, imagin'd they had discover'd all the Properties of the Mind, because they cou'd find nothing in it but Thoughts, and therefore said, that the Mind was only a *Thinking Substance*; and so they contend that there is nothing else in Body but *Extension*, *Impenetrability*, and *Divisibility*, because they cou'd discover nothing else; but they cou'd never yet shew us what those *Substances* were whose Properties were to think, to have Parts, &c. There is no Existence of *Substance* in general; and tho' we understand this Word in *General*, it does by no means follow, that we understand it when 'tis spoke of any particular Subject, which we must be sure to have a particular Regard to.

The End of the First Part of the Art of
REASONING.

The Second Part of LOGIC;
OR,
The Art of REASONING.

of JUDGMENTS.

CHAP. I.

*Of Judgment in the Mind, and express'd
in Words.*

1. **H**AVING consider'd *Ideas* and their Properties particularly, we come now to treat of *Judgments*, in which various *Ideas* are compar'd with each other. We must first accurately distinguish the *Judgment* as it is in the Mind, from the Words in which it is express'd, if we wou'd know what it is.

2. *Judgment*, as it is in the Mind and unwritten, is a Perception of the Relation that is between two or more *Ideas*. Thus when we judge that the Sun is greater than the Moon, having compar'd the two *Ideas* of the Sun and Moon, we find that the *Idea* of the Sun is greater than that of the Moon, and our Mind perfectly acquiesces in this Perception, nor makes any farther Enquiry into the matter. When we judge two Members to be unequal, by having observ'd the inequality of their *Ideas*, our Mind gives it self no farther Trouble in their Examination in that respect, but only confines to its Memory, that those two Members were found to be unequal.

3. We must here observe, That our Mind can give its Assent to *obscure Ideas*, as well as to those which are *clear*; or acquiesce in a Thing as perfectly discover'd, which yet it has no perfect Knowledge of, and can commit this to the Memory as a Thing perfectly known. Thus we may judge the fix'd Stars less than the Moon, by comparing the *obscure Ideas* of those Stars and the Moon, and then take it for a point

point not to be argu'd against, as clear and evident. The Mind has also a Faculty of suspending its Assent, till by an accurate Examen of the *Ideas*, the Subject becomes clear and evident ; or if it be of such a Nature that we cannot arrive at a perspicuous Perception, we continue in Doubt or Suspense, and commend it to the Memory as a dubious matter. This Faculty which we observe in our Mind, of giving our Assent to *obscure Ideas*, or denying it, is call'd *Liberty*.

4. But we cannot make use of this Faculty when the Subject of our Thoughts has the last and greatest Perspicuity that can be. For Example, we can by no Means in the World persuade our selves, that twice two do not make four, or are equal to four ; or that the Part is not less than the whole, and the like Maxims of the most evident Truths ; for as soon as ever we hear them, the Mind cannot deny its Assent, but necessarily acquiesces, without finding in it self the least Desire or Inclination of making any farther Enquiry into the Matter.

5. This is a *Judgment* as it is in the Mind, which when express'd in Words, we call a *Proposition*, in which something always is affirm'd or deny'd. That part of the Proposition of which something is affirm'd or deny'd, is call'd the *Subject* ; the other Part, which is said by the Negation or Affirmation, is call'd the *Attribute*. Thus when we say that *Poverty is to be reliev'd* ; or *Poverty is no Vice* ; the Word *Poverty* is the *Subject* ; *to be reliev'd*, and *Vice*, are the *Attributes*. But besides these two Parts, we must consider the *Copula*, or *connective Word*, by which, when 'tis alone, 'tis affirm'd that there is some Relation between the *Subject* and the *Attribute*, but by adding a Negative Particle, that some Relation is deny'd : In the present Instances we affirm in the first, that there is a Relation between the Idea of *Poverty*, and the Idea of *Relief*, so that the Idea of *Poverty* in our Mind includes the Idea of *Relief* ; and in the later Instance we deny that the Idea of *Poverty* excites in us the Consideration of any thing base or wicked.

6. *Propositions* are sometimes express'd in many Words, and sometimes in few. *Henry rages*, is an entire Proposition, for 'tis the same as if we shou'd say *Henry is raging*.

7. *Propositions* are either *Simple* or *Compound*, the *Simple* are express'd in one Word ; as, *God is good* : the *Compound* in many, as *God, who is good, cannot delight in the Misery of Man*.

CHAP. II.

Of Universal, Particular, and Singular Propositions.

1. **W**E have in the former Part divided Ideas into *Universal, Particular, and Singular*, and said that the Words by which they were express'd, might be rang'd under the same Heads. Hence the *Propositions* have the same threefold Division.

2. When the Subject is *Universal*, or taken in its whole extent, without excepting any subordinate Species or Sort, or any other Individual which is contain'd under it, then is the *Proposition* call'd *Universal*. This *Universality* is express'd by the Word *All* when the *Proposition* is affirmative ; and by that of *None* or *No*, when it is negative ; *All Men are free*, is an universal affirmative Proposition, and *No Man is free* is an universal Negative.

3. But the Subject has some mark or note by which we shew, that not all the Sorts or Species, or Individuals, which are compriz'd under that Word, are meant ; then is the Proposition *Particular* ; as, *some Man is free*. By the Word *some* we intimate that we do not here understand all that is signify'd by the general Word *Man*, but that we only design a Part by the Word *some*.

4. *Singular* or *Individual Propositions* are those in which we affirm only of some one individual Person or Thing ; as, *Alexander was choleric*. These Propositions have a great Affinity to the *Universals* in this, that the Subject of both is taken in its full and whole extent. Hence the *Individual Propositions* in the common Rules of Argumentation are taken for *Universals*.

5. To pass over the trifling of the Schools, which make *Logic* the *Art of Disputing*, not *Reasoning*, and have more Regard to make the Student talk of any thing *Pro* and *Con*, than to find out the Truth, we must observe, that an Observation flowing from what we have before said of Substances, is of more Importance for the discovery of the Truth, the only just End of *Reasoning*. That is, that *Universal Propositions*, when of the Kinds or Species, or of the Generals and Particulars of Substances, cannot be with any certainty made agreeable to the Things themselves ; because since

we do not know the Essences of them, we cannot affirm that all Substances in which we discover some certain Attributes equally to co-exist, are in those of which we know nothing alike, or the same. As for Example, We discover and observe that there are certain singular Attributes constantly co-existing in all Men, yet who can assure us whether all their Minds are alike, so far as that, what difference betwixt Particulars is visible, arises from external Cause in respect of the Mind, as from the Body, from Education, and the like ; or that there is really some real difference between them in the Substance of the Mind itself. The difference of the Wit and Genius of Men seems to persuade the later Opinion, which is observable in two Brothers who have had the same Education ; but since we know not whether the Brain in both is dispos'd in the same manner, the Diversity of the Wit and Ingenuity may proceed from that Cause.

5. Thus such as with Assurance affirm, that the inmost Essence of all Bodies is the same ; if they are in the right, they owe that more to Chance than to any clear Knowledge of the Matter : For there might be a plain difference betwixt the inmost Essence of various Bodies, altho' they agree in having several of the same Attributes, which we do know. We shou'd therefore take a particular Care, as to these general Propositions of Substances, not to give up our Assent to such who pretend to have a perfect and clear Knowledge of their inmost Essence.

6. The *Modes*, whose entire Essence is known to us, fall under a different Consideration ; for we may form general Assertions of them, of indubitable Truth. Hence it is that *Geometry*, which is wholly conversant with the *Modes*, is built on the most certain Foundation, and delivers Universal Rules of all Figures and Magnitudes, which cannot be destroy'd or oppos'd.

CHAP. III.

Of what is Truth and Falshood, and whether there be any certain Difference between them.

1. **BY** Reasoning to find out the Truth, being the just Aim of this our Art, we shall pass over the several Classes of Propositions set down by the common *Logicians*, and which are of little consequence in any thing, but of no man-

manner of use to this more important End. We shall therefore here treat of the Truth and Falshood in general of all Propositions, that we may learn to distinguish the one from the other.

2. That Proposition is true which is agreeable, or answers to the Nature of the Thing, of which any thing is affirm'd or deny'd. Thus when we say that 4 is the one fourth part of twice 8. That Proposition is true, because agreeable to the Nature of these Numbers. If we say twice 4 is equal to twice 3, the Proposition is false, because it is not answerable to the Nature of those Numbers.

3. Whoever will speak seriously what he thinks, will confess, that he necessarily believes that there is no Medium between *Truth* and *Falshood*. It is certain, that all Propositions, consider'd in themselves, appear to us either true or false ; for 'tis a *Contradiction to be agreeable or consentaneous, and not consentaneous and agreeable to the Things*. There are indeed some probable Propositions, or suspected of Falsity, but this has nothing to do with the Nature of Propositions, which is in it self determinately true or false ; but to our Knowledge, which is not (in respect of these Propositions) sufficient to enable us to determine with certainty. Of which hereafter.

4. There have been some who have asserted, that this only was certain, *that nothing was certain*, and that *Truth* had no Criterion or certain Mark to be known from *Falshood* in any thing else but that one Maxim. But since they cou'd not deny but that they held this Maxim for a certain *Truth*, there must be, ev'n according to them, some mark of *Truth*, by which they excepted that Maxim from the uncertainty of all other Propositions. And they were of Opinion, that they had found the Marks of Uncertainty in all these Things, which the other Philosophical Sects held for undoubted *Truths*. They therefore determin'd positively of all Things at the same Time that they pretended to doubt of all Things, while they asserted, that all that was said by others, was uncertain. We cannot therefore condemn the *Pyrrhonians* and *Academics*, as denying that Truth was not at all known to us, while they thought they did truly judge of the Uncertainty of all Things, in which they were as dogmatic and positive as any of the other Philosophers.

5. But that we may satisfy our selves, we must make it the Object of our Enquiry to know, that what we affirm of Things is consentaneous or agreeable to their Nature. If

we will give our selves the Trouble to look into our own Minds, we shall find, that there are some Things which compel our Assent ; but other Things of which we can suspend our Judgment. When we clearly and distinctly discover the certain Relation between two Ideas, we cannot but acquiesce in that Perception, or think our selves oblig'd to make farther Enquiries about it. Thus the Relation of Equality between twice 4 and 8, is so manifest and evident, that we cannot entertain the least doubt of the matter.

6. But shou'd any Man affirm, *that there were Inhabitants in the Moon*, after a long consideration of this Proposition we shall find that we are by no means compell'd to give our Assent to it ; the Reason of which is, that we do not distinctly and plainly discover any necessary Relation between the Moon, and any manner of Inhabitants, but that we can doubt of that Relation, till it be made evident to our Understanding.

7. Hence we may gather, that *Evidence* alone can remove all our Doubts. What remains is, that we enquire, whether it follows, that that Proposition is true, of which we have no Reason to doubt ?

8. We must first in this Question observe, that it is entirely superfluous among Men, because whatever Judgment we make of it, we cannot change our Nature. We necessarily give our Assent to those Things which are *evident*, and we shall always preserve our Faculty or Pow'r of doubting in those Things which are obscure.

9. *Secondly*, If Evidence shou'd be found in Propositions that are false, we must necessarily be compell'd into Error, since we necessarily give our Assent to Evidence. Hence wou'd follow this impious Position, That God, who made us, is the Author of our Errors, since he has thus put us under a Necessity of falling into 'em. But it is only consistent with a wicked Nature to oblige us to be deceiv'd, which in the least to suspect God, wou'd be the height of Impiety.

10. *Thirdly*, We necessarily love Truth, and hate Error ; for there is no body who is not desirous of knowing the Truth, and no body is willingly deceiv'd. But who can prevail with himself so much as to suspect, that we are made in such a manner by a Beneficent Deity, that we shou'd love that with the greatest Vehemence, which we either cou'd not obtain, or not know whether we obtain'd it or not, which is much the same.

11. *Fourthly*,

11. *Fourthly*, If we shou'd err in Things that are evident, as well as in those which are not so, we shou'd sometimes in the evident Propositions find Contradictions, which are commonly found in those which treat of Things that are obscure. On the contrary, evident Things are always agreeable to each other, when frequently evident Things disagree with those that are obscure: Whence we may conclude, that Evidence can not deceive, but Error is confin'd to Obscurity.

12. *Evidence* is, therefore, the Criterion or Mark of *Truth*; and those Things we ought to think true, to which we necessarily give our Assent. For this is likewise the Mark or Characteristic of Truth, that it necessarily compels our Assent. Whatever, therefore, we see *evidently* agreeable to the Things of which we speak, that we must think true. On the other hand, when we find any Proposition evidently contrary to the Nature of the Thing under our Consideration, we may justly declare that to be false.

13. But to decide peremptorily in a Matter that is obscure, is very rash and inconsiderate, as we have observ'd in the First Part, of the *clearness* or *obscurity* of *Ideas*, which we shall not repeat. But since those Things which are really obscure are often asserted to be evident, whoever wou'd avoid that Error, ought as much as he can to suspend his Judgment; and nicely to examine whether he be not influenc'd by some Inclination, or Passion, or Party, when the finding out the Truth ought to be his whole Aim; and then he will never give his Assent to Things that are false or obscure.

CHAP. VI.

Of the several Steps or Degrees of Perspicuity in Propositions, and of Verisimilitude, or Probability.

1. **B**Ecause all that we believe is not built on any evident Knowledge, the Philosophers have observ'd in our Knowledge several Degrees, all which however may be reduc'd to these two, *Science* and *Opinion*.

Science is a Knowledge deriv'd from the Introspection or looking into the Thing it self of which we discourse, and which

which exclude all manner of Doubt. But it may arise from a simple Intuition or View of the Ideas ; as, when we consider this Proposition—*The whole is greater than a Part*, and the like ; whose Truth is known by Evidence alone, without any Reasoning on the Point. Or by deducing certain Consequences, and those more remote, from evident Principles, such as are innumerable Geometrical Demonstrations, necessarily deduc'd by a long Chain of Arguments from their first Principles.

3. *Opinion* is the Assent of the Mind to Propositions not evidently true at the first sight, nor deduc'd by necessary Consequence from those which are evidently true, but such as seem to carry the face of Truth. Thus 'tis probable that the Writers of the Life of *Alexander* magnify'd too much his Exploits. 'Tis not probable, or likely, that he ever receiv'd the Queen of the *Amazons*, or pass'd the Mountain *Caucasus*.

4. Some here add *Faith* or *Belief*, which is an Assent given to any one that tells us any Thing which we have not seen our selves, nor found out by any Argument, or Ratiocination. But that Faith or Belief depends either on some necessary Conclusion deduc'd from evident Arguments, or only on a probable Opinion, and so may be referr'd to one of the two Heads already mention'd.

5. To these we might add *Doubting*, or a *doubtful Assent*, tho' this be likewise a Species or sort of *Opinion*, and uses to be contain'd under the general Name of Opinion. For the Assent is *doubtful* when the Probability is weak, which when strong, produces *firm Opinion*. But to make these clearer to the Understanding, we will make a gradual Rising from Probability to Evidence.

6. Since, as we have seen in the former Chapter, those are call'd true Propositions, which agrees with the Nature of the Things of which they are spoken ; and those probable which only seem to agree to the Nature of the Thing under Consideration ; that Probability may be greater or less, and so produces either a stronger or weaker Opinion. But it is built, summarily consider'd, on our Knowledge and Experience, whether True or False.

7. But to rise from the lowest to the highest Probability, we must first observe, that the lowest Degree of Probability is built on the Relation of another where that is the only Motive of Belief ; in which yet many things are to be consider'd.

8. If the Person who gives the Relation be wholly unknown to us, altho' what he tells is not incredible, yet we cannot give an entire Credit to him, when there are no other Circumstances to add a Weight to his Narration, because we have had no other Experience of his Credibility; whether he be worthy of Belief or not. But if we have some slight Knowledge of him, we are the more ready to believe him, especially if he be a noted Man of great Authority with many, tho' we know not whether he has gained that Fame and Authority by his Merits or not. Nay, we rather believe a rich Man of indifferent Qualifications, than a poor Man, because we suppose the former more conversant with Persons skill'd in Affairs, than the latter. An honest Countenance, and Discourse full of Probity, easily win our Assent.

9. If any one with whom we are better acquainted, tell us any thing, the more known that is, the more Instance we have of his Veracity, the more ready he finds us to have assurance in the Truth of what he tells us, tho' he may deceive us ev'n in that very Narration. 'Tis with difficulty we can persuade our selves, that we are deceiv'd by a Person whom we have known generally to be a Man of Veracity, since Men who have got a Habit of speaking Truth, or any other Habit, seldom act contrary to the constant Disposition of their Mind.

10. There are besides, various Circumstances which add Force to the Testimony of others, as if it were a Thing of that kind in which he cou'd scarce be deceiv'd; as if Men of Sobriety and Temper shou'd tell us, that they had seen to such'd, and accurately examin'd some particular Thing, and not with a transient cursory View. The Probability is heighten'd, if the Belief of their Hearers be of no Advantage to them; or if they incur a considerable Danger by telling it, which they might avoid by saying nothing of the Matter; if to these the number of the Witnesses be encreas'd, the Probability will be so strong, that unless the Narration be opposite to the Nature of the Thing, we can scarce be able to deny our Assent.

11. Secondly, what here affects our Minds, is drawn from the very Nature of the Thing, and our own Experience. Whoever will tell us Stories that are impossible, can never gain our Belief, as long as the Narration labours under that Character; for that is the Mark of Falshood.

12. 'Tis first of all Things necessary, that what is spoken shou'd be thought possible: If we have never seen it, nor heard that any other has experienc'd the like, tho' the Matter it self be not actually impossible, yet it will find but little Credit with us: For Example — If any one shou'd tell us, That he had seen in the *Indies* a Brilliant Diamond as big as a Man's Head; tho' in this our Mind can discover nothing plainly impossible, or contradictory, yet shou'd we scarce believe it, because we never our selves saw one so large, or ever heard of any one else who had.

13. When we our selves have seen any Thing like it, or have known others who have seen the like, we then consider how seldom, or how often it has happen'd, for the more frequent a Thing has been to our Eyes, or those of others to our Knowledge, the easier Credit it finds with us; and on the contrary, the seldomer, the more difficultly believ'd. Thus if any one tell us, that he has seen a Stone Bridge over a River one or two hundred Paces long, he will find no difficulty in gaining our Belief: But we give Credit more hardly to him who shall tell us, that has seen a Bridge of solid Marble four mile in length, over an Arm of the Sea, and another Bridge of four hundred Foot in length, of only one Arch, as they say there are in *China*.

14. By the Test of the same Experience we examine the Circumstances of the Manner of doing any thing, the Circumstances of the Persons, Place and Time, and if these agree with what we know, they add a Force to the Relation. We farther are apt to consider and weigh the Causes or Motives which mov'd him to whom the Action is attributed to do it. For if the Thing be singular, uncommon, and out of the Way, we can scarce believe that it shou'd be done without solid and weighty Reasons, of which, while we are ignorant, the Matter of Fact must at least remain dubious in our Minds. But if these solid and cogent Reasons are known, we cease to doubt, or at least, we easily believe the Matter of Fact, if withal it appear, that the Agent knew these Reasons and Motives. Thus we easily believe the many Prodigies or Miracles of the Old Testament, done by God, because they were of the most momentous Importance to preserve at least one Nation uncorrupted by Idolatry, which cou'd not have been done without those Miracles. But we can scarce persuade our Minds to believe, that God, after the Christian Religion was establish'd, shou'd work Miracles on every trifling Occasion, as the Legends of the old Monks and modern Papists pretend.

15. We must seek the third Motive of our Belief in our selves: For there are some Events, the Truth of which cannot appear to any, but such whose Minds are first qualify'd by some certain Knowledge: As for Example, these are some Events of Ancient History. *There was a King of Macedon, whose Name was Alexander, who subdu'd Asia, having vanquish'd King Darius.* These are so well known to those who are conversant with the *Greek and Roman History*, that they can have no doubt of the Truth; but it is not so evident to a Man who is wholly unacquainted with History: for the former has read many Writers of various Nations and Times, all concurring in the same Account; he knows the Series of the whole History with which these are connected, and came to that Knowledge by degrees, by much Reading: To satisfy another in this Point, he must lead him up the same Steps by which he mounted, else he will find it difficult to make one obstinate believe him.

16. In this Probability of Relations, the fewer or more of these Circumstances occurring, makes it the weaker or stronger. Nay, when they all, or the greatest part meet, so great is the Force of the joining of those Circumstances, that they affect our Mind like the *highest Evidence*. For Example; he who reads the *Roman History*, can no more doubt, but that there was such a Man as *Julius Caesar*, and that he vanquish'd *Pompey*, than that two Lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference are equal.

17. As *Evidence* is the Criterion, or Characteristic of Truth in Things of Speculation, which depend on Reasoning, so in *Matters of Fact* the Concourse of so many Circumstances is an undoubted Proof and Mark of Truth. 'Tis certain, that we can no more deny our Assent to these concurring Circumstances, than to the *highest Evidence*; they therefore either persuade and recommend the Truth, or (which is absurd) God has so form'd us, that we must necessarily be deceiv'd.

18. There is likewise a *Probability* which depends only on our own Reasoning, or Experience, without the intervention of any else, and omitting those Circumstances, which we have enumerated. And here we may distinguish such various Steps and Degrees of *Probability*, that when we come to the highest, it is no longer a meer *Probability*, but manifest Truth, and compels our Assent without any Reserve or Doubt.

19. I. When

19. I. When we consider Things, of which we have some manner of Knowledge, but not a clear and perfect one, we may make a probable Judgment of them, better than if we were wholly ignorant of the Subject ; but this Probability is so weak, that we may be persuaded we have been in an Error. But when the Subject is perfectly known to us, by Experiment, we may make more certain Judgment of some Property of that Subject, which is not so thoroughly understood by us. Thus a Goldsmith, or Refiner, who has often melted Gold, and work'd in it in diverse Ways, can make better Judgment of some things which belong to that Metal, than a Man who has never been employ'd about it.

20. II. He who has some time doubted of a Thing, and judges not of it, but after a serious and long Scrutiny, will make juster Judgment of it than he who (without Experience) gives a rash and precipitate Judgment. 'Tis certain, we believe our selves more, after we have made a thorough Enquiry into it, than when we are oblig'd to make a hasty and unpremeditated Judgment. We call not that a diligent Enquiry or Scrutiny, which leaves us in no manner of Doubt ; for the Nature of the Thing of which we judge, do's not always allow so nice an Introspection, as to free us from all manner of Doubt ; but such an Enquiry we call diligent, which is all that the Nature of the Thing will admit. Thus we can examine few, or rather no Substances, so far, as to assure our selves that we have a certain Knowledge of most of its Properties. This makes all Natural Philosophy (which is not built on Experiments) a meer conjectural Amusement.

21. III. If we have been us'd to such Experiments before we give our Judgment, and have frequently given the like Judgments of other Things which have been approv'd by Experiments, taking thence a certain Assurance of a particular Faculty of finding out the Truth, we hope that with little Pains we have hit the Point ; yet this Assurance is often very fallacious, and leads us into Errors.

22. IV. Our Judgments of Things are either more certain or uncertain, as the Experiments were made a shorter or longer time, from that in which we call them to Mind. For when our Memory of any Experiment is fresh, as well as the whole Course and Reasons of the Operation, our Judgments then seem more probable to us. But when we retain but a faint Memory of the Enquiry, then we are apt to entertain Doubts of our Diligence in the Course of the

Operation, and we dare not maintain our Judgments with any manner of Confidence.

23. V. When Experience has discover'd certain Properties in the Thing which we examine, which are commonly unknown, and only can be found out by Ratiocination, our Guess seems to us the more probable, or likely, the more it agrees with those known Properties. If our Enquiry be which of the three Hypotheses of the Disposition of the Solar Vortex in which our Earth is, be most probable, that of *Ptolomy*, *Tycho*, or *Copernicus*; that of the last is prefer'd to the other two, because it accounts for all the Appearances in the Planets and fixt Stars about us; whereas the other two leave many unaccounted for. In such Enquiries as these, the Simplicity of the Hypothesis is of very great weight; for the fewer Things we are oblig'd to suppose, for giving an account of the Appearances, so much the more plausible is the Hypothesis, provided that by it we are able to account for all Things relating to it.

24. VI. When the Subject of our Enquiry is the Object of our Senses, when we have apply'd our Senses rightly dispos'd, then it is no longer a simple Probability, but an indubitable Truth. There are several Cautions to be us'd in this Affair, which are to be learn'd in Natural Philosophy. We must farther observe, that our Senses were given us, not to arrive at a perfect Knowledge of the Nature of Objects, but only of what is necessary to the Preservation of our Lives.

25. But we give more Credit to some of our Senses, than to others; thus we confide more in our Sight than our Hearing, because the Objects of our Eyes strike stronger on them, than those of the Hearing on the Ears. But when several Senses concur in the discovery of any Thing, as when we not only see, but hear and touch, then there can be no other Doubt remain of the Truth. Thus if we see, hear, and embrace our Friend, we cannot have the least Doubt of the Truth or Reality of what we do. Therefore, this Conviction of the Senses is no more to be resisted, than the Evidence arising from *Reasoning*.

26. From all that we have said it is plain, that there is this difference between a slight or weak Probability, and its strongest or highest Degree; that we cannot deny our Assent to this, but we may in that suspend our Judgment, or give it.

27. But

27. But the Use of these probable Propositions is different in common Life, and in Philosophical, and meerly Speculative Enquiries. For in common Life we very rarely depend on evident Arguments, but esteem it a sufficient Warrant of our doing any Thing, if back'd by no contemptible Probability. For, shou'd we not undertake any Action till we had the utmost Evidence of what we ought to do, we might soon perish ; and yet common Prudence will not allow us always to act on the lightest Probabilities. We ought, as much as possibly we can, diligently to examine all Things, and to contract such a Habit of judging rightly, that we may judge with all the Dispatch and Address imaginable. We ought to choose, of two Things that are not certain, that which may do us the least damage, if we shou'd be deceiv'd.

28. But, in Philosophical Things, we proportion our Assent to the Degree of Probability, so that to a weak Probability we give a weak Assent, a stronger to one that is of greater force, and a full and perfect one to that which comes up to Evidence. For to acquiesce entirely, as in Truth, in a Proposition which is obscure, by reason of some Appearance of Truth, is to throw our selves into manifest danger of Error.

29. But we must not in all Things require a *Mathematical Evidence*, since that can only have Place in abstracted or general, and adequate or perfect Ideas ; all whose Relations and Parts we know : But we ought in *Matters of Fact* to acquiesce in a *Moral Evidence*, or the highest Step or Degree of Probability, as we have describ'd it in this Chapter.

CHAP. V.

Of doubtful, suspected of Falsity, and false Propositions.

1. **T**Hose Things are *Dubious* in general, in which there are no evident Marks of Truth or Falshood. We sometimes discover some few Circumstances in Things which use to produce Probability, without being join'd to any others which may excite any Suspicion in us. Such are many ancient Histories, which we cannot reject, because we find in them some things which have the Appearance of Falshood ; nor yet admit as undoubted, because they have not Evidences enow of Truth. Thus the *Chinese* History of their

their most ancient Kings, especially of *Fohi*, who liv'd soon after *Noah*, we cannot be certain of its Truth, nor accuse them of Falshood. In like manner we cou'd neither condemn as false, or assert as true, that there are in the Universe many Inhabitants more than Mankind, and that some Planets are the Residence of happier, and others of more unhappy Natives.

2. There are sometimes certain Circumstances which us to attend a Falshood mixt with others, that are not improbable ; but in such a manner, that the later are either more numerous, or of greater weight. There occur in the Fables of the *Greeks*, the most ancient Account or Reports of that Nation ; there are many manifest Lyes or Falshoods yet if we narrowly enquire into them, we shall observe many Circumstances which shew, that it is highly probable that most of those things happen'd to the old Inhabitants of ancient *Greece*, which gave occasion to the Rise of those Fables ; so that those Things which are told by the Poets are not all False, but that it is very difficult to distinguish the Truth from the Falshood.

3. There are other Things in which the Reasons for our believing their Truth or Falshood are equal. Many Authors pass this Judgment of the *Giants* and *Gigantic Bones*, which are said to be found in many Places. Of the same kind are most of those Stories of the Apparitions of Evil Spirits, &c.

4. Secondly, Those Propositions are suspected of Falshood, in which there are more and more weighty Marks or Signs of Falshood than of Truth, tho' ev'n those Signs be not forcible enough to compel our Assent. These Signs are opposite to those of Probability, from whence they may be easily gather'd.

5. We must observe here the same Cautions, which we have deliver'd about the probable Propositions : That is that we doubt of the doubtful, and maintain our Suspicion of those which are suspected of Falshood. It wou'd be equally rash and inconsiderate to confound them either with those which are evidently false, or evidently true. Nor ought they to be confounded with each other, as if where-ever there were any light occasion of Doubt, there were a necessity of suspecting Falshood.

6. We may justly call in doubt those Propositions, which are opposite to any *Mathematical*, or *Moral Evidence*. It is therefore false, that a Humane Body, some feet in length, can

be contain'd in a thin bit of Bread ; and of the same Nature wou'd that Proposition be, which shou'd deny that there ever were such a City as *Rome*.

7. But tho' this be the Nature of *false Propositions*, yet is it not always equally known ; and for that Reason, misled by the liberty of giving our Assent to obscure Ideas, we often assert that as a Truth, which is False : Yet we can never own that for a Truth, the Falsity of which is fully known to us ; for *Truth* and *Falshood* are opposite.

8. The Universal Origin of the Error (and in which all others are contain'd) of believing that which is false to be true, is deriv'd from that Liberty we have mention'd, by means of which we give our Assent to Things that are obscure, as if they were perspicuous or plain : But there are other particular Causes of this Error, which are something less general, and which are worth our notice, that we may be aware of them.

9. *First*, Sometimes those who are to deliver their Judgment think not of such Reasons, or Arguments, which yet are in the Nature of the Thing. If Judgment be given then, it is four to one but he errs. Thus, shou'd any one attempt to judge of the Elevation of the Pole, without proper Instruments, unless he had Information of it some other way, he may well be deceiv'd ; or if he hit on the Truth, it will be more by Chance than any Certainty deriv'd from his Art. The same may be said of determining of Nations without knowing the History of them, and the like.

10. *Secondly*, The Ignorance of those who argue, is another occasion of Error, who often have not improv'd their Wit and Judgment by Study and Application. These will not give their Assent, tho' the most weighty and forcible Reasons are produc'd, which wou'd prevail with Men of Judgment and Skill, because they have never learnt to reason well, nor ever apply'd their Minds to understand the Rules of Art. Thus we every day find, that most Mechanic Tradesmen, who employ their Time in Manual Operations for the support of Life, reason very foolishly on those things which are out of their own Employments, admitting very silly and trifling Arguments, as solid ; rejecting those which are really so, as vain and of no force. This is most observable in Religion and Party-matters, in which the Mob listens to any thing that is prodigious with thirsty Ears. Nay, Men of higher Stations, Men of Quality, who waste their Lives in Luxury and Pleasure, neglect their Judgment

so far, that they scarce know or remember any thing beside what they learn from that Instructress of Fools, *Experience* and are easily drawn into the most absurd Opinions, by the Address of cunning Men, who have Art and Knowledge ; of which we have too frequent Examples, both Ancient and Modern.

The third Cause of Error is, that Men often will not make Use of those Arguments of *Truth* and *Falshood*, that are, or may be known, which arises from Passions. *Impatience of Labour* (for Example) will not let them give themselves the Fatigue of observing the long Connection of various Reasons and Arguments, which all make their dependence on each other, or wait for the necessary Number of Experiments, which a thorough Knowledge requires ; and so they pass their Judgment before they are thoroughly acquainted with the Subject. Another Reason of this precipitate Judgment, is our *Lust of Fame and Reputation*, which we are over-hasty to enjoy, while we wou'd seem to be Learned, before we really are so. The *Hate* of some particular Man or Sect, makes us condemn them, without Enquiry, or Hearing their Arguments on any Account whatever. Of this (not to go so far back as the Heathens) we have frequent Examples, both among the Ancient and Modern *Christians*.

12. The fourth Source of Error is the fallacious Rules of Probability, which may be principally refer'd to four Heads or Classes, which we transiently noted in our Discourse of *Probability*.

13. The first is *doubtful Opinions*, which when admitted as certain, produce various other Errors, when they prove to be false themselves. Thus, allowing that those were real Miracles which are told us by the Monks of former Ages, as being done at the Tombs or Images of some Saint, it follows, that they are in the right who make Pilgrimages to such Shrines, and Worship such Images. And from these many more Errors wou'd ensue, for many Consequences are deduc'd from one Principle.

14. The second is of *receiv'd Opinions*, which are suppos'd to be evidently certain, from our having found them from our Childhood admitted by all those with whom we have liv'd or convers'd, and whom we have lov'd. For 'tis no easy matter to eradicate, or ev'n render doubtful, an Opinion that has taken Root in us in our most tender years, before we cou'd form a Judgment of them. But Experience has
shown

shown us, that very many Opinions, which have been generally, ev'n universally receiv'd, by the greatest and most extensive Nations and People, are guilty of the greatest Falshood; and whence by consequence is born a numerous Race of Fictions. Thus when most of the *Romans* believ'd that *Romulus* and *Remus* were nurs'd by a Wolf; that Folly being admitted, it prepar'd their Minds for the Reception of many other such Trifles. Thus *Trogus Pompeius* wou'd enforce the Belief, that one of the most ancient Kings of *Spain* was suckled by a Hart, from what the *Romans* held about *Romulus* and *Remus*.

15. The third may be refer'd to the *Passions*, which prepare us for the Belief of certain Opinions, or arm us against giving Credit to others. That often seems to us probable, to have which true, may be of Consequence to our Interest; for we easily believe what we desire, and as easily hope that others think as we do. This is easily discover'd in our Wars; we scarce ever believe the Blunders of our own Generals, or the Defeats of our own Armies; on the contrary, we magnify our Victories, and the Sloath or ill Conduct of our Enemies. And in these things we are so possess'd with Passion, that we grow angry at those who wou'd gently endeavour to shew us, on how weak a Bottom we have built those Opinions. Thus in pannic Fears, or any general Terror, every little Report is sufficient to throw a People into Consternation and Despair.

16. In *Speculative Opinions*, we believe those true from the Truth of which we derive Advantage, or imagine we do. There are, and have been, many among the *Heathens*, *Jews*, *Mahometans*, and not a few *Christians*, who pretend to believe, or really do, several things, the belief of which conduces to their Benefit. If any Doubts or Scruples arise in their Minds about these Opinions, which we cannot disbelieve without Trouble or Danger, we stifle them in their very birth, by turning our Mind to, and employing it on, some other Object. We easily are perswaded to believe those things which will bring us Honour and Reputation, but with greater difficulty the contrary: Nay, Men are apt to betray this Passion of the Mind so far in Discourse, that tho' they profess that they see and know the Truth, yet they discover a Willingness to believe the contrary, provided they cou'd be defended by any Authority.

17. When any such Opinion is admitted by the choice of any Passion, that same Passion will easily persuade us, that
whatever

whatever is agreeable to that Opinion, and of Use to Confirmation, is most true. Thus the *Romans* having allow'd and receiv'd the Superstitious Opinion of Prodigies they believ'd any thing of the same kind, especially in Times of Distress or Difficulty: And the *Papists* having declared for Image-Worship, or the *Popes* Supremacy, with eagerness catch hold of any Opinion which may conduce to the Proof of them. But there are infinite numbers of this sort of Error, which has its Source from our Passions.

18. The fourth ill Reason of *Probability*, is drawn from *Authority*, in our too great Credulity in that. We frequently find Men, who indeed ought to know perfectly well the Humane Understanding, and the Humane Faculties, giving Credit to another who assumes an Infallibility, tho' he has but very vain and empty Reasons for his rash Presumption. Certainly Men ought never to yield their Assent to simple Authority, unsupported by Reason, when the Point is of Things which we can only know by their Relation, even when that Relation has the Marks of Truth.

19. We must lastly observe in all these Particulars, that there is a certain heap or complexion of Causes, which throw us into Error; and that we rarely fall into it by the Force of one alone. *Want of Arguments*; *Ignorance in our Enquiries* into those which we have; a *Neglect* of them, to which we are unwilling to consider them; *fallacious Reason* of Probability; *taking dubious Opinions* on Trust for evident Truths; *Vulgar receiv'd Opinions*; the *Passions* of the Mind; *weak Authorities*; all these sometimes break in upon our Mind at once, and sometimes in divided Bodies, and with Ease bear us down into Error.

20. Against all this there is one general Caution, which we have already laid down, and that is, That we never give our full Assent to any Proposition whilst it is dubious or obscure, but we shou'd, as long as we can, deny our Assent, and proportion our Belief of Probability to the Degree, or Approach to Certainty or Truth.

21. But there are some other particular Antidotes to be drawn from our Consideration of the Causes which lead us into Error; that is, we ought, with our utmost Care and Application, to examine, on our enquiry into the Truth or Fallshood of any Proposition, whether our Inclination do admit or reject it, on account of some of those Causes which we have laid down. If we find then never so little Reason to suspect any such thing, we ought to suspend our Judgment

sent as long as possibly we can, and examine farther into the matter, and to consult some other, who has not allow'd of this Opinion, from which alone great Help has been deriv'd.

C H A P. VI.

Of Faith, or Belief.

WE have said that *Faith* or *Belief* may be referr'd to *Science* or *Opinion*, so that what we have said of these two, may likewise be apply'd to *Faith*.

2. *Faith* or *Belief* in general, is said to be that Assent we give to a Proposition advanc'd by another, the Truth of which we gather not from our own immediate Reasoning or Experience, but believe it discover'd by another. It may be distinguish'd into *blind* and *seeing*. That we call *blind Faith*, by which we give our Assent to a Proposition advanc'd by another, of whose Veracity we have no certain and evident Reason or Proof ; and this Belief or Faith is altogether unworthy of a Wise Man. The *seeing Faith* is that by which we give our Assent to a Proposition, advanc'd by one who can neither deceive nor be deceiv'd ; but the more evident the Proofs of this is, so much the more strong and vigorous is the Faith or Belief.

3. Faith has likewise been distinguish'd into *Divine* and *Humane*. By the first we believe what is affirm'd by God ; by the later, what is told us by Man. When we are equally convinc'd they are the Words of God, as of Men, the *Divine Faith* is stronger than the *Humane* ; because we have vastly stronger Reasons to believe, that God can neither deceive or be deceiv'd, than those which wou'd persuade us of the same of any Man. But when there is any Doubt, whether or no any Proposition is declar'd by God ; or that God has commanded, that we shou'd believe such a Thing ; the Faith can be no stronger than the Reasons on which it is founded. Yet sometimes the Reasons or Motives of believing Men are of such Weight and Force, that being perfectly understood, they equal a Mathematical Evidence, and then the *Humane Faith* is as solid and unshaken as the *Divine*, because, on both sides, we find an equal necessity of giving our Assent.

4. But since that which is properly call'd *Divine Faith* is immediately directed to God himself affirming something,
no

no Man can pretend to such a Faith, but a Prophet, whom God has immediately spoken. But all our present Faith depends on the Testimony of Men, of whose Veracity, however, we have the most certain Proofs, tho' much their Force depend on our Knowledge of History.

5. From hence we find, that all Faith or Belief has its Foundation on Reasoning, which cannot deceive us when it necessarily compels our Assent. Those to whom God immediately reveal'd his sacred Will, believ'd him for certain Reasons, and not with a *blind* Assent; that is, because they knew he cou'd not deceive: We at this Day believe them, or rather their Writings, for certain Reasons, which oblige us to believe all undoubted Histories.

6. We might here go to farther Particulars about Faith in Revelations, which are neither unprofitable nor unpleasant, but since they more properly belong to Divinity, we shall pass them by.

CHAP. VII.

Of Division.

1. **W**HEN we discourse of any compounded Thing, or Idea, we ought to consider its Parts separately, else while we confound the distinct Parts and Properties, we produce *Obscurity*: But this is avoided by *Division*, which enumerates the distinct Parts of the Thing that is the Subject of our Consideration.

2. *Division* is defin'd, *The Distribution of the Whole in all it contains*; but the *Whole* has a double Signification, whence also *Division* is double.

3. That is a *Whole* which consists of integral Parts, those Substances which are compos'd of various Parts, such as the *Humane* Body, which may be divided into its several Members; and this *Division* is call'd *Partition*.

4. But there is another *Whole*, which is properly a certain abstract Idea, which is common to more Things than one, as the *Universals*; or a compounded Idea, which comprehends the Substance and its Accidents, or at least most of its Accidents. The Parts of this *Whole* are call'd *Subjunctive*, or *Inferiour*.

5. This *Whole* has a triple *Division*. The first is, when the *Kind* or *General* is decided by its *Species*, or *Particulars*, or *Differences*; as when *Substance* is divided into *Body*, and *Spirit*.

Spirit into *Extended* and *Thinking*. The second, when any Thing is divided into several Classes or Formes, by opposite Accidents ; as when the Stars are divided into those which give their own proper and unborrow'd Light ; and those of Opake Bodies, which reflect the Light of the Sun. The third is when the Accidents themselves are divided according to the Subjects in which they inhere, as when Goods are divided into the Goods of the Mind, Body, and Fortune.

6. There are three Rules of a good *Division*: The first is, *That the Members of the Division entirely exhaust the whole Thing that is divided*. Thus, when all Numbers are divided into *equal* and *unequal*, the *Division* is good.

7. The second Rule is, *That the Members of the Division ought to be opposite* ; as the Numbers *equal* and *unequal* are. But this Opposition may be made by a simple Negation ; as, *corporeal*, *not corporeal* ; or by positive Members ; as, *extended*, *thinking*. And this last *Division* is esteem'd the better of the two, because by it the Nature of the Thing is better made known.

8. The third Rule is, *That one Member of the Division ought not to be so contain'd in another, that the other can be affirm'd of it* ; tho' otherwise it may be in some manner included in it, without any Vice or Fault in the *Division*. Thus *Extension* (Geometrically consider'd) may be divided into a *Line*, *Surface* and *Solid* ; tho' the *Line* be included in the *Surface*, and the *Surface* in the *Solid* ; because the *Surface* can't be call'd the *Solid*, nor the *Line* the *Surface*. But Numbers wou'd be very faultily divided into *equal*, *unequal*, and the *sixth*, because *six* is an *equal* Number.

9. For the sake of Order and Perspicuity, when we have found the *Division*, we must take care to conceive it, that it do not produce Confusion and Obscurity. When we examine into the Nature of any Thing, — The *Division* must not be made into too many, or too general Members ; for by this means distinct Things wou'd be confounded together. Thus shou'd any one, who was about to enquire into the Nature of all the Bodies which are known to us, divide them into those which are in this our Earth, those without it, and then, without any other Subdivision, proceed to his Enquiry into their Nature, he must without doubt find himself confounded.

10. The Members ought by no means, unless the Subject necessarily require it, to be too unequal. Such a *Division* is theirs who divide the Universe into *Heaven* and *Earth* ; for the

the Earth, in comparison of that vast Expanse in which the Planets and fixt Stars are contain'd, which is call'd Heav'n, is less than a Point: For 'tis plain, that such a Division wou'd disturb the Mind, whether we were searching after Truth, or teaching Truth discover'd to another.

11. But we must take heed on the other hand, lest, while we endeavour to make the Parts equal, we do not, as we may say, offer violence to the Nature of Things, by joining those which are really separate, and separating those which are really join'd together. We must, therefore, have a nice Regard to the Connection of Things, lest we violently break asunder those Things which are closely united; and join those together which have no manner of Connection with one-another.

12. We must farther take Care not to make our Division too minute, lest the Number of the Parts burthen the Memory, and destroy the Attention; which is a Vice utterly to be avoided by those who wou'd Reason well.

13. Another Fault of *Division* is, when instead of dividing real Parts of a Thing, we only enumerate the different Signification of Words.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Definition; and first, of the Definition of the NAME.

1. **D**efinition is double; one of the *Thing*, and one of the *Name*. The first we esteem the Nature of the *Thing*; the second explains what Signification we give to any *Word* or *Name*; of the last here, referring the first to the next Chapter.

2. Since we do not always think to our selves only, but are oblig'd frequently to convey the Sentiments of our Minds to others, either in Words spoken or written, or be inform'd in the same manner of those of other People, which otherwise we know not; we may lead others, or be led our selves, by others, into Errors, by the ambiguity of the Terms or Words that are made use of by either, unless we explain what we mean by such ambiguous Words, by others that are not ambiguous.

3. We mean not here by Definition of the *Name*, the declaring the Use, or Signification of Words according to Custom: We seek not in what Sense others use any Word, but in what Sense we shall make use of it in our future Discourse.

4. We

4. We shall observe, that the Signification which we design to give to any Word, depends entirely on our Will and Pleasure; for we may affix what Idea we please to any Sound, which in it self signifies nothing at all. But the Definition of the Thing signify'd by any Sound, has not this dependance on our Will and Pleasure; for since its Nature is certain and determin'd in it self, our Words cannot make any manner of Alteration in it.

5. Secondly, Since the Definition of the Name is entirely at our Will and Pleasure, it cannot be call'd in Question by any one else. But then we are to give always the same Sense to the same Word, to avoid Mistakes, for which End we define our Terms.

6. Thirdly, Since the Definition of the Name is not to be call'd in Question, 'tis plain, it may be made use of, like an undoubted or self-evident Maxim, as the *Geometricians* do, who, more than all Men beside, make use of such Definitions; but we must take care, lest we think, therefore, that there is any thing in the Idea affix'd to that defin'd Term which may not be controverted. It is an undoubted Principle, that some one has defined some Word in such a manner; but what he thinks of the Thing, is no undoubted Principle. Thus, if any one shou'd define *Heat to be that which is in those Bodies which heat us, and that it is like that Heat which we feel*, no Man cou'd find fault with the Definition, as far as it expresses what he means by the Word *Heat*; but this does not hinder us from denying, that there is any Thing in the Bodies that warm us like what we feel in our selves.

7. From what has been said, 'tis plain, that the Definition of the Name is of great Use in Philosophy; yet we cannot conclude from thence that all Words ought, or indeed can possibly be defin'd; for there are some so clear (to such who understand the Language we use) and of such a Nature, that they cannot be defin'd; as the Names of all simple Ideas, as we have shown under that Head.

8. Moreover, where the receiv'd Definitions are sufficiently clear, they ought not to be chang'd; because those who are accusom'd to the receiv'd Use, will understand us better, and we our selves run not so great a Risque of Inconstancy in not preserving our Definition. It is manifest, that those Words are better understood, to which we have been long us'd to affect certain Ideas, than those to which new ones are to be join'd; and we better remember the Sense of One, than of Two.

9. From hence likewise it follows, that we should, as little as possible, depart from the receiv'd Sense, when we are necessarily oblig'd to forsake it in some measure; for we sooner, and with more ease, accustom our selves to Significations of Words which are near, or related to those which are already admitted, than to those which are plainly remote, or us'd in a quite contrary Sense.

10. But this, as we have hinted, must be observ'd above all Things, that we always keep to the Definition which we have once made; else we confound our Hearers or Readers, and fall into seeming Contradiction, which renders our Discourse unintelligible.

C H A P. IX.

Of the Definition of the THING.

1. **T**HE Definition of the Name depends entirely on our Will and Pleasure, but the Definition of the Thing we have no Power over; for we can by no means affirm that to be in a Thing or Idea which we consider, which is not in it. Definition is usually divided into *accurate*, and *less accurate*; the first is properly Definition, the second Description.

2. A Definition, properly so call'd, explains the Nature of the Thing defin'd by an Enumeration of its principal Attributes; of which those that are common to others with the Thing defin'd, is call'd the *Kind* or *General*; but those which are peculiar the Thing defin'd, the *Difference*. Thus a Circle may be defin'd, *a Figure whose Circumference is every where equi-distant from the Centre*; the Word *Figure* is the *Kind* or *General*, as being a Name common to all other different Figures, as well as to a Circle; the rest are the *Difference*, since they distinguish a Circle from all other Figures.

3. But Description is an Enumeration of many Attributes, and ev'n those which are accidental. Thus, if any one is describ'd by his Deeds or Actions, or his Sayings or Writings, as if we shou'd instead of naming *Aristotle*, say, *The Philosopher, who obtains a Monarchy among the School-men without a Partner*.

4. Individuals cannot be defin'd, because tho' we know not their essential Properties by which they differ from others

of the same Species, we must remember likewise, that the inmost Nature of Substances is unknown, and therefore they cannot be defin'd. Hence 'tis plain, that only the Modes whose whole Nature is known to us, can only be explain'd by a certain and properly call'd Definition.

5. There are three common Rules of a Definition, the first is, *That the Definition shou'd be adequate to the Thing defin'd* ; that is, agree to all those Things which are contain'd in the Species which is defin'd. The second, *That the Definition shou'd be proper to the Thing defin'd* ; for when the Definition makes us know the Thing defin'd from all other Things, it must be proper and agreeable to the Thing defin'd. The third, since we make use of a Definition to make known a Thing to another which he knew not before, *The Definition ought to be clear, and more easie and obvious than the Thing defin'd.*

6. Here we must again admonish the Reader, not to confound the receiv'd Definition of the Name with the Definition of the Thing. For this Reason the Definition of the Thing cannot be express'd in Words plainly synonymous ; as if any one shou'd ask what is the Supream Deity ? and we shou'd answer, the Supream God ; since the later explains no more the Nature or Attributes of that God than the former.

7. From these Observations we find, that Definition can only have place in compound Ideas, and is only the Enumeration of the chief simple Ideas of which they are compounded ; but simple Ideas cannot be defin'd, because there can be no Enumeration. He who knows not what that is which we call *Heat*, will only learn it by Experience, or some synonymous Word, or some Word of another Language, or by Circumlucation, by which the Thing is shown, not defin'd ; as if we shou'd say, *That it was a Sensation, which we find when we sit by the Fire, or walk in the Sunshine* : By this we shou'd shew what Thing it was to which we gave that Name, but never explain its Nature. For, shou'd any one want that Sense by which we have that Sensation, he wou'd no more understand what we meant, than a Man born Blind what was a Green Colour, by telling him it was that Sensation we have when we behold the Grass in the Fields.

The Third Part of LOGIC;

O R,

The Art of REASONING.

CHAP. I.

Of METHOD, both of Resolution and Composition.

1. **H**AVING consider'd our simple Perceptions, and the several sorts of our Judgments, and shew'd how in them we shou'd conduct our selves to avoid Errors; it remains, that we shew in what manner our Judgments shou'd be dispos'd, that we may the sooner, and with the greater safety, arrive at the Knowledge of Truth. This Part of *Logic* is call'd *Method*, which, contrary to the Custom of the Schools, I shall treat with Diligence, as more conducive to the Knowledge of Truth than the following Part of Argumentation, on which, however, they were more prolix.

2. Since most Truths which fall under our Examination depend on the Knowledge of Others, from whence they are deduc'd by a certain Chain of Consequences, it is not sufficient to have deliver'd the Rules by which we know to what Propositions (separately consider'd) we may give our Assent; we must also shew how they are to be dispos'd among themselves, in regard of each other, that by them we may descend as it were by so many Steps to Truth, plac'd according to the old Proverb, in the bottom of a Well.

3. *Method* is twofold, one is of *Resolution*, by which Truth is generally sought after; the other of *Composition*, by which the Truth now found out is taught or imparted to another.

4. In the Method of *Resolution* we proceed from some particular known Truth, to others which belong to some particular or singular Thing. In the Method of *Composition* we propose some certain general Truths, from which we deduce particular Truths.

5. If in the Method of *Resolution* we propose any Maxims, it is not immediately in the beginning, and all together, and but once, but only as they are necessary for the finding out the Truth ; on the contrary, in the Method of *Composition* they are propos'd all together in the beginning, before there is any need of them.

6. These two Methods differ from each other, as the Methods of searching our Genealogy, descending from the Ancestors to their Posterity ; or on the contrary, by ascending from the Posterity to the Ancestors. Both of them have this in common, that their Progression is from a Thing known, to that which is unknown. Those Things which are known, by both are set in the Front, or first Place, that by them we may (by certain Consequences deduc'd from them) be able to arrive at those which are not known ; and then all this Chain of Consequences in both, consist of Propositions connected with each other.

7. And these following Things are summarily requir'd in both, that Error may be avoided. First, That no Proposition be admitted as true, to which you can deny your Assent, or which is not evident. Next, The Connection of the following Proposition to the foregoing, in every Step of the Progression be likewise evident or necessary ; otherwise, if in a long Chain of Propositions we admit but one Proposition or Consequence that is doubtful or false, whatever was directly deduc'd from thence, must of necessity be either dubious or false.

8. To make this plainer, we shall first propose an Example of the Method of *Resolution*, and then one of that of *Composition*. Let us suppose this to be the Question, *Whether on the Supposition of Man's Existence, we can prove, that God does exist ?* To resolve this, our Method must be thus : (1.) Humane Kind, which now inhabit the Earth, did not always exist, all History whatever still fixing a Beginning to Mankind : This they do not only assert in express Words, but by the whole Series and Course of what they treat, make it manifest, since there is no History which pretends to give us an Account of more than about 6000 Years. (2.) If Humane Kind did not always exist, but had a Beginning, there is a
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Necessity that there shou'd be some other Cause of its Existence; for from nothing, nothing can arise. (3.) Whatever that Cause is, it must have at least all those Properties which we find in our selves; for none can give what he has not himself. (4.) Farther, there is a Necessity that there shou'd be in this Cause Properties which are not in us, since he cou'd do that which we cannot do, that is, make Matter exist, who before had no Being, or that the Mind and Body of Man shou'd begin to exist, which Power we by no means find in our selves. (5.) We find that we have the Power of Faculty of *Understanding* and *Willing*, and a Body which can be mov'd various ways. (6.) Therefore, there must be those Properties, and many far more excellent in the Cause of Humane Kind, such as the Power of drawing out of nothing or making something to exist, which had before no Existence at all. (7.) But this Cause either exists still, or has ceas'd to be. (8.) If he do not still exist, he did not exist from Eternity; for whatever existed from Eternity, can neither by it self, or by any other Cause, be reduc'd to Nothing. (9.) If it did not exist, it must have been produc'd by some other, for whatever has a Beginning must be generated by some other. Then would the same Question return of the Producer, which may be thus generally solv'd: All Things that are, had a Beginning, or they had none. Those which had a Beginning, were produc'd by Causes which had none; therefore, if there be any Thing that does exist, there are eternal Causes. (10.) It must, therefore be confess'd, that there is some eternal Being, which has in it self all those Properties which we find in our selves, and infinitely more, Whether he immediately created us by himself, or by any other Nature? which is not here the Question. (11.) If this Cause of Humane Kind do still exist, the same Reasoning wou'd return which we us'd in the 9th and 10th Steps of our Progression. (12.) Therefore, it necessarily follows from the Existence of Humane Kind, that God does exist, or some eternal Cause, which mediately or immediately created Mankind.

9. Thus by the Method of *Resolution* we prove, or rather find out the Existence of a God. And we may teach or convey this Truth thus found out to others, by the Method of *Composition*, in this manner. (1.) All Beings have a Beginning of Existence, or they have none. (2.) Nothing can come out of Nothing, or begin to exist by its own Power, when it had no Existence. (3.) All those Things, therefore,

...ote, which had a Beginning, must be produc'd by some Being that had no Beginning. (4.) Humane Kind had a Beginning. (5.) It was therefore produc'd mediately, or immediately by some eternal Cause. (6.) That Cause we call God ; and, therefore, *Humane Kind were created by God.*

10. All these Propositions, as we have observ'd, ought in both Methods to be nicely examin'd, that none be admitted as certain, and known, which is not so ; and that no Consequence be slid in which is not necessary. Having so done, we may know that we have found the Truth, or are taught the same by Others.

11. There are some Helps to be had for the more easy performance of this Task, and which are to be taught more distinctly, or with greater care and consideration, because in them depend the whole easiness and certainty of such Reasons or Arguments as are alledg'd. First, what ought to be the Disposition of the Mind for the more happy discovery of Truth : Secondly, we shall deliver the Rules of the Method of *Resolution* ; and Thirdly, those which belong to the Method of *Composition*.

C H A P. II.

Of the Necessity of Attention, and the Means of obtaining it.

1. **W**E have more than once asserted, that Evidence is the Main, or Criterion of Truth. But this Knowledge is not enough to direct our Enquiry after Truth, because that Evidence is not always to be had, nor does the Mind discover it sometimes, without a long Labour and Fatigue. We must, therefore, enquire by what Means we may obtain this Evidence in our Thoughts.

2. It is not enough that we can form Ideas of all Things, which we can conceive in our Minds to come at the Knowledge of Truth, but the Mind must consider them with the greatest and most lively Attention, if we wou'd obtain a thorough Knowledge of them.

3. We have shewn, that our Judgments are the Perceptions of certain Relations, in which the Mind does acquiesce, and that our Errors of Judgment arise from it, does acquiesce in obscure Perceptions, as if they were clear, before it has with sufficient Care examin'd into their Nature.

4. In Judgments of the Mind we shou'd use the same Method as in Judgments of the Eyes, which approach the obscure Objects nearer, and employ the help of artificial Lights, narrow looking into, to it ; so shou'd the Mind in Judgments restrain its Assent, till it has with the utmost Attention consider'd according to the Nature of the Thing in to which it enquires. Hence it appears of how great and necessary use Attention is, which is only a long and uninterrupted Consideration of any one Idea, without the Interposition of any others.

5. We find that we are much more attent, and with greater ease apply our Thoughts to the Consideration of those things which affect us by the Intervention of our Senses, certain Images of which are before the Mind, and such as excite some Affection or Passion, than to those which come into the Mind without any of these Things. Thus we are more attent in the Consideration of any enlighten'd Body, if some Image of a corporeal Thing offer'd to the Enquiry of the Mind ; and in the Consideration of a Thing that may bring us Advantage or Damage, which strikes us with Fear or Desire.

6. Every one who has try'd it before Use has bred a facility, knows that 'tis much more difficult to fix the Mind on abstract Ideas for any Time. The Reason of the difference is plain, because the Mind in other Things finds assistance from the Intervention of the Body, as 'tis affected with more sprightly and lively Sensations and Images, which will thrust themselves on it whether it will or not : On the contrary, in abstract Contemplations, and which derive nothing from the Body, corporeal Motions obstruct the Attention while they perpetually recall the Mind to Bodies, at the same time that the Object of the Mind has nothing in it self that can much affect it, or engage the Attention ; nay, when the Mind is employ'd in these abstract Considerations, it must with all its Force banish all corporeal Images which crowd perpetually upon it. Nor can this be perform'd without Pain, since the Law of Nature has oblig'd the Mind to be in Pain, when Force is offer'd to the Body.

7. Having laid down this, we must try whether or no we cannot encrease the Attention by the help of the Senses and Imaginative Faculty, ev'n in things that are merely incorporeal. By what Art this may be done, we shall shew hereafter ; but above all things we shou'd take care that the Inconvenience do not arise, which usually follows the Com-

motions

otions of the Mind by the Senses, Imagination, or Passions; that is, when the Mind is something more vehemently affected, it is turn'd in such a manner to the Object which affects it, that it takes notice of nothing else. Then is this Motion so far from assisting the Attention to Ideas of incorporeal Things, that on the contrary it proves an Obstacle to it.

8. Hence this important Consequence in our Enquiry after Truth is drawn, that they, who wou'd seriously apply themselves to the search after Truth, shou'd avoid, as much as they possibly can, all the more strong and vehement Sensations; such as great Noises, Light too strong and glaring, Pain, Pleasure, &c. They shou'd likewise take Care that their Imagination be not too vehemently mov'd by any Object, which shou'd infect it so far, as to make them think of it whether they will or not; for by this means the Attention will frequently be interrupted. First, they ought not to be accusom'd to the stronger Emotions of the Passions; for those who experience frequently these Perturbations, contract such a Habit of Mind, that they can scarce think of any thing else but the Objects of the Passions, or those things which have some Connection with them; but since, for Reasons which we shall not touch on here, no Man can be entirely exempt from them, they must make it their Endeavours to seek some Assistance from those unavoidable Evils to their Enquiries after Truth.

9. The Senses may be of advantage to the promoting the Attention, if we make use of them as the *Geometricians* do, who express invisible Quantities by Lines, Numbers, and Letters; for by this means the Mind more easily adheres to, attends, and is fix'd to the Thing which it enquires after; for while the Eyes are fix'd on the Figures, the Mind contemplates the Thing whose Signs they are. And this is done with the more safety, because there is no Danger of confounding the Figures with the Thing he seeks, there being no Relation between them, but what he makes. Thus the swiftness and duration of any Motion can be examin'd by the Description of certain Figures, which the *Geometrician* can never believe to be the Thing that is the Subject of his Enquiry.

10. By this means we may without Danger make Use of our Senses in Ratiocination. That is, that we may not be oppress'd by the multitude of the Relations that are to be consider'd, they may be express'd on Paper by certain Words. Besides, we give more easie Attention to Propositions

tions already express'd, and set down on Paper, than to the Ideas. We can review more often, and with more ease of Marks in long Arguments, when we have fix'd the Signs them on Paper, than when we have them only in our Mind.

11. But these ought to be look'd on as Helps which may be made use of by young Beginners, but shou'd not be offer'd to those of riper Understanding, lest they shou'd accustom themselves too much to them, so that it render them incapable of understanding any thing without the Assistance of some corporeal Image.

12. The Faculty which brings the Images of corporeal Things to the Mind, is most strictly united to the Senses, and therefore belongs to what is said of the Senses, and may afford a particular help to assisting the *Attention*. For example, when we in silent Contemplation compare the Ideas with the external and corporeal Objects, we may observe the like in the Operations of the Eyes as in the Actions of the Mind.

13. If we are to explain to others what we have found out, they will give more Attention to a Comparison, than to bare and naked Exposition of the Thing; they will sooner apprehend and understand us, and remember it better. Hence arose the manner in the remotest Antiquities of using Fables, which was long in Vogue among the Oriental Nations.

14. But here we must beware of the Error of the Ancients in this Particular, which was, while they with too much Zeal sought the Attention of the Unskilful, they had Recourse to so many Figures and Phrases drawn from corporeal Things, that they offer'd to their Minds scarce any Thing but the Ideas of corporeal Beings: So that the Truth being overwhelm'd with those Figures, was perfectly hid, and cannot without the utmost difficulty be freed from them by the Learned themselves.

15. We must, farther, be very cautious of avoiding an Error too common to the Ancients and Moderns, who fancy'd the Comparison, or some other Figure, which was only to illustrate the Things, was really an Argument to prove them.

16. That the Passions often are Enemies to the Knowledge of Truth, no body can doubt, and we have shown many have made a Doubt whether they are ever of any use to it; yet since they are not Evil in their own Nature, they may by good Management be of great help to the encreasing

the Attention; nay, perhaps we may say, that it is never extremely sharp without some Passion. Thus we may make a happy Use of the Desire of Glory, if we keep it within its due Moderation. When this Passion is alone, it is dangerous; other Passions are therefore to be excited in us, which shou'd hinder us from suffering our selves to be born down by the Desire of Glory: And this is the very Desire of knowing the Truth, which is in the Minds of all Mankind; for there is no Man that loves to be deceiv'd, nor any Man that is pleas'd with Ignorance.

17. But we must, ev'n here, take Care that the Desire of finding out the Truth be not the only Cause of our Judgments; for the Passions never give any Light to the Judgment, but only excite our Enquiry after what is advantageous for us to know: But the Judgment ought not to be given as long as we can withhold it, in things of which we can have an evident Knowledge.

C H A P. III.

Of the Capacity of the Mind, and the Means of enlarging it.

1. **W**E call that Mind *capacious* that has many Ideas before it at once; and the more of those it can have a distinct Perception of at once, the larger, or more capacious is the Mind; and the fewer, the more narrow we esteem it. The *Capacity* therefore of the Mind is enlarg'd by contracting a Habit or Custom of considering many Ideas at once without Confusion. We mean not all *together* and at once, that in one numerical individual Moment, and one only Perception of the Mind, many Things can be distinctly understood, since 'tis certain that few Things can be distinctly view'd together. But this Expression is to be allow'd the Latitude of meaning a very short Time; and the Reason we used the Term together, is, that there is no external Mensuration of Time to divide the Rapidity of the Minds motion from one Thought to another.

2. If any one shou'd demand, whether the Minds of all Men were alike, except what difference is made by Education? we shou'd only answer, That we do not certainly know, but that Experience gives us a certain Confirmation of two Things.

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3. That some have so unhappy a Genius, that it is with Difficulty they conceive the Connection of two Propositions, unless they fall on Subjects with which their Experience has been conversant, but are perfectly blind in Contemplation, nor can in the least discover any difference betwixt a good and bad Ratiocination. Others again have a Mind something larger than this, and can by one View of the Mind comprehend more than one Connection of Propositions; but if the deduction of Consequences be something longer than ordinary, they cannot extricate themselves. But then there are some happy Genius's which can with ease, if not at one view, yet in a very little Time, and few Thoughts, comprehend a long Chain of Propositions. They are neither fatigu'd nor disturb'd with that Number of Propositions which wou'd absolutely confound some Others.

4. It is apparent from Experience in the second place, that the Capacity of the Mind can be enlarg'd by a frequent Use of thinking of many Things at once. 'Tis sufficiently known, that the young Learners of *Geometry*, *Arithmetic*, or *Algebra*, are at first disturb'd with the number of Ideas to be consider'd together; nor can they, without a very painful Attention, understand what they read, or are taught, by reason of the number of Ideas which are to be consider'd. As for Example, — Those who at first endeavour to learn the *Rule of Division*, are confounded or puzzl'd by the manifold comparison of the *Divisor* and *Dividend*; and they are surpriz'd to consider how the Master that teaches them shall be able at one View, or at least with very few, to comprehend the Connection of so many Propositions as are form'd in a long Arithmetical Operation; yet the same Students of this Art, after they have apply'd themselves to the Study of Accounts for some Months, comprehend many Operations with ease in their Mind, which before they cou'd not take one. Whence 'tis evident, that the Capacity of the Mind will admit of an Encrease.

5. If it shou'd farther be ask'd, whether the Capacity of all Men cou'd be improv'd by the same Method? we may answer, That Experience has shown us, that all such who can that way improve their Minds, have by it enlarg'd their Capacity; for there are some who, from their first Application cou'd never make any Progress in these Studies; but among those who are not wholly incapable of these Studies, some make a swifter and greater Progress than others, ev'n from the beginning, whether this be the effect of the Nature of the Mind or the Body.

6. To come to the point it self, whoever has a Desire to enlarge the Capacity of his Mind, must make it his endeavour to have his Attention at his Command, so as to apply it when, and to what he pleases, which may be obtain'd by the Means propos'd in the former Chapter. For he that cannot be attentive to a Few, will much less be capable of understanding Many together, and not be confounded by the Multiplicity of the Objects.

7. But since the Capacity of the Mind, as we have seen, is a Faculty within us by Nature, whatever we do to acquire it, as we have express'd it, comes only to this, that by frequent Exercise we render its Use easie to us. We must only examine on what Objects it is chiefly exercis'd.

8. Objects are of two kinds ; one are Mathematical, the other cannot be treated Mathematically. Whatever can be examin'd in a Geometrical Method (which we shall deliver when we shall treat of the *Method* of Composition) are Mathematical ; and of this kind are all things of which we can have a perfect Knowledge, that is, whatever belongs, or relates to *Modes*.

9. All who have apply'd themselves to the enlarging the Capacity of the Mind, tell us, that it is acquir'd by the Consideration of these Things. And 'tis certain, that in *Arithmetic* (to instance one part of the *Mathematics* for all) the manifold Parts of the Object are so distinctly noted, and so clearly perceiv'd, that provided the Attention be apply'd, there is no manner of danger of our being confounded. In Computation or Accompts, there are, first, as many Objects as *Unites* ; next, certain *Names* are impos'd (for Brevity's sake) on certain Collections of *Unites*, without producing any Confusion, how great soever the Collection of *Unites* may be ; as one *Hundred*, a *Thousand*, an *Hundred Thousand*, a *Million*, &c. Lastly, there are long Comparisons of Numbers made in the gross without coming to any one particular, or alone, but of many collectively together, and at once. For whether we add or subtract, multiply or divide, to which all *Arithmetic* is reduc'd, many Numbers are consider'd at once, except only the Number *Two*, which consists only of two *Unites* ; but in the Computation of that, there is not any need of Art.

10. In Computation therefore, we exercise the Faculty of distinctly understanding many Things together, which we call the *Capacity of Genius* ; for we shou'd still remember, that this Capacity we speak of ought always to be join'd

with this distinct Perception, since a confus'd Understanding of Things is of no Use to the finding out of Truth.

11. The Consideration of Substances cannot be Mathematically discuss'd ; and we shou'd in vain imagin, that in these the Capacity of the Mind cou'd ever be acquir'd ; for since we have no clear Knowledge of particular Substances, much less can we know with Perspicuity a Collection of Substances together, we can only consider their Properties, and the Relations that there is between them.

12. Hence we may gather, that the Mind cannot be render'd more capacious by the Consideration of *Genus* and *Species* of the old Philosophers, who rang'd all Substances under those Heads, because it is an uncertain Division of unknown Objects.

C H A P. IV.

Of the Laws of the Method of Resolution.

1. **B**Efore we proceed to the Laws of the Method of Resolution, we must recal to our Memory certain Maxims on which they are built. The first is what we have more than once taken notice of, *viz. That we must consider Evidence in every Step or Degree of our Progressions in our Reasoning or Arguments* ; unless we wou'd run the Risque of falling into Error.

2. The next is the Consequence of this, *That we ought to Reason on those Things only, of which we have clear and perspicuous Ideas ; or on obscure Things only so far as we know them.* Whence we may gather, that our Reasoning ought to be only conversant about the Properties and Modes of Substances and abstract Ideas, and not about the inmost Nature of Things extreamly obscure.

3. The third Maxim is, *That we ought always to begin from the simple and easie, and to dwell on them a while, before we proceed to Things compounded and more difficult* : For we ought first to have a clear Perception of simple Ideas, else we can never have a sufficient Knowledge of the Compounded.

4. These general Maxims are the common Principles of both the Method of Resolution and Composition. For in both Methods are equally requir'd Evidence in the Degrees or Steps of Progression, choice of the Subject of our Enquiries, and the Knowledge of Things simple before those that are

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compounded ; as will appear from what follows. But now we shall proceed to those Laws which are peculiar to the Method of *Resolution*.

5. The first is, *That we must clearly and perfectly understand the State of the Questions propos'd*. If we propose any Thing as the Subject of our Enquiry, it is necessary to avoid rambling from the Point, that we have a distinct Knowledge or Idea in our Mind of the Thing we examine. If the Question be propos'd by others in certain Words, we ought, before we proceed to the Solution, to have a distinct and clear Knowledge of the meaning of every Word, in which it is express'd.

6. Having now a distinct Knowledge of the Subject of our Enquiry, and the Ideas which are contain'd in the Question being now to be compar'd, another Law is, *That with some force and effort of the Mind, one or more middle Ideas must be discover'd, which shou'd be like a common Measure or Standard, by whose help the Relations between the Ideas to be compar'd be found out*.

7. But when the Questions are difficult, and stand in need of a long discussion, the third Law is, *That we cut off all, that has no necessary Relation to the Truth sought after from the Thing which is the Subject of our Consideration*.

8. When the Question is reduc'd to its narrowest Bounds, that is, when we distinctly perceive the Matter in dispute, having rejected all that does not necessarily belong to it, the fourth Law is, *That the compounded Question be divided into Parts, and those to be separately consider'd in such Order, that we begin with those which consist of the more simple Ideas, and never proceed to the more compounded, till we distinctly know the more simple, and by Reflection have render'd them easie to our Consideration*.

9. When by Reflection we have obtain'd a distinct Knowledge of all the Parts of the Question, and manage it with ease in our Minds, thus the fifth Law is, *That certain Signs of our Ideas comprehended in establish'd Figures, or in the fewest Words that can be, be imprint'd in the Memory, or mark'd on Paper, lest the Mind have any more trouble about them*. This Law ought chiefly to be obey'd when the Questions are difficult, and consist of many Heads, tho' it be not unuseful ev'n in those that are more easie. By the help of this Law the Reasoning is sooner concluded, than if they were conceiv'd in many Words and other Signs ; and we thus likewise sooner discover the Connection of the Parts.

10. When those Things which are necessary to the Question are clear to us, and mark'd with compendious Signs, and dispos'd in Order, Then *must the Ideas* (by the sixth Law) *be compar'd with each other, either by Reflection alone, or by express Words.* When more Things than one are to be compar'd, the Memory and Judgment receive great Assistance from Writing, which are easily otherwise confounded, and we can make but an ill Judgment of Things confus'd.

11. If after we have compar'd all the Ideas, whose Signs we have committed to Paper, we cannot yet find out what we seek; then the seventh Law suggests, *That we cut off all the Propositions, which after a full Examination we find of no Use to the Solution of the Question, then we may again proceed in the same Order in the rest, which is deliver'd in the six preceding Laws.*

12. If after we have repeated this Examination as often as it is necessary, nothing of what we have mark'd seems to conduce to the Solution of the Question, we must confess, that, as to us, it is not to be resolv'd, since whatever we cou'd discover in its Parts prove insufficient to solve it. We ought therefore to throw it entirely aside, or consult some Person more knowing in the Subject, or better skill'd in Enquiries.

13. These are the Laws of the Method of *Resolution*, all which are not to be observ'd in all Questions; for one or two of them are sufficient for simple Questions, or those which consist of but few Propositions. But when they are very much compounded and intricate, we must often come to the last, and that to be repeated more than once. But this being a Matter of very great importance, we shall discourse of them separately in several Chapters.

C H A P. V.

Of the three Maxims on which all Method is built.

1. **W**E shall say nothing more than we have already on the first Maxim about *preserving Evidence in every Step or Degree of Knowledge*; but we cou'd not but take Notice of it in this place, both to make appear the Connection of those that follow with it, and also because it cannot be too much inculcated to Men who have been us'd to give their Assent to Things that are obscure.

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2. The next, which is the Consequence of the former, is, *That we ought not to Reason on Things of which we have no clear Ideas, or of obscure Things, as far as they are obscure.* We must not take this Maxim in a Sense that shou'd exclude the Nature of all Things which are yet unknown to us from our Enquiries; for this wou'd be directly opposite to our Design, by which we aim to open a way to the Discovery of Truths unknown to us.

3. But we are of Opinion, that a Philosopher ought not to Reason on obscure Things, in a double Sense: the first is, That he ought not to choose such Objects of his Contemplation, which it is plain, cannot be discover'd by evident Demonstrations. (1.) Thus, as several Geometricians have demonstrated, the *squaring of the Circle*, and the *doubling the Cube*, cannot be found out. (2.) Thus we cannot discover what is the inmost Nature of Things; all we can know of that, is, that Experience has shown us, that there do co-exist in Substances certain Properties: We shou'd therefore reject the Enquiry into Substances, and only consider their Properties. (3.) If we cannot find out the inmost, or whole Nature of any one created Substance, much less must we pretend to discover the Substance of that Supreme Nature which created all the rest. We may gather, as it were by Experience, from those Properties which we see in the Creatures, that they are in the Creator, since no body can give what he has not, yet we cannot conceive how all the real Properties of all Creatures can co-exist in God.

4. The other Sense of this Maxim is, That no certain Consequence can be drawn from a Principle that is unknown or uncertain. Tho' this be a Maxim allow'd by all Philosophers, both ancient and modern, yet have they all offended against it, persuading themselves that they do know their Principles to be clear and certain, which yet are often very uncertain, and many times not known at all. Thus all that we have any clear Perception of in our Minds, is the Property of Thinking; and therefore we cannot positively affirm, that there is any other in it; nor on the other side, can we deny that there is, because there may be some, of which we are ignorant.

4. But it is here necessary to take notice (lest any one shou'd wrest what we mean by our Mind into another Sense) that what we say is not to be understood as if we cou'd not deny Contradictions. For 'tis one thing to deny that any particular is not in a Subject besides what we see, and
and

another to deny that the same thing can be, and not be, in the same Subject at the same Time. Thus we cannot affirm, that there is nothing else in our Mind besides the Faculty of Thinking, because we discover nothing else in it ; but we may without danger of Error, deny that the Mind, whilst it is thinking, is destitute of Thought, since we clearly perceive that one of these two Propositions is necessarily false.

5. To observe the second Caution which we have mention'd, we must necessarily examine with our utmost Diligence into the Principles laid down, before we proceed to the Consequences of them. We are taught by the third Maxim, *That we must begin with the simple and easie Things, and dwell on them some time, before we proceed to the compounded and difficult.* Thus to learn *Arithmetic*, the Student must be perfectly acquainted with, and fix in his Memory the first four Rules of, *Addition, Subtraction, Multiplication and Division*, before he can to any purpose proceed to the Rule of *Three*, and the following Rules.

C H A P. VI.

Of the first Rule of the Method of Resolution.

1. **A**LL our Judgments being only the Perceptions of Relations, in which Perceptions we acquiesce, it is manifest, that when we enquire into any thing which is unknown to us, we only seek after an unknown Relation. When therefore we say in the first Rule, *that we must perfectly and clearly know the State of the Question propos'd* ; 'tis the same thing as if we shou'd tell you, that you are to take particular Care lest you suppose that Relation the Object of your Enquiry, which does by no Means come under our Consideration ; for unless the sought Relation be mark'd with some certain Note, we shall neither know what we seek, nor know it when found out.

2. But if such a Relation be plainly and clearly known, you may say, How can we then make any farther Enquiry about it ? But then say we, can there be any Desire of knowing any thing of which we have no manner of Knowledge ? None at all. That which is sought, therefore, ought necessarily to be distinguish'd from all things else, that we may know it when we find it, and so far know it, before we make any Enquiry about it. No Question can ever be solv'd, whose Terms are not in some measure known to us. Thus

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For Example, we enquire, *What those two Numbers are between which there is such a Relation, as if you take a Unite from one, and add it to the other, they shall be equal ; but on the contrary, if you add the Unite taken from the other, to that from which you subtracted, the Number shall be double to the other ?* Tho' the Numbers between which there is this Relation be not known, yet are they so far known, that that Relation ought to be between them, whence they are acknowledg'd as soon as ever they are found out.

3. When a Question is conceiv'd in Words, those Words ought to be distinctly understood ; or the Ideas which are signify'd by every Word ought to be thoroughly known to us. All Equivocation in the Terms must therefore be entirely remov'd, lest, for one Question, as many arise as there are different Senses of the Proposition ; nor can we apprehend what Sense he that proposes it (if propos'd by another) gives his equivocal Proposition.

4. If we cannot understand all the Senses of the Words in which a Question is conceiv'd, we can never know whether we have given it a Solution in the Sense in which it was propos'd, which often happens in general Questions, and the occasion of which is not sufficiently known : Thus we can only ghes at the Places in old Authors, which cannot be solv'd but by the Series of the Context.

5. When we have render'd the Terms in which any Question is conceiv'd as plain and clear to us as we can, we must apply our Attention to the Consideration of the Conditions, if there be any in it. If we understand not them, the Question remains obscure ; for they often shew us the way to solve the Question. If there be none express'd or understood, then is the Question general, in which we must observe those Things which we have already deliver'd on that Head : But if the Conditions are not express'd, but understood, tho' necessary, it can never be solv'd, if we have not the Opportunity of asking the Proposer of it what they are. If the Conditions added to the Question be superfluous and of no Use, they must be distinguish'd from those which are necessary ; for without this, we often run after things of no Moment, and leave those which are of Importance and Necessary, without any Notice.

6. This Question may be propos'd—to find out two Numbers, one of which design'd by the Letter A, shall be two Unites greater than another design'd by the Letter B ; so that taking a Unite from B, and adding it to A, A shall be doubled. The Con-

Condition of this Question is conceiv'd in the Words *so that* &c. those therefore must have our Attention, because without them the Question is not understood. For the Question is not simply, how a Number may be found out greater by two Unites than another, but such Numbers in which that occurs which is in the Condition, which are 7 and 5.

7. The necessary Condition wou'd be omitted in this Question, *Whether a Man, by putting his Finger in his Ear, cou'd be render'd so immoveable, as not to be able to walk till his Finger be taken out of his Ear?* A Question propos'd in these Words wou'd be deny'd, because the putting the Finger in the Ear cannot render any one immoveable. But this difficulty is remov'd by adding, *That the Man shall be so plac'd, that his Arm shall embrace a solid fixt Pillar, when he puts a Finger of that Arm into his Ear.*

8. Farther, sometimes there are idle Conditions annex'd to the Question propos'd, which conduce nothing at all to the Matter; as if we shou'd propose, *To make a Man, anointed with sweet Oil, and crown'd with a Garland, not able to lie still, tho' he see not any thing that can move him.* Shou'd any one stop at, and consider the meaning of this part, which says, *anointed with sweet Oil, and crown'd with a Garland,* he wou'd spend his Pains to no purpose, since those Words have nothing to do with the Matter: But this is done by putting a Man into a Ship driven on by the Winds; or if he fall from a Tower, or any other high place; for he will of necessity be mov'd, tho' he see not what it is that gives that Motion, since he is driven on by a Matter that do's not fall under the Sense of Seeing.

9. Nor is this only to be regarded in such Questions as are only feign'd for the Exercise of the Mind, for the like Cases occur in Things drawn from the Critical Art, and from Natural Philosophy, and all other Parts of Learning. Thus if we examine, what any particular Word does signify generally consider'd? The Answer, tho' true, is very rarely of any Consequence to the Solution of the particular Question of, what that Word does signify in any one certain place. If, therefore, any one desires to know the later, he ought not to propose the Question in general Terms, but to repeat the Place in which the Sense of that Word, which is sought, occurs; for Words often vary their Sense by their Situation to another, which when they stand alone, they do not signify.

C H A P. VII.

*The Explanation of the second and third Rules
of the Method of Resolution.*

1. **A**LL Questions may be refer'd to two Kinds, or Sorts ; that is, Simple or Compounded. All that is necessarily requir'd to the Solution of the first, is a diligent comparison of the Ideas of which they are compos'd. Thus when 'tis said, that a Circle has this Property, that all the Lines that are drawn from its Centre to its Circumference, are equal: If any one doubt of the Matter of Fact, and wou'd enquire into the Truth or Falshood of that Maxim, he need only compare the Idea of a Circle, with the Idea of this Property.

2. But Compounded Questions cannot be solv'd without comparing the Ideas of which 'tis compos'd, with some third Idea, or many Ideas ; for no Man can find out the unknown Relations, which are the Subject of his Enquiry, by an immediate Comparison of the Ideas of the Question propos'd. There is, therefore, a Necessity of finding out some third Idea, or more, with which the Terms of the Question must be compar'd ; but these Ideas ought to be clear and perspicuous, at least, as to their Relation by which they are compar'd with others. And hence is drawn the second Rule of the Method of *Resolution*.

3. Examples will make this Matter more plain. If this Question was propos'd, *Whether a Thief ought to suffer Death?* Since the Idea of a *Thief* cannot be immediately compar'd with the last Punishment, no Natural Connexion being between those two Ideas ; so that the Idea of a *Thief* shou'd necessarily excite the Idea of that capital Punishment : We can't solve that Question without the Intervention of some third Idea, with which both the others shou'd be compar'd, and that is of *Vindictive Justice*, or the *Knowledge of the Law*. And when we have made this Comparison, we shall say, 'tis Justice, for the good of the Commonwealth, that the Thief be put to Death, or undergo some milder Punishment.

4. If again we put the Question, *Whether a Boy of fifteen, being guilty of Theft, shou'd be put to Death?* The former Question is contain'd in this ; for we must first enquire, whether

ther any Thief deserve Death, before we see whether such a Thief shou'd suffer in that manner. For unless the first Question be solv'd, the later never can. But having found by the Laws, that a Thief at Man's Estate, by the Law, is to be put to Death, we must farther enquire, whether a Thief of fifteen be liable to the same Punishment. Here therefore, wou'd be another Comparison, not of the Bond with the Punishment, but of the Punishment that is to be inflicted, with Justice, or the Law.

5. There may, in this very same Question, occur several other Ideas, which must be compar'd, because the Benefit of the Commonwealth is not a simple Thing; but here, for the sake of Instruction, we make the Idea of Justice a simple Idea, and of the highest Clearness and Perspicuity. We farther suppose, that there is no Enquiry into the Circumstances of the Fact, which yet most commonly come into the Consideration of the Thing.

6. But if the Question was, *What Punishment shou'd be inflicted on Peter, who, without the Award of Law, had by force taken away what he pretends is his due?* Then, at first hearing, very many Things offer themselves to our Consideration. (1.) We must nicely examine, whether he were really the Creditor or not, of him from whom he had taken this Thing, in which Enquiry his Affirmation is to be compar'd with the Bond, Writing, or other Instrument, if there be any, or with the Affidavit, or Oath, or Witnesses, &c. (2.) Next, we must examine, whether the Sum he lent be as great as he pretends, which is by comparing his Oath with the Words of the Deed, or Instrument, or of the Witnesses, &c. (3.) We must enquire, whether he took it away, or not. (4.) Whether by Force, where we must hear Witnesses, whose Evidence must be compar'd with manifold Ideas to make out the Truth. (5.) We must examine, whether the Laws condemn all manner of Force on such an Occasion, where we must compare the Fact with the Words of the Law. (6.) What Punishment the Laws inflict on that Force, which we here suppose to have been us'd, without the Intervention of the Sentence of the Judge. Before, therefore, we can solve this Question, *What Punishment Peter must undergo?* We must in many ways compare the middle Ideas with the Terms of the Question.

7. But if in this Comparison we take in Ideas that are not very clear, there is the greatest Danger imaginable of Error, of which if any one slip in, all the following Propositions,

sitions are either false, or nothing to the purpose, and the Conclusion must be absolutely false.

8. The third Rule is, *To throw away every thing, from the Question to be consider'd, which doth not necessarily belong to the Truth that is sought after.* This Rule is of manifest Advantage and Use; because, whoever does not observe it, either wanders wide of the Matter, and finds not what he seeks, or forms his Judgment by Foreign Ideas, and gives his Mind a profitless Fatigue. Thus, in the former Question, if we shou'd enquire, whether *Peter* were a Denizen or Foreigner, or what are the Laws of other Countries; on that Head or the like, 'tis plain, there cou'd nothing be drawn thence to the solution of the Question.

9. We make use of this Caution in Questions that are conceiv'd in many Words, either by the Ignorance or Design of him who proposes them, to make them the more intricate; or those which are taken out of any Writing, which the Writer never design'd to propose with Clearness and Perspicuity.

C H A P. VIII.

An Explanation of the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh Rules of the Method of Resolution.

1. **W**HEN we have taken away from the Question propos'd all that did not, or appear'd not necessarily to belong to the Thing enquir'd after, if it yet remains compounded so far as to fall under two or more Heads, since we cannot with Attention examine several Things at once, by the fourth Rule we are oblig'd (1.) *To divide the Question into its several Heads.* (2.) *To examine those Heads separately, in such a manner, as to begin with those which consist of the more simple Ideas;* (3.) *and never to proceed to those Heads which are more compounded, till we have by our Consideration made them more simple, perspicuous, and easie to our selves.*

2. The necessity of this Rule is manifest in the solution of compounded Questions; for, first, if we confound their several Heads, we can never have distinct Ideas of them; for Distinction and Confusion are inconsistent. By that means we can never compare the Ideas with each other, as they ought to be compar'd to find out the Truth; which if we shou'd otherwise hit on, it wou'd be more the Effect of Chance, than our Skill or Understanding.

3. We sometimes give the same Judgment of several Ideas, tho', generally speaking, the same Judgments will not agree to several. But if we form a Judgment of various Things

Things mixt together, without considering each singly, we give a general Judgment of different Things which is seldom free from Error in some thing or other. We may discover that an Author has neglected this Rule, when, upon a diligent perusal of his Works, we cannot (tho' the Argument he writes on be not unknown to us) reduce what he says to certain Heads: And this we may find in several of the Ancient as well as Modern Writers; who for that Reason are not read without difficulty and pain.

4. The same Inconveniences arise from the neglect of the second and third Cautions of this our fourth Rule. Having said something of this in the fifth *Chapter*, we shall only add here, that when we are grown familiar and acquainted with the more simple Principles of the Question propos'd, so far as to have them distinctly in our Minds, we never, in the least Consequences drawn from them, affirm any thing contrary to them. On the contrary, when we take but a transient View of the more simple, and pass on so swiftly to the more compounded, we surely forget them, and the last prove often contradictory to the first.

5. The fifth, sixth, and seventh Rules seldom come into Use in any Art but *Algebra*, Examples taken from whence wou'd soon and clearly declare their Use: But they being too difficult for those who are unacquainted with them, and because we are of Opinion that the same Rules can beneficially be adapted to other Arts, we shall draw our Examples elsewhere.

6. When we go about the solution of any propos'd Question, and to set down in Writing what seems to us, may be answer'd to it, it will be of the greatest use imaginable to write the Heads of the Question down in the fewest Words that may be, especially if they are many, lest while we consider of one, the rest, as it often happens by the multiplicity of the Questions, slip out of our Mind. By this means even a happy Memory, which with difficulty retains many Heads, wou'd find a great Assistance; and the Mind unincumber'd with other Things, with less Pain attends the Consideration of Particulars. 'Tis very seldom that all the Parts of a compounded and difficult Question, which must be consider'd, offer themselves together, and at once. Most commonly we must consider some time before we discover all, and then if we write not all that down which we have first found out, while we seek others, that slips out of our Memory. But because it wou'd be very troublesome to write down many things, therefore the various Relations which are to be consider'd, may be express'd by some certain Words.

7. Hence arise two Advantages which are not by any means to be despis'd. The first is, that before we write down more fully what we have found out on any Question, either by Consideration, or that help'd by Reading, by this Art we easily conceive the Order of the things to be written, and change it with equal Ease, if perchance we find any thing amiss in it: The other is, that both the Order and Parts of our Treatise is so fixt in our Memory, by reading over sometimes what we have written, that when we come afterwards to set down our whole Dissertation, we do not depart from that Order, nor omit any thing which is worthy of our Consideration. Other wise, by having too great a Confidence in our Memory we sit down to write with our Order and Heads of our Discourse only in our Mind, many things which occur to us while we are writing, like those which we have thought, insensibly divert us from the right Track which we design'd to pursue, and make us omit what we shou'd have discours'd of, and meddle with those things which have nothing to do in the Question before us.

8. When we have, according to the fifth Rule, express'd the Order we have conceiv'd with certain Marks and Signs, then, according to the sixth Rule, we diligently consider every Proposition that is to be examin'd. There are never more than two Terms of one Proposition to be compar'd, before we find what Relation is, or is not, between them. This thus found out, shou'd in few Words be written down, that the Memory be unburthen'd of it, that we may without any Pains read over our Traces, and see what we have found out, and what is the Connection of our Arguments.

9. When we have written down all the Propositions that were to be examin'd, and have not, however, found out what we sought; the seventh Rule ordains, that we with greater Application peruse what we have written, and cut off whatever we find of no Use to the solution of the Question; and commands us then to examine any thing that may seem of Use, according to the former Method: For we often, on the first View, imagine several Things to be plainly necessary to the solution of the Question, especially in those which are intricate, which afterwards we find on our Experiments, by an accurate comparing of the Ideas, to be of no manner of Use; and on the contrary, that some things, which at first seem'd of no Importance to the Question, on a repeating the Examination, to be of that Use, as to open the Way to our discovery of Truth. And this every one will better know by Experience, than by any Examples brought from others.

10. Lastly, If on a frequent Repetition we can discover no way of solving the Question propos'd, we ought to dash it out with our Pens, as beyond our Power. Or, if in our Enquiries we have discover'd, that there are no Ideas in it by which it can be solv'd, we ought to shew, that it is insolvable in its Nature, that no body throw away their Time any more about it.

11. Perhaps some may object to this Method, that it is difficult: But then they must reflect that there is no easier, and that all these Rules are not made use of in Truths more easy to be discover'd, but only in those which are more difficult and intricate. But it is much more difficult without this Method to find out the Truth, and to know it when discover'd, than to use this Method, and gather the Certainty of our Discoveries.

C H A P. IX.

The Rules of the Method of Composition.

1. **W**E hope 'tis plain from the Comparison we made between the Methods of *Resolution* and *Composition*, in the first Chapter of this Part, what we mean by *Composition*. That is, that after we have found out the Principles of any Truth, or whole Art or Discipline, we must seek some Order, by which the Connection of its Parts may be easily understood, and the Thing it self so prov'd, that having granted the Beginning, you must of necessary consequence grant also all that follows.

2. There has been no better Way found out than, that the general Principles be first propos'd, and if Necessity require, to be prov'd, and that their Consequences be so dispos'd, that those which follow, seem to flow as much as possibly they can from those which went before. Besides the gaining by this means the Order and Force of a Demonstration, we avoid a great Inconvenience in teaching or conveying any Knowledge, which is the Necessity of Repetition: For if we shou'd begin from Particulars to come at last to the Generals, we must be forc'd to repeat what we know of its general, when we speak of every particular, because without the Knowledge of the *General*, you can never have a certain Knowledge of the *Particular*.

3. But we must here put you in Mind, that this Method can only be preserv'd in those Things whose Principles we perfectly know; as for Example, *Geometry*, which is wholly employ'd in the Consideration of abstract *Modes*, of which our Mind has clear and adequate Ideas; but when the Enquiry

quiry is into *Substances*, as in Natural Philosophy, we cannot make use of the Method of *Composition*, because the Kinds of *Substances* are not known to us, nor can we find out their inmost Essences.

4. This Method of *Composition* has been by none so justly and accurately observ'd hitherto, as by the *Mathematicians*, whose Principles are perfectly known; we can therefore draw its Rules from none better, than from the Teachers of *Geometry*.

5. Since they design'd to propose nothing that cou'd be contradicted, they thought they cou'd obtain this chiefly by three Ways. (1.) By offering nothing but what was couched in Words or Terms perfectly understood, and for this Reason they always carefully define the Words they make use of; of which we have spoken in the *Second Part*. (2.) By building only on *evident and clear Principles*, so that they cou'd not be controverted by any one who understood them. They, therefore, first of all propound their *Maxims* or *Axioms*, which they demand to be granted them, as being self-evident, and in need of no Proof. (3.) By *proving demonstratively* all their Consequences, and for this Reason they only make use of in their Arguments or Proofs of *Definitions*, *Axioms* that have been granted, and *Propositions* which they have already prov'd, which are Principles to those Things that come last.

6. To these three Heads may be referr'd all the Observations of the *Geometricians*, in the Demonstration of those Truths which they have discover'd.

7. These are the Laws or Rules of Definitions: (1.) *Never to use any Word doubtful, or the least obscure, without a Definition*. (2.) *To make use of no Words but such as are of a very known Signification, or such as have been already explain'd*.

8. The Rule of their *Maxims* or *Axioms*, is, *To allow nothing for a Maxim or Axiom, but what is most evident*.

9. These are the Laws or Rules of their Demonstrations. (1.) *To prove all Propositions that have the least Obscurity, and to admit nothing to the Demonstrations of them but constituted Definitions, granted Axioms, Propositions already prov'd, or the Construction of the Figure which is under Consideration, when any such thing happens to be done*. (2.) *Never to abuse the Ambiguity of a Word, by not affixing those Definitions by which they are explain'd*.

10. These are Rules which the *Geometricians* have thought necessary to be observ'd, to give those Truths which they design'd to prove, the last and greatest Evidence.

C H A P. X.

*The Explanation of the Rules of Definition*MVSEVM
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1. **W**E have already discours'd of the Definition of Names, but it being a thing of no small Consequence, and without which the *Geometrical* Method cannot be understood, we shall add some few things on the same Subject, avoiding as much as possible a Repetition of what we have said.

2. The first Rule forbids us *admitting any Word that is the least obscure without a Definition*. The Necessity of this Rule is built on this Foundation: I. *That to prove any thing with Evidence, there is a necessity that what we say be perfectly understood*. For how can that Demonstration be evident, which we do not fully understand? But there are a great many Words which cannot be perfectly understood, unless they are defin'd, since the Use of the Tongue from whence they are taken, have not fixt any certain and determinate Sense upon them, and so leaves them obscure; as we may find in studying the Art of Criticism. But when Words of this Nature are made use of in the delivering, especially the Principles of Arts or Sciences, we understand neither the Principles themselves, nor the Consequences drawn from them, nor the Order of the Argumentation, or the Connection of the Propositions; whence it follows, that we cannot certainly conclude, whether what is said be true or false.

3. II. The Definitions of Words has this Effect on our selves, that it makes us more constant and consistent with our selves, by giving always the same Sense to the same Word. For when we have not a distinct Notion of that Signification which we have at first given to a Word, we are apt, by Inadvertence, to recede from it, especially in long Disputes, and when the Discourse is of things of different Kinds; for on these Occasions we our selves are not sufficiently conscious of what we mean, and of the Order of our Argumentation, much less can another understand us. But if we define our Terms or Words, their Signification makes a deeper Impression on our Minds, and by that we are the more easily brought into the right Path, if in our Discourse we have by Accident stray'd from it.

4. The second Rule of Definitions forbids us *to make use of any Words in them, whose Signification is not distinctly known;*

or already explain'd. The Reason of this is plain ; for how can that which is obscure be explain'd by what is obscure ?

5. But to avoid too great a multiplicity of Definitions, we must never make use of obscure Words but when you cannot find any others ; else we shall be oblig'd to make Definitions of Definitions.

C H A P. XI.

An Explanation of the Rules of Maxims, or Axioms.

1. **T**Here are some Propositions of so great Perspicuity and Evidence, and so universally known, that as soon as we hear the Words that express it, we perfectly know and allow their Truth, as, *That Nothing cannot produce Something. No Cause can give what it has not it self.* These, and others of the same Nature, have no need of Demonstration, because no Demonstration can be more evident than they are. And whatever has not this Evidence, is not to be admitted as a Maxim.

2. But we must be cautious of believing, that there is nothing clear and evident, but that which has never been deny'd, because there are several that have been of old deny'd by the violence of some of the ancient Sects, especially the *Pyrrhonians* and *Academics*, which are now beyond Controversie. For, shou'd the majority of Mankind conspire to deny that *One* is less than *Two*, no Man in his Senses can deny that Truth.

3. There are two Rules of Maxims or Axioms, which contain all that belongs to this Matter. The first is, *Whenever we plainly and evidently see that any Attribute agrees with any Subject, as we see that of the Whole being bigger, than its Part, we have not need of any long Consideration of the Attribute and Subject, for the Mind to discover that the Idea of the Attribute has a Connection with the Idea of the Subject ; we may well, therefore, give the Name of a Maxim to such a Proposition.* But this may be put into fewer Words. *Whatever Proposition expresses the immediate clear Comparison of two Ideas, without the help of the third, is an Axiom.*

4. The other Rule, opposite to the former, is thus express'd. *When the bare Consideration of the Ideas of the Subject and the Attribute are not sufficient to discover the Agreement of the Attribute to the Subject, such a Proposition is not to be admitted as an Axiom, but must be demonstrated by the help of other Ideas.* In fewer Words, thus : *Every Proposition, the Proof of which requires some third Idea, besides the Attribute and the*
Sub-

Subject, is not an Axiom. Or shorter yet : A Truth which does not arise from an immediate Comparison of two Ideas, is no Axiom.

C H A P. XII.

An Explanation of the Rules of Demonstration.

1. **T**Here are two things requir'd in a right *Demonstration*; first, that every Proposition of which it consists, consider'd separately, be true; the second, that the Consequences drawn from other foregoing things, necessarily flow from them; or that all the Consequences be contain'd in the Antecedents, or Premises; both which will be certainly gain'd, by following strictly the two Laws deliver'd in the 9th Chap.

2. All the Propositions will be true, if none are admitted except *Definitions* which can be call'd in question; or *Maxims* or *Axioms*, which must always be evident; or Propositions already demonstrated, which by *Demonstration* are freed from all Doubts, or the Construction of Figures, if we make use of any. If therefore we reduce the former Rule to Practice, all the Propositions of which we make use, will be free from any manner of Doubt, since we can by that Rule make use of only those things which we have reckon'd up.

3. The Consequences likewise will be truly drawn, if we sin not against the *second Rule*, which orders us to avoid all manner of Ambiguity in our Words: For no Man in his Wits can believe falsely, that any Proposition follows from another, or is contain'd in another, if he have a perfect Knowledge of both: Almost all the false Consequences that are made, depend on Words ill understood; those that are not so, are so evident and obvious, that no Man of a sound Head can fall into them.

4. To avoid some Errors, we must remember, I. *Not to prove a thing to be true, without giving the Reason of that Truth.* II. *Not to prove that which does not need a Proof.* III. *Not to argue from Impossibility.* IV. *Not demonstrate by Reasons too far fetch'd.*

The Fourth Part of LOGIC.

Of the Socratic Method of Disputing.

1. **S**ince 'tis certain, that the Aim of every honest Man is to find out the Truth, and to convey the Truth thus found out to others; and not to make a vain show of his own, and expose the slowness of Apprehension of another: It follows, that the Art of Squabbling, which has

so long obtain'd in the Schools, and which only Mr. *Lock* condemns under the Name of *Logic*, and which has nothing in it but an empty Ostentation of Wit, is absolutely unworthy of a Man of Wisdom. But since Truth cannot be distinctly known or prov'd without Art, it is necessary to do this rightly, that we apply our selves to the study of this Art. 'Tis often, likewise, necessary to silence the *Sophisters*, who boast their Knowledge of that, of which they are really ignorant, to make use of a great deal of Diligence, that by making them see their Ignorance, they may be better inform'd.

2. *Greece*, which always was pester'd with abundance of these *Sophists*, was never more plagu'd with them than about the Time of *Socrates*, when Philosophy began to find a more than usual Cultivation. This great Man, form'd by Nature for the confounding the Pride of this sort of Men, has shewn us a Way, by which we may attain the same End against them in our Times, if they happen to fall in our Way: And tho' this Way ought to have been pursu'd by former Ages, yet has it been entirely neglected; perhaps because this Pride of seeming to know more than we really do, had got the Ascendant of the Followers of *Socrates* themselves, which made them take to the subtle Arts of the *Sophists*, and reject the most admirable Method of a Man of that consummate Wisdom.

3. But we design to revive with some Short Explanations this Method, both in consideration of the Reason we have given, and also because it is most agreeable to that Candour and Sincerity which every honest Man ought to profess. 'Tis true, this Method requires a Genius, and Acuteness of Wit; but without these Qualities, the Mind cannot in any other Art be provided for extempore Disputes.

4. The first Rule of this Method orders the Man who is to make use of it, *To Conduct himself in such a manner, as if he desir'd to learn something of him with whom he argues.* And indeed, every one of us ought to have a Disposition to hear and allow the Truth, let it come from what Hand soever. Nor ought any Man to think so well of himself, as to imagine he cannot be inform'd by another, or at least be excited to think of a Thing of which perhaps he thought not before. But besides that, every Man owes this Duty to himself, such a Disposition of Mind, which appears in the Countenance and Words, is most adapted to create in the Minds of those who hear us, an Opinion of our Modesty, which goes a great and sure Way to persuade them.

5. Secondly, Before we proceed to any Objections, *We ought, if the Person with whom we argue, makes use of any obscure or doubtful Words, to ask him to explain what he means by them:* For it often happens, that Men have us'd themselves to some Words which they do not perfectly understand themselves; and then they will, by such modest Questions, discover their Ignorance much better, than by a direct Opposition, which often raises the Passions. If the Person happen to be a Man of Sincerity, and Lover of Truth, he will own, that he did not sufficiently understand the Matter, and then the Dispute is at an end. But if we meet with a pertinacious and obstinate Person, who will obtrude his Words upon us without defining them, we ought to proceed no farther in the Dispute, till he has made plain what it is he means. We ought to press him with little Questions, not as the effect of his want of Skill in Arguing, but our dullness of Apprehension of what he understands and delivers in his Speech. In the mean while, we must not admit any one thing that is obscure, tho' it stir up his Anger; which yet may be done by a happy Address, of telling him, that we are ready to yield to Truth, but that we first ought to know it; since no Man in his Senses can give his Assent to a Proposition which he does not understand. But if we can by no means prevail with him to speak

Speak plainly, we must put an End to the Dispute; for thence 'tis evident that he knows not what he wou'd be at. By this means, those that hear us will discover the Man's Vanity who talks of things which he does not understand, and many Times leaves a Sting in the Mind of a Man otherwise too pertinacious.

6. Thirdly, If we bring him at last to speak plainly and clearly what he means, *We must ask him Questions on the Particulars of all the Parts of the Doctrine he advances, and their Consequences; not as reproving them, but for a fuller and more clear Information of the Matter; so that he shou'd appear the Instructor, and we the Learners.* The Absurdity of the Doctrine will appear from these Questions, if it labour with any, much better than by an open Opposition, provided it be done with Dexterity, and the Questions pretty numerous, and be oblig'd several Times to repeat the same thing, lest he shou'd afterward deny that he had said so. Here, that the Explanation may be the more ample, it wou'd not be amiss to make use of Examples and Similitudes, and ask him, whether he means this, or that? The more copious we are in this Particular, the more evident will the Falsity of the Opinion appear.

7. The perspicuous Exposition of any Doctrine, with its Consequences, if it be not true, shows generally its Absurdity: But if this be not sufficient, then we must ask him, *on what Arguments or Proofs he builds his Opinion*; and we must use the same Conduct in regard of the Arguments as to the other Parts. We are to enquire of him with whom we dispute, as if we were by him to be inform'd of a Point of which we are ignorant; but we must not allow him the least Obscurity. In short, we must hear the whole Series of his Argumentation in such a manner, that there remain no Difficulty either in understanding his Doctrine, or the Foundation on which it is built.

8. When we have done this with diligence, the Person who proposes his Doctrine, must plainly see its Falsity, or on what Proofs it depends. If Passion blind his Eyes, yet the Hearers will excuse any farther Dispute with a Man who is Angry; that we receive not his Opinion, tho' labouring with Absurdity.

9. We shall give one Example of this Method on a Modern Controversy, by which it will be better explain'd, betwixt a *Thomist* and another, disputing upon the Efficacy of the Divine Providence.

10. A. *I wonder you are so obstinate, as to deny that God has an Efficacious Operation in the Sins of Men, which the Scriptures in many places so openly and plainly testify.*

B. I only deny'd that I understood how this is done. Perhaps my Dulness makes that a Difficulty to me, which is obvious to another. But I wou'd willingly be inform'd by you, because I can neither believe, nor condemn what I do not understand; what, therefore, do you mean by an *Efficacious Operation in the Sins of Men*? do you mean that he makes them Sin?

A. Far be it from me, for so God wou'd be the Author of Sin. 'Tis Man commits Sin, not God.

B. Do you mean, that God makes Men to commit Sin, or forces Men to commit Sin?

A. I wou'd not have express'd this in so rude a manner; but God, in a dark and unknown manner, so permits Sin, that it must necessarily be committed.

B. You us'd before the Word *Operation*, now you use *Permit*; pray, do they mean the same thing?

A. These Words do not absolutely mean the same thing, but they must be join'd together, so that what God does shou'd be call'd an efficacious Permission; for God neither makes Sin, nor does he simply permit it.

B. You,

B. You, therefore, mean that God permits something, and does something, so that Sin necessarily follows?

A. *That is what I mean.*

B. Perhaps then God does in this, what he does who cutting down the Dykes, lets the Waters in to overflow the Fields. For he does something in breaking the Dyke, and he permits something in suffering the Sea to pass through the Breach.

A. *My Mind cou'd not have been express'd by a more happy Similitude.*

B. But, according to our common way of Speaking, we shou'd say, that he who made a Breach in the Dyke, had let in the Waters; nor wou'd any one accuse the Dyke or the Sea of any manner of Fault; but you, if I mistake you not, accuse Man of the Fault, and say Man, not God, committed the Sin. Wherefore, your efficacious Permission seems unintelligible to me.

A. *Do you not observe, that as to the Things themselves, there is a vast difference between them? For Men are endow'd with Understanding and Will, which the Dyke and the Sea have not; and for that Reason, that is a Crime in the Man, which is not so in the Sea and the Dyke.*

B. But I ask of you, whether that which God does or permits, has that Efficacy (for that Word you have likewise us'd) that Men can no more not Sin when that has order'd it, than the Sea not overflow the Fields through the Breach which affords a free Passage?

A. *You have my Meaning?*

B. According therefore to you, there is the same Relation in that Sense between God and Sin, as there is between the Man who made a Breach in the Dyke, and the Destruction of the Fields.

A. *There is, as to the Event, for both are equally necessary.*

B. The Action therefore of both, according to the Custom of Speech, may be express'd in the same manner: That is, — as he who broke down the Dyke is call'd the Cause of the Loss of the Fields, because he did that which necessarily produc'd that Loss; so God is the Author of Sin, since he has put Man under a necessity of Sinning.

A. *I told you before, that I will not make use of those rude Expressions.*

B. But either I do not understand what you say, or it comes to that Point; for we must not regard the empty sounds of Words which signify nothing, but mind the Ideas to which they are annex'd.

A. *What, you'l prescribe Rules to me of Speaking; as if I did not know how to hold a Discourse.*

11. If the Dialogue once comes to this, there must be an end of it; and hence it will appear, that he (design'd by the Letter A) either knows not what he means, or else has a greater regard to Words than Things. That Opinion is look'd on as sufficiently confuted, which its Defender is oblig'd to express in clear and intelligible Words. Having in the former Dialogue sufficiently explain'd the first and second Rule, to explain the third, we shall suppose the same Dispute again.

12. A. *You sufficiently understand, that my Opinion is, that God has to do with Evil; that he is not a meer bare Spectator, but is so far an Agent, that on his acting Man commits Sin.*

B. If God did nothing before the Sin, wou'd not the Sin be committed?

A. *No, for nothing is done without the Efficacy of the Divine Providence.*

B. What? do you believe that Man alone cannot violate Laws?

A. *That he can, I deny, when I deny, that any thing can be done without the Efficacy of the Divine Providence.*

B. God, therefore, helps us to do wickedly in the same manner, as he helps us to do well?

A. *You mistake, for in Evil we must distinguish the Action, and the Villousness of the Action. God helps us to the doing the Action, but not to the Vice.*

Vice. *But in good Actions he helps us to the Good that is in the Actions.*

B. I beg you, inform me, what you mean by the Words *an Action*, and what by the *Viciousness* of an *Action*?

A. *I will make it plain to you by this Example : In the hatred of our Neighbour, there is the Action of the Hatred, which in itself is indifferent and is only call'd bad, when directed to an unlawful Object, and good when to a lawful. Next, there is the Relation of that Action to the Object, which is Evil. God does not concur to this Relation, tho' there is a necessity his concurring to the Action, without which it cou'd not be done.*

B. By what you have said, I suppose you mean, that God first generates in the Mind of Man, Hatred in general; which is in it self neither Good nor Evil: Then there comes another Relation of the Hatred to the Object as in the Example to our Neighbour. Do I understand you?

A. *Partly you do, but not entirely; for I do not think there is any such Existence as Hatred in general, which shou'd afterwards be determin'd to a certain Object; this is contrary to Experience.*

B. Does God then create that very Hatred that is directed against our Neighbour?

A. *Most certainly the Hatred, but not the Relation.*

B. But does that Hatred exist without that Relation?

A. *Not at all; for the very moment that it is created in our Minds 'tis the Hatred of our Neighbour.*

B. According, therefore, to you, God creates such an Hatred which exists in such a manner with a vicious Relation, that it cannot be separated or distinguish'd from it but by Abstraction.

A. *He does so.*

B. Can this Hatred, thus generated in the Mind of Man, be by the Mind directed to a lawful Object, as *Vice*, for Example?

A. *It cannot; for the Action of God being past, the certain Event must necessarily follow.*

B. I beseech you, Sir, if a Man shou'd put a Burthen on anothers Shoulder, which he that bore it cou'd not afterwards throw off, and by that means he shou'd break his Ribbs, wou'd not he that put on such a Burthen be look'd on as the breaker of his Ribbs, if he had known the Event of his Action?

A. *Most certainly.*

B. Shou'd a Man push another, walking by a River-side, into the Water, who shou'd there be drown'd, shou'd we not say that he who thrust him in drown'd him?

A. *Certainly.*

B. Yet there are, some Men who wou'd say, that you are in an Error in this particular; that the *imposing*, and the *thrusting* was produc'd by both but not the breaking the Ribbs, and the drowning, as God generates the Hatred which is directed against our Neighbour without that evil Relation.

A. *'Tis indeed, most evident, that the Men instant'd, were guilty of the Fracture and the Drowning; but the matter is otherwise with God; who is not oblig'd to give an account to poor miserable Men of his Administration.*

B. But if he did what you wou'd wickedly persuade us, either all Sinners must be acquitted of any Crime, or God himself who compels the Sins, condemn'd.

A. *Don't you know, that God's Ways are not our Ways, nor his Thoughts ours? Shall the Pot complain, that it was not made in such and such a manner?*

13. Hence it is evident to all that hear it, that the *Thomist* (noted by the *Let. A*) either knows not what he means, or makes God the Author of Sin.